我国经济增长主要因素的理论研究与实证分析
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摘要
本文在系统回顾国内外研究文献的基础上,对我国经济增长主要因素进行了理论研究和实证分析。首先,对经济增长要素内生化模型进行演绎,推导出新古典内生要素、金融、制度与经济增长的内生化模型。结合我国经济改革实践,分析要素发展和经济增长的内在共生关系,并在要素发展和经济增长内生化过程的基础上,得出经济增长效率的内生决定机制。同时,对我国改革开放政策和贸易发展根源、经济增长动力和产权约束下的适应性组织形式进行了经验演绎。其次,分析金融发展和经济增长的关系。在回顾金融发展和金融业改革历程后,通过模型和实证进一步分析了产权约束下的金融发展和经济增长关系问题,并分别利用HP滤波、小波变换和互谱分析等方法,检验我国银行业发展、证券市场发展与经济增长关系。第三,利用时间序列数据对我国经济增长主要因素进行检验,在设计出经济增长主要因素指标后,利用OLS和GMM方法对主要因素和经济增长关系进行对比和分析,并测度了资本、劳动和全要素生产率对经济增长的贡献,进一步利用状态空间模型分析经济增长主要因素对全要素生产率贡献的动态变化特征。第四,采用地区面板数据(Panel Data)对我国经济增长主要因素进行再分析。在对比各地区要素投入和定性考查地区经济增长主要因素差异后,利用Kernel Density Distribution(核密度分布)函数考察地区经济增长变化特征,并进行经济增长主要因素贡献分解,再次验证我国经济增长动力和要素贡献的阶段性特征。
总之,这些研究不仅深化了内生经济增长理论,解释了我国经济增长的动力和效率问题,验证了要素对经济增长贡献的阶段性特征,同时也为西部开发、老东北工业基地振兴和新农村建设提供有益的理论支持和经验证据。
About the question of factors of economic growth, the literatures always are on the argument, and the factor determinant theory each emphasize its own factor on the determinant effect on economic growth. Until now, that which factor finally makes economy grow still doesn’t achieve the agreement. The uncertainty of environment, the endogenous characteristic of factor development and economic growth, and the limitation of the empirical test methods, all these make the argument last on. So the theory history of economic growth is the history of the origin of economic growth.
The liberation of economy, the marketization and the reform of property right are the basic characters, and the success of almost thirty years reform makes the researchers focus on Chinese economic growth. What makes the factor development, and what makes Chinese economic growth? Some paper makes the success of Chinese growth owning to the empirical and experimental reform. Others point out that Chinese economic reform is not the experimental reform. It is the reform that the river by touching the stone, or the fiscal decentralization of the central and local government. All these literatures almost apply the free market economic theory into Chinese economy, and quickly make the conclusion, and neglect the complex process of Chinese growth.
So economic growth research should not only emphasize on the one factor and causal relationship, but also on the economic and institution environment of each country. Chinese economic reform is being on without political institution reform, and under the state bank owned financial structure and state capital owned property right structure, and the government governance, Chinese economic growth can be used to compare the factor contribution. Based on the limitation of economic growth theory, and further to analyse the factor attributions, and to explain the characters of Chinese economic reform under the traditional political institution, the research content of the paper is including with: (1)the endogenous process of factor development and economic growth; (2)the original cause of Chinese reform and openness and the factor analysis of Chinese economic growth; (3)the causality of financial development and economic growth; (4)the determinant factor attribution of economic growth; (5)the dynamic characters of the factor attribution of economic growth.
The paper is including with seven chapters.
