中国上市公司治理的有效性评价研究
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摘要
随着理论界和实务界对公司治理问题研究的不断深入,对于公司治理的研究已经从单纯的公司治理要素层面的研究和公司治理结构层面的研究转向公司治理系统评价的研究,即公司治理的量化研究阶段。
构建科学、有效的公司治理评级体系,对于保护利益相关者的利益,加强政府对上市公司的有效监管,形成上市公司声誉制约机制和促进证券市场的发展,都具有重要的作用。目前的公司治理系统评价一般倾向于对公司治理的构成、运作程序和制度建设方面的评价,更多地服务于监管和制度完善的目的,不能够完全地反映公司治理的有效性。我国公司治理风险大部分源于道德风险,公司治理评级分数较高的公司常会因为败德行为引发公司治理风险。中国社科院发布的研究报告称“公司治理分数的高低与公司的绩效并无明显的相关性”的结论也表明我国现有的公司治理评级系统或评级程序与方法可能存在着某些问题。
以价值导向和大股东利益导向为基础的公司治理的有效性评价是公司治理量化研究的一种新的思想、新的方法,它能够部分弥补目前公司治理评级系统的某些不足。对以价值导向和大股东利益导向为基础的公司治理的有效性评价进行研究,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义:它首先强化人们在理论上对公司治理的有效性的界定的认识;确立从公司治理结构评级到公司治理的有效性评价的理论导向;确定了公司治理的有效性评价指标的理论体系,丰富和充实了相关的理论文献。其次,监管部门可针对评价值低于“临界值”的公司加强监控,使得保护中小股东权益这一监管理念更具有可操作性,这对促进中小股东权益的保护,形成上市公司声誉的制约机制和促进证券市场的发展具有实质性意义;中小股东可以依据研究的结论主动回避治理无效的、可能对其利益构成侵害的公司,进而实现社会资源的合理配置;由于监管部门的严格监管和中小股东的主动回避,必然迫使“问题”公司完善公司治理结构。
本文的研究思路是,以价值导向和大股东利益导向为依据,在对已有的公司治理评价研究文献进行分析评述的基础上,构建了公司治理的有效性评价指标体系和评价模型,并进一步进行实证分析,确定了公司治理无效的临界值,以此临界值为分类标志对上市公司进行分组,更清楚地揭示了治理无效的公司的普遍特征。
本文在研究过程中,使用了比较分析方法、规范分析方法、实证分析方法、系统分析方法和多元统计分析等方法。
本文共分为七大部分。
第一部分为导论。主要介绍了本文的研究背景、研究价值和意义、采用的研究方法、研究思路、研究的创新点以及本文的结构及安排。
第二部分为文献综述。本部分对研究文献进行了重新梳理,从公司治理的要素研究、公司治理的结构研究、公司治理系统评价的研究以及公司治理的有效性的研究等方面进行文献综述,着重介绍了国内外有代表性的公司治理评价系统:标准普尔创立的公司治理评价系统;亚州里昂证券的公司治理评级体系; CIMA公司治理战略记分卡;中国台湾辅仁大学2002年公司治理与评等系统;2003年南开大学的公司治理指数等,并指出了现有研究的不足。
第三部分是公司治理的有效性评价依据。本部分通过对公司治理绩效和公司治理溢价研究、公司治理效率研究和公司治理的有效性研究等不同阶段分析,对公司治理的有效性进行了界定。并对公司治理的有效性评价的理论依据和现实依据进行了分析。评价的理论依据是委托代理理论、博弈论、系统理论和现代企业理论;现实依据是OECD的治理原则、世界银行的公司治理架构和中国上市公司治理准则。
第四部分是公司治理的有效性的评价维度和指标体系。本部分以价值导向和大股东利益导向为基础,初步设计公司治理的有效性评价的7个维度:股东治理的有效性、董事会治理的有效性、监事会治理的有效性、经理层治理的有效性、利益相关者治理的有效性、信息透明度的有效性与法律基础和中小投资者保护的有效性和26个指标,并进一步对指标与公司绩效的关系进行了假设。
第五部分是对公司治理的有效性评价指标体系的修正。首先确定了公司治理无效的样本公司,如ST、被证监会通报查处、被媒体披露的问题公司等;然后分别计算治理无效的样本公司和治理有效的样本公司的评价值,运用统计分析软件EVIEWS3.1和EXCELL软件的T-检验方法来验证两类公司的评价值的显著差异性,如无显著性的差异,则需进一步修正指标体系,并反复验证;最后确定了可用于公司治理的有效性评价的5个维度,即股东治理的有效性、董事会治理的有效性、经理层治理的有效性、信息透明度的有效性、法律基础和中小投资者保护的有效性和15个评价指标体系。
第六部分是公司治理的有效性评价模型的实证分析。在确定了公司治理的有效性评价的维度与指标体系的基础上,本部分确定了公司治理的有效性的评价维度权重,构建了公司治理的有效性的评价模型。通过该评价模型计算出公司治理无效的指数均值,并以该均值为基准值,结合专家意见分析、确定了临界值。以临界值为分组标志将所有的样本公司分为治理有效和无效两组,运用描述统计分析方法对公司治理无效的治理特征进行全面的描述。对于治理无效的公司的治理特征,主要有以下发现:股东治理有效性方面:超额控制严重;大股东与上市公司存在超额的关联交易;大股东介入股市明显,产生较严重的权益代理问题;超额担保严重;最大股东持股比例较低;第二至第十大股东持股比例较低。董事会治理方面:最大股东绝对控制了董事会和监事会;过多无效董事会会议。经理层治理方面:CEO与董事长两职合一现象严重且最大股东普遍参与管理。信息透明度的有效性方面:上市公司诚信缺失严重。法律基础和中小投资者保护方面:很小部分公司在其他市场挂牌上市。
