贫困地区农户的信贷需求与信贷约束
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摘要
发展中国家农村金融市场的基本问题是正规金融机构不能有效地满足农户信贷需求的市场失灵问题。现阶段,中国贫困地区农村金融市场既面临着与其他发展中国家相同的市场失灵问题,又因农村经济结构的转变而面临着新的挑战。以工资性收入为主要经济来源的贫困地区农户已不再是传统意义上的家庭生产经营单位,而是劳动力的供给者。农村经济发展及其所引起的农户对金融产品与服务的需求的变化对中国农村金融的发展产生了深远的影响。基于这样的认识,本研究在实证考察农户正规借贷行为和旨在缓解正规信贷约束的小额信贷项目农户参与行为的基础上,试图从信贷需求变化的角度分析贫困地区农户信贷约束的成因及其缓解。
利用实地调查数据,本文采用规范的描述性统计与计量分析方法从微观层面上研究贫困地区农户正规信贷需求的水平、特征及影响因素,农户受到正规信贷约束的原因,以及小额信贷项目的目标瞄准和信贷约束。首先,采用“意愿调查+假想式问题”的调查方法考察贫困地区农户信贷需求的贷款用途特征;在此基础上,使用需求可识别双变量Probit模型有效分离正规信贷需求和正规信贷供给两方面因素对正规信贷市场均衡结果所产生的影响。其次,在需求层面上描述农户正规信贷需求的状况和特征,并探寻信贷需求未能实现的原因,同时使用Probit模型、TobitⅠ和TobitⅡ模型以及Heckman二阶段模型识别并估计农户的正规信贷需求意愿及其规模;在供给层面上采用多元Logit模型研究农户所面临的正规信贷约束及其背后的信贷配给机制。最后,本文转入对小额信贷的分析,利用三个小额信贷项目区农户的调查数据,检验以扶贫为主要目标的中国非政府组织小额信贷的目标瞄准情况,并在控制住小额信贷需求的基础上估计项目区农户所面临的小额信贷约束。
研究发现,在贫困地区,工资收入作为家庭主要收入来源的中低收入农户普遍缺乏生产性正规信贷需求,其正规信贷需求特征可以概括为消费性、较大额度、较长期限和非抵押贷款方式。工资性收入负向显著影响农户的正规信贷需求,而非农经营收入占总收入的比例正向显著影响农户正规信贷的可得性,但对农户的正规信贷需求影响不显著。除农户家庭特征外,贷款产品与贷款程序也是影响农户正规信贷需求的重要原因。交易成本配给与风险配给是阻碍转型时期农户正规信贷需求得到有效满足的主要原因。在实际运行中,小额信贷项目的瞄准目标已从贫困户向富裕户偏移,这一方面是因为项目区农户对孟加拉乡村银行复制模式小额信贷产品缺乏需求,另一方面是因为对小额信贷产品有需求的农户由于小额信贷产品设计与制度安排方面的原因仍面临着较严重的数量配给。
与国内已有文献相比,本文具有以下特点:第一,在观察视角上,试图将贫困地区农户的借贷行为置于国别比较、转型时期的阶段性历史及市场可持续、不断扩展的背景下,希望能够全方位地观察贫困地区农村金融市场,尤其是需求方面的历史变化。第二,在概念界定上,强调了还款能力与供给者贷款产品特征对界定信贷需求概念的重要性,同时,在控制住信贷需求的基础上界定了信贷约束的概念。第三,在分析框架上,将信息不对称、交易成本和风险引入信贷需求与信贷约束的分析之中,从市场内部运行机制的角度探讨了发展中国家农村地区的信贷市场失灵问题。第四,在信贷需求与信贷约束的识别上,采用直接意愿调查方法识别出了具有完备分类特征的信贷需求与信贷约束类型,并且,在调查过程中控制住还款能力、其他贷款渠道及测量误差等因素对调查的干扰。第五,在实证方法上,针对研究问题和样本数据的特点,采用“意愿调查+假象式问题”的调查设计,控制住信贷可得性对信贷需求调查的影响,使用TobitⅡ模型和Heckman二阶段模型方法克服了样本选择偏差问题,利用需求可识别双变量Probit模型避免了未将需求与供给效应有效分离而得出错误解释的危险。
本文所得出的结论在贫困地区构建可持续的农村金融体系、完善农村金融体制改革以及缓解贫困方面具有以下几点政策含义:首先,基于大部分农户对正规信贷需求以消费性用途为主的判断,农村金融政策需要做出相应的战略性调整以适应农户信贷需求的新变化,应该从发放支持小规模经营项目的生产性贷款转向消费性贷款。其次,农村正规金融机构需要改进贷款产品、技术和方式,进一步挖掘并释放潜在的和隐藏的农户正规信贷需求。第三,政府应该从有助于完善农村金融市场的外部条件入手,推进劳动力市场与农村教育、医疗、社会保障以及法律制度的完善,其中最为关键的是农民工劳动力市场的培育与监管。
It is one of the fundamental issues in the rural financial market of developing countries that rural households' demand for formal credit has not been met, which is called credit market failure by economists. At current stage, the rural finance market in depressed area in China has to be confronted with new challenges due to the adjustment of rural economic structure, while sharing the common market failure problem with other developing countries. Most rural households in depressed area whose income is mainly made up of wage no longer essentially play the role of production and management units in the traditional sense, but labor suppliers. Transformed demand of rural households for financial products and service, induced by varying rural economic development, will inevitably exert a profound influence on the development of rural finance in China. Based on the background above, this thesis analyzes empirically rural households' formal borrowing behavior and microfinance project participation, and then from the perspective of the transformation for credit demand, why credit constraint for rural households in depressed area exists and how to alleviate it have been explained and discussed.