Chapter 1 is the review of the literature of economic growth and the content of the paper. In the first section, the paper reviews the literatures, and points out that the main arguments of the literatures can be divided into four kinds, the theory of the institution, the neoclassic endogenous factors, the finance factor, and the region. (1)the institution theory points out that only the efficient institution can make the limiting of the government and property protection into reality, stimulate investment and technology progress, and promote the economy to grow. It is the development of political institution and property institution ahead of economic growth that determines economic growth. (2)the neoclassic endogenous theory shows that the investment of the capital, the human capital, the technology, and the trade is the origin of economic growth, and that the development of all these factors is ahead of the institutional development, and the final cause of the institution and democracy development, and that the political institution appears when the neoclassic factors develop further. (3)the financial theory argues that economic growth originates from the financial development, and that other factors only depend on the finance to be used by the economy, and all these is just the channels of the financial development to make the progress of the economy, and the financial development is not the effect but the cause of economic growth. (4)the regional theory believes that the region determines the endowment of the resource, the climate, the transportation, which difference will affect the speed of the capital accumulation, the quality of the human capital, the technology, and economic production. In control of the effect of the policy and the institution, the region will have effect on economic growth through the transition cost, the transportation, the health and the productivity of the agriculture. For example, the coastal region makes use of the convenient condition of the transportation, and the low transportation cost, and the superiority of the international trade, to promote the economy grow more quickly. But the disadvantageous region and the burning climate will make the population grow excessively quickly and excessively heavy and healthy burden, all these hinder economic growth. So it shows that the region not only have effect on the model of economic growth and institutional development, but also make function with the production precession. Namely, the region determines economic growth. The second and third section further concludes that the limitation of the index, the sample, the method, the assumption of the model, and the further research field of economic growth. The fourth section explains the content, the methods, and the new idea of the paper.
Chapter 2 is that the model of the development of the endogenous factor of economic growth. Based on the logic and the framework of the neoclassic endogenous growth theory, the first section reviews the dynamic process of the capital and human capital, and the characters of the capital development on the way of the balanced growth. Because in the neoclassic growth model without the financial system, and with the financial function more powerful, the second section fully thinks about the financial function. The model shows that whether the endogenous causality of the financial development and economic growth or not depends whether the financial capital can be invested into the best efficient production economy. If the financial capital has been invested in the best efficient economy, it has the close causality relationship of the financial development and economic growth. If in the financial section it is the state owned property structure and the governance structure of the government determination, it will be lack of the efficiency of the financial development, and can’t keep up with economic growth, and will be not cause but the result of economic growth.
Based on the institution attribution and the logic of the institution determination that the origin of growth is the institution especially the property institution and property protection in the transition economy, and with the institution the capital can promote economic growth, and the capital and human capital is just the production factors, the third section concludes the institutional model. The model shows that: (1)in the transition economy, especially the developing country without the perfect institution, economic growth originates from the institutional development. The more quickly and efficient the institutional development is, the more quickly economy grows, namely, economic growth is limited with the institutional development. (2)in the market economy with the perfect institution, economic growth depends on the technology and the human capital, namely, the more quickly the technology and the human capital grow, the more quickly the economy grows. It also points out that in different environment and growth stage, the determinant factor is different. Namely, in the perfect market economy, economic growth is originated from the neoclassic endogenous factors. In the economy without the efficient institution, the institution determines economic growth.
Chapter 3 is the theoretic analysis of the factor development and economic growth. Based the limitation of the factor theory, and according to the reality of Chinese reform, the chapter achieves some theoretic hypothesis. The first section studies on the determinant factors of economic growth and the causality relationship of the institution and the other factors in the model, and shows that the other factors development is originated in the institutional development. Through building the model of factor development and economic growth, the second section concludes that the factor development is endogenous in economic growth originated from the resource endowment and property institution especially the property protection, and that economic growth depends on the factor development, which is originated in the resource endowment and the property right, and that the present growth will strengthen the resource endowment and the factor development of the future, which will determine economic growth of the future, namely, the resource endowment and the level of economic growth of t period→ the property institution and property protection of t period→the factor development of t period→economic growth of t period→the resource endowment and the level of economic growth of t+1 period. The third section concludes the endogenous mechanisms of economic growth on the base of the endogenous factor development. The content is that: the resource endowment RSt and the structure of the property right PRSt of t period→the governance mechanism SGMt of t period→the factor allocation way and efficiency FAt of t period→economic growth efficiency EGEt and the income allocation IRt of t period→the resource endowment RSt+1 and the institution structure PRSt+1 of t+1 period. Namely, economic growth not only depends on the factor development, but also the resource endowment and the property structure, and even if some country with the same resource endowment, its economic growth may be different.
