供应链网络下集群企业合作创新行为的演化分析
|
摘要
在信息经济时代,网络技术迅猛发展、产品周期不断缩短、环境更加复杂和不确定,单个企业难以靠自有资源快速响应市场变化。企业合作突破自有资源边界以整合个体竞争优势与核心能力,是实现收益共享和风险共担的重要方式。产业集群作为一种经济空间组织形式,其具有的地理临近性和产业关联性为企业合作创新提供了便利。
产业集群内部存在着一个以整合企业资源和核心能力为竞争优势的供应链网络。在供应链网络下,企业之间进行横向、纵向和产学研的合作创新。依据双方合作时间久度、合作交易频度、资源共享广度及信息交换深度,集群企业合作创新行为分为强关系和弱关系两种类型。本文基于集群企业的这两种合作创新行为,建立横向企业之间、纵向企业之间以及产学研合作创新行为的演化博弈模型,分析合作创新行为的演化路径和影响因素,研究结果表明：集群企业合作创新行为的演化结果取决于双方合作的初始状态、资产收益率、收益调整以及网络收益。
全文研究分为以下七个部分：第一部分是结合区域经济的集群化现象以及我国产业集群尤其是轮轴式制造业集群发展的不足,提出本文的研究背景及意义、研究内容及思路；第二部分是基于国内外相关研究进展及现状,梳理产业集群、供应链网络、合作创新及演化博弈论的理论综述,并对其进行简要评述；第三、第四、第五和第六部分是本文的主体。其中第三部分分析了企业并购和企业衍生的双螺旋机制对产业集群发展的作用机理,以及不同于以往的集群周期演进模式,并从供应链的视角重点研究了成熟期产业集群的供应链网络结构及特性；第四部分是基于社会经济学的“关系强度”理论,界定产业集群中合作创新行为的四个维度和关系强度,分析了“有限理性”的合作创新行为选择；第五部分重要的假定构成了该部分研究的思路,即横向企业之间的合作创新需有固定资产投资,纵向之间的合作创新行为不需固定资产投资,产学研之间的合作创新只有企业单方进行固定资产投资。通过构建横向企业之间、纵向企业之间以及产学研合作创新行为的演化博弈模型,研究了合作创新行为的演化路径及影响参数；第六部分依据合作创新行为影响因素分析及研究结论,从产业升级转型、构建惩罚和信任机制、合理规范核心企业并购行为以及推动科技成果专业四个方面,提出促进我国产业集群企业合作创新的对策建议。
In the information economy, the network technology developes rapidly, product cycles is shorter, environment is more complex and uncertain, a single enterprise is difficult to rely on own resources to respond quickly to market changes. Breakthrough in the border business cooperation to integrate the individual's own resources, competitive advantages and core competencies, is the realization of revenue sharing and risk sharing of important ways. Industrial clusters as an economic space organization, its geographical proximity and with the industry.
There is a cluster to integrate internal corporate resources and core competencies to competitive advantage in the supply chain network. In the supply chain network, the enterprises horizontal, vertical and co-production and research innovation. There is a cluster to integrate internal corporate resources and core competencies to competitive advantage in the supply chain network. In the supply chain based on degree of cooperation over time, cooperation trading frequency, resource sharing and information exchange breadth depth cooperative innovation cluster is divided into strong business relationships. Based on clusters of enterprises both cooperative innovation, the establishment of horizontal between enterprises, between enterprises and vertical behavior of Cooperative Innovation evolutionary game model to analyze the evolution of cooperative innovation path and impact factors, the results show that:Cluster Enterprise the evolution of cooperative innovation in the results depends on the cooperation of the initial state, return on assets, revenue adjustments and network revenue.