第七部分为本研究结论与进一步研究的方向。本文对中国上市公司治理的有效性评价问题进行了研究,得到了一些有意义的研究结论,主要有:(1)关于公司治理的有效性的界定;(2)关于公司治理的有效性评价基础的确定;(3)关于公司治理的有效性评价指标体系的选择;(4)关于公司治理的有效性的临界值的计算;(5)关于治理无效的公司特征的揭示。未来继续研究的方面:如绩效指标的选取问题;以临界值为标志进行的治理有效性分组问题;研究方法的选择问题;如遇国家资本市场政策的重大调整,有关指标的得分、临界值的计算等调整问题以及对股权分置改革前后的公司治理的有效性的对比研究等等。
本文的主要创新之处体现在:(1)确定了以公司价值导向和最大股东利益导向为评价的切入点;(2)构建了公司治理的有效性评价的指标体系和评价模型;(3)确定了公司治理无效的评价指数临界值;(4)采用T-检验等统计方法对公司治理的有效性评价的指标体系进行筛选和修正。
本研究的局限性在于:由于本文所做的研究主要采用的是上市公司公开的数据,运用T-检验方法筛选与修正评价指标,这一方面考虑了理论上、研究方法上的严谨性,但另一方面可能会造成对公司治理实践上的忽视。
With the gradual research of Corporate Governance issue from the theory world and practice, studies on Corporate Governance are now on the stage of Assessment of Corporate Governance system, quantitativing research, after processing the research of the Key Element and of the Structure of Corporate Governance.
Constructing scientific, effective system of indicators of corporate governance has its important effects, which will benefit to protect stakeholders’interests, to strengthen government to supervise listed firms, to form Prestige restriction mechanism, to enhance securities market development. The current grading system of Corporate Governance is apt to assessing Corporate Governance construction, operating procedure and essential rules or regulations, which serves as the goal of monitoring and regulations’perfection as possible. The current assessment cannot reflect the effetiveness of corporate governance. Governing risk in China mainly originates from moral hazard; firms with the higher score of Corporate Governance often lead to governing risk. The research report that Chinese Academy of Social Sciences said that the score of corporate governance is not obviously related with the company’s performance also indicates that there maybe exist some problems in current procedure and method or in assessment of corporate governance system.
Assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance based on firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit is a new idea and a new research method on quantitativing research of corporate governance and it can partly dabate some deficiency of the current grading system.
