CEO替换，公司业绩和公司治理
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摘要
本文建立了CEO替换与公司业绩、公司治理关系的分析框架,并以转型经济体的代表中国为例进行了实证分析。
在理论综述部分,介绍了公司治理以及内控机制和外控机制的相关理论,分析了代理理论、制度理论和组织理论对于CEO替换的研究情况。在理论研究部分,重点讨论了成熟市场经济国家CEO替换的关键要因和机理,包括了决定CEO替换的主体,董事会替换CEO的依据和影响董事会执行力度的因素这三个主要问题。
在实证部分,本文结合公司治理理论以其与CEO替换的关系,以转型经济体的代表中国为例,验证了成熟市场经济国家CEO替换的关键要因和机理对于中国上市公司的有效性,分析了转型经济体对于CEO替换的公司治理机制的特殊性,提出了以中国为代表的转型经济体存在的不足之处。
结合理论和实证分析内容,本文最后对转型经济国家公司治理,特别是遏制上市公司CEO机会主义行为的有效性,提出了政策建议。
建立健全公司治理制度,保护投资者尤其是中小股东利益。外部董事代表的是中小股东的利益,则由外部董事占主导的董事会将更利于监控管理层。进一步完善资本市场,加强外控机制的作用。加强信息披露和透明度。转型经济体要加强信息披露力度和信息透明度,特别是关于公司财务状况及经营成本,股份所有权结构,董事会成员和高级管理人员的薪酬和补偿以及公司治理的政策和方针的信息。同时,要依据严格的会计标准和审计标准,对信息进行审计和披露。只有公正、透明的公司会计制度和财务报告制度,诚信可靠的独立审计,才能促进董事会对于公司治理措施的有效性进行监督。
The paper has set up a theoretical frame based on corporate governance to explore the CEO turnover and corporate performance, and we also have taken the CEO turnover of Chinese listed firms, a representative of transitional economies, as an example to carry on empirical analysis.
In the survey part of related theories about the paper, we introduced the governance theory and its internal and external control mechanisms; we also introduced the agency theory, institutional theory and stewardship theory and related studies about CEO turnover.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we explored how corporate governance and corporate performance affected the CEO turnover among mature economies. We examined the determinants that drive CEO turnover and the factors that influence the board's decision-making process for CEO turnover.
In the empirical part of the paper, we combined the governance theory with CEO turnover, and empirically analyzed CEO turnover for Chinese listed firms, to verify those mechanism and the key factors of CEO turnover we collected from mature economies. Then we compared the differences between mature markets and transitional economies.
The final part of the paper provided some suggestion for corporate governance in transitional economies, particularly for the control mechanism for preventing the opportunistic behavior of CEO in the listed firms.
Our findings also suggest several avenues for future research. Since the sample that we perform empirical tests is limited to the current period, more theoretical work is needed to understand the ex-post effects of CEO turnover on the corporate performance and corporate governance. Another potential area of research is to determine the reasons behind CEO turnover, for voluntary and involuntary turnovers have different implications.
在理论综述部分,介绍了公司治理以及内控机制和外控机制的相关理论,分析了代理理论、制度理论和组织理论对于CEO替换的研究情况。在理论研究部分,重点讨论了成熟市场经济国家CEO替换的关键要因和机理,包括了决定CEO替换的主体,董事会替换CEO的依据和影响董事会执行力度的因素这三个主要问题。
在实证部分,本文结合公司治理理论以其与CEO替换的关系,以转型经济体的代表中国为例,验证了成熟市场经济国家CEO替换的关键要因和机理对于中国上市公司的有效性,分析了转型经济体对于CEO替换的公司治理机制的特殊性,提出了以中国为代表的转型经济体存在的不足之处。
结合理论和实证分析内容,本文最后对转型经济国家公司治理,特别是遏制上市公司CEO机会主义行为的有效性,提出了政策建议。
建立健全公司治理制度,保护投资者尤其是中小股东利益。外部董事代表的是中小股东的利益,则由外部董事占主导的董事会将更利于监控管理层。进一步完善资本市场,加强外控机制的作用。加强信息披露和透明度。转型经济体要加强信息披露力度和信息透明度,特别是关于公司财务状况及经营成本,股份所有权结构,董事会成员和高级管理人员的薪酬和补偿以及公司治理的政策和方针的信息。同时,要依据严格的会计标准和审计标准,对信息进行审计和披露。只有公正、透明的公司会计制度和财务报告制度,诚信可靠的独立审计,才能促进董事会对于公司治理措施的有效性进行监督。
The paper has set up a theoretical frame based on corporate governance to explore the CEO turnover and corporate performance, and we also have taken the CEO turnover of Chinese listed firms, a representative of transitional economies, as an example to carry on empirical analysis.
