上市公司隧道行为及其影响因素研究
|
摘要
大量研究表明,并不是所有国家的股权都是分散的,相当部分国家的股权是相对集中甚至是高度集中的,集中的股权结构容易导致控股股东利用控制权侵害中小股东的利益,上市公司控股股东的隧道行为损害了中小股东的利益,不利于上市公司的发展,甚至严重阻碍资本市场的健康发展。我国上市公司普遍存在“一股独大”的现象,因此控股股东通过直接占用上市公司资金、关联方交易等“挖掘隧道”的方式损害中小股东的利益,侵占上市公司利益,阻碍我国金融市场的发展。
本文首先从德棉股份和九发股份违规的例子引出:虽然上市公司隧道行为的环境有所改善,但是我国上市公司控股股东的隧道行为仍然存在。
其次,本文在对国内外相关文献研究的基础上,结合我国隧道行为环境的变化,总结前人研究的不足,并指出本文的研究方向。
再次,本文对隧道行为的形成机制、国有上市公司与非国有上市公司在隧道行为程度上的不同之处、隧道行为的方式以及隧道行为产生的危害进行理论分析。
最后,本文选择08年我国A股上市公司样本,剔除不存在隧道行为的整体上市样本、可能会利用关联方交易对上市公司进行支撑的ST样本、可能会利用关联方交易进行盈余管理的样本,再将样本分为国有和非国有进行比较研究。选择关联方交易作为隧道行为的替代变量分析第一大股东持股比例、控制权与现金流权的分离、股权制衡、机构投资者、流通股比例、独立董事比例对隧道行为的影响。
本文研究发现:在我国隧道行为的方式有了一定的变化;在影响因素上,第一大股东持股比例与两权分离度致使我国存在严重的隧道行为,股权制衡与流通股比例对隧道行为起到很好的制衡作用,机构投资者起到了一定的制衡作用,独立董事比例没有对隧道行为起到制衡作用;第一大股东持股比例过高、股权制衡较弱以及两权分离对国有上市公司的影响过大致使国有上市公司存在严重的隧道行为。
As the research, we found that not all the countries’shares are dispersed, a considerable part of the country's shares is relatively concentrated or highly concentrated, concentrated shares lead to controlling shareholders use control right to infract the interests of small shareholders, the tunneling activities not only undermine the interests of small shareholders, as well as damage the development of listed companies, or even impediment to the healthy of capital markets. The phenomenon of“only one big share”is very popular in China. therefore, the controlling shareholder of listed companies through direct occupation of funds, related party transactions and other "tunneling" approach to occupation listed company's interests and harm the interests of small shareholders, impede China's financial markets.
Firstly, this paper take example of two list companies whose capital was occupied by the controlling shareholders get: Although the tunneling environment has changed, but the controlling shareholders of listed companies’tunneling activities still exists in China.
Secondly, this paper obtains predecessors’shortage on the study of literature at home and abroad, and based on the changed environment of the tunneling activities.
Again, this paper analysis the formation mechanism of the tunneling activities, the differences between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies in the tunneling activities, the quomodo of tunneling activities and the harm of tunneling activities.
Finally, this paper distinguish between samples, excluding the holistic listed company samples, excluding the ST samples that controlling shareholders may use related party transactions to supported ,and excluding the samples that controlling shareholders may use related party transactions to do some earnings management, and then divide the sample into state-owned and non-state to do comparative study. This paper choice related party transactions as substitute variables for tunneling activities, choice the proportion of largest shareholder, the resolution between control rights and cash flow, equity restriction ratio, institutional investors, the proportion of circulation stock, the proportion of independent directors on board of directors.
Through this paper we found that: our country’s tunneling behavior has changed in a certain way; in influencing factors, the first shareholding ratio and separation of ownership lead to the serious tunneling, equity restriction and the proportion of circulation stock restrain the tunneling, institutional investors play a limited role on tunneling, the proportion of independent directors does not play a role on tunneling, the high proportion of largest shareholder, the weak equity restriction and the excess influence of separation of two rights lead to state-owned listed company’s serious tunneling.
