论平均奖的经济性质
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摘要
在我国的社会现代化建设进程中,经济建设过于注重效率,而忽视公平对社会发展的重要性,导致我国出现了收入差距恶化,劳动者报酬比例过低并逐年下降的局面。为应对这一现状,关于收入分配制度改革的理论大量涌现,企图解决收入分配的不和谐现象,实现公平分配。
平均奖的研究在这一历史背景下相应而生。首先,平均奖在国内外的企业组织中是现实存在的,其表现形式也是多样化的。本文以国内的湘潭钢铁集团,南斯拉夫的劳动管理型企业以及日本的企业制度为例,论证了平均奖的现实存在性,并归纳出平均奖的主要表现形式。需要明确的是平均奖不是平均主义,它与平均主义的分配方式有着根本的区别。从经济学性质角度出发,平均奖是一种建立在劳动者联合体产权制度基础上的,对同质劳动者相互合作所创造的剩余的分配方式,同时它也是一种团队激励方式。平均奖经济性质的理论解释可以归结为平均奖的来源、本质、决定因素以及激励效应几个方面,以平均奖的来源为研究起点使得平均奖的产生有着生产力方面的基础。企业分工协作所创造的总收益在支付了所有成员的参与约束之后的剩余为合作剩余,这构成了平均奖的初始源泉。平均奖本质上是同质劳动者之间相互合作所创造的那部分合作剩余。根据马克思的产权决定分配理论,劳动者联合体产权制度决定了同质劳动者创造的合作剩余必然采取平均的方式进行分配。平均奖是对劳动者合作劳动的报酬,同时也是一种团队激励方式。平均奖的激励效应主要体现在对企业员工的合作程度、个人激励效应以及企业整体激励效应和企业与员工之间建立稳定的信任关系的促进作用上。为对平均奖进行具体的模型解释,本文把平均奖置于联合产权制度的框架之下,通过对联合产权制度下的要素联合体产权主体和劳动者联合体产权主体之间的合作博弈分析,得到可分配合作剩余中劳动者联合体产权在组织均衡时应得的份额,该部分剩余在劳动者联合体内部的分配方式就是平均奖。
In China's modernization process of the community, the efficiency of economic development was given too many attentions, while the importance of fairness to social development was neglected. So, this situation leaded to a deterioration of the income gap, the too low proportion of workers’remuneration and an annual decline of the proportion. To deal with this situation, on the income distribution system reform, a large number of theories appeared and attempted to resolve the disharmony of the income distribution and achieve fair distribution.
Study in the average award was proposed in the historical background consequentially. First of all, the average award is existed realistically in Chinese and foreign business organizations, and its form of performance are also diversified. In this paper, the editor take the Xiangtan Iron & Steel Group Co., Ltd in the domestic and the Yugoslav labor-managed enterprises and the enterprise system in Japan as examples to demonstrate the reality of existence of the average award, and sum up the main forms of performance of the average award. What needed to be clear is that the average award is not equalitarianism, while the average award and equalitarianism are different in Natures. On the economic nature of the average award, the Article definite that the average award are a distribution approach of the cooperative remaining that created by the homogeneous workers, the distribution approach is based on the system of the property rights of the commonwealth workers; it also is a way of team incentives. The analysis to the economic nature of the average award can be attributed to several aspects, including the sources of the average award, the nature, the determinants and its incentive effects and so on. The source of the average award was made as the starting point of studying, which made the generation of the average award have a foundation of productivity. After the total income created by collaboration and division in enterprise are paid to all members’participation constraints, the remaining are cooperative remaining, which constitute the initial source of the average award. In essentially, the average award are the cooperative remaining that created by mutual cooperation between Homogeneous workers. According to the Marx's theory of the property rights deciding the distribution, the commonwealth property rights of workers decide the distribution of the cooperative remaining that created by the homogeneous workers is bound to take the average form. The average awards are to reward the labor of workers co-operation, but also an team incentive approach. The incentive effects of the average award are mainly reflected in the promotion of the level of cooperation between employees, the individual incentive effects, as well as their overall incentive effects and establishing a stable trust relationship between enterprises and employees. To explain the average award by the specific model, the average awards were put into the framework of the joint property rights system. The Article calculated the share in the co-operation remaining that can be allocated when Balanced being attained throng analyzing the cooperative game between the property rights of the commonwealth elements of and he property rights of the commonwealth workers under the joint property rights system, this share is belong to the property rights of the commonwealth workers. The share is distributed in the property rights of the commonwealth workers; the share attained by everyone in the property rights is the average award.
