我国股份制商业银行公司治理绩效研究
|
摘要
从近年中国的改革实践与国际经济发展潮流可总结出三个关键词:市场化、竞争和开放。按照WTO对有关我国金融业开放的要求,现阶段我国正开始全面开放金融市场,我国的银行业面临着严峻的竞争形势,这种竞争的实质是现代银行制度的竞争。而商业银行公司治理机制是现代银行制度的核心,其优劣程度直接决定了银行的市场竞争力,伴随着金融体制改革尤其是银行改革的不断深入,治理结构的优化已成为提升银行竞争力的必由之路。温家宝总理曾说:“根本解决银行的问题在于改革,在于建立现代的公司治理结构和现代金融企业制度,并且创造条件实行股份制。”我国股份制商业银行是市场经济下现代银行制度的产物,其产生与发展都基本上遵循了我国建立现代企业制度的要求,股份制商业银行的公司治理结构也是基本上按照国家相关的法律法规建立的。股份制商业银行作为我国金融体系的重要组成部分,经过近20年的发展,其竞争力逐步提高,成为了我国国有商业银行、城市商业银行改革发展的方向。加强对股份制商业银行公司治理的研究,不仅有助于加深对我国股份制商业银行公司治理现状和特点的了解,更重要的是可以为正处于改革阶段的国有商业银行、城市商业银行等改进和完善公司治理机制提供有益的借鉴。
虽然在商业银行公司治理的研究领域,相关研究已经较多,但国内学术界对该问题的研究更多的是从理论上进行推演,缺乏基于经验数据的实证分析。笔者认为,导致这一问题的原因是受体制转型和整体环境的影响,相对于发达国家,我国商业银行数据披露不够充分。但随着改革的深入和制度的规范,各大股份制商业银行陆续公布其年报数据,使得我国商业银行信息披露现状有了很大改观,为相关研究提供了可能。有鉴于此,本文在借鉴已有文献和相关实证研究的基础上,从一般公司治理理论的讨论入手,结合商业银行自身特点提出相关假设,进而根据各股份制商业银行公布的年报数据,对股份制商业银行公司治理对经营绩效的影响进行实证检验,这对于全面、综合、深刻地认识我国股份制商业银行的公司治理情况,完善我国商业银行公司治理机制和机理,提升我国银行竞争力,具有重要的理论和实践意义。
本文除绪论外分为四个部分:
第一部分,公司治理与现代商业银行公司治理相关理论。本部分在分析一般公司治理理论内涵的基础上,由一般到特殊,梳理了现代商业银行公司治理变迁过程,揭示了其产生的必然性,并进一步分析了商业银行治理的特殊性及其治理结构的特征,为本文的实证研究奠定了理论基础。
第二部分,我国股份制商业银行公司治理评价体系。本部分首先归纳总结了国内外一些先进且运用广泛的一般公司治理评价体系。以之为借鉴基础,根据商业银行公司治理的特殊性,分析了我国股份制商业银行公司治理评价体系设置的原则,提出了较为准确、全面的评价指标体系,为本文实证研究中解释变量的选取提供了依据。
第三部分,我国股份制商业银行业绩评价。该部分首先归纳分析了国内外商业银行业绩评价体系,阐述了商业银行业绩评价体系的设置原则。以此为基础,借鉴已有商业银行业绩评价体系,提出了我国股份制商业银行业绩评价指标体系,并解释说明了这一体系中评价指标的选择及其意义、评价标准的设定及其计分方法,进一步计算得出所选样本的业绩得分值,为本文实证研究中被解释变量的选取提供了依据。
第四部分,我国股份制商业银行公司治理对经营绩效影响的实证分析。该部分是全文重点,首先根据前文理论基础以及我国股份制商业银行公司治理评价指标体系和业绩评价指标体系提出了研究假设,结合所选各股份制商业银行的年报数据,分别从股权结构、董事会、监事会、高管薪酬四个主要公司治理机制方面进行研究。选取这四个方面的指标作为解释变量,股份制商业银行业绩得分作为被解释变量,运用E-views软件建立多元回归模型。进一步分析模型的回归结果,揭示了股份制商业银行公司治理各变量与银行绩效所存在的内在关系,就改进股份制商业银行公司治理提出了相关建议。
本文的主要特色和贡献表现在:
第一,在商业银行公司治理的研究领域,相关研究已经较多,但国内学术界对该问题的研究更多的是从理论上进行推演,缺乏基于经验数据的实证分析。本文在借鉴已有文献和相关实证研究的基础上,从一般公司治理理论的讨论入手,结合商业银行自身特点提出相关假设,进而根据各股份制商业银行公布的年报数据,对股份制商业银行公司治理绩效性进行实证检验,揭示了股份制商业银行公司治理各变量与银行绩效所存在的内在关系。本文较为全面地考虑了股份制商业银行公司治理的影响因素,克服了已有研究仅仅从治理机制中的某一方面进行考察的局限性。
第二,本文根据商业银行治理的特殊性,构建了一个包含盈利性、安全性以及流动性指标的绩效评分体系,并通过这个体系计算出的银行综合业绩得分作为被解释变量进行实证研究,克服了已有研究只从银行绩效评价中盈利能力的角度出发,片面的仅以银行资产收益率ROA或净资产收益率ROE为绩效指标。这样一来,衡量股份制商业银行治理的效果,不仅从公司治理对银行盈利能力的改善,还从其对银行财务安全性的增强、流动性的贡献这三个视角,较为全面、系统地揭示出股份制商业银行公司治理与银行业绩所存在的关系。这不仅为本文研究,也为后续研究者提供了新的视角。
第三,本文的实证研究为相关政策建议的制定提供了基于经验数据的实证依据,弥补了以往政策建议仅仅从理论推演而来的不足。笔者根据本文的实证结果,针对我国股份制商业银行公司治理中存在的问题,提出在国家持股的同时,优化国有股东的行为,弱化政府的多头管理,加强政府对银行的外部监管角色;加强股份制商业银行董事会和监事会的建设,使两者真正发挥其管理和监督作用;建立健全股份制商业银行的薪酬制度,并保持其独立性,加强对高管人员的业绩评价,使高管人员薪酬与其业绩、责任挂钩。