本文首先从德棉股份和九发股份违规的例子引出:虽然上市公司隧道行为的环境有所改善,但是我国上市公司控股股东的隧道行为仍然存在。
其次,本文在对国内外相关文献研究的基础上,结合我国隧道行为环境的变化,总结前人研究的不足,并指出本文的研究方向。
再次,本文对隧道行为的形成机制、国有上市公司与非国有上市公司在隧道行为程度上的不同之处、隧道行为的方式以及隧道行为产生的危害进行理论分析。
最后,本文选择08年我国A股上市公司样本,剔除不存在隧道行为的整体上市样本、可能会利用关联方交易对上市公司进行支撑的ST样本、可能会利用关联方交易进行盈余管理的样本,再将样本分为国有和非国有进行比较研究。选择关联方交易作为隧道行为的替代变量分析第一大股东持股比例、控制权与现金流权的分离、股权制衡、机构投资者、流通股比例、独立董事比例对隧道行为的影响。
本文研究发现:在我国隧道行为的方式有了一定的变化;在影响因素上,第一大股东持股比例与两权分离度致使我国存在严重的隧道行为,股权制衡与流通股比例对隧道行为起到很好的制衡作用,机构投资者起到了一定的制衡作用,独立董事比例没有对隧道行为起到制衡作用;第一大股东持股比例过高、股权制衡较弱以及两权分离对国有上市公司的影响过大致使国有上市公司存在严重的隧道行为。
As the research, we found that not all the countries’shares are dispersed, a considerable part of the country's shares is relatively concentrated or highly concentrated, concentrated shares lead to controlling shareholders use control right to infract the interests of small shareholders, the tunneling activities not only undermine the interests of small shareholders, as well as damage the development of listed companies, or even impediment to the healthy of capital markets. The phenomenon of“only one big share”is very popular in China. therefore, the controlling shareholder of listed companies through direct occupation of funds, related party transactions and other "tunneling" approach to occupation listed company's interests and harm the interests of small shareholders, impede China's financial markets.
Firstly, this paper take example of two list companies whose capital was occupied by the controlling shareholders get: Although the tunneling environment has changed, but the controlling shareholders of listed companies’tunneling activities still exists in China.
Secondly, this paper obtains predecessors’shortage on the study of literature at home and abroad, and based on the changed environment of the tunneling activities.
Again, this paper analysis the formation mechanism of the tunneling activities, the differences between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies in the tunneling activities, the quomodo of tunneling activities and the harm of tunneling activities.
Finally, this paper distinguish between samples, excluding the holistic listed company samples, excluding the ST samples that controlling shareholders may use related party transactions to supported ,and excluding the samples that controlling shareholders may use related party transactions to do some earnings management, and then divide the sample into state-owned and non-state to do comparative study. This paper choice related party transactions as substitute variables for tunneling activities, choice the proportion of largest shareholder, the resolution between control rights and cash flow, equity restriction ratio, institutional investors, the proportion of circulation stock, the proportion of independent directors on board of directors.
Through this paper we found that: our country’s tunneling behavior has changed in a certain way; in influencing factors, the first shareholding ratio and separation of ownership lead to the serious tunneling, equity restriction and the proportion of circulation stock restrain the tunneling, institutional investors play a limited role on tunneling, the proportion of independent directors does not play a role on tunneling, the high proportion of largest shareholder, the weak equity restriction and the excess influence of separation of two rights lead to state-owned listed company’s serious tunneling.
引文
[1] Johnson,La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,et al.Tunneling.AmericanEconomic Review,2000,90:22-27.
[2] Jensen,Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.Journal of FinancialEconomics,1976,3:305-360.
[3] La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shileifer,et al.Corporate OwnershipAround the World.The Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517
[4] La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shileifer,et al.Legal Determinantsof External Finance.Journal of Finance,1997,23:1131-1150.
