WTO决策法律制度的民主问题研究
摘要
WTO作为国际经济共治机构,它倍受关注。WTO决策法律制度作为WTO体制中的重要一环,亦被发达国家和发展中国家所重视。本文对WTO决策法律制度的民主问题进行了较为深入的研究,分析了WTO决策法律制度缺乏民主的成因,阐述了总干事和秘书处是如何对WTO决策法律制度的民主产生影响,指出了WTO决策法律制度的民主与效率之间的关系。在此基础上,为提高WTO决策法律制度的民主,本文进行了一些理论探索,提出了一些意见和建议。本文分为导论、正文和结论三大部分,其中正文共有六章。
导论部分对WTO决策法律制度做了简要的概述,并说明和介绍了本论题的研究意义、研究现状、研究资料与方法以及本文的结构安排。
第一章从必要性和可行性两个角度论述了民主在国际关系领域的适用,并指出了在国际关系领域适用民主时应当注意的几个问题。
第二章对WTO决策程序是否民主进行了分析。本章认为,无论是从WTO成员方的有效参与,还是从WTO决策程序的透明度来看,WTO决策程序中的民主现状都是不容乐观的。一方面,成员方有效参与WTO决策程序的广度有待拓展,参与深度有待加强,参与范围有待拓宽;另一方面,WTO决策程序的内部透明度和外部透明度有待提高。
第三章围绕WTO决策程序的内部和外部民主赤字及其解决而展开。首先分析了发达国家提出的改革“绿屋会议”的诸多建议,对其进行了较为深刻的批驳,并就如何改革“绿屋会议”提出了务实的“三步走”计划;接着说明了非政府组织参与WTO决策程序的应有定位。
第四章主要讨论WTO表决制度的民主问题。本章对GATT/WTO表决制度的历史沿革进行了阐述,在分析GATT/WTO在不同时代采用不同的表决制度的历史背景及其成因的基础上,指出了WTO正在出现的政治化危险信号,最后对WTO各项表决制度是否民主做了进一步的探讨,认为一国一票简单多数决是WTO最为理想的民主表决制度。
第五章对总干事与秘书处如何对WTO决策法律制度的民主产生影响做了论述。本章指出,建构民主的WTO决策法律制度,要求总干事与秘书处在筹备和召开正式与非正式会议的过程中,应恪守WTO协定对它们职权及职责的规定,站在中立及客观的立场上,对成员方的意见给予及时和正确的反映。
第六章探讨WTO决策法律制度民主与效率之间的关系。本章认为二者虽然在总体上是一种相辅相成的关系,但是,WTO决策法律制度的民主价值要优于其效率价值。
结论部分从民主的角度对WTO决策法律制度可供选择的改革方案做了总体上的区分,指出WTO决策法律制度有两种改革途径:一是理想模式的改革;一是理想模式之下的次优改革路径。站在发展中国家的立场,并结合中国作为一个负责任的发展中大国的基本定位,本章阐述了发展中国家及中国在WTO决策法律制度改革问题上的最佳选择和次优选择。
WTO raises concerns as an organization of international economic co-governance. Both developing and developed countries attach great importance to WTO decision-making legal system which plays an important role in WTO institution. This dissertation further studies democracy in WTO decision-making legal system, by analyzing the reason why the legal system lacks democracy, setting forth how Director-General and The Secretariat exert their influence on democracy of WTO decision-making legal system, and discussing the correlation between democracy and efficiency in WTO decision-making legal system. Basing on the discussion, this dissertation carries on the related theoretical exploration and provides some suggestions for democracy in WTO decision-making legal system.
This dissertation consists of Introduction, Body and Conclusion, and there are six chapters in Body section.
Introduction makes a brief generalization of WTO decision-making legal system, and covers research significance, current research status, research references and methods, and structure arrangement of the dissertation.
Chapter One discusses how democracy adapts in international relations from the perspectives of feasibility and necessity, and points out several issues that we should pay attention to when democracy adapts in international relations.
Chapter Two analyzes whether or not democracy conducts in WTO decision-making process. It is found that democracy in WTO decision-making process does not seem to be optimistic, in terms of effective participations of WTO members and transparency of WTO decision-making process. On one hand, effective participations of WTO members should be enhanced, on the other hand, WTO decision-making process needs to be improved in internal and external transparency both.
Chapter Three focuses on internal and external democracy deficit existing in WTO decision-making process. Particularly, this chapter makes an in-depth discussion of suggestions on reforming“Green Room meetings”proposed by developed countries, and then proposes the three-step plan on the reformation of“Green Room meetings”, in which it analyses what roles non-governmental organizations should play when participating in WTO decision-making process.
Chapter Four mainly discusses democracy in WTO voting system. This chapter makes a thorough introduction to the history of GATT/WTO voting system. Basing on the analysis of historical backgrounds and factors of different voting rules adopted in different ages, there appears to be a dangerous sign of politicization in WTO. Finally, with the further exploration of whether or not democracy conducts in voting systems, it is concluded that majority voting is the most democratic WTO voting rule.
Chapter Five makes an introduction on how Director-General and The Secretariat exert their influence on democracy in WTO decision-making legal system. This chapter points out, in order to establish WTO decision-making legal system, Director-General and The Secretariat should obey their duties regulated by WTO in the process of preparing and convening formal or non-formal meetings, and make prompt and right response from a neutral and objective point of view.
Chapter Six, by analyzing the correlation between democracy and efficiency, brings forward that the value of democracy should be prior to that of efficiency in WTO decision-making legal system.
Conclusion generally distinguishes available reform projects in WTO decision-making legal system, and points out two reform approaches, that is, the best and the second best option under the ideal pattern. Finally, it illustrates the best option and the second best one open to China, when she faces the reform in WTO decision-making legal system as a responsible developing country.
导论部分对WTO决策法律制度做了简要的概述,并说明和介绍了本论题的研究意义、研究现状、研究资料与方法以及本文的结构安排。
第一章从必要性和可行性两个角度论述了民主在国际关系领域的适用,并指出了在国际关系领域适用民主时应当注意的几个问题。
第二章对WTO决策程序是否民主进行了分析。本章认为,无论是从WTO成员方的有效参与,还是从WTO决策程序的透明度来看,WTO决策程序中的民主现状都是不容乐观的。一方面,成员方有效参与WTO决策程序的广度有待拓展,参与深度有待加强,参与范围有待拓宽;另一方面,WTO决策程序的内部透明度和外部透明度有待提高。
第三章围绕WTO决策程序的内部和外部民主赤字及其解决而展开。首先分析了发达国家提出的改革“绿屋会议”的诸多建议,对其进行了较为深刻的批驳,并就如何改革“绿屋会议”提出了务实的“三步走”计划;接着说明了非政府组织参与WTO决策程序的应有定位。
第四章主要讨论WTO表决制度的民主问题。本章对GATT/WTO表决制度的历史沿革进行了阐述,在分析GATT/WTO在不同时代采用不同的表决制度的历史背景及其成因的基础上,指出了WTO正在出现的政治化危险信号,最后对WTO各项表决制度是否民主做了进一步的探讨,认为一国一票简单多数决是WTO最为理想的民主表决制度。
第五章对总干事与秘书处如何对WTO决策法律制度的民主产生影响做了论述。本章指出,建构民主的WTO决策法律制度,要求总干事与秘书处在筹备和召开正式与非正式会议的过程中,应恪守WTO协定对它们职权及职责的规定,站在中立及客观的立场上,对成员方的意见给予及时和正确的反映。
第六章探讨WTO决策法律制度民主与效率之间的关系。本章认为二者虽然在总体上是一种相辅相成的关系,但是,WTO决策法律制度的民主价值要优于其效率价值。
结论部分从民主的角度对WTO决策法律制度可供选择的改革方案做了总体上的区分,指出WTO决策法律制度有两种改革途径:一是理想模式的改革;一是理想模式之下的次优改革路径。站在发展中国家的立场,并结合中国作为一个负责任的发展中大国的基本定位,本章阐述了发展中国家及中国在WTO决策法律制度改革问题上的最佳选择和次优选择。
WTO raises concerns as an organization of international economic co-governance. Both developing and developed countries attach great importance to WTO decision-making legal system which plays an important role in WTO institution. This dissertation further studies democracy in WTO decision-making legal system, by analyzing the reason why the legal system lacks democracy, setting forth how Director-General and The Secretariat exert their influence on democracy of WTO decision-making legal system, and discussing the correlation between democracy and efficiency in WTO decision-making legal system. Basing on the discussion, this dissertation carries on the related theoretical exploration and provides some suggestions for democracy in WTO decision-making legal system.
This dissertation consists of Introduction, Body and Conclusion, and there are six chapters in Body section.
Introduction makes a brief generalization of WTO decision-making legal system, and covers research significance, current research status, research references and methods, and structure arrangement of the dissertation.
Chapter One discusses how democracy adapts in international relations from the perspectives of feasibility and necessity, and points out several issues that we should pay attention to when democracy adapts in international relations.