平均奖的研究在这一历史背景下相应而生。首先,平均奖在国内外的企业组织中是现实存在的,其表现形式也是多样化的。本文以国内的湘潭钢铁集团,南斯拉夫的劳动管理型企业以及日本的企业制度为例,论证了平均奖的现实存在性,并归纳出平均奖的主要表现形式。需要明确的是平均奖不是平均主义,它与平均主义的分配方式有着根本的区别。从经济学性质角度出发,平均奖是一种建立在劳动者联合体产权制度基础上的,对同质劳动者相互合作所创造的剩余的分配方式,同时它也是一种团队激励方式。平均奖经济性质的理论解释可以归结为平均奖的来源、本质、决定因素以及激励效应几个方面,以平均奖的来源为研究起点使得平均奖的产生有着生产力方面的基础。企业分工协作所创造的总收益在支付了所有成员的参与约束之后的剩余为合作剩余,这构成了平均奖的初始源泉。平均奖本质上是同质劳动者之间相互合作所创造的那部分合作剩余。根据马克思的产权决定分配理论,劳动者联合体产权制度决定了同质劳动者创造的合作剩余必然采取平均的方式进行分配。平均奖是对劳动者合作劳动的报酬,同时也是一种团队激励方式。平均奖的激励效应主要体现在对企业员工的合作程度、个人激励效应以及企业整体激励效应和企业与员工之间建立稳定的信任关系的促进作用上。为对平均奖进行具体的模型解释,本文把平均奖置于联合产权制度的框架之下,通过对联合产权制度下的要素联合体产权主体和劳动者联合体产权主体之间的合作博弈分析,得到可分配合作剩余中劳动者联合体产权在组织均衡时应得的份额,该部分剩余在劳动者联合体内部的分配方式就是平均奖。
In China's modernization process of the community, the efficiency of economic development was given too many attentions, while the importance of fairness to social development was neglected. So, this situation leaded to a deterioration of the income gap, the too low proportion of workers’remuneration and an annual decline of the proportion. To deal with this situation, on the income distribution system reform, a large number of theories appeared and attempted to resolve the disharmony of the income distribution and achieve fair distribution.
Study in the average award was proposed in the historical background consequentially. First of all, the average award is existed realistically in Chinese and foreign business organizations, and its form of performance are also diversified. In this paper, the editor take the Xiangtan Iron & Steel Group Co., Ltd in the domestic and the Yugoslav labor-managed enterprises and the enterprise system in Japan as examples to demonstrate the reality of existence of the average award, and sum up the main forms of performance of the average award. What needed to be clear is that the average award is not equalitarianism, while the average award and equalitarianism are different in Natures. On the economic nature of the average award, the Article definite that the average award are a distribution approach of the cooperative remaining that created by the homogeneous workers, the distribution approach is based on the system of the property rights of the commonwealth workers; it also is a way of team incentives. The analysis to the economic nature of the average award can be attributed to several aspects, including the sources of the average award, the nature, the determinants and its incentive effects and so on. The source of the average award was made as the starting point of studying, which made the generation of the average award have a foundation of productivity. After the total income created by collaboration and division in enterprise are paid to all members’participation constraints, the remaining are cooperative remaining, which constitute the initial source of the average award. In essentially, the average award are the cooperative remaining that created by mutual cooperation between Homogeneous workers. According to the Marx's theory of the property rights deciding the distribution, the commonwealth property rights of workers decide the distribution of the cooperative remaining that created by the homogeneous workers is bound to take the average form. The average awards are to reward the labor of workers co-operation, but also an team incentive approach. The incentive effects of the average award are mainly reflected in the promotion of the level of cooperation between employees, the individual incentive effects, as well as their overall incentive effects and establishing a stable trust relationship between enterprises and employees. To explain the average award by the specific model, the average awards were put into the framework of the joint property rights system. The Article calculated the share in the co-operation remaining that can be allocated when Balanced being attained throng analyzing the cooperative game between the property rights of the commonwealth elements of and he property rights of the commonwealth workers under the joint property rights system, this share is belong to the property rights of the commonwealth workers. The share is distributed in the property rights of the commonwealth workers; the share attained by everyone in the property rights is the average award.
引文
①《马克思恩格斯全集》第23卷,第248页。
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[1]宫希魁,初次分配就要重视公平[N].中国经济时报,2005-11-08.
[2]潘军,谢琼,杨巨.劳动收入与消费结构[J].湘潭大学学报,2009,1:56-61.
[3]马克思,恩科斯.马克思恩格斯全集.第23卷[M].北京:人民出版社,1972,6:60.
[4]马克思,恩科斯.马克思恩格斯全集.第23卷[M].北京:人民出版社,1972,6:190.
[5]马克思,恩科斯.马克思恩格斯全集.第23卷[M].北京:人民出版社,1972,6:454.
[6] Weitzman, Martin L. The Share Economy: Conquering Stagflation [M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984,11: 34-36.
[7] Alchian, Demsets. Production, Information Costs and Economics Organization [J]. American Review, 1972, 62: 777-795.
[8] George Akerlof. Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange [J]. Quarterly Journal of Ecolnomics 1982, 7 (4): 543-569.
[9] Aoki,M. Equilibrium Growth of the Hierarchical Firm: Shareholder Employee Cooperative Game Approach [J]. The Economic Review, 1980, 70: 1097-1110.
[10]加护野忠男,小林喜雄,资源抵押与退出障碍.今井贤一等著,现代日本企业制度[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1997,5:21-23.
[11]布莱尔.所有权与控制——面向21世纪的公司治理探索[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999,8:164-168.
[12] Elleman,D.P, P.Pitegoff. The democratic corporation: the new worker cooperative statute in Massachusetts [J].NYU Review of Law and Social Change, 1983, 11(3):441-472.
[13]杨瑞龙,周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义——兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997,1:12-22.
[14]洪远朋.共享利益论:股份合作制利益关系研究[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2001,10:5-9.
[15]刘桂斌,刘勤.产权经济学新论[M].北京:人民出版社,2007,7:12-13.
[16]刘长庚.论企业的联合产权制度性质[J].湘潭大学学报,2005,6:121-125.
[17]杨瑞龙,卢周来.对劳动管理型企业的经济学研究:一个方法论的评述[J].中国社会科学,2005,2:47-55.
[18]刘有锦,劳保忠等著.外国工资概况(第二辑)[M].北京:劳动出版社,1982:9.
[19]汉斯曼,于静译.企业所有权论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2001,2:88-92.
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