With first-hand survey data, the thesis applies methods of descriptive statistics and econometrics to investigate empirically the level, feature and influential factors of rural households' demand for formal credit, search for reasons why rural households are credit constrained, as well as explore how microfinance project performs its targeting in China and whether it alleviates rural households' credit constraint or not. Firstly, the author puts forward an improved survey method 'willingness survey and hypothetical questions' to study the loan purpose of rural households' demand for credit in depressed area; Moreover, Demand-identified Bivariate Probit model is employed to succeed in separating impacts of demand and supply on the formal credit market equilibrium. Secondly, it is one of attempts for this paper to depict and investigate the level and feature of credit demand, and why it has not been fully met. Meanwhile, using Probit model, Tobit I and II model, and Heckman two-stage model, it identifies and estimates the factors influencing rural households' demand decision-whether they demand loan or not and what amount they demand. In the investigation on credit supply, Multinomial-Logit model is applied to analyze rural households' credit constraint and formal institutions' credit rationing mechanism. Finally, this paper turns to study microfinance. Using data from three regions which have been pioneering microfinance project, the author tests the targeting of Chinese NGO microfinance project which claims to aim at poverty alleviation, and microfinance credit constraint confronted by rural households in project region is also estimated on the base of controlling the microfinance demand.
It is found that middle-and-lower income households in depressed area whose income is mostly made up of wage are lack of demand for production credit. 'The feature of their credit demand can be summarized as non-production, larger credit amounts, longer credit terms and non-pledge. Increased wage income reduces the probability of rural households' demand for formal credit, and non-farm income does not impact formal credit demand but formal credit access. Besides household character, credit products and loan procedure also affect credit demand. Transaction cost rationing and risk rationing impede formal credit demand from being effectively met. Three GB model Microfinance projects don't succeed in targeting poor rural households in the surveyed regions. Beside rural households in project villages being lack of the demand for GB model micro-credit product, why the microfinance target moves from the poor upward to the rich lies in some households who demand for micro-credit being faced with quantity credit rationing due to limits of microfinance project' products and institution.
Comparing with the existing concerned literature, the features of this paper have been illustrated as follow. Firstly, under the cross-country, historical-horizon and market-oriented perspectives, this paper attempts to observe and understand rural households' borrowing behavior and the evolution of rural financial market in China. Secondly, it emphasizes the significant influence of repayment capacity and features of the credit product provided by the specific lender on the definition of credit demand, and credit constraint is defined after credit demand has been controlled. The third, information asymmetry, transaction cost and risk are introduced into the analytical framework of the credit demand and the credit constraint, in which rural formal credit market failure in developing countries is investigated from the angle of interior market mechanism. The Forth, the direct willingness survey method is used to identify and measure credit demand and credit constraint which is self-containedly categorized, in which repayment capacity, other credit sector and measurement errors are controlled. At last, with the characteristics of the research issue and survey data being taken into account, this paper applies the improved method of 'willingness survey and hypothetical questions' to control the influence of credit accessibility on the survey of credit demand, uses Tobit II model and Heckman two-stage model to overcome sample selection bias problems, and employs Demand-identified Bivariate Probit model to avoid the hazard to make fallacious interpretations without separating credit demand and credit supply in the model estimation.