Chapter Two analyzes whether or not democracy conducts in WTO decision-making process. It is found that democracy in WTO decision-making process does not seem to be optimistic, in terms of effective participations of WTO members and transparency of WTO decision-making process. On one hand, effective participations of WTO members should be enhanced, on the other hand, WTO decision-making process needs to be improved in internal and external transparency both.
Chapter Three focuses on internal and external democracy deficit existing in WTO decision-making process. Particularly, this chapter makes an in-depth discussion of suggestions on reforming“Green Room meetings”proposed by developed countries, and then proposes the three-step plan on the reformation of“Green Room meetings”, in which it analyses what roles non-governmental organizations should play when participating in WTO decision-making process.
Chapter Four mainly discusses democracy in WTO voting system. This chapter makes a thorough introduction to the history of GATT/WTO voting system. Basing on the analysis of historical backgrounds and factors of different voting rules adopted in different ages, there appears to be a dangerous sign of politicization in WTO. Finally, with the further exploration of whether or not democracy conducts in voting systems, it is concluded that majority voting is the most democratic WTO voting rule.
Chapter Five makes an introduction on how Director-General and The Secretariat exert their influence on democracy in WTO decision-making legal system. This chapter points out, in order to establish WTO decision-making legal system, Director-General and The Secretariat should obey their duties regulated by WTO in the process of preparing and convening formal or non-formal meetings, and make prompt and right response from a neutral and objective point of view.
Chapter Six, by analyzing the correlation between democracy and efficiency, brings forward that the value of democracy should be prior to that of efficiency in WTO decision-making legal system.
Conclusion generally distinguishes available reform projects in WTO decision-making legal system, and points out two reform approaches, that is, the best and the second best option under the ideal pattern. Finally, it illustrates the best option and the second best one open to China, when she faces the reform in WTO decision-making legal system as a responsible developing country.
引文
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② 同上,第 296 页。
③ 同上,第 286 页。
④ 同上,第 247 页。
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② Id.
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① 《多哈宣言》第 48 段“关于谈判结果的决定仅由 WTO 成员作出”之规定,实际上是认定了只有成员方才有权作决定。
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① WTO 总干事拉米(Lamy)于 2005 年 12 月 13 日发布的题为“WTO 决策过程的民主”的讲话中说道:“尽管 WTO 决策程序遭受了很多批评,但总的来说,它是民主的。”LAMY. WTO’s Decision Making Process Democratic[EB/OL]. http://www.un.org/radio/print.asp?NewsID=3552. 2006-8-5.
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② JEFFORDS, MAURA BLUE. Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: the Need for Effective Consultation between the WTO & NGOs[J]. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2003,(28):945.
③ CHARNOVITZ, S. & WICKHAM, J. Non-governmental Organization and the Original International Trade Regime[J], Journal World Trade, 1995,(25):120-121.
④ CHARNOVITZ, STEVE. Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance[J], Michigan Journal of International Law, 1996-1997,(18):255.
① 《贸易技术壁垒协定》中有大量给 NGOs 施加义务的规定,这些条款主要有:第 3 条第 1、4、5 款,第8 条第 1、2 款等。
② 《卫生与动植物检疫措施协定》第 13 条规定:“各成员方应制定和实施积极的措施和机制,以支持中央政府机构以外的机构遵守本协定的规定。各成员应采取所能采取的合理措施,以保证其领土内的非政府实体以及其领土内相关实体为其成员的区域机构,符合本协定的相关规定。此外,各成员不得采取其效果具有直接或间接要求或鼓励此类区域或非政府实体,或地方政府机构以与本协定不一致的方式行事作用的措施。各成员应保证只有在非政府遵守本协定的情况下,方可依靠这些实体提供的服务实施卫生与动植物检疫措施。”
③ WTO. WT/L/162, 18 July 1996.
① Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngoe/introe.htm. 2004-10-9.
② Registration for Non-Governmental Organizations[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/English/thewto/minister/min03e/ng_oacce.htm. 2004-11-3.
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③ 转引自:刘志云. 国际经济法律自由化原理研究[M]. 厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005. 374.
① NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-making and developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm. (visited 8 September 2005).
② BOSSCHE, PETER VAN DEN. Debating the Future of the World Trade Organization: Divergent Views on the 2005 Sutherland Report[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,18(3):763. 世界银行和国际货币基金组织的官僚机构亦主要是由在西方国家自由主义经济传统中受训的经济学家组成。[美] 卡伦·明斯特. 国际关系精要(第三版)[M]. 潘忠岐译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2007. 255.
③ SOUTH CENTRE. SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
① http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib03_e.htm. 2005-7-11
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③ DAVIDSON, HON PETER & STEINBERG, RICHARD. The WTO as an Institution: What Next Steps are Needed? An UNCTAD in the Making? Is Internal and External Transparency Needed, Achievable?[J]. International Law, 2003,(37):802.
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② JACKSON, JOHN H. The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.21.
③ MCINTYRE, ELIZABETH. Weighted Voting in International Organizations[J]. International Organization, 1954,18(4):489.
④ Id.
⑤ Charter of the International Trade Organization, International Organization, 1948,2(3):573-586.
⑥ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):454.
① ODELL, JOHN S. Negotiating the World Economy[M]. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.163.
② MCINTYRE, ELIZABETH. Weighted Voting in International Organizations[J]. International Organization, 1954, 8(4):490.
③ Id., p.491.
④ ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):579.
① JACKSON, JOHN H. The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.22.
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③ 同上,第 66 页。
④ STILES, KENDALL. Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO[J]. Global Governance, 1996,(2):122.
⑤ 同本页注②,第 68 页。
① STEINBERG, RICHARD H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. International Organization, Spring,2002,56(2):345.
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③ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):326.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):71.
② [瑞士] 奥列佛·隆:关贸总协定多边贸易体制的法律及其局限[M]. 童守云译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1989. 70.
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④ 同上,第 59 页。
⑤ KATZENSTEIN, PETER J. International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes[J]. International Organization, Fall,1995,29(4):1021.
⑥ GASIOROWSKI, MARK J. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence[J]. International Studies Quarterly, 1986,(30):23-38. 罗伯特·基欧汉:权力与相互依赖(3)[M]. 门洪华译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2002.1-23.
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② HOWSE, ROBER. From Politics to Technocracy—And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trade Regime[J]. America Journal of International Law, 2002,(96):94-96.
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② 同上,第 143 页。
③ 王贵国. 世界贸易组织法[M]. 北京:法律出版社,2003. 13.
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⑤ KONTOROVITCH, EUGENE. The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions[J]. Chinese Journal International Law, 2003,(4):296.
⑥ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):61.
① 王贵国. 世界贸易组织法[M]. 北京:法律出版社,2003. 15-16.
② STILES, KENDALL. Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO[J]. Global Governance, 1996,(2):139.
③ ODELL, JOHN S. Negotiating the World Economy[M]. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.165.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):62.
② [美] 朱迪斯·歌尔德斯坦. 制定 GATT 的规则:政治、制度与美国的政策[A]. [美] 约翰·鲁杰. 多边主义[C]. 苏长和等译. 浙江人民出版社,2003. 255.
③ JACKSON, JOHN H. The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):74.
① ODELL, JOHN S. Chairing a WTO Negotiation[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(2):433-440.
② STILES, KENDALL. Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO[J]. Global Governance, 1996,(2):139.
③ [美] 罗伯特·吉尔平. 全球政治经济学:解读国际经济秩序[M]. 杨宇光,杨炯译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2006. 196.
④ 同上,第 199 页。
① JACKSON, JOHN H. The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguary Results[J]. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1997,(36):182-188.
② [美] 约翰·H·杰克逊.世界贸易体制——国际经济关系的法律与政策[M]. 张乃根译. 上海:复旦大学出版社,2001. 73.
③ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):62-63.
① 世界贸易组织秘书处编. 乌拉圭回合协议导读[M]. 索必成,胡盈之译. 北京:法律出版社,2000. 24.
② WTO. WT/GC/M/6, 20 September 1995.
③ WTO. WT/GC/M/8, 13 December 1995.
① “文明冲突”系美国学者亨廷顿提出的概念,他认为坚持西方文明普遍性的人们将会与其他文明发生冲突,尤其是与伊斯兰世界发生冲突。佘碧平. 文明的冲突和永久和平的理想:评亨廷顿的《文明的冲突和世界秩序的重铸》[J]. 复旦学报(社会科学版),1998,(3):103.
② [美] 弗里德·罗斯勒. 国内政策目标和多边贸易秩序——过去的教训[A]. [美] 安尼·O.克鲁格编. 作为国际组织的 WTO[C]. 彭利平、刘军等译. 上海:上海人民出版社,2002. 311-313.
③ GATHII, JAMES THUO. The High Stakes of WTO Reform[J]. Michigan Law Review, May, 2006,(104):1364.
① KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition)[EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2006-7-16.
② U.S. Shifts Policy on Iran Accession[EB/OL].http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-16/BRIDGESWeekly9-9.pdf. 2006-8-26.
