基于现代契约理论的中国上市公司盈余管理实证研究
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摘要
盈余管理是20世纪80年代以来在国际经济学界和会计学界兴起的一个前沿研究课题。国外学者对盈余管理问题研究较早,盈余管理被称为“市场参与者的游戏”。近年来,随着我国证券市场的逐步发展和市场经济的日趋成熟,上市公司对外提供的财务报告成为投资者等利益相关者做出决策的重要依据,而作为证券市场最重要的代表公司业绩的会计盈余信息就备受人们关注,成为评价企业和管理者的最基本标准。盈余管理不是一种单纯的会计行为,它是不同利益相关者之间利益冲突的产物。目前,盈余管理现象非常普遍,加强对盈余管理的研究对提高会计信息质量和改善证券市场资源优化配置的功能有着十分重要的意义。
Watts和Zimmerman根据经济学的契约理论,提出西方实证会计理论的三大假设:报酬契约假设、债务契约假设、政治成本假设。本文试图从现代契约理论的角度出发,借鉴国内外学者的研究成果,采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法探讨我国上市公司的盈余管理行为。
论文共分四章。
第一章绪论,简要介绍了论文研究的背景、目的意义、国内外研究动态、研究思路、研究方法和可能创新之处,并对国内外研究动态进行了简要的评述。
第二章介绍了盈余管理的有关理论,包括对盈余管理概念的界定、盈余管理的特征、盈余管理产生的背景和条件、盈余管理的经济学解释以及盈余管理的动机,是整篇论文的理论基础。
第三章实证部分。论文选取2007年沪深两市的全部A股上市公司为研究对象,剔除ST、*ST、新上市及数据不全的公司后,共得到1135家公司作为样本。研究方法上,本文在对现有盈余管理测度模型进行评价的基础上,选取横截面的再修正琼斯模型计算可操控性应计利润,以此衡量上市公司的盈余管理程度。然后通过构建多元回归模型,采用参数检验的方法,对我国上市公司盈余管理的契约动因进行实证研究。
最后,结合论文实证研究的结果,从限制盈余管理动机的产生和减少盈余管理发生的可能性角度提出约束盈余管理行为的对策。并对论文的研究进行了评述和展望。
Since the 80s of 20th century, earnings management became a hot research subject in the international economics and accounting educational circles. Overseas financial researchers presented theories explaining the earnings management policy of listed companies, earnings management is called”a game of market participants”, which has a long history in western countries. With the development of security market and the market economy, the financial reports, which are offered by the listed companies, have been considered as the most important basis by which people make dicisions. Concerned by people extremely as corporate performance, the accounting earnings information is paid more attention and becomes the basic standard of estimating enterprises and managers. Earnings management is not just a kind of accounting behavior. It roots from the conflict of different stakeholders. At present, the phenomenon of earnings management is very widespread, more and more the case of the listed companies’earnings management continuously been seen in the report, strengthen the research of the earnings management to raise the quality of the accounting information and improve the stock market’s function of the optimization disposition have the very important meaning. Watts and Zimmerman give us the three hypotheses of economic incentives:
Compensation Contract Hypothesis, Debt Contract Hypothesis and Political Cost Hypothesis. Based on the contract theory and the fruits of scholars abroad and inside for reference, this thesis using the methods both of theoretic analysis and empirical testing made on earnings management of Chinese listed companies.
The thesis is divided into four chapters.
Chapter one: Introduction. This chapter mainly explains the title selection background, researching purpose; defines the research ranges; brief surveys the domestic and international research dynamic status; states the research thought, methods and possible innovations.
Chapter two: Correlative theory about earnings management. In this chapter we introduces the nation of earnings management; the character of earnings management; economical explanation of it; procreant background, condition and motivation of it. Therefore this part is the academic basis of the whole paper.
Chapter three: This thesis chooses 1135 companies from Chinese listed companies, and collects 2007 years’financial data of these companies as the research sample, deleting ST,*ST, new listed and data missing companies. Methodically, after comparing and evaluating the methods of measuring earnings management abroad, this thesis uses Cross-Sectional Re-Modified Jones Model to calculate the Discretionary Accruals, which is uesd to represent the earnings management. The purpose of the thesis is testing the relationship between the degree of the earnings management and contractual incentive factors. The testing method is regression analysis and comparing analysis.
Chapter four discusses the ways of earnings management to figure out how to manage earnings and proposes some suggestions to limit earnings management. At last, pointed out the limitation of this research and the direction of the future research.