Three key-words can be summarized through China's reform experience and international economic development trend: marketization, competition, openness. According to the requirements of financial industry openness by WTO, the financial market is open completely at the moment, the banking industry is facing serious competition, whose essential is the competition of modern banking system. Commercial banking corporate governance system is the core of modern banking system, it decides the market competitive ability of banks. As financial system reform going deeper and deeper, the perfection of governance structure is the only way of promoting competitive ability of banks. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has said, "In order to settle banking problem completely, the key is reform, founding modern corporate governance structure and modern financial enterprise system, and creating conditions for stock system." China's joint-stock commercial banks is the result of modern banking system under marketing economy, its foundation and development follow the requirements of establishing modern enterprise system, and its corporate governance is established according to relative laws and regulations. Joint-stock commercial banks, as the important part of national financial system, become the reform and developing direction of stated-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks after 20-year’s development, with increasing competitive ability. Research on corporate governance of joint-stock commercial banks is not only beneficial to know more about current situation and characteristics of corporate governance of joint-stock commercial banks, but also able to provide state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks helpful references of improving and perfecting corporate governance system when they are in the process of reform.
Though there are many studies on the field of corporate governance of commercial banks, many of them in China are based on the theory deduction, lacking empirical study analysis based on experience data. The author thinks that the reason of this problem is that influenced by system transfer and entire environment, compared with developed countries, China’s commercial banks expose limited data. As the deepening of reform and standardization of system, every big joint-stock commercial banks expose annual report gradually, making big improvement of current situation of information exposure of China’s commercial banks, which makes it possible for relevant research. In this case, based on current literatures and relative empirical studies, this paper begins with discussion of ordinary corporate governance theories, proposes some hypothesis combined with the characteristics of commercial banks, analyzes the performance of joint-stock commercial banks based on the annual data exposed of every joint-stock commercial banks. This is of great theory and practice importance to know the corporate governance situations of China’s joint-stock commercial banks completely, deeply, perfect the corporate governance system and mechanism, improve the competitive ability of China’s banks.