Full study is divided into the following seven parts:The first part is combined with the phenomenon of regional economic clusters and industrial clusters in China, especially wheel-type manufacturing cluster development, the paper proposes the research background and significance, content and ideas; The second part is based on the research status and the status quo, carding cluster, supply chain network, co-innovation theory and evolutionary game theory, summarized and a brief comment; Third, fourth, fifth and sixth part is the main body of this article. The third part of the enterprise mergers and acquisitions and the double helix mechanism derived from the development of industrial cluster mechanism, and different from the previous cycle of evolution of the cluster model, and the supply chain from the perspective of a mature industry cluster focuses on the supply chain network structure and properties; The fourth part is based on social economics "relationship strength" theory, defining cooperation in industrial clusters in the four dimensions of innovative behavior and relationship strength of the "limited rational" choice cooperative innovation. The fifth part constitutes an important assumption of the part of the idea that horizontal cooperation between innovative companies the need for investment in fixed assets, vertical cooperation between the creative acts without fixed asset investment industries and academe, the cooperation between the only enterprise innovation unilateral investment in fixed assets. The sixth part of the basis for cooperation in innovation and Influence Factors Analysis and study result, upgrading from the transformation of industry. Bebuild and trust and penalties mechanism, reasonable standard core enterprise merger and acquisition activity as well as four professional scientific and technological accomplishments, we proposed strategies proposal to promote Chinese clusters in innovative.
产业集群内部存在着一个以整合企业资源和核心能力为竞争优势的供应链网络。在供应链网络下,企业之间进行横向、纵向和产学研的合作创新。依据双方合作时间久度、合作交易频度、资源共享广度及信息交换深度,集群企业合作创新行为分为强关系和弱关系两种类型。本文基于集群企业的这两种合作创新行为,建立横向企业之间、纵向企业之间以及产学研合作创新行为的演化博弈模型,分析合作创新行为的演化路径和影响因素,研究结果表明：集群企业合作创新行为的演化结果取决于双方合作的初始状态、资产收益率、收益调整以及网络收益。
全文研究分为以下七个部分：第一部分是结合区域经济的集群化现象以及我国产业集群尤其是轮轴式制造业集群发展的不足,提出本文的研究背景及意义、研究内容及思路；第二部分是基于国内外相关研究进展及现状,梳理产业集群、供应链网络、合作创新及演化博弈论的理论综述,并对其进行简要评述；第三、第四、第五和第六部分是本文的主体。其中第三部分分析了企业并购和企业衍生的双螺旋机制对产业集群发展的作用机理,以及不同于以往的集群周期演进模式,并从供应链的视角重点研究了成熟期产业集群的供应链网络结构及特性；第四部分是基于社会经济学的“关系强度”理论,界定产业集群中合作创新行为的四个维度和关系强度,分析了“有限理性”的合作创新行为选择；第五部分重要的假定构成了该部分研究的思路,即横向企业之间的合作创新需有固定资产投资,纵向之间的合作创新行为不需固定资产投资,产学研之间的合作创新只有企业单方进行固定资产投资。通过构建横向企业之间、纵向企业之间以及产学研合作创新行为的演化博弈模型,研究了合作创新行为的演化路径及影响参数；第六部分依据合作创新行为影响因素分析及研究结论,从产业升级转型、构建惩罚和信任机制、合理规范核心企业并购行为以及推动科技成果专业四个方面,提出促进我国产业集群企业合作创新的对策建议。
In the information economy, the network technology developes rapidly, product cycles is shorter, environment is more complex and uncertain, a single enterprise is difficult to rely on own resources to respond quickly to market changes. Breakthrough in the border business cooperation to integrate the individual's own resources, competitive advantages and core competencies, is the realization of revenue sharing and risk sharing of important ways. Industrial clusters as an economic space organization, its geographical proximity and with the industry.
There is a cluster to integrate internal corporate resources and core competencies to competitive advantage in the supply chain network. In the supply chain network, the enterprises horizontal, vertical and co-production and research innovation. There is a cluster to integrate internal corporate resources and core competencies to competitive advantage in the supply chain network. In the supply chain based on degree of cooperation over time, cooperation trading frequency, resource sharing and information exchange breadth depth cooperative innovation cluster is divided into strong business relationships. Based on clusters of enterprises both cooperative innovation, the establishment of horizontal between enterprises, between enterprises and vertical behavior of Cooperative Innovation evolutionary game model to analyze the evolution of cooperative innovation path and impact factors, the results show that:Cluster Enterprise the evolution of cooperative innovation in the results depends on the cooperation of the initial state, return on assets, revenue adjustments and network revenue.