Watts和Zimmerman根据经济学的契约理论,提出西方实证会计理论的三大假设:报酬契约假设、债务契约假设、政治成本假设。本文试图从现代契约理论的角度出发,借鉴国内外学者的研究成果,采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法探讨我国上市公司的盈余管理行为。
论文共分四章。
第一章绪论,简要介绍了论文研究的背景、目的意义、国内外研究动态、研究思路、研究方法和可能创新之处,并对国内外研究动态进行了简要的评述。
第二章介绍了盈余管理的有关理论,包括对盈余管理概念的界定、盈余管理的特征、盈余管理产生的背景和条件、盈余管理的经济学解释以及盈余管理的动机,是整篇论文的理论基础。
第三章实证部分。论文选取2007年沪深两市的全部A股上市公司为研究对象,剔除ST、*ST、新上市及数据不全的公司后,共得到1135家公司作为样本。研究方法上,本文在对现有盈余管理测度模型进行评价的基础上,选取横截面的再修正琼斯模型计算可操控性应计利润,以此衡量上市公司的盈余管理程度。然后通过构建多元回归模型,采用参数检验的方法,对我国上市公司盈余管理的契约动因进行实证研究。
最后,结合论文实证研究的结果,从限制盈余管理动机的产生和减少盈余管理发生的可能性角度提出约束盈余管理行为的对策。并对论文的研究进行了评述和展望。
Since the 80s of 20th century, earnings management became a hot research subject in the international economics and accounting educational circles. Overseas financial researchers presented theories explaining the earnings management policy of listed companies, earnings management is called”a game of market participants”, which has a long history in western countries. With the development of security market and the market economy, the financial reports, which are offered by the listed companies, have been considered as the most important basis by which people make dicisions. Concerned by people extremely as corporate performance, the accounting earnings information is paid more attention and becomes the basic standard of estimating enterprises and managers. Earnings management is not just a kind of accounting behavior. It roots from the conflict of different stakeholders. At present, the phenomenon of earnings management is very widespread, more and more the case of the listed companies’earnings management continuously been seen in the report, strengthen the research of the earnings management to raise the quality of the accounting information and improve the stock market’s function of the optimization disposition have the very important meaning. Watts and Zimmerman give us the three hypotheses of economic incentives:
Compensation Contract Hypothesis, Debt Contract Hypothesis and Political Cost Hypothesis. Based on the contract theory and the fruits of scholars abroad and inside for reference, this thesis using the methods both of theoretic analysis and empirical testing made on earnings management of Chinese listed companies.
The thesis is divided into four chapters.
Chapter one: Introduction. This chapter mainly explains the title selection background, researching purpose; defines the research ranges; brief surveys the domestic and international research dynamic status; states the research thought, methods and possible innovations.
Chapter two: Correlative theory about earnings management. In this chapter we introduces the nation of earnings management; the character of earnings management; economical explanation of it; procreant background, condition and motivation of it. Therefore this part is the academic basis of the whole paper.
Chapter three: This thesis chooses 1135 companies from Chinese listed companies, and collects 2007 years’financial data of these companies as the research sample, deleting ST,*ST, new listed and data missing companies. Methodically, after comparing and evaluating the methods of measuring earnings management abroad, this thesis uses Cross-Sectional Re-Modified Jones Model to calculate the Discretionary Accruals, which is uesd to represent the earnings management. The purpose of the thesis is testing the relationship between the degree of the earnings management and contractual incentive factors. The testing method is regression analysis and comparing analysis.
Chapter four discusses the ways of earnings management to figure out how to manage earnings and proposes some suggestions to limit earnings management. At last, pointed out the limitation of this research and the direction of the future research.
引文
[1] Paul M.Healy & James M.Wahlen,王学军等译.盈余管理研究回顾及其对会计准则建设的启示[J].会计研究,2000(11):P52-60
[2] Skinner D.J, Sloan R. G.Earnings surprises, growth expectations and stock returns, or don’t let an earnings torpedosink your portfolio [M]. University of Michigan, 2000
[3] Watts R.L, Zimmerman J.L[美]著,陈少华等译.实证会计理论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999.9
[4] Jensen M., Meckling, W.The theory the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 4: P305-360
[5] Healy P.M. The effect of bonus schemeson accounting decisions [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7: P85-107
[6] Akinobu Shuto. Executive Compensation and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Japan [J]. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2007, 16:P1-26
[7] Naveen D.Daniel, David J.Denis, Lalitha Naveen. Do Firms manage Earnings to Meet Dividend Thresholds? [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, 45:P2-26
[8] DeAngelo H, DeAngelo L, Skinner D. Accounting choice in troubled companies [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 17:P113-143
[9] Dechow P.M., R.G.Sloan, A.P. Sweeney. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13 ( Spring ):P1-36.