Studies of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance based on firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit has its important sense in theory and pratice: firstly, it enhances people understanding on definition of effectiveness of corporate governance, definites oriented theory from the rating of corporate governance structure to assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, definites the theory of system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, which makes relevant literature rich. Secondly, supervision can strengthen its power on firms that their assessment value are lower than critical value and make it feasible to protect small & middle stockholders’benefits, to form Prestige restriction mechanism, to securities market development and to enhance securities market development. Small & middle stockholders may shun firms that would be ineffective in corporate governance and woule invade their benefit. This may realize reasonable allocationon social resources. Firms of ineffectiveness of corporate governance will be forced to improve their corporate governce structure because of restrict supervision and initiative shun of small & middle stockholders
This paper’s research mentality is: taking firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit as the assessment basis, constructing system of indicators and model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance after analyzing and appraising the past literature, defining the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance by further positive test, grouping the listed firms according to the critical value standard and describing the common characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance clearly.
In the research process, the paper uses the comparative analysis; normal analysis, positive analysis, multivariate linear regression analysis, and so on.
Part 1 is on introductions. It mainly introduces research background, research value, research method, research innovations, its structure and arrangement.
Part 2 is on literature review. This part gives literature summary from the research of the Key Element and of the Structure of corporate governance and of Assessment of corporate governance system to the stage of effectiveness of corporate governance, emphasizes to introduce the typical corporate governance assessment system of the home and abroad, such as corporate governance rating of Standard & Poors, of CLSA Credit Lyonnais Securities in Asia, of Fujen Catholic University of 2002, of CCGINK of Nankai University of 2003 and so on, summarizes the literature deficiency.
Part 3 is on the basis of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. This part gives the assumption of effectiveness of corporate governance by analyzing corporate governance performance and corporate governance premium, governance efficiency , effectiveness of corporate governance and provides the theory basis for assessment, such as principle-agent theory, the game theory, systematic theory and modern theory of the firm and the practice basis, such as the OECD principle, the World Bank's governance framework and governance criterion of Chinese listed companies.
Part 4 is on dimension and system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. It preliminarily designs 7 dimensions: governance of the largest shareholder, governance of the board of directors, governance of the the board of supervisors, governance of the CEO, governance of stakeholders, governance of the financial information disclosre and governance of the law basis and small & middle investors’protection and 26 indicators based on firms’oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit, judges the relationship between system of indicators and firm’s performance.
Part 5 is on amendment of system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. It selects sample firms of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, such as the firms marked ST, ones that are circulated by China Securities Regulatory Commission for their issues and ones are discolsed by the medium, calculates the assessment value of the two sample firms, tests the assessment value’s significant difference by T-test method of Eviews3.1 and Excell repeadedly, defines 5 dimension: governance of the largest shareholder, governance of the board of directors, governance of the CEO, governance of the financial information disclosre and governance of the law basis and small & middle investors’protection and 15 system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance.
Part 6 is on positive analysis of the model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. It defines the weight of assessment dimension, constructs the model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, calculates the average value of system of indicators of ineffectiveness of corporate governance companies, defines the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance by the above average value and experts advices, describes the characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance through descriptive statistics. It lists main findings on the characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, which lies in: For governance of the largest shareholder: serious extra control; existing extra related party transactions between the largest shareholder and listed firms; The largest shareholder gets involved in securities and causes serious equity agent issues; serious extra guarantee; the lower proportion of the largest shareholder; the lower proportion of the second to tenth shareholders.For governance of the board of directors: The largest shareholder abosolutely controls the board of directors and the board of supervisors; so many ineffective meetings of the board of directors. For governance of the CEO: the CEO and chairman duties are centralized seriously and the largest shareholder takes part in operating activies. For governance of the financial information disclosre: serious lack of sincerity in listed firms. For governance of the law basis and small & middle investors’protection: fewer firms are listed in other securires markets abroad.
Part 7 is on research conclusions and limitations. The main research of the paper are:(1)definiting effectiveness of corporate governance, (2)definiting the basis of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, (3)selecting system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, (4)calculating and defining the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, (5)describing the characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance. Because the paper uses the public data of listed firms to make research and uses t-test, which considered scientific aspect in theory and methods on the hand and it maybe neglect the pratice of corporate governance. Further studies of the paper lies in: performance index selection, grouping based on critical value, research method selection, adjustment in index-score and critical value calculation when policies on capital market are changed, comparative research on ineffectiveness of corporate governancebefore and after reforming of stockholders structure.
The key innovations embodys in: (1) defining firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit as assessing basis, (2) constructing system of indicators and model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, (3) defining the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, (4) screening and amending system of indicators by T-test.