[5] Stijin Clasessens,Simeon Diankow,Larry H.Lang.Expropriationof Minority Shareholders:Evidence from East Asia[M].Word BankWorking Paper,1998:33-41
[6] Mara Faccio、Lerry Lang,Leslie Young.Dividends andExpropriation.The American Economic Review,2001,91:54-78.
[7] Lemmon,Michael,Karl V.Lins.Ownership Structure,CorporateGovernance,and Firm Value:Evidence from the East AsianFinancial Crisis.Journal of Finance,2003,58:21-38
[8] Fan、Wong,Zhang.The Emerging of Corporate Pyramids inChina.HongKang:Chinese University of HongKang,2005:132-146
[9] Johnson,Boone,Breach,et al.Corporate Governance In TheAsianFinancial Crisis.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:141-186
[10] Bertrand.Ferreting out tunneling:An application to Indian businessgroups.Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,118:121-148
[11] Wolfenzon,Daniel.A theory of pyramidal structures.Cambridge:Harvard University,1999:121-139
[12] Bennedsen,Wolfenzon.The Balance of Power In Closely HeldCorporations.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:113-139
[13] Clasessens,Simeon Djankov,Joseph P.H.Fan,et al.Disentanglingthe incentive and entrenchment effects of largeshareholdings.journal of finance,2002,57:2741-2771
[14] Art Durnev,E.Han Kim.To Steal or Not to Steal:Firm Attributes,Legal Environment,and Valuation.Working Paper,SocialScience Research Network,2003:49-86
[15]王俊秋.股权结构、隧道挖掘与公司价值的实证研究.财会通讯,2006,8:30-34
[16]马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策.会计研究,2005,9:44-50
[17]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究.南开管理评论,2004,6:33-38
[18]朱红军,汪辉.股权制衡可以改善公司治理吗?—宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争得案例研究.管理世界,2004,10:71-79
[19]肖燕.上市公司“掏空”现象透视—以ST猴王为例.当代经济,2004,10:28-29
[20]张光荣,曾勇.大股东的支持行为与隧道行为—基于托普软件的案例研究.管理世界,2006,8:23-27
[21]吕长江,肖成民.民营上市公司所有权安排与掏空行为——基于阳光集团的案例研究.管理世界,2006,10:128-138
[22]吴晓求.股权分置改革后的中国资本市场.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006:104-113
[23]郑江绥,袁宁,宫胜.控制权分裂、股权分置与上市公司治理.西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,2:55-58
[24]李黎,张羽.解决股权分置:一个金融政治经济学的视角.重庆社会科学,2005,10:15-20
[25]王国刚,杨涛.股市公共性:股权分置改革的理论根据.中国工业经济,2006,4:13-21
[26]胡松.股权分置改革的经济学分析.江西财经大学学报,2006,3:9-13
[27]瞿卫东,姜诚.股权分置改革中的对价问题研究.经济与管理研究,2006,1:42-46
[28]苏梅,寇纪淞,陈富赞.股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究.管理科学学报,2006,1:54-61
[29]廖旗平,陈建梁.对股权分置改革对价水平影响因素的分析.审计与经济研究,2006,3:92-96
[30]朱小平,暴冰,杨研.股权分置改革与流动性定价问题研究.会计研究,2006,2:87-92
[31]廖旗平.对利用权证解决股权分置问题的分析.中央财经大学学报,2005,9:14-20
[32]程华.权证:股权分置改革中的新探索.财会通讯,2006,3:15-21
[33]何俊德,杨诚,梁红丽.关于股权分置改革中对价问题研究.华东经济管理,2006,7:34-41
[34]奉立城,许伟河.股权分置改革试点上市公司的超常收益实证研究.当代财经,2006,2:5-9
[35]李冻菊.股权分置改革的效应研究——来自深市中小企业板的实证.经济经纬,2006,4:3-8
[36]张继袖,陆宇建.股权分置改革的市场反应研究——以中小企业板为视角.南京师大学报(社会科学版),2006,4:40-50
[37]李琪琦.对股权分置改革市场效应的探讨——基于46家股改试点公司的实证分析.贵州财经学院学报,2006,1:35-40
[38]黎璞,陈晓红,刘剑锋.对股权分置改革的事件法研究.系统工程,2004,7:10-14
[39]刘成彦,陈炜.后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究.证券市场导报,2006,10:16-27
[40]林乐芬.中国上市公司股权集中度研究.北京:经济管理出版社,2005:10-18
[41]王瑞英,谢清喜,郭飞.我国上市公司关联交易的实证研究—基于2002年及2003年第一季度的数据分析.财贸经济,2003, 12:29-35.