It is the significance of the above discoveries that would be realized for sustainable rural financial market construction, rural financial reform and poverty alleviation. Firstly, based on the basic judgment of most rural households' demand for consumption credit, rural financial policy must adjust its strategy in order to adapt to the changes of demand for credit. The focus of the future rural finance reform should shift from supporting small-scale production project to developing consumption credit products. Secondly, rural formal financial institutions should make progress on credit product design, lending technology and delivery system, which helps to setting free latent and hidden demand for formal credit. At last, government should improve the outer environment of the rural financial market, speed up the progress of labor market, education, medical care, social security system, infrastructure construction, judicatory system and law, among which it is the most important that government should take the responsibility of protecting and regulating labor market.
利用实地调查数据,本文采用规范的描述性统计与计量分析方法从微观层面上研究贫困地区农户正规信贷需求的水平、特征及影响因素,农户受到正规信贷约束的原因,以及小额信贷项目的目标瞄准和信贷约束。首先,采用“意愿调查+假想式问题”的调查方法考察贫困地区农户信贷需求的贷款用途特征;在此基础上,使用需求可识别双变量Probit模型有效分离正规信贷需求和正规信贷供给两方面因素对正规信贷市场均衡结果所产生的影响。其次,在需求层面上描述农户正规信贷需求的状况和特征,并探寻信贷需求未能实现的原因,同时使用Probit模型、TobitⅠ和TobitⅡ模型以及Heckman二阶段模型识别并估计农户的正规信贷需求意愿及其规模;在供给层面上采用多元Logit模型研究农户所面临的正规信贷约束及其背后的信贷配给机制。最后,本文转入对小额信贷的分析,利用三个小额信贷项目区农户的调查数据,检验以扶贫为主要目标的中国非政府组织小额信贷的目标瞄准情况,并在控制住小额信贷需求的基础上估计项目区农户所面临的小额信贷约束。
研究发现,在贫困地区,工资收入作为家庭主要收入来源的中低收入农户普遍缺乏生产性正规信贷需求,其正规信贷需求特征可以概括为消费性、较大额度、较长期限和非抵押贷款方式。工资性收入负向显著影响农户的正规信贷需求,而非农经营收入占总收入的比例正向显著影响农户正规信贷的可得性,但对农户的正规信贷需求影响不显著。除农户家庭特征外,贷款产品与贷款程序也是影响农户正规信贷需求的重要原因。交易成本配给与风险配给是阻碍转型时期农户正规信贷需求得到有效满足的主要原因。在实际运行中,小额信贷项目的瞄准目标已从贫困户向富裕户偏移,这一方面是因为项目区农户对孟加拉乡村银行复制模式小额信贷产品缺乏需求,另一方面是因为对小额信贷产品有需求的农户由于小额信贷产品设计与制度安排方面的原因仍面临着较严重的数量配给。
与国内已有文献相比,本文具有以下特点:第一,在观察视角上,试图将贫困地区农户的借贷行为置于国别比较、转型时期的阶段性历史及市场可持续、不断扩展的背景下,希望能够全方位地观察贫困地区农村金融市场,尤其是需求方面的历史变化。第二,在概念界定上,强调了还款能力与供给者贷款产品特征对界定信贷需求概念的重要性,同时,在控制住信贷需求的基础上界定了信贷约束的概念。第三,在分析框架上,将信息不对称、交易成本和风险引入信贷需求与信贷约束的分析之中,从市场内部运行机制的角度探讨了发展中国家农村地区的信贷市场失灵问题。第四,在信贷需求与信贷约束的识别上,采用直接意愿调查方法识别出了具有完备分类特征的信贷需求与信贷约束类型,并且,在调查过程中控制住还款能力、其他贷款渠道及测量误差等因素对调查的干扰。第五,在实证方法上,针对研究问题和样本数据的特点,采用“意愿调查+假象式问题”的调查设计,控制住信贷可得性对信贷需求调查的影响,使用TobitⅡ模型和Heckman二阶段模型方法克服了样本选择偏差问题,利用需求可识别双变量Probit模型避免了未将需求与供给效应有效分离而得出错误解释的危险。
本文所得出的结论在贫困地区构建可持续的农村金融体系、完善农村金融体制改革以及缓解贫困方面具有以下几点政策含义:首先,基于大部分农户对正规信贷需求以消费性用途为主的判断,农村金融政策需要做出相应的战略性调整以适应农户信贷需求的新变化,应该从发放支持小规模经营项目的生产性贷款转向消费性贷款。其次,农村正规金融机构需要改进贷款产品、技术和方式,进一步挖掘并释放潜在的和隐藏的农户正规信贷需求。第三,政府应该从有助于完善农村金融市场的外部条件入手,推进劳动力市场与农村教育、医疗、社会保障以及法律制度的完善,其中最为关键的是农民工劳动力市场的培育与监管。
It is one of the fundamental issues in the rural financial market of developing countries that rural households' demand for formal credit has not been met, which is called credit market failure by economists. At current stage, the rural finance market in depressed area in China has to be confronted with new challenges due to the adjustment of rural economic structure, while sharing the common market failure problem with other developing countries. Most rural households in depressed area whose income is mainly made up of wage no longer essentially play the role of production and management units in the traditional sense, but labor suppliers. Transformed demand of rural households for financial products and service, induced by varying rural economic development, will inevitably exert a profound influence on the development of rural finance in China. Based on the background above, this thesis analyzes empirically rural households' formal borrowing behavior and microfinance project participation, and then from the perspective of the transformation for credit demand, why credit constraint for rural households in depressed area exists and how to alleviate it have been explained and discussed.