Chapter 4 is the institution attribution of Chinese economic growth. The first section deduces the origination of reform and openness policy. It points out that the policy comes from the polity, which is originated in the economic condition and resource endowment of Chinese especial development stage, especially low income of the country and cities. The second section is further to study the determinant factors. Some papers make economic growth owing to the government voluntary choice and the polity especially the trade policy. This section deduces that the development of trade is originated in the property institution. Based on the development of the rural enterprises and the reform of state owned enterprises, the third section analyses the best organization institution under the different level of the property right and the property protection.
Chapter 5 is the empirical study of the relationship of financial development and economic growth. According to the assumption and deduction of the contents, the financial market is not efficient. The first section reviews the reform process of the financial development and financial reform, especially the institution origin of low efficiency of state owned banks. The second section studies the relationship of financial development and economic growth with the limit of the property right, and shows that the property right of the finance determines the investment and the efficiency of the capital, and further determines economic growth. If the state-owned finance has more power in the economy, the efficiency of finance is much lower. There is less positive function to economic growth. If the finance is in the control of the state-owned, the finance has no efficiency, and there is no co-growth of financial development and economic growth. The third section and fourth section test the efficiency of the bank and the stock market. Based on the hp filter, the wavelet and the spectrum analysis respectively, Chinese financial development and economic growth have no dual causality relationship, and financial development lags economic growth, and financial development is the result of economic growth. One explanation is that the state owned property right structure causes the low efficiency.
Chapter 6 is the empirical test of the main factors based on the series of Chinese whole economic growth. In the first section, it is to design and explain the indexes of the determinant factors. The second section is to test the factor attribution in different methods. The results show the different factors have different attribution. The test proves that, the property institution is endogenous in economic growth, and can explain the development of the capital, the human capital, the financial factor and the trade. The third section and the fourth section retest the attribution of the capital, the human capital, and the whole factor productive based on the State Space Model, and show that Chinese economic growth mainly depends on the quantity of the capital and the labor, and the institution. But the high attribution of the capital has included the function of the institution. Because the institution can make straight contribution to economic growth, the institution also has effect on the production factors. The institution has effect on the investment quantities of the factors and the efficiency of the use of the factors.
Chapter 7 is the empirical test of the main factors of Chinese economic growth based on the panel data. In essence, it is to test the dynamic attribution of the factors. Further understanding the characters of the region factor, the first section compares quantities of the factors of every province. The second section used the Kernel Density Distribution to study the model of economic growth. The result shows that it is imbalance of growth of the regional economy, and that there is the change from the sharp peak to dual peaks on the process of economic growth since 1980s, especially the bipolar development in the same level of economic growth. In the same region, economic growth has the club convergence trend, such as the east, the middle, and the west. In the different region, there exists not the convergence but the bipolar trend.
The third section analyses the determinant factors of growth and decomposes the factor attribution. The empirical study is that: (1)the capital is the key determinant factor of the regional growth. (2)the less important factor is the property institution, and the attribution of the factor becomes higher and higher. Comparing with the regions, the institution of the east is ahead of the middle, and the growth caused by the institution of the west is less than the middle. The trade has positive effect on the growth, and keeps unchanged, but the coefficient of the east is ten times than the middle and the west. So the bipolar development of the regional growth is originated from the difference of the institution and the trade. Just like the theory of chapter 4, the trade development also comes from the institution. (3)the attribution of the industrial structure in the east is the biggest, namely, the industrial structure is easier to promote economic growth. But the finance and the region both have obvious dynamic characters, and both have little effect on growth. As the whole, the institution and the trade determinate regional growth with the function of the property institution and the industrial structure.