Except prolegomenon, this paper includes four parts:
Part 1:Relative theories on corporate governance and modern commercial banks corporate governance. Based on analyzing theory connotation of ordinary corporate governance, this part reviews the developing process of modern commercial banks corporate governance.
Part 2:Corporate governance evaluation system of China’s joint-stock commercial banks. This part firstly summarizes the advanced and popular corporate governance evaluation system in and outside China, and makes it as reference, analyzes the principles of corporate governance evaluation system setting of joint stock commercial banks according to the particularity of commercial bank corporate governance, proposes relatively accurate and complete evaluation index system.
Part 3: performance evaluation of China’s joint-stock commercial banks. This part analyzes performance evaluation system of commercial banks in and outside China, explains the setting principles of this system, puts forward performance evaluation system of China’s commercial banks, using current commercial bank performance evaluation system as reference, and explains the choosing and its meaning, evaluation standard setting and scoring methods, calculates the scores of chosen samples.
Part 4: empirical research on the influence of China’s joint-stock commercial bank corporate governance to operation performance. This part is the stress of the paper. At first, it brings forward research hypothesis according to previous theoretical basis and China’s joint stock commercial band corporate governance evaluation index system and performance evaluation index system, combined with chosen annual report data of each joint stock commercial bank, makes research on separately four main corporate governance aspects: stock ownership structure, board of directors, supervision board, and top management salaries. Choosing indexes from these four aspects as independent variables, the performance score of joint stock commercial banks as dependent variable, multiple regression model is set with the usage of E-views. By analyzing the regression result, this part states internal relationship between the independent variables of joint-stock commercial bank corporate governance and their performance, makes proposals to improve the corporate governance of joint stock commercial banks.
The features and contributions of this paper are:
1. In the field of corporate governance of commercial banks, there are many relative studies, however, the domestic studies mainly focused on theory deduction, lacking empirical analysis of experience data. This paper, based on current literatures and empirical studies, proposes relevant hypothesis combined with the characteristics of commercial banks, makes empirical test on corporate governance performance of commercial banks according to the annual report data, exposing the internal relationship between the independent variables of corporate governance and performance of banks. This paper fully takes the factors influencing corporate governance of commercial banks into consideration, conquers the limitation of current studies which only concerned on one aspect of governance system.
2. Based on the particularity of corporate governance of commercial banks, this paper builds a performance scoring system including the indexes of profitability, safety, and liquidity, and through which performance scores of banks are calculated. These scores are considered as independent variables of the empirical studies, different from current studies which only focus on profitability of performance evaluation, with ROA and ROE as performance indexes. In this case, evaluation of corporate governance performance of joint stock commercial banks is based on three aspects: improvement of profitability, strengthening of financial safety, contribution of liquidity, fully and systematically exposing the relationship between corporate governance of joint stock commercial banks and performance of banks. This is a new point of view not only for this paper, but also for other researchers.
3. The empirical study provides empirical base for relevant policy suggestions, making up for the shortages that the policy suggestions are deducted from theories. The author proposes some suggestions in order to settle the problems existing in corporate governance of China’s joint-stock commercial banks: optimize the state-owned shareholders, weaken the Government's multi-management, and strengthen the Government's external monitoring role, improve the management and supervision functions of board of directors and supervision board, as well as build healthy salary commission system, which is responsible for performance evaluation of top management.
