保险监管机制的法经济学分析
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摘要
随着经济社会的发展,保险业在经济领域中发挥着越来越重要的作用,保险业的发达与否不仅是一个国家经济发展状况的标志,更是关系到国家的经济安全,因而对保险业能否实现有效的监管就成为一个关键的课题。保险业是典型的信息不对称行业,信息不对称主要发生在监管者与被监管者、保险公司与保险消费者之间,所以,如何对保险公司实施有效监管以及如何构建最优的保险契约从而节约监管成本和交易成本是本文讨论的核心问题。从世界金融监管发展的情况来看,各国的监管制度滞后于经济发展的步伐,特别是跟不上金融创新的节奏已经成为不争的事实,次贷危机引发的世界性金融危机就是最好的证明。因此,本文结合当前世界金融监管改革的大背景来探讨后危机阶段保险业监管的发展方向。笔者试图通过对保险行业的实质特点的阐述并将保险业监管纳入到整个金融监管的宏观框架之中,来论述应当如何构建最佳的保险监管机制。从保险监管制度或体制存在弊端入手,提出完善保险监管的若干政策建议。
Insurance regulation on the development of modern insurance industry played a crucial role.Insurance regulatory standards of a country's level of influence not only in terms of market access to the insurance market competition is the right size,but also a modern government can lead the insurance company maximize the benefits and functions of government social wefare is maximized where asign.
The first chapter, to achieve effective regulation of insurance is important to understand the theory of evolution of the insurance regulatory origins. This chapter from the theory of the development of insurance regulation, changes in regulatory objectives and international advanced system to learn from the perspective of the results of monitoring of the insurance industry a systematic review.
Chapter II, from an economic perspective to examine problems in the insurance industry to make the necessary avoidance strategy, and then to resolve the insurance regulators from the mechanism, structure, system relationship between the internal logic.
First, the analysis of insurance regulation and insurance markets, the asymmetric information problem. On the one hand, the article from the economics of information economics to examine the security aspects of monitoring are being regulated information asymmetry between. Caused by the regulator itself has information superiority, leading regulators struggle to learn about the actual situation of the insurance company, then based on their actual hard costs, earnings for the development of effective regulatory system. On the other hand, the insurance market from the perspective of the insurance contract, both the asymmetric information problem. As the insurance contract the parties each have their own information superiority, coupled with the main body of the opportunistic tendencies, they inevitably will in the process of concluding the contract to avoid self-incriminating information in order to devise the optimal side contract, however, kind of contract on both sides, there are a large number of inequality, over time, will inevitably hinder and undermine the insurance market.
Secondly, this chapter draw on a number of incentive regulation in the kernel of proposed areas of the insurance industry to different categories, elastic appropriate combination of regulatory strategy. With the market mechanism can be implemented effectively in the areas of appropriate monitoring, which will not only be able to give full play to market the role of optimal allocation of resources, but also the cost of regulation to maximize savings and improve regulatory efficiency. While the insurance industry of information asymmetry, investment issues, in particular solvency problems should be strict regulation, which not only involves the safety and stability of the insurance industry, it is even more government regulation, regulation and control capabilities of the market can be achieved.
Meanwhile, the field in the insurance market regulation should be introduced Deductible Clause and Coinsurance Clause, only the parties to the insurance contract to impose in advance or after the necessary balance between the interests of oversight mechanisms, the resistance can only maximize the information asymmetry because of the insurance parties arising from adverse selection and moral hazard, in order to maximize the realization of a fair insurance market, justice.
Finally, the chapter on the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis has caused global financial crisis, a brief review, pointed out that as the insurance industry regulatory failure, not only one of the architects of this financial crisis, but also makes the insurance industry in the current financial crisis in losses. The reason is that the whole area of financial supervision and regulation of the financial innovation can not follow the pace of development. Therefore, effective regulation of the insurance industry should be integrated from the perspective of the entire financial regulatory measures,through the deepening of the banking, securities, insurance and business between the capital to constantly improve the status of the consolidated supervision of their respective functions, ability to resist risks,further integration of financial regulation for the future to provide the necessary conditions.