From the first section to the third section, the study further shows that: (1)on the base of different resource endowment, the factor of growth is different and dynamic. In the middle and the west, growth depends more on the government investment, but in the east, growth mostly depends on the competition and the trade. (2)the unbalance and bipolar growth is caused by the development of the property institution and the trade. If there is good property protection, the trade and competition will promote the regional growth. If there is no change of the resource endowment, the factor development and economic growth, the unbalance of regional growth will be lasted.
In the whole, the research not only deepens the endogenous economic growth theory, and explains the factors and the efficiency of Chinese economic growth, and testifies the dynamic characters. All this supplies the theoretical support and empirical evidence of the west exploration, the Northeast industry development and the building of the new countryside of China.
总之,这些研究不仅深化了内生经济增长理论,解释了我国经济增长的动力和效率问题,验证了要素对经济增长贡献的阶段性特征,同时也为西部开发、老东北工业基地振兴和新农村建设提供有益的理论支持和经验证据。
About the question of factors of economic growth, the literatures always are on the argument, and the factor determinant theory each emphasize its own factor on the determinant effect on economic growth. Until now, that which factor finally makes economy grow still doesn’t achieve the agreement. The uncertainty of environment, the endogenous characteristic of factor development and economic growth, and the limitation of the empirical test methods, all these make the argument last on. So the theory history of economic growth is the history of the origin of economic growth.
The liberation of economy, the marketization and the reform of property right are the basic characters, and the success of almost thirty years reform makes the researchers focus on Chinese economic growth. What makes the factor development, and what makes Chinese economic growth? Some paper makes the success of Chinese growth owning to the empirical and experimental reform. Others point out that Chinese economic reform is not the experimental reform. It is the reform that the river by touching the stone, or the fiscal decentralization of the central and local government. All these literatures almost apply the free market economic theory into Chinese economy, and quickly make the conclusion, and neglect the complex process of Chinese growth.
So economic growth research should not only emphasize on the one factor and causal relationship, but also on the economic and institution environment of each country. Chinese economic reform is being on without political institution reform, and under the state bank owned financial structure and state capital owned property right structure, and the government governance, Chinese economic growth can be used to compare the factor contribution. Based on the limitation of economic growth theory, and further to analyse the factor attributions, and to explain the characters of Chinese economic reform under the traditional political institution, the research content of the paper is including with: (1)the endogenous process of factor development and economic growth; (2)the original cause of Chinese reform and openness and the factor analysis of Chinese economic growth; (3)the causality of financial development and economic growth; (4)the determinant factor attribution of economic growth; (5)the dynamic characters of the factor attribution of economic growth.
The paper is including with seven chapters.
Chapter 1 is the review of the literature of economic growth and the content of the paper. In the first section, the paper reviews the literatures, and points out that the main arguments of the literatures can be divided into four kinds, the theory of the institution, the neoclassic endogenous factors, the finance factor, and the region. (1)the institution theory points out that only the efficient institution can make the limiting of the government and property protection into reality, stimulate investment and technology progress, and promote the economy to grow. It is the development of political institution and property institution ahead of economic growth that determines economic growth. (2)the neoclassic endogenous theory shows that the investment of the capital, the human capital, the technology, and the trade is the origin of economic growth, and that the development of all these factors is ahead of the institutional development, and the final cause of the institution and democracy development, and that the political institution appears when the neoclassic factors develop further. (3)the financial theory argues that economic growth originates from the financial development, and that other factors only depend on the finance to be used by the economy, and all these is just the channels of the financial development to make the progress of the economy, and the financial development is not the effect but the cause of economic growth. (4)the regional theory believes that the region determines the endowment of the resource, the climate, the transportation, which difference will affect the speed of the capital accumulation, the quality of the human capital, the technology, and economic production. In control of the effect of the policy and the institution, the region will have effect on economic growth through the transition cost, the transportation, the health and the productivity of the agriculture. For example, the coastal region makes use of the convenient condition of the transportation, and the low transportation cost, and the superiority of the international trade, to promote the economy grow more quickly. But the disadvantageous region and the burning climate will make the population grow excessively quickly and excessively heavy and healthy burden, all these hinder economic growth. So it shows that the region not only have effect on the model of economic growth and institutional development, but also make function with the production precession. Namely, the region determines economic growth. The second and third section further concludes that the limitation of the index, the sample, the method, the assumption of the model, and the further research field of economic growth. The fourth section explains the content, the methods, and the new idea of the paper.