虽然在商业银行公司治理的研究领域,相关研究已经较多,但国内学术界对该问题的研究更多的是从理论上进行推演,缺乏基于经验数据的实证分析。笔者认为,导致这一问题的原因是受体制转型和整体环境的影响,相对于发达国家,我国商业银行数据披露不够充分。但随着改革的深入和制度的规范,各大股份制商业银行陆续公布其年报数据,使得我国商业银行信息披露现状有了很大改观,为相关研究提供了可能。有鉴于此,本文在借鉴已有文献和相关实证研究的基础上,从一般公司治理理论的讨论入手,结合商业银行自身特点提出相关假设,进而根据各股份制商业银行公布的年报数据,对股份制商业银行公司治理对经营绩效的影响进行实证检验,这对于全面、综合、深刻地认识我国股份制商业银行的公司治理情况,完善我国商业银行公司治理机制和机理,提升我国银行竞争力,具有重要的理论和实践意义。
本文除绪论外分为四个部分:
第一部分,公司治理与现代商业银行公司治理相关理论。本部分在分析一般公司治理理论内涵的基础上,由一般到特殊,梳理了现代商业银行公司治理变迁过程,揭示了其产生的必然性,并进一步分析了商业银行治理的特殊性及其治理结构的特征,为本文的实证研究奠定了理论基础。
第二部分,我国股份制商业银行公司治理评价体系。本部分首先归纳总结了国内外一些先进且运用广泛的一般公司治理评价体系。以之为借鉴基础,根据商业银行公司治理的特殊性,分析了我国股份制商业银行公司治理评价体系设置的原则,提出了较为准确、全面的评价指标体系,为本文实证研究中解释变量的选取提供了依据。
第三部分,我国股份制商业银行业绩评价。该部分首先归纳分析了国内外商业银行业绩评价体系,阐述了商业银行业绩评价体系的设置原则。以此为基础,借鉴已有商业银行业绩评价体系,提出了我国股份制商业银行业绩评价指标体系,并解释说明了这一体系中评价指标的选择及其意义、评价标准的设定及其计分方法,进一步计算得出所选样本的业绩得分值,为本文实证研究中被解释变量的选取提供了依据。
第四部分,我国股份制商业银行公司治理对经营绩效影响的实证分析。该部分是全文重点,首先根据前文理论基础以及我国股份制商业银行公司治理评价指标体系和业绩评价指标体系提出了研究假设,结合所选各股份制商业银行的年报数据,分别从股权结构、董事会、监事会、高管薪酬四个主要公司治理机制方面进行研究。选取这四个方面的指标作为解释变量,股份制商业银行业绩得分作为被解释变量,运用E-views软件建立多元回归模型。进一步分析模型的回归结果,揭示了股份制商业银行公司治理各变量与银行绩效所存在的内在关系,就改进股份制商业银行公司治理提出了相关建议。
本文的主要特色和贡献表现在:
第一,在商业银行公司治理的研究领域,相关研究已经较多,但国内学术界对该问题的研究更多的是从理论上进行推演,缺乏基于经验数据的实证分析。本文在借鉴已有文献和相关实证研究的基础上,从一般公司治理理论的讨论入手,结合商业银行自身特点提出相关假设,进而根据各股份制商业银行公布的年报数据,对股份制商业银行公司治理绩效性进行实证检验,揭示了股份制商业银行公司治理各变量与银行绩效所存在的内在关系。本文较为全面地考虑了股份制商业银行公司治理的影响因素,克服了已有研究仅仅从治理机制中的某一方面进行考察的局限性。
第二,本文根据商业银行治理的特殊性,构建了一个包含盈利性、安全性以及流动性指标的绩效评分体系,并通过这个体系计算出的银行综合业绩得分作为被解释变量进行实证研究,克服了已有研究只从银行绩效评价中盈利能力的角度出发,片面的仅以银行资产收益率ROA或净资产收益率ROE为绩效指标。这样一来,衡量股份制商业银行治理的效果,不仅从公司治理对银行盈利能力的改善,还从其对银行财务安全性的增强、流动性的贡献这三个视角,较为全面、系统地揭示出股份制商业银行公司治理与银行业绩所存在的关系。这不仅为本文研究,也为后续研究者提供了新的视角。
第三,本文的实证研究为相关政策建议的制定提供了基于经验数据的实证依据,弥补了以往政策建议仅仅从理论推演而来的不足。笔者根据本文的实证结果,针对我国股份制商业银行公司治理中存在的问题,提出在国家持股的同时,优化国有股东的行为,弱化政府的多头管理,加强政府对银行的外部监管角色;加强股份制商业银行董事会和监事会的建设,使两者真正发挥其管理和监督作用;建立健全股份制商业银行的薪酬制度,并保持其独立性,加强对高管人员的业绩评价,使高管人员薪酬与其业绩、责任挂钩。
Three key-words can be summarized through China's reform experience and international economic development trend: marketization, competition, openness. According to the requirements of financial industry openness by WTO, the financial market is open completely at the moment, the banking industry is facing serious competition, whose essential is the competition of modern banking system. Commercial banking corporate governance system is the core of modern banking system, it decides the market competitive ability of banks. As financial system reform going deeper and deeper, the perfection of governance structure is the only way of promoting competitive ability of banks. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has said, "In order to settle banking problem completely, the key is reform, founding modern corporate governance structure and modern financial enterprise system, and creating conditions for stock system." China's joint-stock commercial banks is the result of modern banking system under marketing economy, its foundation and development follow the requirements of establishing modern enterprise system, and its corporate governance is established according to relative laws and regulations. Joint-stock commercial banks, as the important part of national financial system, become the reform and developing direction of stated-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks after 20-year’s development, with increasing competitive ability. Research on corporate governance of joint-stock commercial banks is not only beneficial to know more about current situation and characteristics of corporate governance of joint-stock commercial banks, but also able to provide state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks helpful references of improving and perfecting corporate governance system when they are in the process of reform.