③ AFZAL, AANA. Pakistan, The WTO , and Labor Reform[J]. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 2006,(29):107.
④ HOWSE, ROBER. From Politics to Technocracy—And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trade Regime[J]. America Journal International Law, 2002,(96):116-117.
① VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives foe the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):480-481.
② The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. 2005-5-16.
③ GATT. SR20/9. November 26, 1962.
① SPANOGLE, JOHN A. Can Helms-Burton Be Challenge under WTO?[J]. Stetson Law Review, 1998,(27):1322.
② KONTOROVITCH, EUGENE. The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions[J]. Chinese Journal International Law, 2003,(4):296.
③ HIPEL, KEITH W. & WANG, MUHONG. Hypergame Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict[J]. International Studies Quarterly, 1998,(32):335-358.
④ GATT. C/M/157, June 22, 1982.
⑤ Id.
⑥ Id..
① [美] 朱迪斯·歌尔德斯坦. 制定 GATT 的规则:政治、制度与美国的政策[A]. [美] 约翰·鲁杰. 多边主义[C]. 苏长和等译. 浙江人民出版社,2003. 254.
② JACKSON, JOHN H. The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System[J]. Journal of World Trade Law, 1978,(12):93-99. HUDEC, ROBERT E. Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the WTO[J]. World Trade Review, 2002,(1):211-220.
① ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):572.
① [英] 詹宁斯·瓦茨,修订. 奥本海国际法(第一卷 第一分册)[M]. 王铁崖等译. 北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1995. 276-277.
② 杨泽伟. 主权论:国际法上的主权问题及其发展趋势研究[M]. 北京,北京大学出版社,2006. 76-82.
③ 江国青. 联合国专门机构法律制度研究[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993. 194.
④ VOITOVICH, SERGEI A. International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 78.
① 杨泽伟. 国际法析论[M]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003. 193.
② SOUTH CENTRE. Selection of the WTO Director-General: Some Points to Consider, SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
③ “全球共治”理论是我国学者提出的新概念,与全球治理理论一样,该概念的提出也是为了应对国际社会共同面临的一系列需要合作才能正确解决的重要国际性问题,如国际政治、国际经济与国际环境等等。与全球治理理论不同的是,全球共治理论更强调全球力量(包括个人、非政府组织、国家和国际组织等等)的共同参与。在国家这一层次,全球共治理论强调国际社会所有国家对国际性问题的共同参与和治理。全球治理理论并没有体现“共同”参与和治理之特征。从这个意义上说,全球治理理论是结果导向的,即其目的是治理国际性问题,而并没有特别指出“共同”治理的意义。全球共治理论则不同,它是既强调治理结果,也强调治理方法。对全球共治理论的详细阐述请参阅:俞正梁,陈玉刚. 全球共治理论初探[J]. 世界经济与政治,2005,(2):8-15.
① PORTUGAL, MURILO. Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making[J]. http://www.g24.org/research.htm.2006-10-15.
② OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):397.
③ 李国安. 国际货币金融法学[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1999. 16.
④ 王贵国. 国际货币金融法[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1996. 81-82.
⑤ [美] 斯蒂芬·D·克莱斯勒. 结构冲突:第三世界对抗全球自由主义[M]. 李小华译. 杭州:浙江人民出版社,2001. 135-136.
⑥ 美国学者约翰·罗尔克针对 IMF 的加权投票制度(即一国多票制度)指出:“这种以财富为权数的体系的一个后果是,这个规则把大多数的选票分配给了那些占世界人口少数的经济发达国家。这种分配遭到了欠发达国家的控诉,它们认为 IMF 是由北半球控制的,并且正被用作支配欠发达国家的工具。”[美] 约翰·罗尔克. 世界舞台上的国际政治(第 9 版)[M]. 宋伟等译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2005,576.
① 陈安. 美国 1994 年“主权大辩论”及其后续影响[J]. 中国社会科学,2001,(5):152.
② VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):435.
① ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):572-573. 《国际联盟盟约》第 5 条第 1 款规定:除本盟约或本条约另有明白规定者外,凡大会或行政院开会时之决议应得联盟出席于会议之会员国全体同意。可见,全体一致原则是国际联盟盟约的主导型表决机制,其他表决机制是例外。
② 多数决主要体现在《国际联盟盟约》的以下条款当中:第 1 条(一);第 4 条(一)、(二);第 5 条(二);第 15 条(六);第 16 条(四)。详细规定请参阅:王铁崖、田如萱,编. 国际法资料选编[M]. 北京:法律出版社,1982. 806-817.
③ [美] 路易斯·亨金. 国际法:政治与价值[M]. 张乃根等译. 北京:中国政法大学出版社,2005. 36.
④ KENNEDY, DAVID. A New Stream of International Law Scholaship[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988,(7):46.
① SANDS, PHILIPPE & KLEIN, PIERRE. Bowett’s Law of International Institutions(Fifth Edition)[M]. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001. 264.
② ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):575.
③ OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):381.
④ KENNEDY, DAVID. A New Stream of International Law Scholaship[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988,(7):42.
⑤ 其实,倘若按照投票权分配方式的不同,多数决可分为一国一票多数决和加权多数决两种。由于笔者在前面已经对加权制的投票权分配方法的不足之处和不利因素加以了分析,并认为在国际组织中采用一国一票的投票权分配方法要优于一国多票,为此,此处讨论的多数决是一国一票前提下的多数决,而不讨论加权多数决。
⑥ 江国青. 联合国专门机构法律制度研究[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993. 205-206.
⑦ VOITOVICH, SERGEI A. International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 77.
⑧ MCINTYRE, ELIZABETH. Weighted Voting in International Organizations[J]. International Organization, 1954, 8(4):485-486.
① VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):437.
② 洛克和卢梭不约而同地将民主定义为多数规则(majority rule)。赵成根. 民主与公共决策研究[M]. 哈尔滨:黑龙江人民出版社,2000. 295.
③ 盛洪. 经济学透视下的民主[A]. 盛洪. 现代制度经济学(下卷)[C]. 北京:北京大学出版社,2003. 143.
① KENNEDY, DAVID. A New Stream of International Law Scholaship[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988,(7):46.
② VOITOVICH, SERGEI A. International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 77.
③ OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):408.
④ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):438.
⑤ 同本页注①。
⑥ [美] 伊安·夏皮罗. 政治的道德基础[M]. 姚建华,宋国友译. 上海:上海三联书店,2006. 237.
① [美] 罗伯特·A.达尔.民主及其批评者[M].曹海军,佟德志译. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2006. 189.
② 同上。
③ OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):408.
① [美] 科恩. 论民主[M]. 聂崇信,朱秀贤译. 北京:商务印书馆,1988. 73.
① WTO. WT/L/161, 25 July 1996.
② GATT. PC/7, 13 December 1994. WTO. L/7578, 13 December 1994.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):66.
② GLASSMAN, DEBRA. An Introduction to the WTO[EB/OL]. http://www.globaled.org/issues/160/b.html. 2006-12-12.
③ 同本页注①,第 67 页。
④ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
① 赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 37-38.
② VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):480-481.
③ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):341.
④ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):68.
⑤ 赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 37.
① FOOTER, MARY E. The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making[J]. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Winter,1996/Spring,1997,(17):668.
② 徐崇利. 全球化时代国际立法模式的演变:从“国家间立法”模式到“跨国立法”模式[A]. 沈涓,主编. 国际法研究(第一卷)[C]. 北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2006. 47.
③ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):68.
④ SOUTH CENTRE. Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions. SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/3/rev.11 Sep.
⑤ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):333.
① [美] 约翰·米尔斯海默. 大国政治的悲剧[M]. 王义桅,唐小松译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2003. 4.
② 赵维田. 制定专用于发展中国家的规则:评《多哈新框架协议》[A]. 沈涓,主编. 国际法研究(第一卷)[C]. 北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2006. …….
③ STEINBERG, RICHARD H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. International Organization, Spring,2002,56(2):364.
④ 刘志云. 国际经济法律自由化原理研究[M]. 厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005. 374.
① 还有一种“反向协商一致”(negative consensus or inverted consensus),该表决机制只在 WTO 争端解决中适用。具体而言,在设立专家小组、通过专家小组和上诉机构报告、授权报复等问题的决策方面,除非协商一致反对该请求或报告,否则该项请求或报告就被 DSB 接受或通过。Kim Van der Borght. Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate[J]. American University International Law Review, 1998-1999, (14):1224. 我国有著述将 negative consensus 译为“消极协商一致”,笔者认为该译法值得商榷,因为这种译法无法将 negative consensus 与 passive consensus 很好地区分开,容易引起两者的混淆。
② SOUTH CENTRE. Institutional Governance and Decision-Making Processes in the WTO, SC/TADP/AN/IG/7, December 2003. para.45.
③ 王献枢,主编. 国际法(修订第 2 版)[M]. 北京:中国政法大学出版社,2002. 301.
④ 赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 37.