Chapter 2 is that the model of the development of the endogenous factor of economic growth. Based on the logic and the framework of the neoclassic endogenous growth theory, the first section reviews the dynamic process of the capital and human capital, and the characters of the capital development on the way of the balanced growth. Because in the neoclassic growth model without the financial system, and with the financial function more powerful, the second section fully thinks about the financial function. The model shows that whether the endogenous causality of the financial development and economic growth or not depends whether the financial capital can be invested into the best efficient production economy. If the financial capital has been invested in the best efficient economy, it has the close causality relationship of the financial development and economic growth. If in the financial section it is the state owned property structure and the governance structure of the government determination, it will be lack of the efficiency of the financial development, and can’t keep up with economic growth, and will be not cause but the result of economic growth.
Based on the institution attribution and the logic of the institution determination that the origin of growth is the institution especially the property institution and property protection in the transition economy, and with the institution the capital can promote economic growth, and the capital and human capital is just the production factors, the third section concludes the institutional model. The model shows that: (1)in the transition economy, especially the developing country without the perfect institution, economic growth originates from the institutional development. The more quickly and efficient the institutional development is, the more quickly economy grows, namely, economic growth is limited with the institutional development. (2)in the market economy with the perfect institution, economic growth depends on the technology and the human capital, namely, the more quickly the technology and the human capital grow, the more quickly the economy grows. It also points out that in different environment and growth stage, the determinant factor is different. Namely, in the perfect market economy, economic growth is originated from the neoclassic endogenous factors. In the economy without the efficient institution, the institution determines economic growth.
Chapter 3 is the theoretic analysis of the factor development and economic growth. Based the limitation of the factor theory, and according to the reality of Chinese reform, the chapter achieves some theoretic hypothesis. The first section studies on the determinant factors of economic growth and the causality relationship of the institution and the other factors in the model, and shows that the other factors development is originated in the institutional development. Through building the model of factor development and economic growth, the second section concludes that the factor development is endogenous in economic growth originated from the resource endowment and property institution especially the property protection, and that economic growth depends on the factor development, which is originated in the resource endowment and the property right, and that the present growth will strengthen the resource endowment and the factor development of the future, which will determine economic growth of the future, namely, the resource endowment and the level of economic growth of t period→ the property institution and property protection of t period→the factor development of t period→economic growth of t period→the resource endowment and the level of economic growth of t+1 period. The third section concludes the endogenous mechanisms of economic growth on the base of the endogenous factor development. The content is that: the resource endowment RSt and the structure of the property right PRSt of t period→the governance mechanism SGMt of t period→the factor allocation way and efficiency FAt of t period→economic growth efficiency EGEt and the income allocation IRt of t period→the resource endowment RSt+1 and the institution structure PRSt+1 of t+1 period. Namely, economic growth not only depends on the factor development, but also the resource endowment and the property structure, and even if some country with the same resource endowment, its economic growth may be different.