Though there are many studies on the field of corporate governance of commercial banks, many of them in China are based on the theory deduction, lacking empirical study analysis based on experience data. The author thinks that the reason of this problem is that influenced by system transfer and entire environment, compared with developed countries, China’s commercial banks expose limited data. As the deepening of reform and standardization of system, every big joint-stock commercial banks expose annual report gradually, making big improvement of current situation of information exposure of China’s commercial banks, which makes it possible for relevant research. In this case, based on current literatures and relative empirical studies, this paper begins with discussion of ordinary corporate governance theories, proposes some hypothesis combined with the characteristics of commercial banks, analyzes the performance of joint-stock commercial banks based on the annual data exposed of every joint-stock commercial banks. This is of great theory and practice importance to know the corporate governance situations of China’s joint-stock commercial banks completely, deeply, perfect the corporate governance system and mechanism, improve the competitive ability of China’s banks.
Except prolegomenon, this paper includes four parts:
Part 1:Relative theories on corporate governance and modern commercial banks corporate governance. Based on analyzing theory connotation of ordinary corporate governance, this part reviews the developing process of modern commercial banks corporate governance.
Part 2:Corporate governance evaluation system of China’s joint-stock commercial banks. This part firstly summarizes the advanced and popular corporate governance evaluation system in and outside China, and makes it as reference, analyzes the principles of corporate governance evaluation system setting of joint stock commercial banks according to the particularity of commercial bank corporate governance, proposes relatively accurate and complete evaluation index system.
Part 3: performance evaluation of China’s joint-stock commercial banks. This part analyzes performance evaluation system of commercial banks in and outside China, explains the setting principles of this system, puts forward performance evaluation system of China’s commercial banks, using current commercial bank performance evaluation system as reference, and explains the choosing and its meaning, evaluation standard setting and scoring methods, calculates the scores of chosen samples.
Part 4: empirical research on the influence of China’s joint-stock commercial bank corporate governance to operation performance. This part is the stress of the paper. At first, it brings forward research hypothesis according to previous theoretical basis and China’s joint stock commercial band corporate governance evaluation index system and performance evaluation index system, combined with chosen annual report data of each joint stock commercial bank, makes research on separately four main corporate governance aspects: stock ownership structure, board of directors, supervision board, and top management salaries. Choosing indexes from these four aspects as independent variables, the performance score of joint stock commercial banks as dependent variable, multiple regression model is set with the usage of E-views. By analyzing the regression result, this part states internal relationship between the independent variables of joint-stock commercial bank corporate governance and their performance, makes proposals to improve the corporate governance of joint stock commercial banks.
The features and contributions of this paper are:
1. In the field of corporate governance of commercial banks, there are many relative studies, however, the domestic studies mainly focused on theory deduction, lacking empirical analysis of experience data. This paper, based on current literatures and empirical studies, proposes relevant hypothesis combined with the characteristics of commercial banks, makes empirical test on corporate governance performance of commercial banks according to the annual report data, exposing the internal relationship between the independent variables of corporate governance and performance of banks. This paper fully takes the factors influencing corporate governance of commercial banks into consideration, conquers the limitation of current studies which only concerned on one aspect of governance system.