⑤ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
⑥ SOUTH CENTRE. Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions. SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/3/rev. 11 Sep.
⑦ BERCERO, IGNACIO GARCIA. Functioning of the WTO System: Elements for Possible Institutional Reform[J]. International Trade Law and Regulation, 2000, 6(4):105-107.
① NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
② 一位驻日内瓦大使在接受 Aileen Kwa 采访时说道:“真正的困难是没有记录的非正式发言以及不过是橡皮图章似的正式会议。因此,很难发现关于某一问题的记录,以及说明问题的历史和成员方意见的实质性差别的说明。……有人到这里已经 10 年了,他们都没有关于某个问题的历史回忆。这是非常重要的,因为当我的继任者接任时,他们没有任何关于过去的了解,以便帮助他们了解现在。”KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition[EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
③ SOUTH CENTRE. SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
① 赵维田. 制定专用于发展中国家的规则:评《多哈新框架协议》[A]. 沈涓,主编. 国际法研究(第一卷)[C]. 北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2006. 256-267.
② 同上,第 264 页。
③ [美] 弗雷德里克·皮尔逊,[美] 西蒙·巴亚斯里安. 国际政治经济学:全球体系中的冲突与合作[M]. 杨毅等译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2006. 171.
④ 俞正梁,陈玉刚,苏长和. 21 世纪全球政治范式[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社,2005. 180.
① BARRY, BUZAN. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):325.
② [美] 罗伯特·基欧汉,[美] 约瑟夫·奈. 权力与相互依赖(第三版)[M]. 门洪华译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2002.1-11.
① ODELL, JOHN S. Chairing A WTO Negotiation[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(2):442.
② 同上,第 442-443 页。
③ 张向晨. 发展中国家与 WTO 的政治经济关系(修订本)[M]. 北京:法律出版社,2002. 268.
① [印度] 峇吉拉·劳·达斯. WTO 协议:不足、失衡及需要的改革[M]. 第三世界网络,2004. 8.
② GERHART, PETER M. Slow Transformations: the WTO as a Distributive Organization[J]. American University of International Law Review, 2002,(17):1051.
③ PANTICHPAKDI, SUPACHAI. The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the New Millennium[J]. George Washington International Law Review, 2001,(33):422.
④ ODELL, JOHN S. Problems in Negotiating Consensus in the World Trade Organization[EB/OL]. http://wc.wustl.edu/workingpapers/Odell.PDF.2005-3-9.
⑤ 肖德. 论世界贸易组织在国际经贸关系发展中的作用[M]. 中国经济出版社,2002. 128.
⑥ 黄志雄. WTO 体制内的发展问题与国际发展法研究[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,2005. 203.
① NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26. ② KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL].
http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
③ “在乌拉圭回合中,……发展中国家积极参与多边贸易谈判。”伯纳德·霍克曼,迈克尔·考斯泰基. 世界贸易体制的政治经济学:从关贸总协定到世界贸易组织[M]. 刘平,洪晓东等译. 北京:法律出版社,1999年. 249.
① KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
② Id.
① WILKINSON, RORDEN. The WTO in Crisis: Exploring the Dimensions of Institutional Inertia[J]. Journal of World Trade, 2001,35(3):415.
① Guidelines for WTO Technical Cooperation, WT/COMTD/8, 16 Oct. 1996. A New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation: Technical Cooperation for Capacity-building, Growth and Integration, WT/COMTD/W/90, 21 Sept. 2001.
② SHAFFER, GREGORYr. Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing Countries?[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, Fall,2005,(23):650.
③ 发达国家向 WTO 技术援助部门的具体捐赠数额,请参阅:http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/tct_arc_e.htm. 2006-11-27.
④ SHAFFER, GREGORY. Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing Countries?[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, Fall,2005,(23):673.
① KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
② 西方有学者就指出:“秘书处越来越有效率”。 ALVAREZ, JOSE E. The WTO as Linkage Machine[J]. America Journal of International Law, 2002,(96):147.
③ STEINBERG, RICHARD H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. International Organization, Spring,2002,56(2):356.
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④ 同上,第 16-17 页。
① [美] 丹尼尔·W. 布罗姆利. 经济利益与经济制度:公共政策的理论基础[M]. 陈郁,郭宇峰等译. 上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2006. 94-95.
① BLACKHURST, RICHARD. Reforming WTO Decision Making: Lessons from Singapore and Seattle[EB/OL]. http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr63.pdf.2005-6-18.
② [瑞士] 理查德·布莱克赫斯特.WTO 履行其使命之能力[A].[美] 安妮·O.克鲁格.作为国际组织的WTO[C].黄理平等译.上海:上海世纪出版集团,2002. 51.
① The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium[EB/OL].para.368. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. 2005-5-16. 美国国际经济研究所研究所高级研究员肖特在接受采访时也说道:“像 WTO 这样一个领导世界贸易的机构每年的预算是 8 千万美元,这简直是个丑闻,我认为 WTO 资金不足。”张向晨,孙亮. WTO 后的中美关系:与美国学者的对话[M]. 广州:广东人民出版社,2002. 44.
② SUPACHAI. The WTO after 10 Years: The Lessons Learned and the Challenges Ahead[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp35_e.htm. 2006-11-8.
① OSTRY, SYLVIA. WTO: Institutional Design for Better Governance [EB/OL]. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/trade/ostry.htm. 2006-11-30.
② BLACKHURAT, RICHARD. Reforming WTO Decision Making: Lessons from Singapore and Seattle[EB/OL]. http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr63.pdf. 2005-6-18.
③ SCHOTT, JEFFREY J. & WATAL, JAYASHREE. Decision Making in the WTO[EB/OL]. http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?researchid=63. 2005-8-5.
④ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
⑤ SUTHERLAND, PETER & SWELL, JOHN. Chanllenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance[EB/OL]. http://www.unu.edu/news/wto/ch05.pdf. 2006-11-30.
⑥ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):476.
① 陈安. 南南联合自强五十年的国际经济立法反思[J]. 中国法学,2006,(2):102-103
① ODELL, JOHN S. Problems in Negotiating Consensus in the World Trade Organization[EB/OL]. http://wc.wustl.edu/workingpapers/Odell.PDF. 2005-3-9.
② WOLFE, ROBERT. See You in Geneva? Domocracy, the Rule of Law and the WTO[EB/OL]. http://www.queensu.ca/sps/working_papers/files/sps_wp_16.pdf. 2006-12-1.
① 罗尔斯是主张平等优先的代表,密尔顿·弗里德曼是主张效率优先的代表,阿瑟·奥肯则是主张平等与效率兼顾的代表。“罗尔斯有一个清晰干脆的回答:把优先权交给平等。密尔顿·弗里德曼也有一个清晰干脆并且是一贯的回答:把优先权交给效率。我的回答很少是清晰干脆的。”[美] 阿瑟·奥肯. 平等与效率[M]. 王奔州等译. 北京:华夏出版社,1999. 90.
② KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
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④ GERHART, PETER M. Slow Transformations: the WTO as a Distributive Organization[J]. American University of International Law Review, 2002,(17):1051.
① CULPEPER, R. Overriding Jurisdictions in Global Financial Goverance, and Long Term Financing for the Poorest Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.g24.org/research.htm. 2006-8-7.
② SAKBANI, A. A Re-Exmination of the Architecture of the International Economic System in a Global Setting: Issues and Proposals[EB/OL]. http://www.unctas.org/TEMPLATES/Page.asp?intItemID=1397&lang=1. 2006-8-9.
③ [美] 约瑟夫·奈. 硬权力与软权力[M]. 门洪华译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2005.180.
④ 同上,第 209 页。
⑤ 同上,第 123 页。
① MOISI, DOMINIQUE. The Real Crisis over the Atlantic[J]. Foreign Affairs, 2001, (4):153.
② [英] 巴里·布赞. 美国和诸大国:21 世纪的世界政治[M]. 刘永涛译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2007. 142.
③ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
④ BRONCKERS, MARCO C. E. F. More Power to the WTO?[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):41-64.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):71.
① 龚雯. 多哈回合的香港六日[N]. 环球时报,2005-12-19(18).
① 如“美国国会在《1974 年贸易法》中授权行政部门代表在东京回合谈判中,把 GATT 决策机制列为优先课题,并一度主张仿效国际货币基金组织那样的‘加权表决制’,按在国际贸易总额中所占的份额分配表决权 。”赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 39.
② VERENYON, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):480.
① SOUTH CENTRE. SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
② 比如有观点指出:“作为一个更为基本的决策工具,事实上的投票能够当然地对那些持反对派立场的起到泄气的作用。当它们不愿意在关键性的投票场合公开反对一项提议时,公式化的决策程序还可以使个体成员方很难应藏在阻止共识产生的背后。” EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):73.
① REICH, ARIE. Threat of Politicization of the WTO[J]. University of Pennsylvania. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,(26):811.