Chapter 4 is the institution attribution of Chinese economic growth. The first section deduces the origination of reform and openness policy. It points out that the policy comes from the polity, which is originated in the economic condition and resource endowment of Chinese especial development stage, especially low income of the country and cities. The second section is further to study the determinant factors. Some papers make economic growth owing to the government voluntary choice and the polity especially the trade policy. This section deduces that the development of trade is originated in the property institution. Based on the development of the rural enterprises and the reform of state owned enterprises, the third section analyses the best organization institution under the different level of the property right and the property protection.
Chapter 5 is the empirical study of the relationship of financial development and economic growth. According to the assumption and deduction of the contents, the financial market is not efficient. The first section reviews the reform process of the financial development and financial reform, especially the institution origin of low efficiency of state owned banks. The second section studies the relationship of financial development and economic growth with the limit of the property right, and shows that the property right of the finance determines the investment and the efficiency of the capital, and further determines economic growth. If the state-owned finance has more power in the economy, the efficiency of finance is much lower. There is less positive function to economic growth. If the finance is in the control of the state-owned, the finance has no efficiency, and there is no co-growth of financial development and economic growth. The third section and fourth section test the efficiency of the bank and the stock market. Based on the hp filter, the wavelet and the spectrum analysis respectively, Chinese financial development and economic growth have no dual causality relationship, and financial development lags economic growth, and financial development is the result of economic growth. One explanation is that the state owned property right structure causes the low efficiency.
Chapter 6 is the empirical test of the main factors based on the series of Chinese whole economic growth. In the first section, it is to design and explain the indexes of the determinant factors. The second section is to test the factor attribution in different methods. The results show the different factors have different attribution. The test proves that, the property institution is endogenous in economic growth, and can explain the development of the capital, the human capital, the financial factor and the trade. The third section and the fourth section retest the attribution of the capital, the human capital, and the whole factor productive based on the State Space Model, and show that Chinese economic growth mainly depends on the quantity of the capital and the labor, and the institution. But the high attribution of the capital has included the function of the institution. Because the institution can make straight contribution to economic growth, the institution also has effect on the production factors. The institution has effect on the investment quantities of the factors and the efficiency of the use of the factors.
Chapter 7 is the empirical test of the main factors of Chinese economic growth based on the panel data. In essence, it is to test the dynamic attribution of the factors. Further understanding the characters of the region factor, the first section compares quantities of the factors of every province. The second section used the Kernel Density Distribution to study the model of economic growth. The result shows that it is imbalance of growth of the regional economy, and that there is the change from the sharp peak to dual peaks on the process of economic growth since 1980s, especially the bipolar development in the same level of economic growth. In the same region, economic growth has the club convergence trend, such as the east, the middle, and the west. In the different region, there exists not the convergence but the bipolar trend.
The third section analyses the determinant factors of growth and decomposes the factor attribution. The empirical study is that: (1)the capital is the key determinant factor of the regional growth. (2)the less important factor is the property institution, and the attribution of the factor becomes higher and higher. Comparing with the regions, the institution of the east is ahead of the middle, and the growth caused by the institution of the west is less than the middle. The trade has positive effect on the growth, and keeps unchanged, but the coefficient of the east is ten times than the middle and the west. So the bipolar development of the regional growth is originated from the difference of the institution and the trade. Just like the theory of chapter 4, the trade development also comes from the institution. (3)the attribution of the industrial structure in the east is the biggest, namely, the industrial structure is easier to promote economic growth. But the finance and the region both have obvious dynamic characters, and both have little effect on growth. As the whole, the institution and the trade determinate regional growth with the function of the property institution and the industrial structure.
From the first section to the third section, the study further shows that: (1)on the base of different resource endowment, the factor of growth is different and dynamic. In the middle and the west, growth depends more on the government investment, but in the east, growth mostly depends on the competition and the trade. (2)the unbalance and bipolar growth is caused by the development of the property institution and the trade. If there is good property protection, the trade and competition will promote the regional growth. If there is no change of the resource endowment, the factor development and economic growth, the unbalance of regional growth will be lasted.