Full study is divided into the following seven parts:The first part is combined with the phenomenon of regional economic clusters and industrial clusters in China, especially wheel-type manufacturing cluster development, the paper proposes the research background and significance, content and ideas; The second part is based on the research status and the status quo, carding cluster, supply chain network, co-innovation theory and evolutionary game theory, summarized and a brief comment; Third, fourth, fifth and sixth part is the main body of this article. The third part of the enterprise mergers and acquisitions and the double helix mechanism derived from the development of industrial cluster mechanism, and different from the previous cycle of evolution of the cluster model, and the supply chain from the perspective of a mature industry cluster focuses on the supply chain network structure and properties; The fourth part is based on social economics "relationship strength" theory, defining cooperation in industrial clusters in the four dimensions of innovative behavior and relationship strength of the "limited rational" choice cooperative innovation. The fifth part constitutes an important assumption of the part of the idea that horizontal cooperation between innovative companies the need for investment in fixed assets, vertical cooperation between the creative acts without fixed asset investment industries and academe, the cooperation between the only enterprise innovation unilateral investment in fixed assets. The sixth part of the basis for cooperation in innovation and Influence Factors Analysis and study result, upgrading from the transformation of industry. Bebuild and trust and penalties mechanism, reasonable standard core enterprise merger and acquisition activity as well as four professional scientific and technological accomplishments, we proposed strategies proposal to promote Chinese clusters in innovative.
引文
[1]Porter M. Cluster and new economics of competition [J], Harvard Business Review,1998, No.11-12:77-90.
[2]魏后凯.中国制造业集中状况及其国际比较[J].中国工业经济,2002,(1)：41-49.
[3]Burt S. The contingent value of social capital [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42: 339-365.
[4][英]马歇尔.朱志泰译.经济学原理[M].北京：商务印书馆,1997.
[5][德]阿尔弗雷德·韦伯.李刚剑译.工业区位论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1997.
[6]Krugman P. Geography and Trade[M].Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,1991.
[7]Tichy G. Clusters: less dispensable and more risky than ever [A].M.Steiner.Clusters and Regional Specialisation [C].Londan:Pion Limited,207 Brondesbury Park,NW2 5JM,1998.
[8]Granovetter M.The Strength of Weak Ties[J].American Journal of Sociology,1973, (78): 1360-80.
[9]Grabher GThe Weakness of Strong Ties:The Lock-in of Regional Development in Ruhr Area [A]. Grabher G. The embedded firm. On the socio-economics of industrial networks [C]. Routledge, London and New York: 1993:255-277.
[10]仇保兴.小企业集群研究[M].上海：复旦大学出版社.1999：71-79.
[11]王缉慈.创新的空间——企业集群与区域发展[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2001.
[12]魏守华,王缉慈,赵雅沁.产业集群：新型区域经济发展理论[J].经济经纬,2002(2)：18-20.
[13]王珺.衍生型集群：珠江三角洲西岸地区产业集群生产机制研究[J].管理世界,2005(8)：80-86.
[14]叶建亮.知识溢出与企业集群[J].经济科学,2001(3)：23-30.
[15]贾生华.产业演进、协同创新与民营企业持续成长：理论研究与浙江经验[M].浙江大学出版社,2007.
[16]朱瑞博.模块化抗产业集群内生性风险的机理分析[J].中国工业经济,2004,(5).
[17]曹瑄玮,席酉民.产业集群发展中路径依赖的形成——社会心理学的观点[J].经济社会体制比较(双月刊),2007(4)：36-42.
[18]Fu-Renlin, Michael S. Reengineering the Order Fulfillment Process in Supply Chain Networks[J]. The International Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems,1998, (10).
