企业家人力资本开发及其与企业绩效关系研究
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摘要
本文以企业家人力资本为研究对象，综合运用管理学、经济学、行为科
学和博奕论等多学科的理论和方法，构建了企业家人力资本开发理论的基本
框架，论证了开发企业家效率性人力资本、动力性人力资本和交易性人力资
本对提高企业绩效的积极作用，并对国有企业家人力资本开发提出了理论建
议。全文的研究是从以下五方面展开的：
（1）企业家人力资本分析。对企业家及人力资本概念进行了新的界定，
分析了企业家人力资本的特点，讨论了企业家职能，并对企业家人力资本开
发的原理作了较为详尽的阐述。
（2）企业家人力资本的形成与选择。企业家人力资本的形成与选择，关
键是要解决企业家的能力问题。对此，本文从制度安排、投资决策机制、供
求系统耗散结构、风险性、市场选择机制及信号传递机制等多角度、多方面
进行了讨论和研究。
（3）企业家人力资本的使用。首先从管理学角度出发，研究了企业家的
需要问题，然后根据这种需要，提出了满足这种需要及其相关的激励措施，
包括合约设计、控制权、声誉、精神性激励及“三大市场”的竞争；同时指
出监督约束机制对提高企业家使用效果的积极作用。该方面的研究旨在解决
企业家的生产性努力水平问题。
（4）企业家人力资本与企业绩效关系。研究了企业家效率性人力资本、
动力性人力资本和交易性人力资本与企业绩效的关系及其作用原理，旨在为
开发企业家人力资本提供理论思路。
（5）国有企业家人力资本现状分析及政策建议。首先根据实证研究结果，
运用本研究的成果和观点分析了国有企业家人力资本的现状，并对国有企业
家典型的成功案例和失败案例进行了剖析，然后对国有企业的改革提出了管
见，并对国有企业家人力资本配置问题提出了政策建议。
本研究主要有四个方面的创新点：
（1）企业绩效是企业家人力资本价值、企业家掌握的资源禀赋及企业环
境的函数，而企业家人力资本价值是由企业家三个子人力资本，即效率性人
力资本、动力性人力资本和交易性人力资本综合作用的结果。
武汉理工大学博士学位论文
u）重新界定了企业、企业家、人力资本、同质性资源和异质性资源等
重要概念，分析了企业家人力资本的特点、企业家职能，提出并模型化了企
业家人力资本开发的基本原理。特别是，对人力资本概念提出了新的诠释，
并对人力资本的构成提出了新见解。
（3）企业家人力资本的开发，受到文化因素、制度因素、经济因素等方
面的影响。文化塑造企业家效用偏好，从而调节激励企业家的成本和方式；
制度因素影响到企业家人力资本开发的深度和广度，对开发的方向和路径具
有重要的导向作用：经济因素影响企业家人力资本开发的力度和方向。
（4）企业家努力水平是激励强度、监督约束力度及企业家自身动力性人
力资本存量的函数。激励主要包括物质利益激励、精神性激励和生存环境激
励等，其中，市场竞争是生存环境激励的重要内容。
The paper studies on entrepreneur human capital. With the comprehensive utilization of theories and methods of management, economics, behavior science, and game theory, it lays out the basic theoretical framework of the development of entrepreneur human capital and testifies the positive effects of the development of entrepreneur's efficiency human capital, dynamic human capital, exchange human capital can on enterprise's performance . It also makes some theoretical suggestions on the development of entrepreneur human capital of state-owned enterprises. Its research includes the following five parts:
(1) Analysis of entrepreneur human capital. This part studies on the concepts of entrepreneur and its human capital, analyzes the traits of entrepreneur human capital, discusses the functions of entrepreneur. It also explicates the theory of development of entrepreneur human capital.
(2) Formation and choice of entrepreneur human capital. It is a problem of solving entrepreneur's capability. This part studies on that topics in terms of the institutional structure, invest decision, rundown structure, risk, market selection mechanism and signaling mechanism.