In the whole, the research not only deepens the endogenous economic growth theory, and explains the factors and the efficiency of Chinese economic growth, and testifies the dynamic characters. All this supplies the theoretical support and empirical evidence of the west exploration, the Northeast industry development and the building of the new countryside of China.
引文
①Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth”, American Economic Review, 2005, 547-579。在此,将三人系列合作论文简写为AJR,以下同理。
②对于引发西欧经济大发展的初始冲击问题,张宇燕等(2004)认为,可能是大量的金白银流入西欧刺激了经济的发展。
①Acemoglu, D., Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “From Education to Democracy?”, The Democratic Transition and Economic Growth, vol.95(2), 2005, pp.45-49. 在此,将此四人的系列合作论文也简写为AJRY,以下同理。
①诸如在所有的样本数据中,有 23 个国家先民主化而后经济自由化,9 个国家先自由化而后民主化,并且时间间隔差异也较大,先民主化后经济自由化的时间间隔为4年,而先经济自由化后民主化的时间间隔为9年(Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini, 2004)。
① Gernot Doppelhofer, Ronald I. Miller, Xavier Sala-I-Matin, “Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates(BACE) Approach”, NBER Working Paper, 2000, w.7750.
①李富强、董直庆、王林辉,《内生制度、政府治理和经济增长效率:基于我国经济时序数据的理论构建和实证研究》,工作论文,2006。
①模型推导完全参考戴维? 罗默著,苏剑等译:《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.12-22。
①模型推导完全参考戴维? 罗默著,苏剑等译:《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.124-174。
①模型推导完全参考戴维? 罗默, 苏剑等译,《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.96-122。
①Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi, “Democracy, Technology, and Growth”, NBER Working Paper, 2007, w.13180.
戴维? 罗默,苏剑等译,《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.126-160。
Romer, C. D., “the Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 1990, pp.597-624.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman E., “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy”, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Aghion and Howitt, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econometrica, 60, 1992, pp.323-351.
①这种现象可以在一定程度上解释休克疗法及其失效后果,若以产权制度为主要内容的改革,突然增加制度的改革投入,但这种制度改革投入增量并无法在本质上增进产权保护。因为,在若干期后,产权保护将回到原先水平。
①Coffee, John, “Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Examination of Private Benefits of Control”, Columbia University Law School Working Paper, 2001.
①李富强:《内生制度、最优治理和我国经济增长》,吉林大学博士论文,2006。
①数据来源于《中国统计年鉴》。
①由于在此目的是考察城市居民的生活状况,以第二和第三产业的产出增加值来衡量城市经济产出,无形中提高了城市经济的产出水平,但若在较高产出假定下,城市经济还是体现出低效率和低产出趋势,就进一步说明了我国城市居民的贫困状态。
①当然我们也不能否认,特定权力精英对制度安排和经济增长道路选择有其特定的作用和贡献。
①企业合约性质和有效性实施不仅取决于合约内容和奖惩的可测性,而且还取决于一个可观察、可界定的激励约束制度安排,特别是有效的产权制度为前提。
②李富强、董直庆、王林辉等,《竞争、产权和我国国有企业治理效率的实证检验》,工作论文,2007。
①Agénor, P.R., “Infrastructure, Public Education and Growth with Congestion Costs”, Working Paper, Center for Growth and Business Cycle Research, University of Manchester, 2005.
① 葛哲学、陈仲生编著:《Matlab 时频分析技术及其应用》,人民邮电出版社,2006 年。
①刘俊生:《我国经济周期的测定与分析》,吉林大学博士论文,2007 年。
①Acemoglu, “Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.XLIII, 2005, 1025-1048.