Chapter III, from two different aspects of the insurance industry and insurance regulators in the defects. First, our current failure to complete the transformation into a service on the market as the core concept of insurance supervision mechanisms, institutions and systems. This not only led to the insurance regulatory process can not incentive compatible, resulting in inefficient regulation, but also makes the insurance industry itself, the information bias in the problem that an effective solution. Together with a large number of existence of a contract market, the format, the insurance intermediary does not sound,ultimately caused the insurer to the rights of consumers should hardly be maintained.
Second, the experience of the international financial crisis shows that China's current financial sub-sector regulatory model is very difficult to respond to future pace of financial innovation. The reason why China's insurance industry is small by the financial crisis is not a regulatory mechanism, how mature systems, the fundamental reason is that the insurance industry, international, market-oriented without a brain unscathed.
Chapter Four, for China's insurance supervision of problems, this chapter appropriate reference to IAIS of the relevant provisions of the proposed deal with both insurance regulators and market information asymmetry between the principal related measures.In addition, by introducing the current trend of financial integration in different countries around the world regulate the choice, and further pointed out that the implementation of the regulation of financial integration is the trend of China's insurance regulatory reform and the German financial regulators in the Asian financial turmoil of the success stories to illustrate its regulatory approach reference to China.
Chapter V, on China's insurance regulatory regime, the system made a number of recommendations. In view of the insurance supervision over existing deficiencies and the current pace of innovation in the international financial sector, only the realization of the rapid changes in regulatory philosophy of the new regulatory reform is fundamental. Therefore, only changing the government's regulatory functions, implementation of the insurance industry to adapt to the high elastic combination phase regulation can effectively promote the health of China's insurance industry, and orderly development.
Insurance regulation on the development of modern insurance industry played a crucial role.Insurance regulatory standards of a country's level of influence not only in terms of market access to the insurance market competition is the right size,but also a modern government can lead the insurance company maximize the benefits and functions of government social wefare is maximized where asign.
The first chapter, to achieve effective regulation of insurance is important to understand the theory of evolution of the insurance regulatory origins. This chapter from the theory of the development of insurance regulation, changes in regulatory objectives and international advanced system to learn from the perspective of the results of monitoring of the insurance industry a systematic review.
Chapter II, from an economic perspective to examine problems in the insurance industry to make the necessary avoidance strategy, and then to resolve the insurance regulators from the mechanism, structure, system relationship between the internal logic.
First, the analysis of insurance regulation and insurance markets, the asymmetric information problem. On the one hand, the article from the economics of information economics to examine the security aspects of monitoring are being regulated information asymmetry between. Caused by the regulator itself has information superiority, leading regulators struggle to learn about the actual situation of the insurance company, then based on their actual hard costs, earnings for the development of effective regulatory system. On the other hand, the insurance market from the perspective of the insurance contract, both the asymmetric information problem. As the insurance contract the parties each have their own information superiority, coupled with the main body of the opportunistic tendencies, they inevitably will in the process of concluding the contract to avoid self-incriminating information in order to devise the optimal side contract, however, kind of contract on both sides, there are a large number of inequality, over time, will inevitably hinder and undermine the insurance market.
Secondly, this chapter draw on a number of incentive regulation in the kernel of proposed areas of the insurance industry to different categories, elastic appropriate combination of regulatory strategy. With the market mechanism can be implemented effectively in the areas of appropriate monitoring, which will not only be able to give full play to market the role of optimal allocation of resources, but also the cost of regulation to maximize savings and improve regulatory efficiency. While the insurance industry of information asymmetry, investment issues, in particular solvency problems should be strict regulation, which not only involves the safety and stability of the insurance industry, it is even more government regulation, regulation and control capabilities of the market can be achieved.