[42]陈晓,王瑞.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据.经济研究,2005,4:77-86.
[43]肖眠.自由现金流量、利益输送与现金股利.经济科学,2005, 2:67-76.
[44]赵海林,郑垂勇.上市公司利益转移研究—基于冀东水泥的案例研究,当代财经,2005(11):104-107
[45]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究.管理世界,2005 9:119-151
[46]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排—来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004,12:3-13
[47]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择.中国会计评论,2004,2:40-45
[48]王宛秋,毛春华.上市公司大股东占款现象的分析与对策.会计之友,2004,2:18-19
[49]刘志远,花贵如.政府控制、机构投资者持股与投资者权益保护.财经研究,2009, 4:119-130
[52]周县华,吕长江.股权分置改革高股利分配与投资者利益保护—基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究.会计研究,2008,8:59-68
[53]张祥建,郭岚.关联交易与控制性股东的行为实施.资本市场2007,5:97-105
[54]罗党论,唐清泉.金字塔结构、所有制与中小股东利益保护.财经研究,2008 ,9:132-143
[55]罗党论,唐清泉.市场环境与控股股东“掏空”行为研究.会计研究, 2007,4:69-74
[56]赵海林.上市公司利益转移行为研究.[博士学位论文].河海大学,2005:54-56
[2] Jensen,Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.Journal of FinancialEconomics,1976,3:305-360.
[3] La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shileifer,et al.Corporate OwnershipAround the World.The Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517
[4] La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shileifer,et al.Legal Determinantsof External Finance.Journal of Finance,1997,23:1131-1150.
[5] Stijin Clasessens,Simeon Diankow,Larry H.Lang.Expropriationof Minority Shareholders:Evidence from East Asia[M].Word BankWorking Paper,1998:33-41
[6] Mara Faccio、Lerry Lang,Leslie Young.Dividends andExpropriation.The American Economic Review,2001,91:54-78.
[7] Lemmon,Michael,Karl V.Lins.Ownership Structure,CorporateGovernance,and Firm Value:Evidence from the East AsianFinancial Crisis.Journal of Finance,2003,58:21-38
[8] Fan、Wong,Zhang.The Emerging of Corporate Pyramids inChina.HongKang:Chinese University of HongKang,2005:132-146
[9] Johnson,Boone,Breach,et al.Corporate Governance In TheAsianFinancial Crisis.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:141-186
[10] Bertrand.Ferreting out tunneling:An application to Indian businessgroups.Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,118:121-148
[11] Wolfenzon,Daniel.A theory of pyramidal structures.Cambridge:Harvard University,1999:121-139
[12] Bennedsen,Wolfenzon.The Balance of Power In Closely HeldCorporations.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:113-139
[13] Clasessens,Simeon Djankov,Joseph P.H.Fan,et al.Disentanglingthe incentive and entrenchment effects of largeshareholdings.journal of finance,2002,57:2741-2771