In the survey part of related theories about the paper, we introduced the governance theory and its internal and external control mechanisms; we also introduced the agency theory, institutional theory and stewardship theory and related studies about CEO turnover.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we explored how corporate governance and corporate performance affected the CEO turnover among mature economies. We examined the determinants that drive CEO turnover and the factors that influence the board's decision-making process for CEO turnover.
In the empirical part of the paper, we combined the governance theory with CEO turnover, and empirically analyzed CEO turnover for Chinese listed firms, to verify those mechanism and the key factors of CEO turnover we collected from mature economies. Then we compared the differences between mature markets and transitional economies.
The final part of the paper provided some suggestion for corporate governance in transitional economies, particularly for the control mechanism for preventing the opportunistic behavior of CEO in the listed firms.
Our findings also suggest several avenues for future research. Since the sample that we perform empirical tests is limited to the current period, more theoretical work is needed to understand the ex-post effects of CEO turnover on the corporate performance and corporate governance. Another potential area of research is to determine the reasons behind CEO turnover, for voluntary and involuntary turnovers have different implications.
引文
[1]何家成：《公司治理、结构、机制与效率---治理案例的国际比较》,经济科学出版社,2004年。
[2]怀特·帕金斯：改善公司治理事关中国进入高收入社会步伐的快慢,《公司治理、结构、机制与效率---治理案例的国际比较》序言,经济科学出版社,2004年。
[3]J.弗雷德·威斯通,S.郑光,胡安·A.苏：《接管、重组与公司治理(第二版)》东北财经大学出版社,2000年。
[4]L·E戴维斯,D·C诺斯.制度创新的理论：描述、类推和说明.财产权利与制度变迁.上海三联书店,1991年版
[5]J.M.伍德里奇：《计量经济学导论：现代观点》,经济科学出版社,2003年。
[6]徐莉萍,陈工孟,辛宇：控制权转移、产权改革及公司经营绩效之改进。《管理世界》2005年第3期,126-136。
[7]王辉、忻蓉、徐淑英：中国企业CEO的领导行为及对企业经营业绩的影响,《管理世界》2006年第4期,24-39。
[8]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁：董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?《经济研究》2006年第47期,62-73。
[9]朱琪：上市公司控制权变更：理论与实证分析,浙江大学博士学位论文,2003年。
[10]Allgood, S., Farrell, K.A.,2003. The match between the CEO and firm. Journal of Business 76,317-341.
[11]Booth J. R., Cornett M. M., Tehranian H.,2002. Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance 26,1973-1996.
[12]Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Parrino R., Trapani T.,1999. Outside directors and CEO selection, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18,337-355.
[13]Brickley J.A.,2003. Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36,227-233.
[14]Brookman, J., Thistle, P.D.,2009. CEO tenure, the risk of termination and firm value. Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (2009) 331-344.
[15]Buchholtz, A.K., Young, M., Powell, G.,1998. Are board members pawns or watchdogs? The link between CEO pay and firm performance. Group and Organization Management 23,6-26.
[16]Chatterjee, S., Harrison, J.,2001. Corporate governance. In:Hitt, M.A., Freeman, R.E., Harrison, J.S. (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management. Blackwell Publishers.