② 有观点认为:“如果这些制度所反映的全球经济和政治权力结构没有一同发生变化,那么制度表面上的变化就会像化妆品一样,没有什么实际意义。”SOUTH CENTRE. Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions. SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/3/rev. 11 Sep. 笔者认为该观点具有一定的正确性,但也有一定的片面性。其片面性在于忽视了制度具有独立的反作用力,即制度一旦形成,它能够对外生于制度的结构产生制约作用,甚至在有些情况下结构的变化具有“制度路进的依赖”特征。
③ 高岚君. 国际法的价值论[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,2006. 136. 格·童金. 国际法原论[M]. 尹玉海译. 北京:中国民主法制出版社,2006, 19.
① 有西方学者也认为在 WTO 的某些“家务事”(housekeeping)事项上,用多数决替代协商一致是有必要的。BOSSCHE, PETER VAN DEN. Radical Overhaul or Pragmatic Change? The Need and Scope for Reform of Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization[EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=977376 2007-4-30.
② JACKSON, JOHN H. The WTO “Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Severn “Mantras” Revisited[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):74.
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① 程序民主认为只有当一种结果是由相当的程序产生时,这种结果才是可接受的。实质民主则根据不同的决策规则所导致的结果是否公正来加以评价。[美] I. 夏皮罗.民主理想的构成要素[A].[加] A. 布莱顿等.理解民主——经济与政治的视角[C].毛丹等译.上海:学林出版社,2000. 228-229.
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③ 如果主权国家没有对国际强行法进行表态,那么它受国际强行法约束的情况算不算是“受自己同意的法律约束”呢?对于这个问题的回答,有学者经研究指出:“大部分学者都明确承认了国际强行法对新国家(即没有对国际强行法表态或者是对其持否定态度的国家——笔者注)具有拘束力。”“那些获得公认的、具有进步意义的国际强行法原则或规范应当对新国家具有法律约束力,只要新国家成为当今国际社会的一员,它就不能以任何理由规避国际强行法的效力。”张潇剑.国际强行法论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1995.94-97.
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① 如 1931 年日本帝国主义侵略我国东北,国际联盟虽然派李顿调查团来华调查,但《李顿调查团报告书》竞认为“恢复原状并非解决办法”,而建议“设立一种特殊制度治理东三省”。这显然偏袒日本帝国主义的侵略行径,出卖中国的利益。
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② 同上,第 296 页。
③ 同上,第 286 页。
④ 同上,第 247 页。
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② Id.
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① 《多哈宣言》第 48 段“关于谈判结果的决定仅由 WTO 成员作出”之规定,实际上是认定了只有成员方才有权作决定。
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③ BLACKHURST, RICHARD & HARTRIDGE, DAVID. Improving the Capacity of WTO Institutions to Fuill Their Mandate[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2004,7(3):716.
① [瑞士] 奥列弗·隆.关贸总协定多边贸易体制的法律及其局限[M].童守云译.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1989.64.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):73.
② JACKSON, JOHN H. The WTO “Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Severn “Mantras” Revisited[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):75.
③ BLACKHURST, RICHARD & HARTRIDGE, DAVID. Improving the Capacity of WTO Institutions to Fuill Their Mandate[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2004,7(3):714.
④ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm. 2004-11-26.
⑤ 理查德·布莱克赫斯特.WTO 履行其使命之能力[A]. [美] 安妮·O.克鲁格.作为国际组织的WTO[C].黄理平等译.上海:上海世纪出版集团,2002. 41-76.
① WTO 总干事拉米(Lamy)于 2005 年 12 月 13 日发布的题为“WTO 决策过程的民主”的讲话中说道:“尽管 WTO 决策程序遭受了很多批评,但总的来说,它是民主的。”LAMY. WTO’s Decision Making Process Democratic[EB/OL]. http://www.un.org/radio/print.asp?NewsID=3552. 2006-8-5.
② CHO, SUNGJOON. A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2004,7(2):241.
① [美] 罗伯特·达尔.论民主[M].李伯光,林猛译.北京:商务印书馆,1999.42.
① [美] 托马·斯戴伊,[美] 哈蒙·齐格勒.民主的嘲讽[M].孙占平等译.北京:世界知识出版社,1991. 5.
② [美] 罗伯特·吉尔平.全球政治经济学:解读国际经济秩序[M].杨宇光,杨炯译.上海:上海世纪出版集团,2006.76.
③ [美] 本杰明·巴伯. 强势民主[M]. 彭斌,吴润洲译. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2006. 177.
① REICHERT, WILLIAM M. Resolving the Trade and Enviroment Conflict: The WTO and NGO Consultative Relations[J]. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, 1996,(5):227.
② http://documents.un.org/mother.asp 2007-3-18.
③ TARROW, SIDNEY. Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics[J]. Annual Review of Political Science, 2001,(4):2.
① 柳炳华.国际法(上卷).朴国哲,朴永姬译.北京:中国政法大学出版社,1997.539.
② 王杰,张海滨,张志洲.全球治理中的国际非政府组织[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,2004.20-29.
③ 王彦志.非政府组织与国际经济法论纲[A].陈安.国际经济法论丛(第 7 卷)[C].北京:法律出版社,2003,252.
④ JEFFORDS, MAURA BLUE. Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: the Need for Effective Consultation between the WTO & NGOs[J]. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2003,(28):985.
① CHARNOVITZ, STEVE. Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization[J]. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 1996,(17):349-350.
② ESTY, DANIEL C. Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 1998,(1):123.
③ NICHOLS, PHILIP M. Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization[J]. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 1996,(17):860-866.
① HOUSMAN, ROBERT F. Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making[J]. Cornell International Law Journal, 1994,(27):704-705.
② JEFFORDS, MAURA BLUE. Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: the Need for Effective Consultation between the WTO & NGOs[J]. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2003,(28):945.
③ CHARNOVITZ, S. & WICKHAM, J. Non-governmental Organization and the Original International Trade Regime[J], Journal World Trade, 1995,(25):120-121.
④ CHARNOVITZ, STEVE. Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance[J], Michigan Journal of International Law, 1996-1997,(18):255.
① 《贸易技术壁垒协定》中有大量给 NGOs 施加义务的规定,这些条款主要有:第 3 条第 1、4、5 款,第8 条第 1、2 款等。
② 《卫生与动植物检疫措施协定》第 13 条规定:“各成员方应制定和实施积极的措施和机制,以支持中央政府机构以外的机构遵守本协定的规定。各成员应采取所能采取的合理措施,以保证其领土内的非政府实体以及其领土内相关实体为其成员的区域机构,符合本协定的相关规定。此外,各成员不得采取其效果具有直接或间接要求或鼓励此类区域或非政府实体,或地方政府机构以与本协定不一致的方式行事作用的措施。各成员应保证只有在非政府遵守本协定的情况下,方可依靠这些实体提供的服务实施卫生与动植物检疫措施。”
③ WTO. WT/L/162, 18 July 1996.
① Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngoe/introe.htm. 2004-10-9.
② Registration for Non-Governmental Organizations[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/English/thewto/minister/min03e/ng_oacce.htm. 2004-11-3.
① BOSSCHE, PETER VAN DEN & ALEXOVICOVA, IVETA. Effective Global Economic Governance by The World Trade Organisation[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,(7):678.
② DAVIDSON, HON PETER & STEINBERG, RICHARD. The WTO as an Institution: What Next Steps are Needed? An UNCTAD in the Making? Is Internal and External Transparency Needed, Achievable?[J]. International Law, 2003,(37):802.
③ 转引自:刘志云. 国际经济法律自由化原理研究[M]. 厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005. 374.
① NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-making and developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm. (visited 8 September 2005).
② BOSSCHE, PETER VAN DEN. Debating the Future of the World Trade Organization: Divergent Views on the 2005 Sutherland Report[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,18(3):763. 世界银行和国际货币基金组织的官僚机构亦主要是由在西方国家自由主义经济传统中受训的经济学家组成。[美] 卡伦·明斯特. 国际关系精要(第三版)[M]. 潘忠岐译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2007. 255.
③ SOUTH CENTRE. SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
① http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib03_e.htm. 2005-7-11
② 王杰,张海滨,张志洲.全球治理中的国际非政府组织[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,2004. 261-262. 曾令良. 风雨伴辉煌的多边贸易体制:成就、问题与完善——纪念世界贸易组织成立 10 周年[A]. 黄进,主编. 武大国际法评论(第五卷)[C]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,2006. 115.
③ DAVIDSON, HON PETER & STEINBERG, RICHARD. The WTO as an Institution: What Next Steps are Needed? An UNCTAD in the Making? Is Internal and External Transparency Needed, Achievable?[J]. International Law, 2003,(37):802.
② 徐莹. 当代国际政治中的非政府组织[M]. 北京:当代世界出版社,2006. 116.
③ 徐崇利. 经济全球化与中国国际经济法的研究范式[A]. 高鸿钧,主编. 清华法治论衡[C]. 北京:清华大学出版社,2005. 193.
① DUNOFF, JEFFREY L. The WTO’s Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution[J]. American Review of International Arbitration, 2002,(13):197-208.