Meanwhile, the field in the insurance market regulation should be introduced Deductible Clause and Coinsurance Clause, only the parties to the insurance contract to impose in advance or after the necessary balance between the interests of oversight mechanisms, the resistance can only maximize the information asymmetry because of the insurance parties arising from adverse selection and moral hazard, in order to maximize the realization of a fair insurance market, justice.
Finally, the chapter on the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis has caused global financial crisis, a brief review, pointed out that as the insurance industry regulatory failure, not only one of the architects of this financial crisis, but also makes the insurance industry in the current financial crisis in losses. The reason is that the whole area of financial supervision and regulation of the financial innovation can not follow the pace of development. Therefore, effective regulation of the insurance industry should be integrated from the perspective of the entire financial regulatory measures,through the deepening of the banking, securities, insurance and business between the capital to constantly improve the status of the consolidated supervision of their respective functions, ability to resist risks,further integration of financial regulation for the future to provide the necessary conditions.
Chapter III, from two different aspects of the insurance industry and insurance regulators in the defects. First, our current failure to complete the transformation into a service on the market as the core concept of insurance supervision mechanisms, institutions and systems. This not only led to the insurance regulatory process can not incentive compatible, resulting in inefficient regulation, but also makes the insurance industry itself, the information bias in the problem that an effective solution. Together with a large number of existence of a contract market, the format, the insurance intermediary does not sound,ultimately caused the insurer to the rights of consumers should hardly be maintained.
Second, the experience of the international financial crisis shows that China's current financial sub-sector regulatory model is very difficult to respond to future pace of financial innovation. The reason why China's insurance industry is small by the financial crisis is not a regulatory mechanism, how mature systems, the fundamental reason is that the insurance industry, international, market-oriented without a brain unscathed.
Chapter Four, for China's insurance supervision of problems, this chapter appropriate reference to IAIS of the relevant provisions of the proposed deal with both insurance regulators and market information asymmetry between the principal related measures.In addition, by introducing the current trend of financial integration in different countries around the world regulate the choice, and further pointed out that the implementation of the regulation of financial integration is the trend of China's insurance regulatory reform and the German financial regulators in the Asian financial turmoil of the success stories to illustrate its regulatory approach reference to China.
Chapter V, on China's insurance regulatory regime, the system made a number of recommendations. In view of the insurance supervision over existing deficiencies and the current pace of innovation in the international financial sector, only the realization of the rapid changes in regulatory philosophy of the new regulatory reform is fundamental. Therefore, only changing the government's regulatory functions, implementation of the insurance industry to adapt to the high elastic combination phase regulation can effectively promote the health of China's insurance industry, and orderly development.
引文
[1] Arrow.K.Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care[J].American Econmic Review,1963,53:91-96.
[2] Shavell Steven.On Moral Hazard and Insurance Quarterly[J].Journal of Econ omics,1979,93:541-562.
[3] Spence A.Michael,Richard Zeckhauser.Insurance,Information,and Individual Action[J].American Econmic Review,1971,61:380-387.
[4] Townsend R.M.Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1979,21:266-293.
[5] Dionne G.The Effects of Insurance on the Possibilities of Fraud[J].The Geneva Papers on Risk and insurance,1984,9:304-321.
[6] Mookherjee D.Optimal Auditing Insurance and Redistribution[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1989,CIV,205-228.
[7] G.A.Akerlof.The Market for“Lemons”:Quality Uncertainty and the market Mechanism[J] .Quarterly Jouranl of Economics,1970;84(3):488:500.
[8] J.E.Stiglitz.The Theory of“Screeming”,Education,and the Distribution of Inco me[J] .American Economic Review,1975,65(3):283-300.
[9] Clark, j.A.Economies of scale and scope at depository financial institutions:a review of the literature[J].Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review,1988(10):16-33.
[10] Saunder,Anthony.Financial Institution Management[M].A modern perspective, 2000: 506.
[11] Joskow,p.Cartels Competition and Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance Industry[J].Bell Journal of Economics and management science, 1973,4(2): 375-427.
[12]冷煜.金融危机启示:金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管[J].保险研究,2009(4).
[13]植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1992.