①在不国国别下的实证检验,贸易主要用两国距离或贸易比例预测值等作为贸易的工具变量(Frankel and Romer, 1999)。制度工具变量主要是利用居住人口的死亡率或殖民化经历(Acemoglu et al., 2004)。而 Rodrik et al.(2004)将英语人口比例或其他人口比例作为制度变量。
① 高铁梅主编,《计量经济分析方法与建模 EVIEWS 应用及实例》,清华大学出版社,2006 年。
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②对于引发西欧经济大发展的初始冲击问题,张宇燕等(2004)认为,可能是大量的金白银流入西欧刺激了经济的发展。
①Acemoglu, D., Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “From Education to Democracy?”, The Democratic Transition and Economic Growth, vol.95(2), 2005, pp.45-49. 在此,将此四人的系列合作论文也简写为AJRY,以下同理。
①诸如在所有的样本数据中,有 23 个国家先民主化而后经济自由化,9 个国家先自由化而后民主化,并且时间间隔差异也较大,先民主化后经济自由化的时间间隔为4年,而先经济自由化后民主化的时间间隔为9年(Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini, 2004)。
① Gernot Doppelhofer, Ronald I. Miller, Xavier Sala-I-Matin, “Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates(BACE) Approach”, NBER Working Paper, 2000, w.7750.
①李富强、董直庆、王林辉,《内生制度、政府治理和经济增长效率:基于我国经济时序数据的理论构建和实证研究》,工作论文,2006。
①模型推导完全参考戴维? 罗默著,苏剑等译:《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.12-22。
①模型推导完全参考戴维? 罗默著,苏剑等译:《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.124-174。
①模型推导完全参考戴维? 罗默, 苏剑等译,《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.96-122。
①Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi, “Democracy, Technology, and Growth”, NBER Working Paper, 2007, w.13180.
戴维? 罗默,苏剑等译,《高级宏观经济学》,商务印书馆,1999,pp.126-160。
Romer, C. D., “the Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 1990, pp.597-624.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman E., “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy”, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Aghion and Howitt, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econometrica, 60, 1992, pp.323-351.
①这种现象可以在一定程度上解释休克疗法及其失效后果,若以产权制度为主要内容的改革,突然增加制度的改革投入,但这种制度改革投入增量并无法在本质上增进产权保护。因为,在若干期后,产权保护将回到原先水平。
①Coffee, John, “Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Examination of Private Benefits of Control”, Columbia University Law School Working Paper, 2001.
①李富强:《内生制度、最优治理和我国经济增长》,吉林大学博士论文,2006。
①数据来源于《中国统计年鉴》。
①由于在此目的是考察城市居民的生活状况,以第二和第三产业的产出增加值来衡量城市经济产出,无形中提高了城市经济的产出水平,但若在较高产出假定下,城市经济还是体现出低效率和低产出趋势,就进一步说明了我国城市居民的贫困状态。
①当然我们也不能否认,特定权力精英对制度安排和经济增长道路选择有其特定的作用和贡献。
①企业合约性质和有效性实施不仅取决于合约内容和奖惩的可测性,而且还取决于一个可观察、可界定的激励约束制度安排,特别是有效的产权制度为前提。
②李富强、董直庆、王林辉等,《竞争、产权和我国国有企业治理效率的实证检验》,工作论文,2007。
①Agénor, P.R., “Infrastructure, Public Education and Growth with Congestion Costs”, Working Paper, Center for Growth and Business Cycle Research, University of Manchester, 2005.
① 葛哲学、陈仲生编著:《Matlab 时频分析技术及其应用》,人民邮电出版社,2006 年。
①刘俊生:《我国经济周期的测定与分析》,吉林大学博士论文,2007 年。
①Acemoglu, “Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.XLIII, 2005, 1025-1048.
①在不国国别下的实证检验,贸易主要用两国距离或贸易比例预测值等作为贸易的工具变量(Frankel and Romer, 1999)。制度工具变量主要是利用居住人口的死亡率或殖民化经历(Acemoglu et al., 2004)。而 Rodrik et al.(2004)将英语人口比例或其他人口比例作为制度变量。
① 高铁梅主编,《计量经济分析方法与建模 EVIEWS 应用及实例》,清华大学出版社,2006 年。
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