[14] Art Durnev,E.Han Kim.To Steal or Not to Steal:Firm Attributes,Legal Environment,and Valuation.Working Paper,SocialScience Research Network,2003:49-86
[15]王俊秋.股权结构、隧道挖掘与公司价值的实证研究.财会通讯,2006,8:30-34
[16]马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策.会计研究,2005,9:44-50
[17]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究.南开管理评论,2004,6:33-38
[18]朱红军,汪辉.股权制衡可以改善公司治理吗?—宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争得案例研究.管理世界,2004,10:71-79
[19]肖燕.上市公司“掏空”现象透视—以ST猴王为例.当代经济,2004,10:28-29
[20]张光荣,曾勇.大股东的支持行为与隧道行为—基于托普软件的案例研究.管理世界,2006,8:23-27
[21]吕长江,肖成民.民营上市公司所有权安排与掏空行为——基于阳光集团的案例研究.管理世界,2006,10:128-138
[22]吴晓求.股权分置改革后的中国资本市场.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006:104-113
[23]郑江绥,袁宁,宫胜.控制权分裂、股权分置与上市公司治理.西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,2:55-58
[24]李黎,张羽.解决股权分置:一个金融政治经济学的视角.重庆社会科学,2005,10:15-20
[25]王国刚,杨涛.股市公共性:股权分置改革的理论根据.中国工业经济,2006,4:13-21
[26]胡松.股权分置改革的经济学分析.江西财经大学学报,2006,3:9-13
[27]瞿卫东,姜诚.股权分置改革中的对价问题研究.经济与管理研究,2006,1:42-46
[28]苏梅,寇纪淞,陈富赞.股权分置改革中股东间博弈的实证研究.管理科学学报,2006,1:54-61
[29]廖旗平,陈建梁.对股权分置改革对价水平影响因素的分析.审计与经济研究,2006,3:92-96
[30]朱小平,暴冰,杨研.股权分置改革与流动性定价问题研究.会计研究,2006,2:87-92
[31]廖旗平.对利用权证解决股权分置问题的分析.中央财经大学学报,2005,9:14-20
[32]程华.权证:股权分置改革中的新探索.财会通讯,2006,3:15-21
[33]何俊德,杨诚,梁红丽.关于股权分置改革中对价问题研究.华东经济管理,2006,7:34-41
[34]奉立城,许伟河.股权分置改革试点上市公司的超常收益实证研究.当代财经,2006,2:5-9
[35]李冻菊.股权分置改革的效应研究——来自深市中小企业板的实证.经济经纬,2006,4:3-8
[36]张继袖,陆宇建.股权分置改革的市场反应研究——以中小企业板为视角.南京师大学报(社会科学版),2006,4:40-50
[37]李琪琦.对股权分置改革市场效应的探讨——基于46家股改试点公司的实证分析.贵州财经学院学报,2006,1:35-40
[38]黎璞,陈晓红,刘剑锋.对股权分置改革的事件法研究.系统工程,2004,7:10-14
[39]刘成彦,陈炜.后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究.证券市场导报,2006,10:16-27
[40]林乐芬.中国上市公司股权集中度研究.北京:经济管理出版社,2005:10-18
[41]王瑞英,谢清喜,郭飞.我国上市公司关联交易的实证研究—基于2002年及2003年第一季度的数据分析.财贸经济,2003, 12:29-35.
[42]陈晓,王瑞.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据.经济研究,2005,4:77-86.
[43]肖眠.自由现金流量、利益输送与现金股利.经济科学,2005, 2:67-76.
[44]赵海林,郑垂勇.上市公司利益转移研究—基于冀东水泥的案例研究,当代财经,2005(11):104-107
[45]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究.管理世界,2005 9:119-151
[46]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排—来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004,12:3-13
[47]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择.中国会计评论,2004,2:40-45
[48]王宛秋,毛春华.上市公司大股东占款现象的分析与对策.会计之友,2004,2:18-19
[49]刘志远,花贵如.政府控制、机构投资者持股与投资者权益保护.财经研究,2009, 4:119-130
[52]周县华,吕长江.股权分置改革高股利分配与投资者利益保护—基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究.会计研究,2008,8:59-68
[53]张祥建,郭岚.关联交易与控制性股东的行为实施.资本市场2007,5:97-105
[54]罗党论,唐清泉.金字塔结构、所有制与中小股东利益保护.财经研究,2008 ,9:132-143
[55]罗党论,唐清泉.市场环境与控股股东“掏空”行为研究.会计研究, 2007,4:69-74
[56]赵海林.上市公司利益转移行为研究.[博士学位论文].河海大学,2005:54-56