风险投资与高新技术融合的技术转让体系研究
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摘要
我国促进高新技术与风险投资融合的技术转让体系尚处于萌芽阶段,而西方发达国家则已成熟。为此,借鉴别人的经验,研究技术转让体系形成的环境、条件、政策及政策工具(工具组合)具有重要意义。
根据中国具有融合功能的技术转让体系建设的难点,提出了借鉴与创新相结合、过程与结果相统一、宏观政策与转让活动考察相结合、整体与局部相统一的设计原则;基于攻克难点的技术转让体系功能、组成、运行平台等关键点,设计了我国技术转让体系。它由三大类机构——政府机构、公共机构、商业机构组成。中央、地方政府技术转让机构代表政府;行政、财政支持的政府实验室、政府工程研究中心、政府技术转移中心、大学技术转让中心等肩负公共机构的技术转让使命;除已有的高新技术孵化器、信息服务公司外,技术拍卖型公司转化为专利销售公司,技术引进集成型公司转化为专利与开发公司,快速融资型公司转化为风险资本公司,风险管理探索型公司转化为风险开发与管理公司,它们构成商业技术转让机构。
推动我国技术转让体系发育成熟的基本手段是立法促进、行政推动、市场机制。立法规定政府机构的使命、职责、业绩衡量与考核程序;立法规定公共中介的法律地位、管理体制、运行机制;利用条例完善技术转让支持政策的实施机制,逐步形成法律定位清晰、政策扶持到位、监督管理完善、市场竞争平等的良好发展环境。针对现阶段政府权力介入程度高、机构分散、效率低的特点,行政推动重在资源整合与有效利用。整合不是加强科技部门权力,而是指导各方站在价值链、价值网络的各自节点上创造价值并摘取各自的份额,在创造与收获价值的过程中发挥体系功能。针对目前政府、市场双轮驱动状况,逐步引入市场机制,化解政府主导配置与市场配置资源的矛盾。
着力研究了技术转让体系建设的市场机制引入问题,即靠财政、税收、优惠贷款等宏观经济政策和公共机构输出的丰富多样的政策工具(工具组合)逐步引入。研究表明:日益改进的宏观经济政策对技术转让机构产生越来越强的正向影响,技术转让机构越来越需要宏观经济政策的支持。因此,宏观经济政策与技术转让机构必须互动、互进。在此前提下,政策工具(工具组合)延伸宏观经济政策和市场机制引入效能。政策工具组合设计源于各种工具各自的局限性,只有多项工具组合使用,方能弥补缺陷。
技术转让机构融合高新技术与风险投资的前提是双方信任合作。但双方机会主义倾向严重,存在信任危机。化解危机的办法是依靠隐含社会契约的垂直与多边约束机制来约束双方守信,而高新技术评价网络、风险资本网络、大学及研究机构的附属中介是其实现形式。
In this paper, the VC-Hi-tech combination is well defined that on the one hand the policies of VC stimulating and High-tech commercializing match the two parties and on the other hand technology transfer organizations(TTOs) aid VC and Hi-tech to get combined. As far as China’s technology transfer system(TTS) is concerned, it is on the emergency stage compared with its Western counterparts. So it is very important and meaningful for us to study western experiences in the TTS forming environments, preconditions, economic policies and policy instruments.
To overcome China’s TTS difficulties, the Chinese TTS is well designed with good functions, components and running platform, based on the four principles which are creating new ways for China to take advantage of foreign experience, finding out the processes over the successful foreign paths, highlighting from observing and studying the foreign technology transfer actions on the macro-policy platform, and integrating TTS partial functions to get lessons from the whole TTS. The TTS with Chinese Characteristics will consists of the following components----both central and local government-led agencies, organizations derived from the governmental labs, engineering centers, technology transfer centers, usually getting governmental financial grants, and commercial ones which include patent selling and developing companies, VC gathering, risk managing and controlling companies, apart from incubators and IT corporations. In China, they are now in primitive forms which are evolving from companies in technology introduction and auction and integration, speedy financial aid getting and early management risk controlling and so on.
China’s TTS incubation needs legislation, administration and market mechanism. The statute should stipulate governmental agencies’missions, duties, performance standards and appraisal processes, identify public organizations’positions as legal entities, management hierarchies, running mechanism, define governmental rules promoting the technology transfer. In this way, distinct-positioned laws, implemental and preferential policies, practical guides and supervision, friendly competition will be combined together to put forward the transfer. To direct against the governmental agencies’interfering widely, inharmoniously and ineffectively, the administration should focus its force on coordinating agencies and non-governmental organizations, distribute all the resources fairly and guide all the parties involved to create new values and then get their own shares according to their contributions in the whole value chain, not to intensify the administrational powers to do so. And also to direct against the co-existence of governmental and market powers, the government should gradually adopt the market mechanism in TTS forming.
The TTS matchmaking ultimately depends on the market mechanism, so it is important for the government to use a variety of policies such as financial aids, tax reductions, governmental loans as primitive incentives to attract TTOs. The study hints that macro-polices which are getting nice over time affect the TTOs with stronger and more positive forces, and TTOs are eager for the support of the preferential polices. Therefore inducing macro-policies and the TTOs’actions must get combined. Only through the combination, can policy instruments outstretch the macro-polices’functions. And many policy instruments are combined in order to overcome the limitations when they are used single-handedly.
In this paper, a friendly mutual trust for TTS matchmaking is studied. The VC and Hi-tech are always opportunistic, and it is the opportunism that leads them into distrust trap. To skip over it, the hidden social contracts bind the two together by hierarchical management in the society, and multilateral restraints by folk customs. Based on the two mechanisms, Hi-tech networks, VC networks and university technology transfer offices can pave the trust way.