构建科学、有效的公司治理评级体系,对于保护利益相关者的利益,加强政府对上市公司的有效监管,形成上市公司声誉制约机制和促进证券市场的发展,都具有重要的作用。目前的公司治理系统评价一般倾向于对公司治理的构成、运作程序和制度建设方面的评价,更多地服务于监管和制度完善的目的,不能够完全地反映公司治理的有效性。我国公司治理风险大部分源于道德风险,公司治理评级分数较高的公司常会因为败德行为引发公司治理风险。中国社科院发布的研究报告称“公司治理分数的高低与公司的绩效并无明显的相关性”的结论也表明我国现有的公司治理评级系统或评级程序与方法可能存在着某些问题。
以价值导向和大股东利益导向为基础的公司治理的有效性评价是公司治理量化研究的一种新的思想、新的方法,它能够部分弥补目前公司治理评级系统的某些不足。对以价值导向和大股东利益导向为基础的公司治理的有效性评价进行研究,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义:它首先强化人们在理论上对公司治理的有效性的界定的认识;确立从公司治理结构评级到公司治理的有效性评价的理论导向;确定了公司治理的有效性评价指标的理论体系,丰富和充实了相关的理论文献。其次,监管部门可针对评价值低于“临界值”的公司加强监控,使得保护中小股东权益这一监管理念更具有可操作性,这对促进中小股东权益的保护,形成上市公司声誉的制约机制和促进证券市场的发展具有实质性意义;中小股东可以依据研究的结论主动回避治理无效的、可能对其利益构成侵害的公司,进而实现社会资源的合理配置;由于监管部门的严格监管和中小股东的主动回避,必然迫使“问题”公司完善公司治理结构。
本文的研究思路是,以价值导向和大股东利益导向为依据,在对已有的公司治理评价研究文献进行分析评述的基础上,构建了公司治理的有效性评价指标体系和评价模型,并进一步进行实证分析,确定了公司治理无效的临界值,以此临界值为分类标志对上市公司进行分组,更清楚地揭示了治理无效的公司的普遍特征。
本文在研究过程中,使用了比较分析方法、规范分析方法、实证分析方法、系统分析方法和多元统计分析等方法。
本文共分为七大部分。
第一部分为导论。主要介绍了本文的研究背景、研究价值和意义、采用的研究方法、研究思路、研究的创新点以及本文的结构及安排。
第二部分为文献综述。本部分对研究文献进行了重新梳理,从公司治理的要素研究、公司治理的结构研究、公司治理系统评价的研究以及公司治理的有效性的研究等方面进行文献综述,着重介绍了国内外有代表性的公司治理评价系统:标准普尔创立的公司治理评价系统;亚州里昂证券的公司治理评级体系; CIMA公司治理战略记分卡;中国台湾辅仁大学2002年公司治理与评等系统;2003年南开大学的公司治理指数等,并指出了现有研究的不足。
第三部分是公司治理的有效性评价依据。本部分通过对公司治理绩效和公司治理溢价研究、公司治理效率研究和公司治理的有效性研究等不同阶段分析,对公司治理的有效性进行了界定。并对公司治理的有效性评价的理论依据和现实依据进行了分析。评价的理论依据是委托代理理论、博弈论、系统理论和现代企业理论;现实依据是OECD的治理原则、世界银行的公司治理架构和中国上市公司治理准则。
第四部分是公司治理的有效性的评价维度和指标体系。本部分以价值导向和大股东利益导向为基础,初步设计公司治理的有效性评价的7个维度:股东治理的有效性、董事会治理的有效性、监事会治理的有效性、经理层治理的有效性、利益相关者治理的有效性、信息透明度的有效性与法律基础和中小投资者保护的有效性和26个指标,并进一步对指标与公司绩效的关系进行了假设。
第五部分是对公司治理的有效性评价指标体系的修正。首先确定了公司治理无效的样本公司,如ST、被证监会通报查处、被媒体披露的问题公司等;然后分别计算治理无效的样本公司和治理有效的样本公司的评价值,运用统计分析软件EVIEWS3.1和EXCELL软件的T-检验方法来验证两类公司的评价值的显著差异性,如无显著性的差异,则需进一步修正指标体系,并反复验证;最后确定了可用于公司治理的有效性评价的5个维度,即股东治理的有效性、董事会治理的有效性、经理层治理的有效性、信息透明度的有效性、法律基础和中小投资者保护的有效性和15个评价指标体系。
第六部分是公司治理的有效性评价模型的实证分析。在确定了公司治理的有效性评价的维度与指标体系的基础上,本部分确定了公司治理的有效性的评价维度权重,构建了公司治理的有效性的评价模型。通过该评价模型计算出公司治理无效的指数均值,并以该均值为基准值,结合专家意见分析、确定了临界值。以临界值为分组标志将所有的样本公司分为治理有效和无效两组,运用描述统计分析方法对公司治理无效的治理特征进行全面的描述。对于治理无效的公司的治理特征,主要有以下发现:股东治理有效性方面:超额控制严重;大股东与上市公司存在超额的关联交易;大股东介入股市明显,产生较严重的权益代理问题;超额担保严重;最大股东持股比例较低;第二至第十大股东持股比例较低。董事会治理方面:最大股东绝对控制了董事会和监事会;过多无效董事会会议。经理层治理方面:CEO与董事长两职合一现象严重且最大股东普遍参与管理。信息透明度的有效性方面:上市公司诚信缺失严重。法律基础和中小投资者保护方面:很小部分公司在其他市场挂牌上市。
第七部分为本研究结论与进一步研究的方向。本文对中国上市公司治理的有效性评价问题进行了研究,得到了一些有意义的研究结论,主要有:(1)关于公司治理的有效性的界定;(2)关于公司治理的有效性评价基础的确定;(3)关于公司治理的有效性评价指标体系的选择;(4)关于公司治理的有效性的临界值的计算;(5)关于治理无效的公司特征的揭示。未来继续研究的方面:如绩效指标的选取问题;以临界值为标志进行的治理有效性分组问题;研究方法的选择问题;如遇国家资本市场政策的重大调整,有关指标的得分、临界值的计算等调整问题以及对股权分置改革前后的公司治理的有效性的对比研究等等。
本文的主要创新之处体现在:(1)确定了以公司价值导向和最大股东利益导向为评价的切入点;(2)构建了公司治理的有效性评价的指标体系和评价模型;(3)确定了公司治理无效的评价指数临界值;(4)采用T-检验等统计方法对公司治理的有效性评价的指标体系进行筛选和修正。
本研究的局限性在于:由于本文所做的研究主要采用的是上市公司公开的数据,运用T-检验方法筛选与修正评价指标,这一方面考虑了理论上、研究方法上的严谨性,但另一方面可能会造成对公司治理实践上的忽视。
With the gradual research of Corporate Governance issue from the theory world and practice, studies on Corporate Governance are now on the stage of Assessment of Corporate Governance system, quantitativing research, after processing the research of the Key Element and of the Structure of Corporate Governance.