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③ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):325. SOHN, LOUIS B. Voting Procedures in United Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1975,(69):310. OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):381-382. GIANARIS, WILLIAM N. Weighted Voting in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank[J]. Fordham International Law Journal, 1990-1991,(14):910.
④ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):428.
① 倪云虎,宋玉华等:关贸总协定简明教程[M]. 杭州:浙江大学出版社,1993. 3-4.
② JACKSON, JOHN H. The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.21.
③ MCINTYRE, ELIZABETH. Weighted Voting in International Organizations[J]. International Organization, 1954,18(4):489.
④ Id.
⑤ Charter of the International Trade Organization, International Organization, 1948,2(3):573-586.
⑥ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):454.
① ODELL, JOHN S. Negotiating the World Economy[M]. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.163.
② MCINTYRE, ELIZABETH. Weighted Voting in International Organizations[J]. International Organization, 1954, 8(4):490.
③ Id., p.491.
④ ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):579.
① JACKSON, JOHN H. The Jurisprudence of GATT & the WTO[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.22.
② [瑞士] 奥列佛·隆:关贸总协定多边贸易体制的法律及其局限[M]. 童守云译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1989. 57.
③ 同上,第 66 页。
④ STILES, KENDALL. Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO[J]. Global Governance, 1996,(2):122.
⑤ 同本页注②,第 68 页。
① STEINBERG, RICHARD H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. International Organization, Spring,2002,56(2):345.
② [瑞士] 奥列佛·隆:关贸总协定多边贸易体制的法律及其局限[M]. 童守云译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1989. 70.
③ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):326.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):71.
② [瑞士] 奥列佛·隆:关贸总协定多边贸易体制的法律及其局限[M]. 童守云译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社,1989. 70.
③ [美] 康威汉·得森:国际关系:世纪之交的冲突与合作[M]. 金帆译. 海口:海南出版社、三环出版社,2004. 57.
④ 同上,第 59 页。
⑤ KATZENSTEIN, PETER J. International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes[J]. International Organization, Fall,1995,29(4):1021.
⑥ GASIOROWSKI, MARK J. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence[J]. International Studies Quarterly, 1986,(30):23-38. 罗伯特·基欧汉:权力与相互依赖(3)[M]. 门洪华译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2002.1-23.
① [美] 科依勒·贝格威尔,[美] 罗伯特·W·思泰格尔. 世界贸易体系经济学[M]. 雷达,詹宏毅等译. 北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005. 51.
② HOWSE, ROBER. From Politics to Technocracy—And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trade Regime[J]. America Journal of International Law, 2002,(96):94-96.
③ 陈安. 国际经济法学专论(上编 总论)[M]. 北京:高等教育出版社,2002. 264-277.
① [美] 罗伯特·基欧汉. 霸权之后:世界政治经济中的合作与纠纷[M]. 苏长和等译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2006. 136.
② 同上,第 143 页。
③ 王贵国. 世界贸易组织法[M]. 北京:法律出版社,2003. 13.
④ [美] 朱迪斯·歌尔德斯坦. 制定 GATT 的规则:政治、制度与美国的政策[A]. [美] 约翰·鲁杰. 多边主义[C]. 苏长和等译. 浙江人民出版社,2003. 254-255.
⑤ KONTOROVITCH, EUGENE. The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions[J]. Chinese Journal International Law, 2003,(4):296.
⑥ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):61.
① 王贵国. 世界贸易组织法[M]. 北京:法律出版社,2003. 15-16.
② STILES, KENDALL. Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO[J]. Global Governance, 1996,(2):139.
③ ODELL, JOHN S. Negotiating the World Economy[M]. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.165.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):62.
② [美] 朱迪斯·歌尔德斯坦. 制定 GATT 的规则:政治、制度与美国的政策[A]. [美] 约翰·鲁杰. 多边主义[C]. 苏长和等译. 浙江人民出版社,2003. 255.
③ JACKSON, JOHN H. The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):74.
① ODELL, JOHN S. Chairing a WTO Negotiation[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(2):433-440.
② STILES, KENDALL. Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO[J]. Global Governance, 1996,(2):139.
③ [美] 罗伯特·吉尔平. 全球政治经济学:解读国际经济秩序[M]. 杨宇光,杨炯译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2006. 196.
④ 同上,第 199 页。
① JACKSON, JOHN H. The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguary Results[J]. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1997,(36):182-188.
② [美] 约翰·H·杰克逊.世界贸易体制——国际经济关系的法律与政策[M]. 张乃根译. 上海:复旦大学出版社,2001. 73.
③ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):62-63.
① 世界贸易组织秘书处编. 乌拉圭回合协议导读[M]. 索必成,胡盈之译. 北京:法律出版社,2000. 24.
② WTO. WT/GC/M/6, 20 September 1995.
③ WTO. WT/GC/M/8, 13 December 1995.
① “文明冲突”系美国学者亨廷顿提出的概念,他认为坚持西方文明普遍性的人们将会与其他文明发生冲突,尤其是与伊斯兰世界发生冲突。佘碧平. 文明的冲突和永久和平的理想:评亨廷顿的《文明的冲突和世界秩序的重铸》[J]. 复旦学报(社会科学版),1998,(3):103.
② [美] 弗里德·罗斯勒. 国内政策目标和多边贸易秩序——过去的教训[A]. [美] 安尼·O.克鲁格编. 作为国际组织的 WTO[C]. 彭利平、刘军等译. 上海:上海人民出版社,2002. 311-313.
③ GATHII, JAMES THUO. The High Stakes of WTO Reform[J]. Michigan Law Review, May, 2006,(104):1364.
① KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition)[EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2006-7-16.
② U.S. Shifts Policy on Iran Accession[EB/OL].http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-16/BRIDGESWeekly9-9.pdf. 2006-8-26.
③ AFZAL, AANA. Pakistan, The WTO , and Labor Reform[J]. Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 2006,(29):107.
④ HOWSE, ROBER. From Politics to Technocracy—And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trade Regime[J]. America Journal International Law, 2002,(96):116-117.
① VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives foe the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):480-481.
② The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. 2005-5-16.
③ GATT. SR20/9. November 26, 1962.
① SPANOGLE, JOHN A. Can Helms-Burton Be Challenge under WTO?[J]. Stetson Law Review, 1998,(27):1322.
② KONTOROVITCH, EUGENE. The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions[J]. Chinese Journal International Law, 2003,(4):296.
③ HIPEL, KEITH W. & WANG, MUHONG. Hypergame Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict[J]. International Studies Quarterly, 1998,(32):335-358.
④ GATT. C/M/157, June 22, 1982.
⑤ Id.
⑥ Id..
① [美] 朱迪斯·歌尔德斯坦. 制定 GATT 的规则:政治、制度与美国的政策[A]. [美] 约翰·鲁杰. 多边主义[C]. 苏长和等译. 浙江人民出版社,2003. 254.
② JACKSON, JOHN H. The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System[J]. Journal of World Trade Law, 1978,(12):93-99. HUDEC, ROBERT E. Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the WTO[J]. World Trade Review, 2002,(1):211-220.
① ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):572.
① [英] 詹宁斯·瓦茨,修订. 奥本海国际法(第一卷 第一分册)[M]. 王铁崖等译. 北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1995. 276-277.
② 杨泽伟. 主权论:国际法上的主权问题及其发展趋势研究[M]. 北京,北京大学出版社,2006. 76-82.
③ 江国青. 联合国专门机构法律制度研究[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993. 194.
④ VOITOVICH, SERGEI A. International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 78.
① 杨泽伟. 国际法析论[M]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003. 193.
② SOUTH CENTRE. Selection of the WTO Director-General: Some Points to Consider, SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
③ “全球共治”理论是我国学者提出的新概念,与全球治理理论一样,该概念的提出也是为了应对国际社会共同面临的一系列需要合作才能正确解决的重要国际性问题,如国际政治、国际经济与国际环境等等。与全球治理理论不同的是,全球共治理论更强调全球力量(包括个人、非政府组织、国家和国际组织等等)的共同参与。在国家这一层次,全球共治理论强调国际社会所有国家对国际性问题的共同参与和治理。全球治理理论并没有体现“共同”参与和治理之特征。从这个意义上说,全球治理理论是结果导向的,即其目的是治理国际性问题,而并没有特别指出“共同”治理的意义。全球共治理论则不同,它是既强调治理结果,也强调治理方法。对全球共治理论的详细阐述请参阅:俞正梁,陈玉刚. 全球共治理论初探[J]. 世界经济与政治,2005,(2):8-15.
① PORTUGAL, MURILO. Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making[J]. http://www.g24.org/research.htm.2006-10-15.
② OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):397.
③ 李国安. 国际货币金融法学[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1999. 16.
④ 王贵国. 国际货币金融法[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社,1996. 81-82.
⑤ [美] 斯蒂芬·D·克莱斯勒. 结构冲突:第三世界对抗全球自由主义[M]. 李小华译. 杭州:浙江人民出版社,2001. 135-136.