根据中国具有融合功能的技术转让体系建设的难点,提出了借鉴与创新相结合、过程与结果相统一、宏观政策与转让活动考察相结合、整体与局部相统一的设计原则;基于攻克难点的技术转让体系功能、组成、运行平台等关键点,设计了我国技术转让体系。它由三大类机构——政府机构、公共机构、商业机构组成。中央、地方政府技术转让机构代表政府;行政、财政支持的政府实验室、政府工程研究中心、政府技术转移中心、大学技术转让中心等肩负公共机构的技术转让使命;除已有的高新技术孵化器、信息服务公司外,技术拍卖型公司转化为专利销售公司,技术引进集成型公司转化为专利与开发公司,快速融资型公司转化为风险资本公司,风险管理探索型公司转化为风险开发与管理公司,它们构成商业技术转让机构。
推动我国技术转让体系发育成熟的基本手段是立法促进、行政推动、市场机制。立法规定政府机构的使命、职责、业绩衡量与考核程序;立法规定公共中介的法律地位、管理体制、运行机制;利用条例完善技术转让支持政策的实施机制,逐步形成法律定位清晰、政策扶持到位、监督管理完善、市场竞争平等的良好发展环境。针对现阶段政府权力介入程度高、机构分散、效率低的特点,行政推动重在资源整合与有效利用。整合不是加强科技部门权力,而是指导各方站在价值链、价值网络的各自节点上创造价值并摘取各自的份额,在创造与收获价值的过程中发挥体系功能。针对目前政府、市场双轮驱动状况,逐步引入市场机制,化解政府主导配置与市场配置资源的矛盾。
着力研究了技术转让体系建设的市场机制引入问题,即靠财政、税收、优惠贷款等宏观经济政策和公共机构输出的丰富多样的政策工具(工具组合)逐步引入。研究表明:日益改进的宏观经济政策对技术转让机构产生越来越强的正向影响,技术转让机构越来越需要宏观经济政策的支持。因此,宏观经济政策与技术转让机构必须互动、互进。在此前提下,政策工具(工具组合)延伸宏观经济政策和市场机制引入效能。政策工具组合设计源于各种工具各自的局限性,只有多项工具组合使用,方能弥补缺陷。
技术转让机构融合高新技术与风险投资的前提是双方信任合作。但双方机会主义倾向严重,存在信任危机。化解危机的办法是依靠隐含社会契约的垂直与多边约束机制来约束双方守信,而高新技术评价网络、风险资本网络、大学及研究机构的附属中介是其实现形式。
In this paper, the VC-Hi-tech combination is well defined that on the one hand the policies of VC stimulating and High-tech commercializing match the two parties and on the other hand technology transfer organizations(TTOs) aid VC and Hi-tech to get combined. As far as China’s technology transfer system(TTS) is concerned, it is on the emergency stage compared with its Western counterparts. So it is very important and meaningful for us to study western experiences in the TTS forming environments, preconditions, economic policies and policy instruments.
To overcome China’s TTS difficulties, the Chinese TTS is well designed with good functions, components and running platform, based on the four principles which are creating new ways for China to take advantage of foreign experience, finding out the processes over the successful foreign paths, highlighting from observing and studying the foreign technology transfer actions on the macro-policy platform, and integrating TTS partial functions to get lessons from the whole TTS. The TTS with Chinese Characteristics will consists of the following components----both central and local government-led agencies, organizations derived from the governmental labs, engineering centers, technology transfer centers, usually getting governmental financial grants, and commercial ones which include patent selling and developing companies, VC gathering, risk managing and controlling companies, apart from incubators and IT corporations. In China, they are now in primitive forms which are evolving from companies in technology introduction and auction and integration, speedy financial aid getting and early management risk controlling and so on.
China’s TTS incubation needs legislation, administration and market mechanism. The statute should stipulate governmental agencies’missions, duties, performance standards and appraisal processes, identify public organizations’positions as legal entities, management hierarchies, running mechanism, define governmental rules promoting the technology transfer. In this way, distinct-positioned laws, implemental and preferential policies, practical guides and supervision, friendly competition will be combined together to put forward the transfer. To direct against the governmental agencies’interfering widely, inharmoniously and ineffectively, the administration should focus its force on coordinating agencies and non-governmental organizations, distribute all the resources fairly and guide all the parties involved to create new values and then get their own shares according to their contributions in the whole value chain, not to intensify the administrational powers to do so. And also to direct against the co-existence of governmental and market powers, the government should gradually adopt the market mechanism in TTS forming.
The TTS matchmaking ultimately depends on the market mechanism, so it is important for the government to use a variety of policies such as financial aids, tax reductions, governmental loans as primitive incentives to attract TTOs. The study hints that macro-polices which are getting nice over time affect the TTOs with stronger and more positive forces, and TTOs are eager for the support of the preferential polices. Therefore inducing macro-policies and the TTOs’actions must get combined. Only through the combination, can policy instruments outstretch the macro-polices’functions. And many policy instruments are combined in order to overcome the limitations when they are used single-handedly.
In this paper, a friendly mutual trust for TTS matchmaking is studied. The VC and Hi-tech are always opportunistic, and it is the opportunism that leads them into distrust trap. To skip over it, the hidden social contracts bind the two together by hierarchical management in the society, and multilateral restraints by folk customs. Based on the two mechanisms, Hi-tech networks, VC networks and university technology transfer offices can pave the trust way.
引文
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