[10] Charlotte.J.Wright, Shannon.L.Leikam. Earnings Management and Forced CEO Dismissal [J]. Advances in Accounting, 2005, 21: P61-81
[11] Sweeney A.P. Debt-covenant violations and managers’accounting responses [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 5:P281-308
[12] Igor Goncharov, Jochen Zimmermann.The Supply of and Demand for Accounting Information [J]. Economics of Transition, 2007, 15
[13] Bergstresser D, Philippon T, CEO incentives and earnings management: evidence from the 1990s [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 80:P511-529
[14] Hwee-Cheng Tan, Karim Jamal. Effect of Accounting Discretion on Ability of Managers to Smooth Earnings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2006, 25:P554-573
[15] Jones.Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 1999, 29: P193-228
[16] Key K.G.,“Political Costs Incentives for Earnings Management in the Cable Industry”[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1997, 23: P309-337
[17] Donal Byard,Mahmud Hossain,Santanu Mitra.US Oil Companies’Earnings Management in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2007,26:P733-748
[18]宋建峰.盈余管理的动机透视及其对审计的意义[N].证券市场导报,1998-12
[19]蒋义宏.变更会计政策的行为与动机——上市公司利用变更会计政策操纵利润案例分析[N].中国证券报,1999-10-8
[20]王跃堂.会计政策选择的经济动机—基于沪深股市的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(12):P31-41
[21]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002(5):P58-64
[22]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9):P29-34
[23]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):P111-119
[24]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1):P58-65
[25]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有者权益,会计信息与债务契约[J].管理世界,2006(10):P100-107
[26]赵英林,周在霞.我国上市公司盈余管理经济动机实证研究-以深市制造业企业为研究样本[J].齐鲁珠坛,2007(2):P11-18
[27]李丹,蔡玉华.债务契约性质与盈余管理幅度实证研究[J].企业家天地,2007(6):P37-39
[28]叶志锋,胡玉明,纳超洪.基于银行借款融资动机的盈余管理研究-来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008(1):P118-124
[29]田丰,周红.新闻纸行业在反倾销调查中的盈余管理[J].财经研究,2000(11):P28-35
[30]陈晓,李静.地方政府行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12):P20-28
[31]任春艳.上市公司盈余管理与会计准则制定[M].中国财政经济出版社.2004
[32] Schipper Katherine. Commentary on Earnings Management [J]. Accounting Horizons, 1989, December: P91-102.
[33] William R.Scott著,陈汉文译.财务会计理论[M].北京机械工业出版社,2000
[34]张维迎.企业的企业家一契约理论[M].上海人民出版社,1995
[35]尚洪涛.财务契约论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社, 2006.6
[36]朱琴芬编著.新制度经济学[M].上海:华东师范大学出版社,2006
[37] Berle A,G.Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York:MacMillan,1932
[38] Terry D. Warfield, John J.Wild, Kenneth L.Wild. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1995, 20: P61-91
[39]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):P32-64
[40] Slew Hong Teoh,Ivo Welch,T.J. Wong. Earnings management and the underpermance of seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998,50:P63-99
[41]夏立军.国外盈余管理计量方法述评[J].外国经济与管理,2002(10):P35-41
[42] Dechow P.M.,R.G.Sloan,A.P. Sweeney. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,13(Spring):P1-36
[43] Kang Sivaramakrishnan. Issues in testing earnings management and instrumental variable approach[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1995, 33(2):P353-367
[44]朱德胜,岳丽君.管理者薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究[J].山东财政学院学报,2004(6):P45-49
[45]郝黎仁等编著.SPSS实用统计分析[M].北京中国水利水电出版社,2003
[46] Stephen A Zeff,Bala G Dharan著,夏冬林译.现代财务会计理论—问题与争论[M].北京经济科学出版社,2000
[47]郭道扬.会计史研究—历史·现时·未来[M].中国财政经济出版社,2004
[48]刘月平.中国上市公司盈余管理的制度背景及行为研究[M].北京中国财政经济出版社, 2000
[49]惠小兵,陈方正.关于转轨经济中上市公司盈余管理的动机研究[J].华东经济管理,2001(4):P68-70
[50]杜滨.红利计划下经理人员的盈余管理行为[J].贵州工业大学学报,2002(4):P11-14
[51]蔡祥,李志文,张卫国.中国实证会计研究综述[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003(2):P155-183
[2] Skinner D.J, Sloan R. G.Earnings surprises, growth expectations and stock returns, or don’t let an earnings torpedosink your portfolio [M]. University of Michigan, 2000
[3] Watts R.L, Zimmerman J.L[美]著,陈少华等译.实证会计理论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999.9
[4] Jensen M., Meckling, W.The theory the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 4: P305-360
[5] Healy P.M. The effect of bonus schemeson accounting decisions [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1985, 7: P85-107
[6] Akinobu Shuto. Executive Compensation and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Japan [J]. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2007, 16:P1-26
[7] Naveen D.Daniel, David J.Denis, Lalitha Naveen. Do Firms manage Earnings to Meet Dividend Thresholds? [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, 45:P2-26
[8] DeAngelo H, DeAngelo L, Skinner D. Accounting choice in troubled companies [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 17:P113-143
[9] Dechow P.M., R.G.Sloan, A.P. Sweeney. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13 ( Spring ):P1-36.