[14]让-雅克?拉丰,大卫?马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
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[16]李未,朱雨顺,刘伟.美国“RBC标准”对我国保险监管的启示[J].金融与经济,2004(12).
[17]王上文.保险监管RBC制度的经济学解释[J].保险研究,2006(1).
[18]孙祁祥,郑伟.欧盟保险偿付能力监管标准Ⅱ及对中国的启示[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.
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[24]陶存文.中国保险交易制度成本研究[M].上海:立信会计出版社,2005.
[25]段家喜,邢彬.澳大利亚:适度保护被保险人利益[G]//国际保险监管研究.北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
[26]孟龙.中国保险监管国际化问题研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002.
[27]李扬,陈文辉.国际保险监管核心原则——理念、规则及中国实践[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2006.
[28]张洪涛.保险经济学[M].北京:中国人民法学出版社,2006.
[29]侯祖戎.中国保险业经营模式变迁与监管机制创新[D].武汉:华中科技大学,2005.
[30]谢地.政府规制经济学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2003.
[31]祝向军.保险商品价格形成的经济学分析[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2004.
[32]陈富良.放松规制与强化规制[M].上海:上海三联书店,2001.
[33]孙祁祥,郑伟,肖志光.保险业与美国金融危机:角色及反思[J].保险研究,2009(11).
[34]田原.金融危机下完善我国保险监管的思考[J].理论前沿,2009(4).
[35]孟昭亿.国际保险监管文献汇编IAIS卷[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2006.
[36]陈柳钦.金融危机背景下美国金融监管构架改革[J].中共天津市委党校学报,2009(3).
[37]吴淑君,徐小庆.金融危机背景下德国的金融监管体制及其启示[J].中国行政管理,2009(2).
①Arrow.K.Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care[J].American Econmic Review,1963,5 3:91-96.
②Shavell Steven.On Moral Hazard and Insurance Quarterly[J].Journal of Economics,1979,93:5 41-562.
③Spence A.Michael,Richard Zeckhauser.Insurance,Information,and Individual Action[J].American Econmic Review,1971,61:380-387.
④Townsend R.M.Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification[J].Jour nal of Economic Theory,1979,21:266-293.
①Dionne G.The Effects of Insurance on the Possibilities of Fraud[J].The Geneva Papers on Risk and insurance,1984,9:304-321.
②Mookherjee D.Optimal Auditing Insurance and Redistribution[J] .Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989, CIV, 205-228.
③当今凯恩斯学派的主要代表人物,毕业于麻省理工学院获得博士学位,后来成为加州大学经济学首席教授。
④G.A.Akerlof.The Market for“Lemons”:Quality Uncertainty and the market Mechanism[J].Quarterly Jouranl of Economics,1970:84(3):488:500.
⑤对信息经济学的研究做出了卓越的贡献,成为2001年诺贝尔经济学奖的获得者。
⑥J.E.Stiglitz.The Theory of“Screeming”,Education,and the Distribution of Income[J].American Economic Review,1975,65(3):283-300.
⑦Clark,j.A.Economies of scale and scope at depository financial institutions:a review of the literature[J].Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review,1988(10):16-33.
①Saunders,Anthony.Financial Institutions Management[M].A modern perspective,2000:506.
②冷煜.金融危机启示;金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管[J].保险研究,2009(4).
③Joskow,p.Cartels Competition and Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance Industry[J].Bell Journal of Economics and management science,1973,4(2):375-427.
④植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京;中国发展出版社,1992.
⑤让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
①姚庆海,刘云海.澳门保险监管制度及其借鉴[G]//中国保险监督管理委员会.国际保险监管研究.北京:中国金融出版社,2003:130-150.
②李未,朱雨顺,刘伟.美国“RBC标准”对我国保险监管的启示[J].金融与经济,2004(12).
③王上文.保险监管RBC制度的经济学解释[J].保险研究,2006(1).
④孙祁祥,郑伟.欧盟保险偿付能力监管标准Ⅱ及对中国的启示[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.