2. Based on the particularity of corporate governance of commercial banks, this paper builds a performance scoring system including the indexes of profitability, safety, and liquidity, and through which performance scores of banks are calculated. These scores are considered as independent variables of the empirical studies, different from current studies which only focus on profitability of performance evaluation, with ROA and ROE as performance indexes. In this case, evaluation of corporate governance performance of joint stock commercial banks is based on three aspects: improvement of profitability, strengthening of financial safety, contribution of liquidity, fully and systematically exposing the relationship between corporate governance of joint stock commercial banks and performance of banks. This is a new point of view not only for this paper, but also for other researchers.
3. The empirical study provides empirical base for relevant policy suggestions, making up for the shortages that the policy suggestions are deducted from theories. The author proposes some suggestions in order to settle the problems existing in corporate governance of China’s joint-stock commercial banks: optimize the state-owned shareholders, weaken the Government's multi-management, and strengthen the Government's external monitoring role, improve the management and supervision functions of board of directors and supervision board, as well as build healthy salary commission system, which is responsible for performance evaluation of top management.
引文
[1]Adam and Mehran, 2003:Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Working Papers.
[2]Alijoyo et al., 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Indonesia, ADBI Working Papers,Vol.17
[3]Anderson and Campbell, 2000: Corporate Governance of Japanese banks, working papers of university of Missouri.
[4]Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber, 2000: Pay at the Executive Suite: How Do U.S. Banks Compensate Their Top Management Teams?”,Working Paper of Florida State University.
[5]Arun and Turner, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banking Institution in Developing Economics:The Indian Experience, University of Ulster Working Papers.
[6]Booth et al, 2002: Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.26
[7]Byook et al., 2000: Corporate Governance and Recent Consolidation in the Banking Industry, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.6
[8]Caprio and Levine, 2002: Corporate Governance of Banks: Concepts and International Observations, World Bank Working Papers,
[9]Caprio et al., 2003: Governance and Bank Valuation, World Bank Working Papers.Vol.3
[10]Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 2000: Corporate Governance in Banking: A Conceptual Framework , Strathclyde University Working Papers.
[11]Crespi et al., 2003: Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Banks: Does Ownership Matter?, SSRN Working Papers.
[12]Houston and James, 1995: CEO Compensation and Bank Risk: Is Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.36.
[13]Jae-Ha Park, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Republic of Korea, ADBI Working Papers
[14]Koh and Soon, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Malaysia, ADBI Working Papers.
[15]Lang and So, 2002: Ban Ownership Structure and Economic performance, Chinese University of Hong Kong Working Papers.
[16]Levine, 2003: The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence, GCGF Working Papers.
[17]Macey and O'Hara: 2001: The Corporate Governance of Banks, FRBNYE Economic Policy Review, Vol.10.
[18]Morck, Shleife. And Vishny, 1988: Management Ownership and Market Value———An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20.
[19]Nam, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks: Review of Issues, ADBI Working Papers.
[20]Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Thailand, ADBI Working Papers.
[21]Prowse, 1997: Corporate Control in Commercial Banks, The Journal of Financial Research, Vol.20.
[22]Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, Vol.52.