With first-hand survey data, the thesis applies methods of descriptive statistics and econometrics to investigate empirically the level, feature and influential factors of rural households' demand for formal credit, search for reasons why rural households are credit constrained, as well as explore how microfinance project performs its targeting in China and whether it alleviates rural households' credit constraint or not. Firstly, the author puts forward an improved survey method 'willingness survey and hypothetical questions' to study the loan purpose of rural households' demand for credit in depressed area; Moreover, Demand-identified Bivariate Probit model is employed to succeed in separating impacts of demand and supply on the formal credit market equilibrium. Secondly, it is one of attempts for this paper to depict and investigate the level and feature of credit demand, and why it has not been fully met. Meanwhile, using Probit model, Tobit I and II model, and Heckman two-stage model, it identifies and estimates the factors influencing rural households' demand decision-whether they demand loan or not and what amount they demand. In the investigation on credit supply, Multinomial-Logit model is applied to analyze rural households' credit constraint and formal institutions' credit rationing mechanism. Finally, this paper turns to study microfinance. Using data from three regions which have been pioneering microfinance project, the author tests the targeting of Chinese NGO microfinance project which claims to aim at poverty alleviation, and microfinance credit constraint confronted by rural households in project region is also estimated on the base of controlling the microfinance demand.
It is found that middle-and-lower income households in depressed area whose income is mostly made up of wage are lack of demand for production credit. 'The feature of their credit demand can be summarized as non-production, larger credit amounts, longer credit terms and non-pledge. Increased wage income reduces the probability of rural households' demand for formal credit, and non-farm income does not impact formal credit demand but formal credit access. Besides household character, credit products and loan procedure also affect credit demand. Transaction cost rationing and risk rationing impede formal credit demand from being effectively met. Three GB model Microfinance projects don't succeed in targeting poor rural households in the surveyed regions. Beside rural households in project villages being lack of the demand for GB model micro-credit product, why the microfinance target moves from the poor upward to the rich lies in some households who demand for micro-credit being faced with quantity credit rationing due to limits of microfinance project' products and institution.
Comparing with the existing concerned literature, the features of this paper have been illustrated as follow. Firstly, under the cross-country, historical-horizon and market-oriented perspectives, this paper attempts to observe and understand rural households' borrowing behavior and the evolution of rural financial market in China. Secondly, it emphasizes the significant influence of repayment capacity and features of the credit product provided by the specific lender on the definition of credit demand, and credit constraint is defined after credit demand has been controlled. The third, information asymmetry, transaction cost and risk are introduced into the analytical framework of the credit demand and the credit constraint, in which rural formal credit market failure in developing countries is investigated from the angle of interior market mechanism. The Forth, the direct willingness survey method is used to identify and measure credit demand and credit constraint which is self-containedly categorized, in which repayment capacity, other credit sector and measurement errors are controlled. At last, with the characteristics of the research issue and survey data being taken into account, this paper applies the improved method of 'willingness survey and hypothetical questions' to control the influence of credit accessibility on the survey of credit demand, uses Tobit II model and Heckman two-stage model to overcome sample selection bias problems, and employs Demand-identified Bivariate Probit model to avoid the hazard to make fallacious interpretations without separating credit demand and credit supply in the model estimation.
It is the significance of the above discoveries that would be realized for sustainable rural financial market construction, rural financial reform and poverty alleviation. Firstly, based on the basic judgment of most rural households' demand for consumption credit, rural financial policy must adjust its strategy in order to adapt to the changes of demand for credit. The focus of the future rural finance reform should shift from supporting small-scale production project to developing consumption credit products. Secondly, rural formal financial institutions should make progress on credit product design, lending technology and delivery system, which helps to setting free latent and hidden demand for formal credit. At last, government should improve the outer environment of the rural financial market, speed up the progress of labor market, education, medical care, social security system, infrastructure construction, judicatory system and law, among which it is the most important that government should take the responsibility of protecting and regulating labor market.
引文
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