①钱维章,何唐兵.论保险公司的治理结构建设[J].保险研究,2003(10).
②陶存文.中国保险交易制度成本研究[M].上海:立信会计出版社,2005.
③段家喜,邢彬.澳大利亚:适度保护被保险人利益[G]//国际保险监管研究.北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
④孟龙.中国保险监管国际化问题研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002.
①李扬,陈文辉.国际保险监管核心原则——理念、规则及中国实践[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2006.
①张洪涛.保险经济学[M].北京:中国人民法学出版社,2006:333.
②侯祖戎.中国保险业经营模式变迁与监管机制创新[D].武汉:华中科技大学,2005.
①谢地.政府规制经济学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2003:85.
①祝向军.保险商品价格形成的经济学分析[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2004:203.
②陈富良.放松规制与强化规制[M].上海:上海三联书店,2001:83.
①中国保监会.美国次级按揭贷款危机及其影响分析[EB/OL].(2007-11-4)[2009-11-15].http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab211/i57680.htm
①孙祁祥,郑伟,肖志光.保险业与美国金融危机:角色及反思[J].保险研究,2009(11).
②孙祁祥,郑伟,肖志光.保险业与美国金融危机:角色及反思[J].保险研究,2009(11).
③田原.金融危机下完善我国保险监管的思考[J].理论前沿,2009(4):6.
④孙祁祥,郑伟,肖志光.保险业与美国金融危机:角色及反思[J].保险研究,2009(11):101-102.
①中国保监会.日本车险市场发展对我国的借鉴[EB/OL].(2009-7-24)[2009-12-15]. http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab211/i106563.htm
①冷煜.金融危机启示:金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管[J].保险研究.2009(4).
①孟昭亿.国际保险监管文献汇编IAIS卷[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2006:447.
②李扬,陈文辉.国际保险监管核心原则——理念、规则及中国实践[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2006:85.
①诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、哈佛大学教授,美国前任财政部长,现任白宫经济委员会主任。
②冷煜.金融危机启示:金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管[J].保险研究,2009(4).
③陈柳钦.金融危机背景下美国金融监管构架改革[J].中共天津市委党校学报,2009(3).
①吴淑君,徐小庆.金融危机背景下德国的金融监管体制及其启示[J].中国行政管理,2009(2).
[2] Shavell Steven.On Moral Hazard and Insurance Quarterly[J].Journal of Econ omics,1979,93:541-562.
[3] Spence A.Michael,Richard Zeckhauser.Insurance,Information,and Individual Action[J].American Econmic Review,1971,61:380-387.
[4] Townsend R.M.Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1979,21:266-293.
[5] Dionne G.The Effects of Insurance on the Possibilities of Fraud[J].The Geneva Papers on Risk and insurance,1984,9:304-321.
[6] Mookherjee D.Optimal Auditing Insurance and Redistribution[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1989,CIV,205-228.
[7] G.A.Akerlof.The Market for“Lemons”:Quality Uncertainty and the market Mechanism[J] .Quarterly Jouranl of Economics,1970;84(3):488:500.
[8] J.E.Stiglitz.The Theory of“Screeming”,Education,and the Distribution of Inco me[J] .American Economic Review,1975,65(3):283-300.
[9] Clark, j.A.Economies of scale and scope at depository financial institutions:a review of the literature[J].Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review,1988(10):16-33.
[10] Saunder,Anthony.Financial Institution Management[M].A modern perspective, 2000: 506.
[11] Joskow,p.Cartels Competition and Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance Industry[J].Bell Journal of Economics and management science, 1973,4(2): 375-427.
[12]冷煜.金融危机启示:金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管[J].保险研究,2009(4).
[13]植草益.微观规制经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1992.
[14]让-雅克?拉丰,大卫?马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[15]姚庆海,刘云海.澳门保险监管制度及其借鉴[G]//中国保险监督管理委员会.国际保险监管研究.北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
[16]李未,朱雨顺,刘伟.美国“RBC标准”对我国保险监管的启示[J].金融与经济,2004(12).
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