⑥ 美国学者约翰·罗尔克针对 IMF 的加权投票制度(即一国多票制度)指出:“这种以财富为权数的体系的一个后果是,这个规则把大多数的选票分配给了那些占世界人口少数的经济发达国家。这种分配遭到了欠发达国家的控诉,它们认为 IMF 是由北半球控制的,并且正被用作支配欠发达国家的工具。”[美] 约翰·罗尔克. 世界舞台上的国际政治(第 9 版)[M]. 宋伟等译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2005,576.
① 陈安. 美国 1994 年“主权大辩论”及其后续影响[J]. 中国社会科学,2001,(5):152.
② VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):435.
① ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):572-573. 《国际联盟盟约》第 5 条第 1 款规定:除本盟约或本条约另有明白规定者外,凡大会或行政院开会时之决议应得联盟出席于会议之会员国全体同意。可见,全体一致原则是国际联盟盟约的主导型表决机制,其他表决机制是例外。
② 多数决主要体现在《国际联盟盟约》的以下条款当中:第 1 条(一);第 4 条(一)、(二);第 5 条(二);第 15 条(六);第 16 条(四)。详细规定请参阅:王铁崖、田如萱,编. 国际法资料选编[M]. 北京:法律出版社,1982. 806-817.
③ [美] 路易斯·亨金. 国际法:政治与价值[M]. 张乃根等译. 北京:中国政法大学出版社,2005. 36.
④ KENNEDY, DAVID. A New Stream of International Law Scholaship[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988,(7):46.
① SANDS, PHILIPPE & KLEIN, PIERRE. Bowett’s Law of International Institutions(Fifth Edition)[M]. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001. 264.
② ZAMORA, STEPHEN. Voting in International Economic Orgnizations[J]. American Journal of International Law, July,1980,(74):575.
③ OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):381.
④ KENNEDY, DAVID. A New Stream of International Law Scholaship[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988,(7):42.
⑤ 其实,倘若按照投票权分配方式的不同,多数决可分为一国一票多数决和加权多数决两种。由于笔者在前面已经对加权制的投票权分配方法的不足之处和不利因素加以了分析,并认为在国际组织中采用一国一票的投票权分配方法要优于一国多票,为此,此处讨论的多数决是一国一票前提下的多数决,而不讨论加权多数决。
⑥ 江国青. 联合国专门机构法律制度研究[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993. 205-206.
⑦ VOITOVICH, SERGEI A. International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 77.
⑧ MCINTYRE, ELIZABETH. Weighted Voting in International Organizations[J]. International Organization, 1954, 8(4):485-486.
① VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):437.
② 洛克和卢梭不约而同地将民主定义为多数规则(majority rule)。赵成根. 民主与公共决策研究[M]. 哈尔滨:黑龙江人民出版社,2000. 295.
③ 盛洪. 经济学透视下的民主[A]. 盛洪. 现代制度经济学(下卷)[C]. 北京:北京大学出版社,2003. 143.
① KENNEDY, DAVID. A New Stream of International Law Scholaship[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 1988,(7):46.
② VOITOVICH, SERGEI A. International Economic Organizations in the International Legal Process[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 77.
③ OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):408.
④ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):438.
⑤ 同本页注①。
⑥ [美] 伊安·夏皮罗. 政治的道德基础[M]. 姚建华,宋国友译. 上海:上海三联书店,2006. 237.
① [美] 罗伯特·A.达尔.民主及其批评者[M].曹海军,佟德志译. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2006. 189.
② 同上。
③ OSIEKE, EBERE. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund[J]. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1984,33(2):408.
① [美] 科恩. 论民主[M]. 聂崇信,朱秀贤译. 北京:商务印书馆,1988. 73.
① WTO. WT/L/161, 25 July 1996.
② GATT. PC/7, 13 December 1994. WTO. L/7578, 13 December 1994.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):66.
② GLASSMAN, DEBRA. An Introduction to the WTO[EB/OL]. http://www.globaled.org/issues/160/b.html. 2006-12-12.
③ 同本页注①,第 67 页。
④ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
① 赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 37-38.
② VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):480-481.
③ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):341.
④ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):68.
⑤ 赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 37.
① FOOTER, MARY E. The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making[J]. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Winter,1996/Spring,1997,(17):668.
② 徐崇利. 全球化时代国际立法模式的演变:从“国家间立法”模式到“跨国立法”模式[A]. 沈涓,主编. 国际法研究(第一卷)[C]. 北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2006. 47.
③ EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):68.
④ SOUTH CENTRE. Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions. SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/3/rev.11 Sep.
⑤ BUZAN, BARRY. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):333.
① [美] 约翰·米尔斯海默. 大国政治的悲剧[M]. 王义桅,唐小松译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2003. 4.
② 赵维田. 制定专用于发展中国家的规则:评《多哈新框架协议》[A]. 沈涓,主编. 国际法研究(第一卷)[C]. 北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2006. …….
③ STEINBERG, RICHARD H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. International Organization, Spring,2002,56(2):364.
④ 刘志云. 国际经济法律自由化原理研究[M]. 厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005. 374.
① 还有一种“反向协商一致”(negative consensus or inverted consensus),该表决机制只在 WTO 争端解决中适用。具体而言,在设立专家小组、通过专家小组和上诉机构报告、授权报复等问题的决策方面,除非协商一致反对该请求或报告,否则该项请求或报告就被 DSB 接受或通过。Kim Van der Borght. Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate[J]. American University International Law Review, 1998-1999, (14):1224. 我国有著述将 negative consensus 译为“消极协商一致”,笔者认为该译法值得商榷,因为这种译法无法将 negative consensus 与 passive consensus 很好地区分开,容易引起两者的混淆。
② SOUTH CENTRE. Institutional Governance and Decision-Making Processes in the WTO, SC/TADP/AN/IG/7, December 2003. para.45.
③ 王献枢,主编. 国际法(修订第 2 版)[M]. 北京:中国政法大学出版社,2002. 301.
④ 赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 37.
⑤ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
⑥ SOUTH CENTRE. Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions. SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/3/rev. 11 Sep.
⑦ BERCERO, IGNACIO GARCIA. Functioning of the WTO System: Elements for Possible Institutional Reform[J]. International Trade Law and Regulation, 2000, 6(4):105-107.
① NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
② 一位驻日内瓦大使在接受 Aileen Kwa 采访时说道:“真正的困难是没有记录的非正式发言以及不过是橡皮图章似的正式会议。因此,很难发现关于某一问题的记录,以及说明问题的历史和成员方意见的实质性差别的说明。……有人到这里已经 10 年了,他们都没有关于某个问题的历史回忆。这是非常重要的,因为当我的继任者接任时,他们没有任何关于过去的了解,以便帮助他们了解现在。”KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition[EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
③ SOUTH CENTRE. SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
① 赵维田. 制定专用于发展中国家的规则:评《多哈新框架协议》[A]. 沈涓,主编. 国际法研究(第一卷)[C]. 北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,2006. 256-267.
② 同上,第 264 页。
③ [美] 弗雷德里克·皮尔逊,[美] 西蒙·巴亚斯里安. 国际政治经济学:全球体系中的冲突与合作[M]. 杨毅等译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2006. 171.
④ 俞正梁,陈玉刚,苏长和. 21 世纪全球政治范式[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社,2005. 180.
① BARRY, BUZAN. Negotiating by Consensus: Development in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea[J]. American Journal of International Law, 1981,75(2):325.
② [美] 罗伯特·基欧汉,[美] 约瑟夫·奈. 权力与相互依赖(第三版)[M]. 门洪华译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2002.1-11.
① ODELL, JOHN S. Chairing A WTO Negotiation[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(2):442.
② 同上,第 442-443 页。
③ 张向晨. 发展中国家与 WTO 的政治经济关系(修订本)[M]. 北京:法律出版社,2002. 268.
① [印度] 峇吉拉·劳·达斯. WTO 协议:不足、失衡及需要的改革[M]. 第三世界网络,2004. 8.
② GERHART, PETER M. Slow Transformations: the WTO as a Distributive Organization[J]. American University of International Law Review, 2002,(17):1051.
③ PANTICHPAKDI, SUPACHAI. The Evolving Multilateral Trade System in the New Millennium[J]. George Washington International Law Review, 2001,(33):422.
④ ODELL, JOHN S. Problems in Negotiating Consensus in the World Trade Organization[EB/OL]. http://wc.wustl.edu/workingpapers/Odell.PDF.2005-3-9.
⑤ 肖德. 论世界贸易组织在国际经贸关系发展中的作用[M]. 中国经济出版社,2002. 128.
⑥ 黄志雄. WTO 体制内的发展问题与国际发展法研究[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,2005. 203.
① NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26. ② KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL].
http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
③ “在乌拉圭回合中,……发展中国家积极参与多边贸易谈判。”伯纳德·霍克曼,迈克尔·考斯泰基. 世界贸易体制的政治经济学:从关贸总协定到世界贸易组织[M]. 刘平,洪晓东等译. 北京:法律出版社,1999年. 249.
① KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
② Id.
① WILKINSON, RORDEN. The WTO in Crisis: Exploring the Dimensions of Institutional Inertia[J]. Journal of World Trade, 2001,35(3):415.
① Guidelines for WTO Technical Cooperation, WT/COMTD/8, 16 Oct. 1996. A New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation: Technical Cooperation for Capacity-building, Growth and Integration, WT/COMTD/W/90, 21 Sept. 2001.
② SHAFFER, GREGORYr. Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing Countries?[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, Fall,2005,(23):650.
③ 发达国家向 WTO 技术援助部门的具体捐赠数额,请参阅:http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/tct_arc_e.htm. 2006-11-27.
④ SHAFFER, GREGORY. Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing Countries?[J]. Wisconsin International Law Journal, Fall,2005,(23):673.
① KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
② 西方有学者就指出:“秘书处越来越有效率”。 ALVAREZ, JOSE E. The WTO as Linkage Machine[J]. America Journal of International Law, 2002,(96):147.
③ STEINBERG, RICHARD H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO[J]. International Organization, Spring,2002,56(2):356.
④ REICH, ARIE. The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution[J]. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 2004,(25):377.
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② BOSSCHE, PETER VAN DEN & ALEXOVICOVA, IVETA. Effective Global Economic Governance by The World Trade Organisation[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,(7):688.
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① HENKIN, LOUIS. International Law: Politics and Values[M]. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 4.
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① TRACHTMAN, JOEL P. The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis[J]. Northwestern School of Law Journal of International Law & Business, Winter,1996/Spring,1997,(17):487.
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③ [英] 伯纳德·霍克曼,[英] 迈克尔·考斯泰基. 世界贸易体制的政治经济学:从关贸总协定到世界贸易组织[M]. 刘平,洪晓东等译. 北京:法律出版社,1999. 14.
④ 同上,第 16-17 页。
① [美] 丹尼尔·W. 布罗姆利. 经济利益与经济制度:公共政策的理论基础[M]. 陈郁,郭宇峰等译. 上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2006. 94-95.
① BLACKHURST, RICHARD. Reforming WTO Decision Making: Lessons from Singapore and Seattle[EB/OL]. http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr63.pdf.2005-6-18.
② [瑞士] 理查德·布莱克赫斯特.WTO 履行其使命之能力[A].[美] 安妮·O.克鲁格.作为国际组织的WTO[C].黄理平等译.上海:上海世纪出版集团,2002. 51.
① The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium[EB/OL].para.368. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. 2005-5-16. 美国国际经济研究所研究所高级研究员肖特在接受采访时也说道:“像 WTO 这样一个领导世界贸易的机构每年的预算是 8 千万美元,这简直是个丑闻,我认为 WTO 资金不足。”张向晨,孙亮. WTO 后的中美关系:与美国学者的对话[M]. 广州:广东人民出版社,2002. 44.
② SUPACHAI. The WTO after 10 Years: The Lessons Learned and the Challenges Ahead[EB/OL]. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp35_e.htm. 2006-11-8.
① OSTRY, SYLVIA. WTO: Institutional Design for Better Governance [EB/OL]. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/Conferences/trade/ostry.htm. 2006-11-30.
② BLACKHURAT, RICHARD. Reforming WTO Decision Making: Lessons from Singapore and Seattle[EB/OL]. http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr63.pdf. 2005-6-18.
③ SCHOTT, JEFFREY J. & WATAL, JAYASHREE. Decision Making in the WTO[EB/OL]. http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?researchid=63. 2005-8-5.
④ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
⑤ SUTHERLAND, PETER & SWELL, JOHN. Chanllenges Facing the WTO and Policies to Address Global Governance[EB/OL]. http://www.unu.edu/news/wto/ch05.pdf. 2006-11-30.
⑥ VERENYOV, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):476.
① 陈安. 南南联合自强五十年的国际经济立法反思[J]. 中国法学,2006,(2):102-103
① ODELL, JOHN S. Problems in Negotiating Consensus in the World Trade Organization[EB/OL]. http://wc.wustl.edu/workingpapers/Odell.PDF. 2005-3-9.
② WOLFE, ROBERT. See You in Geneva? Domocracy, the Rule of Law and the WTO[EB/OL]. http://www.queensu.ca/sps/working_papers/files/sps_wp_16.pdf. 2006-12-1.
① 罗尔斯是主张平等优先的代表,密尔顿·弗里德曼是主张效率优先的代表,阿瑟·奥肯则是主张平等与效率兼顾的代表。“罗尔斯有一个清晰干脆的回答:把优先权交给平等。密尔顿·弗里德曼也有一个清晰干脆并且是一贯的回答:把优先权交给效率。我的回答很少是清晰干脆的。”[美] 阿瑟·奥肯. 平等与效率[M]. 王奔州等译. 北京:华夏出版社,1999. 90.
② KWA, AILEEN. Power Politics in the WTO (Updated Second Edition) [EB/OL]. http://online.forumsyd.se/web/Arkiv/0000F3FB-80000002/00386268-000F6CFB.-1/power-politics-in-the-WTO.pdf. 2005-7-16.
③ [美] 科恩. 论民主[M]. 聂崇信,朱秀贤译. 北京:商务印书馆,1988. 216-217.
④ GERHART, PETER M. Slow Transformations: the WTO as a Distributive Organization[J]. American University of International Law Review, 2002,(17):1051.
① CULPEPER, R. Overriding Jurisdictions in Global Financial Goverance, and Long Term Financing for the Poorest Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.g24.org/research.htm. 2006-8-7.
② SAKBANI, A. A Re-Exmination of the Architecture of the International Economic System in a Global Setting: Issues and Proposals[EB/OL]. http://www.unctas.org/TEMPLATES/Page.asp?intItemID=1397&lang=1. 2006-8-9.
③ [美] 约瑟夫·奈. 硬权力与软权力[M]. 门洪华译. 北京:北京大学出版社,2005.180.
④ 同上,第 209 页。
⑤ 同上,第 123 页。
① MOISI, DOMINIQUE. The Real Crisis over the Atlantic[J]. Foreign Affairs, 2001, (4):153.
② [英] 巴里·布赞. 美国和诸大国:21 世纪的世界政治[M]. 刘永涛译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团,2007. 142.
③ NARLIKAR, AMRITA. WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries[EB/OL]. http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wtodecis/toc.htm.2004-11-26.
④ BRONCKERS, MARCO C. E. F. More Power to the WTO?[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):41-64.
① EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):71.
① 龚雯. 多哈回合的香港六日[N]. 环球时报,2005-12-19(18).
① 如“美国国会在《1974 年贸易法》中授权行政部门代表在东京回合谈判中,把 GATT 决策机制列为优先课题,并一度主张仿效国际货币基金组织那样的‘加权表决制’,按在国际贸易总额中所占的份额分配表决权 。”赵维田. 世贸组织(WTO)的法律制度[M]. 长春:吉林人民出版社,2000. 39.
② VERENYON, DMITRI V. Vote or Lose: An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization[J]. Buffalo Law Review, Spring,2003,(51):480.
① SOUTH CENTRE. SC/TADP/AN/IG/8, January 2005.
② 比如有观点指出:“作为一个更为基本的决策工具,事实上的投票能够当然地对那些持反对派立场的起到泄气的作用。当它们不愿意在关键性的投票场合公开反对一项提议时,公式化的决策程序还可以使个体成员方很难应藏在阻止共识产生的背后。” EHLERMANN, CLAUS-DIETER & EHRING, LOTHAR. Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,8(1):73.
① REICH, ARIE. Threat of Politicization of the WTO[J]. University of Pennsylvania. Journal of International Economic Law, 2005,(26):811.
② 有观点认为:“如果这些制度所反映的全球经济和政治权力结构没有一同发生变化,那么制度表面上的变化就会像化妆品一样,没有什么实际意义。”SOUTH CENTRE. Comparative Assessment of Developing Country Participation in the Governance of Global Economic Institutions. SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/3/rev. 11 Sep. 笔者认为该观点具有一定的正确性,但也有一定的片面性。其片面性在于忽视了制度具有独立的反作用力,即制度一旦形成,它能够对外生于制度的结构产生制约作用,甚至在有些情况下结构的变化具有“制度路进的依赖”特征。
③ 高岚君. 国际法的价值论[M]. 武汉:武汉大学出版社,2006. 136. 格·童金. 国际法原论[M]. 尹玉海译. 北京:中国民主法制出版社,2006, 19.
① 有西方学者也认为在 WTO 的某些“家务事”(housekeeping)事项上,用多数决替代协商一致是有必要的。BOSSCHE, PETER VAN DEN. Radical Overhaul or Pragmatic Change? The Need and Scope for Reform of Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization[EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=977376 2007-4-30.
② JACKSON, JOHN H. The WTO “Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Severn “Mantras” Revisited[J]. Journal of International Economic Law, 2001,(4):74.
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