[23]Simon, 2001: Corporate Governance on Indonesian banks, Nan yang Technological University Ph.D. Thesis
[24]蔡鄂生、王立彦、窦洪权:银行公司治理与控制,经济科学出版社,2003
[25]陈丽蓉、王晓光、邓永顺,2004:我国上市商业银行公司治理状况考察,会计时空,第5期
[26]曹廷求,2004:中国股份制商业银行公司治理:基于银行年报的实证分析,改革,第4期
[27]黄陈、孙胜权,2002:银行评价与主要财务指标关系的实证研究,金融研究,第12期
[28]海通证券研究所上市公司治理评价项目组,2004:上市公司治理评价体系及其应用,证券市场导报,第10期
[29]金运,2002:我国股份制银行公司治理的实践与展望,上海金融,第1期
[30]李维安:公司治理,南开大学出版社,2001
[31]李维安、曹廷求,2003:商业银行公司治理:理论模式与我国的选择,南开学报,第1期
[32]李维安、曹延求,2004:股权结构、公司治理机制与城市银行绩效——来自山东、河南两省的调查证据,经济研究,第12期
[33]李维安、曹廷求,2005:商业银行公司治理——商业银行特殊性的研究,南开大学学报,第1期
[34]连建辉、赵海,2005:上市银行公司治理:理论与实证分析,广东金融学院学报,第4期
[35]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组,2003:中国上市公司治理评价系统研究,南开管理评论,第3期
[36]青木昌彦,钱颖一:转轨经济中的公司治理结构,中国经济出版社,1995
[37]施东晖、司徒大年,2003:值得企业家关注的公司治理评价体系,国际经济评论,第3期
[38]田美玉、陈小红,2006:商业银行公司治理评价体系研究,财会通讯(学术版),第12期
[39]陶正芳、杨振东、李艳萍,2004:从控制权到所有权:地方性股份制商业银行法人治理结构改革的逻辑闭,金融研究,第4期
[40]吴敬琏:现代公司与企业改革,天津人民出版社,1994
[41]许小年、王燕:中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验,中国人民大学出版社,2000
[42]袁云峰、张波,2004:商业银行经营绩效综合评价体系研究,国际金融研究,第12期
[43]朱建武、薛俊波,2004:股份制银行的异化与国有商业银行改革路径探析,财经理论与实践,第6期
[44]张维迎:企业理论与中国企业改革,北京大学出版社,1999
1 Fama and Jensen, separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics,1983
2 Mayer, Corporate Governance in Market and Transition Economies: For Presentation at the Imitational Conference on Chinese Corporate Governance,1995.10
3吴敬琏,现代公司与企业改革,天津人民出版社,1994
4青木昌彦,钱颖一,转轨经济中的公司治理结构,中国经济出版社,1995
5张维迎,企业理论与中国企业改革,北京大学出版社,1999,
6李维安,公司治理,南开大学出版社,2001
8海通证券研究所上市公司治理评价项目组,2004:上市公司治理评价体系及其应用,证券市场导报,第10期
9田美玉、陈小红,2006,商业银行公司治理评价体系研究,财会通讯·学术版,第12期
10于利亚等,《西方银行业绩考评》,现代工业出版社,2003
11谢平、许国平、李德,2001:《运用信用评级原理加强金融监管》,《管理世界》,第6期
12财政部统计评价司:《企业绩效评价工作指南》,北京,经济科学出版社,2002
13黄陈,孙胜权,2002,银行评价与主要财务指标关系的实证研究,金融研究,第12期
[2]Alijoyo et al., 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Indonesia, ADBI Working Papers,Vol.17
[3]Anderson and Campbell, 2000: Corporate Governance of Japanese banks, working papers of university of Missouri.
[4]Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber, 2000: Pay at the Executive Suite: How Do U.S. Banks Compensate Their Top Management Teams?”,Working Paper of Florida State University.
[5]Arun and Turner, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banking Institution in Developing Economics:The Indian Experience, University of Ulster Working Papers.
[6]Booth et al, 2002: Boards of Directors, Ownership, and Regulation, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.26
[7]Byook et al., 2000: Corporate Governance and Recent Consolidation in the Banking Industry, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.6
[8]Caprio and Levine, 2002: Corporate Governance of Banks: Concepts and International Observations, World Bank Working Papers,
[9]Caprio et al., 2003: Governance and Bank Valuation, World Bank Working Papers.Vol.3
[10]Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 2000: Corporate Governance in Banking: A Conceptual Framework , Strathclyde University Working Papers.
[11]Crespi et al., 2003: Governance Mechanisms in Spanish Banks: Does Ownership Matter?, SSRN Working Papers.
[12]Houston and James, 1995: CEO Compensation and Bank Risk: Is Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.36.
[13]Jae-Ha Park, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Republic of Korea, ADBI Working Papers
[14]Koh and Soon, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Malaysia, ADBI Working Papers.
[15]Lang and So, 2002: Ban Ownership Structure and Economic performance, Chinese University of Hong Kong Working Papers.