[10] Charlotte.J.Wright, Shannon.L.Leikam. Earnings Management and Forced CEO Dismissal [J]. Advances in Accounting, 2005, 21: P61-81
[11] Sweeney A.P. Debt-covenant violations and managers’accounting responses [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 5:P281-308
[12] Igor Goncharov, Jochen Zimmermann.The Supply of and Demand for Accounting Information [J]. Economics of Transition, 2007, 15
[13] Bergstresser D, Philippon T, CEO incentives and earnings management: evidence from the 1990s [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 80:P511-529
[14] Hwee-Cheng Tan, Karim Jamal. Effect of Accounting Discretion on Ability of Managers to Smooth Earnings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2006, 25:P554-573
[15] Jones.Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 1999, 29: P193-228
[16] Key K.G.,“Political Costs Incentives for Earnings Management in the Cable Industry”[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1997, 23: P309-337
[17] Donal Byard,Mahmud Hossain,Santanu Mitra.US Oil Companies’Earnings Management in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2007,26:P733-748
[18]宋建峰.盈余管理的动机透视及其对审计的意义[N].证券市场导报,1998-12
[19]蒋义宏.变更会计政策的行为与动机——上市公司利用变更会计政策操纵利润案例分析[N].中国证券报,1999-10-8
[20]王跃堂.会计政策选择的经济动机—基于沪深股市的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(12):P31-41
[21]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002(5):P58-64
[22]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9):P29-34
[23]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):P111-119
[24]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1):P58-65
[25]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有者权益,会计信息与债务契约[J].管理世界,2006(10):P100-107
[26]赵英林,周在霞.我国上市公司盈余管理经济动机实证研究-以深市制造业企业为研究样本[J].齐鲁珠坛,2007(2):P11-18
[27]李丹,蔡玉华.债务契约性质与盈余管理幅度实证研究[J].企业家天地,2007(6):P37-39
[28]叶志锋,胡玉明,纳超洪.基于银行借款融资动机的盈余管理研究-来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2008(1):P118-124
[29]田丰,周红.新闻纸行业在反倾销调查中的盈余管理[J].财经研究,2000(11):P28-35
[30]陈晓,李静.地方政府行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12):P20-28
[31]任春艳.上市公司盈余管理与会计准则制定[M].中国财政经济出版社.2004
[32] Schipper Katherine. Commentary on Earnings Management [J]. Accounting Horizons, 1989, December: P91-102.
[33] William R.Scott著,陈汉文译.财务会计理论[M].北京机械工业出版社,2000
[34]张维迎.企业的企业家一契约理论[M].上海人民出版社,1995
[35]尚洪涛.财务契约论[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社, 2006.6
[36]朱琴芬编著.新制度经济学[M].上海:华东师范大学出版社,2006
[37] Berle A,G.Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York:MacMillan,1932
[38] Terry D. Warfield, John J.Wild, Kenneth L.Wild. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1995, 20: P61-91
[39]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):P32-64
[40] Slew Hong Teoh,Ivo Welch,T.J. Wong. Earnings management and the underpermance of seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998,50:P63-99
[41]夏立军.国外盈余管理计量方法述评[J].外国经济与管理,2002(10):P35-41
[42] Dechow P.M.,R.G.Sloan,A.P. Sweeney. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,13(Spring):P1-36
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[44]朱德胜,岳丽君.管理者薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究[J].山东财政学院学报,2004(6):P45-49
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