(3) Usage of entrepreneur human capital. Firstly, this part studies on the entrepreneur's needs by taking advantage of management. Secondly, according to the needs, it presents the means of meeting them and the related incentive measures, which include contract, control right, fame, spiritual incentive and competition of three-markets. Meanwhile, it designates the positive effects of supervision and restriction on raising the efficiency of using entrepreneur. It aims at how to solve the problem of raising the level of entrepreneur's producing effort.
(4) Relationship between entrepreneur human capital and enterprise's performance .This part researches on the relationships and action theories among entrepreneur's efficiency human capital, dynamic human capital, exchange human capital and enterprise's performance, in order to offer a theoretical methods for the development of entrepreneur human capital.
(5) Analysis of the position of state-owned enterprise's entrepreneur human capital and policy proposals. Firstly, according to the empirical analysis, this part
applies the research results and viewpoints of this paper to analyze the position of state-owned entrepreneur's human capital and probes into the classic successful and failed cases. Secondly, this part presents some personal viewpoints on the reform of state-owned enterprise, and suggests on distribution of entrepreneur human capital.
The paper has the following four innovative aspects:
(1) The enterprise's performance is the function of entrepreneur human capital, the resources held by entrepreneur and enterprise environments. The value of entrepreneur human capital is the result of comprehensive effect of efficiency human, dynamic human capital and exchange human capital.
(2) The paper studies on the important concepts of enterprise, entrepreneur, human capital, coessential resource and idiosyncratic resource, and analyzes the traits of entrepreneur human capital, discusses the functions of entrepreneur. It presents and formats the basic theory of development of entrepreneur human capital. Particularly, it re-explains the concept of human capital, and presents the new idea on the constitution of human capital.
(3) The development of entrepreneur human capital is influenced by various factors such as culture, institution and economy. The culture factor affects the preference for the entrepreneur's utility and adjusts the incentive cost and means. The institution factor affects the depth and width of development of entrepreneur human capital and leads the direction and way of development. The economy factor affects the effectiveness and direction of development of entrepreneur human capital.
(4) The effort level of entrepreneur is the function of incentive intensity, supervision, restriction and entrepreneur's dynamic human capital. The incentive includes material,
学和博奕论等多学科的理论和方法，构建了企业家人力资本开发理论的基本
框架，论证了开发企业家效率性人力资本、动力性人力资本和交易性人力资
本对提高企业绩效的积极作用，并对国有企业家人力资本开发提出了理论建
议。全文的研究是从以下五方面展开的：
（1）企业家人力资本分析。对企业家及人力资本概念进行了新的界定，
分析了企业家人力资本的特点，讨论了企业家职能，并对企业家人力资本开
发的原理作了较为详尽的阐述。
（2）企业家人力资本的形成与选择。企业家人力资本的形成与选择，关
键是要解决企业家的能力问题。对此，本文从制度安排、投资决策机制、供
求系统耗散结构、风险性、市场选择机制及信号传递机制等多角度、多方面
进行了讨论和研究。
（3）企业家人力资本的使用。首先从管理学角度出发，研究了企业家的
需要问题，然后根据这种需要，提出了满足这种需要及其相关的激励措施，
包括合约设计、控制权、声誉、精神性激励及“三大市场”的竞争；同时指
出监督约束机制对提高企业家使用效果的积极作用。该方面的研究旨在解决
企业家的生产性努力水平问题。
（4）企业家人力资本与企业绩效关系。研究了企业家效率性人力资本、
动力性人力资本和交易性人力资本与企业绩效的关系及其作用原理，旨在为
开发企业家人力资本提供理论思路。
（5）国有企业家人力资本现状分析及政策建议。首先根据实证研究结果，
运用本研究的成果和观点分析了国有企业家人力资本的现状，并对国有企业
家典型的成功案例和失败案例进行了剖析，然后对国有企业的改革提出了管
见，并对国有企业家人力资本配置问题提出了政策建议。
本研究主要有四个方面的创新点：
（1）企业绩效是企业家人力资本价值、企业家掌握的资源禀赋及企业环
境的函数，而企业家人力资本价值是由企业家三个子人力资本，即效率性人
力资本、动力性人力资本和交易性人力资本综合作用的结果。
武汉理工大学博士学位论文
u）重新界定了企业、企业家、人力资本、同质性资源和异质性资源等
重要概念，分析了企业家人力资本的特点、企业家职能，提出并模型化了企
业家人力资本开发的基本原理。特别是，对人力资本概念提出了新的诠释，
并对人力资本的构成提出了新见解。
（3）企业家人力资本的开发，受到文化因素、制度因素、经济因素等方
面的影响。文化塑造企业家效用偏好，从而调节激励企业家的成本和方式；
制度因素影响到企业家人力资本开发的深度和广度，对开发的方向和路径具
有重要的导向作用：经济因素影响企业家人力资本开发的力度和方向。
（4）企业家努力水平是激励强度、监督约束力度及企业家自身动力性人
力资本存量的函数。激励主要包括物质利益激励、精神性激励和生存环境激
励等，其中，市场竞争是生存环境激励的重要内容。