Constructing scientific, effective system of indicators of corporate governance has its important effects, which will benefit to protect stakeholders’interests, to strengthen government to supervise listed firms, to form Prestige restriction mechanism, to enhance securities market development. The current grading system of Corporate Governance is apt to assessing Corporate Governance construction, operating procedure and essential rules or regulations, which serves as the goal of monitoring and regulations’perfection as possible. The current assessment cannot reflect the effetiveness of corporate governance. Governing risk in China mainly originates from moral hazard; firms with the higher score of Corporate Governance often lead to governing risk. The research report that Chinese Academy of Social Sciences said that the score of corporate governance is not obviously related with the company’s performance also indicates that there maybe exist some problems in current procedure and method or in assessment of corporate governance system.
Assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance based on firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit is a new idea and a new research method on quantitativing research of corporate governance and it can partly dabate some deficiency of the current grading system.
Studies of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance based on firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit has its important sense in theory and pratice: firstly, it enhances people understanding on definition of effectiveness of corporate governance, definites oriented theory from the rating of corporate governance structure to assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, definites the theory of system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, which makes relevant literature rich. Secondly, supervision can strengthen its power on firms that their assessment value are lower than critical value and make it feasible to protect small & middle stockholders’benefits, to form Prestige restriction mechanism, to securities market development and to enhance securities market development. Small & middle stockholders may shun firms that would be ineffective in corporate governance and woule invade their benefit. This may realize reasonable allocationon social resources. Firms of ineffectiveness of corporate governance will be forced to improve their corporate governce structure because of restrict supervision and initiative shun of small & middle stockholders
This paper’s research mentality is: taking firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit as the assessment basis, constructing system of indicators and model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance after analyzing and appraising the past literature, defining the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance by further positive test, grouping the listed firms according to the critical value standard and describing the common characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance clearly.