[17]Core J.E., Holthausen R. W., Larcker D.F.,1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial economics51,371-406.
[18]Dedman E., Lin S. W.-J.,2002. Shareholder wealth effects of CEO departures: evidence from the UK.Journal of Corporate Finance 8,81-104.
[19]Eisenhardt K.M.,1989. Agency theory:an assessment and review.Academy of management review,1989, Vol.14, No.1,57-74.
[20]Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.,1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26,301-325.
[21]Fan D.K.K., Lau C.M., Young M.,2007. Is China's corporate governance beginning to come of age? The case of CEO turnover. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15,105-120.
[22]Fana J.P.H., Wong T.J., Zhang T.,2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84,330-357.
[23]Farrell, K.A., Whidbee, D.,2000. The consequences of forced CEO succession for outside directors. Journal of Business 73,597-627.
[24]Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C.,1996. Strategic leadership:top executives and their effects on organizations. Minneapolis/St Paul, MN:West Publishing Co.
[25]Firth M., Fung P.M. Y., Rui O.M.,2006.Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China. Journal of Corporate Financel2,693-714.
[26]Gillan S. L.,2006. Recent developments in corporate governance:an overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12,381-402.
[27]Goyal V. K., Park C. W.,2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance 8,49-66.
[28]Helmich, D.,1980. Board size, variation, and rates of succession in the corporate presidency. Journal of Business Research8,51-63.
[29]Hendry K., Kiel G.C.,2004. The role of the board in firm strategy:integrating agency and organizational control perspectives. Corporate governance 12,500-520.
[30]Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt, M., Wan, W., Yiu, D.,1999. Theory and research, in strategic management:swings of a pendulum. Journal of Management 25,417-456.
[31]Kang E., Zardkoohi A.,2005. Board leadership structure and firm performance. Corporate Government 13,785-799.
[32]Kaplan,S.N., Minton, B.A.,2008, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? NBER
[33]Kato T., Long C.,2006. CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China:Evidence from micro data. Journal of Comparative Economics 34,796-817.
[34]Kini O., Kracaw W., Mian S.,1995. Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition. Journal of Corporate Finance 1,383-1412.
[35]Li Y., Guo H., Liu Y., Li M.,2008. Incentive mechanisms, entrepreneurial orientation, and technology commercialization:evidence from China's transitional economy. Journal of Product Innovation Management 25,63-78.
[36]Murphy, K.J., Zimmerman, J.,1993. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16,273-315.
[37]Parrinoa R., Siasb R.W., Starksa L.T.,2003. Voting with their feet:institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 3-46.
[38]Parrino R.,1997. CEO turnover and outside succession:A cross-sectional analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 46,165-197.
[39]Stiles P.,2002.Board at Work, Oxford University Press.
[40]Tian, J.J., Lau, C.,2001. Board composition, leadership structure and performance in Chinese shareholding companies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 18,245-263.
[41]Ward R.,2003, Saving the Corporate Board, Wiley Press.
[2]怀特·帕金斯：改善公司治理事关中国进入高收入社会步伐的快慢,《公司治理、结构、机制与效率---治理案例的国际比较》序言,经济科学出版社,2004年。
[3]J.弗雷德·威斯通,S.郑光,胡安·A.苏：《接管、重组与公司治理(第二版)》东北财经大学出版社,2000年。
[4]L·E戴维斯,D·C诺斯.制度创新的理论：描述、类推和说明.财产权利与制度变迁.上海三联书店,1991年版
[5]J.M.伍德里奇：《计量经济学导论：现代观点》,经济科学出版社,2003年。
[6]徐莉萍,陈工孟,辛宇：控制权转移、产权改革及公司经营绩效之改进。《管理世界》2005年第3期,126-136。
[7]王辉、忻蓉、徐淑英：中国企业CEO的领导行为及对企业经营业绩的影响,《管理世界》2006年第4期,24-39。
[8]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁：董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?《经济研究》2006年第47期,62-73。
[9]朱琪：上市公司控制权变更：理论与实证分析,浙江大学博士学位论文,2003年。
[10]Allgood, S., Farrell, K.A.,2003. The match between the CEO and firm. Journal of Business 76,317-341.