The paper studies on entrepreneur human capital. With the comprehensive utilization of theories and methods of management, economics, behavior science, and game theory, it lays out the basic theoretical framework of the development of entrepreneur human capital and testifies the positive effects of the development of entrepreneur's efficiency human capital, dynamic human capital, exchange human capital can on enterprise's performance . It also makes some theoretical suggestions on the development of entrepreneur human capital of state-owned enterprises. Its research includes the following five parts:
(1) Analysis of entrepreneur human capital. This part studies on the concepts of entrepreneur and its human capital, analyzes the traits of entrepreneur human capital, discusses the functions of entrepreneur. It also explicates the theory of development of entrepreneur human capital.
(2) Formation and choice of entrepreneur human capital. It is a problem of solving entrepreneur's capability. This part studies on that topics in terms of the institutional structure, invest decision, rundown structure, risk, market selection mechanism and signaling mechanism.
(3) Usage of entrepreneur human capital. Firstly, this part studies on the entrepreneur's needs by taking advantage of management. Secondly, according to the needs, it presents the means of meeting them and the related incentive measures, which include contract, control right, fame, spiritual incentive and competition of three-markets. Meanwhile, it designates the positive effects of supervision and restriction on raising the efficiency of using entrepreneur. It aims at how to solve the problem of raising the level of entrepreneur's producing effort.
(4) Relationship between entrepreneur human capital and enterprise's performance .This part researches on the relationships and action theories among entrepreneur's efficiency human capital, dynamic human capital, exchange human capital and enterprise's performance, in order to offer a theoretical methods for the development of entrepreneur human capital.
(5) Analysis of the position of state-owned enterprise's entrepreneur human capital and policy proposals. Firstly, according to the empirical analysis, this part
applies the research results and viewpoints of this paper to analyze the position of state-owned entrepreneur's human capital and probes into the classic successful and failed cases. Secondly, this part presents some personal viewpoints on the reform of state-owned enterprise, and suggests on distribution of entrepreneur human capital.
The paper has the following four innovative aspects:
(1) The enterprise's performance is the function of entrepreneur human capital, the resources held by entrepreneur and enterprise environments. The value of entrepreneur human capital is the result of comprehensive effect of efficiency human, dynamic human capital and exchange human capital.
(2) The paper studies on the important concepts of enterprise, entrepreneur, human capital, coessential resource and idiosyncratic resource, and analyzes the traits of entrepreneur human capital, discusses the functions of entrepreneur. It presents and formats the basic theory of development of entrepreneur human capital. Particularly, it re-explains the concept of human capital, and presents the new idea on the constitution of human capital.
(3) The development of entrepreneur human capital is influenced by various factors such as culture, institution and economy. The culture factor affects the preference for the entrepreneur's utility and adjusts the incentive cost and means. The institution factor affects the depth and width of development of entrepreneur human capital and leads the direction and way of development. The economy factor affects the effectiveness and direction of development of entrepreneur human capital.
(4) The effort level of entrepreneur is the function of incentive intensity, supervision, restriction and entrepreneur's dynamic human capital. The incentive includes material,
引文
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