[16]Levine, 2003: The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence, GCGF Working Papers.
[17]Macey and O'Hara: 2001: The Corporate Governance of Banks, FRBNYE Economic Policy Review, Vol.10.
[18]Morck, Shleife. And Vishny, 1988: Management Ownership and Market Value———An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20.
[19]Nam, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks: Review of Issues, ADBI Working Papers.
[20]Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004: Corporate Governance of Banks in Thailand, ADBI Working Papers.
[21]Prowse, 1997: Corporate Control in Commercial Banks, The Journal of Financial Research, Vol.20.
[22]Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, Vol.52.
[23]Simon, 2001: Corporate Governance on Indonesian banks, Nan yang Technological University Ph.D. Thesis
[24]蔡鄂生、王立彦、窦洪权:银行公司治理与控制,经济科学出版社,2003
[25]陈丽蓉、王晓光、邓永顺,2004:我国上市商业银行公司治理状况考察,会计时空,第5期
[26]曹廷求,2004:中国股份制商业银行公司治理:基于银行年报的实证分析,改革,第4期
[27]黄陈、孙胜权,2002:银行评价与主要财务指标关系的实证研究,金融研究,第12期
[28]海通证券研究所上市公司治理评价项目组,2004:上市公司治理评价体系及其应用,证券市场导报,第10期
[29]金运,2002:我国股份制银行公司治理的实践与展望,上海金融,第1期
[30]李维安:公司治理,南开大学出版社,2001
[31]李维安、曹廷求,2003:商业银行公司治理:理论模式与我国的选择,南开学报,第1期
[32]李维安、曹延求,2004:股权结构、公司治理机制与城市银行绩效——来自山东、河南两省的调查证据,经济研究,第12期
[33]李维安、曹廷求,2005:商业银行公司治理——商业银行特殊性的研究,南开大学学报,第1期
[34]连建辉、赵海,2005:上市银行公司治理:理论与实证分析,广东金融学院学报,第4期
[35]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组,2003:中国上市公司治理评价系统研究,南开管理评论,第3期
[36]青木昌彦,钱颖一:转轨经济中的公司治理结构,中国经济出版社,1995
[37]施东晖、司徒大年,2003:值得企业家关注的公司治理评价体系,国际经济评论,第3期
[38]田美玉、陈小红,2006:商业银行公司治理评价体系研究,财会通讯(学术版),第12期
[39]陶正芳、杨振东、李艳萍,2004:从控制权到所有权:地方性股份制商业银行法人治理结构改革的逻辑闭,金融研究,第4期
[40]吴敬琏:现代公司与企业改革,天津人民出版社,1994
[41]许小年、王燕:中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验,中国人民大学出版社,2000
[42]袁云峰、张波,2004:商业银行经营绩效综合评价体系研究,国际金融研究,第12期
[43]朱建武、薛俊波,2004:股份制银行的异化与国有商业银行改革路径探析,财经理论与实践,第6期
[44]张维迎:企业理论与中国企业改革,北京大学出版社,1999
1 Fama and Jensen, separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics,1983
2 Mayer, Corporate Governance in Market and Transition Economies: For Presentation at the Imitational Conference on Chinese Corporate Governance,1995.10
3吴敬琏,现代公司与企业改革,天津人民出版社,1994
4青木昌彦,钱颖一,转轨经济中的公司治理结构,中国经济出版社,1995
5张维迎,企业理论与中国企业改革,北京大学出版社,1999,
6李维安,公司治理,南开大学出版社,2001
8海通证券研究所上市公司治理评价项目组,2004:上市公司治理评价体系及其应用,证券市场导报,第10期
9田美玉、陈小红,2006,商业银行公司治理评价体系研究,财会通讯·学术版,第12期
10于利亚等,《西方银行业绩考评》,现代工业出版社,2003
11谢平、许国平、李德,2001:《运用信用评级原理加强金融监管》,《管理世界》,第6期
12财政部统计评价司:《企业绩效评价工作指南》,北京,经济科学出版社,2002
13黄陈,孙胜权,2002,银行评价与主要财务指标关系的实证研究,金融研究,第12期