In the research process, the paper uses the comparative analysis; normal analysis, positive analysis, multivariate linear regression analysis, and so on.
Part 1 is on introductions. It mainly introduces research background, research value, research method, research innovations, its structure and arrangement.
Part 2 is on literature review. This part gives literature summary from the research of the Key Element and of the Structure of corporate governance and of Assessment of corporate governance system to the stage of effectiveness of corporate governance, emphasizes to introduce the typical corporate governance assessment system of the home and abroad, such as corporate governance rating of Standard & Poors, of CLSA Credit Lyonnais Securities in Asia, of Fujen Catholic University of 2002, of CCGINK of Nankai University of 2003 and so on, summarizes the literature deficiency.
Part 3 is on the basis of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. This part gives the assumption of effectiveness of corporate governance by analyzing corporate governance performance and corporate governance premium, governance efficiency , effectiveness of corporate governance and provides the theory basis for assessment, such as principle-agent theory, the game theory, systematic theory and modern theory of the firm and the practice basis, such as the OECD principle, the World Bank's governance framework and governance criterion of Chinese listed companies.
Part 4 is on dimension and system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. It preliminarily designs 7 dimensions: governance of the largest shareholder, governance of the board of directors, governance of the the board of supervisors, governance of the CEO, governance of stakeholders, governance of the financial information disclosre and governance of the law basis and small & middle investors’protection and 26 indicators based on firms’oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit, judges the relationship between system of indicators and firm’s performance.
Part 5 is on amendment of system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. It selects sample firms of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, such as the firms marked ST, ones that are circulated by China Securities Regulatory Commission for their issues and ones are discolsed by the medium, calculates the assessment value of the two sample firms, tests the assessment value’s significant difference by T-test method of Eviews3.1 and Excell repeadedly, defines 5 dimension: governance of the largest shareholder, governance of the board of directors, governance of the CEO, governance of the financial information disclosre and governance of the law basis and small & middle investors’protection and 15 system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance.
Part 6 is on positive analysis of the model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance. It defines the weight of assessment dimension, constructs the model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, calculates the average value of system of indicators of ineffectiveness of corporate governance companies, defines the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance by the above average value and experts advices, describes the characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance through descriptive statistics. It lists main findings on the characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, which lies in: For governance of the largest shareholder: serious extra control; existing extra related party transactions between the largest shareholder and listed firms; The largest shareholder gets involved in securities and causes serious equity agent issues; serious extra guarantee; the lower proportion of the largest shareholder; the lower proportion of the second to tenth shareholders.For governance of the board of directors: The largest shareholder abosolutely controls the board of directors and the board of supervisors; so many ineffective meetings of the board of directors. For governance of the CEO: the CEO and chairman duties are centralized seriously and the largest shareholder takes part in operating activies. For governance of the financial information disclosre: serious lack of sincerity in listed firms. For governance of the law basis and small & middle investors’protection: fewer firms are listed in other securires markets abroad.
Part 7 is on research conclusions and limitations. The main research of the paper are:(1)definiting effectiveness of corporate governance, (2)definiting the basis of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, (3)selecting system of indicators of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, (4)calculating and defining the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, (5)describing the characteristics of ineffectiveness of corporate governance. Because the paper uses the public data of listed firms to make research and uses t-test, which considered scientific aspect in theory and methods on the hand and it maybe neglect the pratice of corporate governance. Further studies of the paper lies in: performance index selection, grouping based on critical value, research method selection, adjustment in index-score and critical value calculation when policies on capital market are changed, comparative research on ineffectiveness of corporate governancebefore and after reforming of stockholders structure.
The key innovations embodys in: (1) defining firm’s oriented value and the largest shareholder’s oriented benefit as assessing basis, (2) constructing system of indicators and model of assessment of effectiveness of corporate governance, (3) defining the critical value of ineffectiveness of corporate governance, (4) screening and amending system of indicators by T-test.
引文
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⑤连锁董事会(interlocking boards of director),是指在某一行业担任董事的同时也出任其他行业的董事,对于此问题,美国加州大学的本.巴格迪坎(Ben H·Bagdikian)作过深入研究。
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32 作者通过对已有的关于上市公司利益相关者信息披露的资料统计整理初步得到的结论。
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