[11]Booth J. R., Cornett M. M., Tehranian H.,2002. Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance 26,1973-1996.
[12]Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Parrino R., Trapani T.,1999. Outside directors and CEO selection, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18,337-355.
[13]Brickley J.A.,2003. Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36,227-233.
[14]Brookman, J., Thistle, P.D.,2009. CEO tenure, the risk of termination and firm value. Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (2009) 331-344.
[15]Buchholtz, A.K., Young, M., Powell, G.,1998. Are board members pawns or watchdogs? The link between CEO pay and firm performance. Group and Organization Management 23,6-26.
[16]Chatterjee, S., Harrison, J.,2001. Corporate governance. In:Hitt, M.A., Freeman, R.E., Harrison, J.S. (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management. Blackwell Publishers.
[17]Core J.E., Holthausen R. W., Larcker D.F.,1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial economics51,371-406.
[18]Dedman E., Lin S. W.-J.,2002. Shareholder wealth effects of CEO departures: evidence from the UK.Journal of Corporate Finance 8,81-104.
[19]Eisenhardt K.M.,1989. Agency theory:an assessment and review.Academy of management review,1989, Vol.14, No.1,57-74.
[20]Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.,1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26,301-325.
[21]Fan D.K.K., Lau C.M., Young M.,2007. Is China's corporate governance beginning to come of age? The case of CEO turnover. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15,105-120.
[22]Fana J.P.H., Wong T.J., Zhang T.,2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84,330-357.
[23]Farrell, K.A., Whidbee, D.,2000. The consequences of forced CEO succession for outside directors. Journal of Business 73,597-627.
[24]Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C.,1996. Strategic leadership:top executives and their effects on organizations. Minneapolis/St Paul, MN:West Publishing Co.
[25]Firth M., Fung P.M. Y., Rui O.M.,2006.Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China. Journal of Corporate Financel2,693-714.
[26]Gillan S. L.,2006. Recent developments in corporate governance:an overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12,381-402.
[27]Goyal V. K., Park C. W.,2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance 8,49-66.
[28]Helmich, D.,1980. Board size, variation, and rates of succession in the corporate presidency. Journal of Business Research8,51-63.
[29]Hendry K., Kiel G.C.,2004. The role of the board in firm strategy:integrating agency and organizational control perspectives. Corporate governance 12,500-520.
[30]Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt, M., Wan, W., Yiu, D.,1999. Theory and research, in strategic management:swings of a pendulum. Journal of Management 25,417-456.
[31]Kang E., Zardkoohi A.,2005. Board leadership structure and firm performance. Corporate Government 13,785-799.
[32]Kaplan,S.N., Minton, B.A.,2008, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? NBER
[33]Kato T., Long C.,2006. CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China:Evidence from micro data. Journal of Comparative Economics 34,796-817.
[34]Kini O., Kracaw W., Mian S.,1995. Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition. Journal of Corporate Finance 1,383-1412.
[35]Li Y., Guo H., Liu Y., Li M.,2008. Incentive mechanisms, entrepreneurial orientation, and technology commercialization:evidence from China's transitional economy. Journal of Product Innovation Management 25,63-78.
[36]Murphy, K.J., Zimmerman, J.,1993. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16,273-315.
[37]Parrinoa R., Siasb R.W., Starksa L.T.,2003. Voting with their feet:institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 3-46.
[38]Parrino R.,1997. CEO turnover and outside succession:A cross-sectional analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 46,165-197.
[39]Stiles P.,2002.Board at Work, Oxford University Press.
[40]Tian, J.J., Lau, C.,2001. Board composition, leadership structure and performance in Chinese shareholding companies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 18,245-263.
[41]Ward R.,2003, Saving the Corporate Board, Wiley Press.