[19]Christopher C, Suvir V. Strategic Risk Management: The New Competitive Edge [J]. Long Range Planning,1999, (4).
[20]Cooper C, Lambert M, Pagh D. Supply Chain Management: Implementation Issues Research Opportunities [J]. The International Journal of Logistics Management,1998, (2).
[21]Walker T.Emerging trends in supply.chain architecture [J]. International Journal of Production Research,2005,43(6):3517-3528.
[22]马士华,林勇,陈志祥.供应链管理[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2000.
[23]霍佳震,吴群,谌飞龙.集群供应链网络的联结模式与共治框架[J].中国工业经济,2007,10：13-20.
[24]周健,李必强.供应链组织的复杂适应特征及其推论[J].运筹与管理,2004,13(6)：120-124.
[25]范旭等.复杂供应链网络中的不确定性分析[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2006,3(3)：20-24.
[26]李玉琼.网络环境下企业生态系统创新共生战略[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[27]夏兰,周钟山.基于网络结构视角的产业集群演化和创新[M].北京：中国市场出版社,2006.
[28]盖文启.创新网络：区域经济发展新思维[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.
[29]李凯,李士杰.装备制造业集群网络结构研究与实证[J].管理世界,2004(12)：68-76.
[30]夏德,程国平.企业集群与供应链的共生性研究[J].研究与发展管理,2003,15(6)：62-66.
[31]黎继子,蔡根女.基于cluster供应链组织系统体系结构[J].科研管理,2004,25(3)：77-80.
[32]戚桂清,杨锡怀,李森.基于重复博弈的集群供应链网络竞合关系分析[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2006,27(2)：233-236.
[33]Aspremont, Claude and J acquemin, Alexis, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly wit h Spillovers:Erratum [J]. American Economic Review, June 1990,80,641-2.
[34]Smilor, Raymond W. and Gibson, David V."Technology Transfer in Muti-OrganizationalEnvironments: The Case of R&D Consortia"IEEE Transactions on Engineering Manage-ment,Vol.38,No.1,February 1991.
[35]Branstetter, Lee and Sakakibara, Mariko,"Japanese Research Consortia:A Microecono-metric Analysis of Industrial Policy",The Jour-nal of Industrial Economics,Vol.XLVI,No.2,June 1998.
[36]Ingham,Marc and Mothe,Caroline,"How to learnin R&D Partnerships?",R&D Management 28,4,1998.
[37]傅家骥.技术创新学[M].北京：清华大学出版社,1998.
[38]郭晓川.企业网络合作化技术创新及其模式比较[J].科学管理研究,1998,(10).
[39]裴学敏,陈金贤.知识资产对合作创新过程的影响分析[J],科研管理,1999(1).
[40]周玉泉,李垣.合作学习、组织柔性与创新方式选择的关系研究[J].科研管理,2006,27(2)：9-14.
[41]苏越良.网络环境下合作技术创新奉献[J].系统工程,2005,23(4)：7-13.
[42]许箫迪,王子龙.基于战略联盟的企业协同创新模型研究[J].科学管理研究,2005,23(6)：12-15.
[43]幸理.企业合作创新中模块化理论的运用[J].当代经济,2006,(7).
[44]刘兰剑,党兴华.合作技术创新界面管理研究及其新进展[J].科研管理,2007,28(3)：1-8.
[45]贾晓霞,周溪召.面向合作研发项目的企业知识集成管理模式研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,3：83-88.
[46]张米尔,江诗松.创新互动与装备制造业结构升级[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2004,10：24-27.
[47]陈云,王浣尘等.产业集群中的信息共享与合作创新研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004(8)：54-57.
[48]Nash J.Non-Cooperative Games[D].Ph.D.thesis,New Jersey:Princeton University,1950.
[49]Maynard J.The Theory of Games and the Evolution ofAnimal Conflict[J].Journal of Theory Biology,1973,(47).
[50]Maynard J,Price R.The Logic of Animal Conflicts[J].Nature,1974,(246):15-18.
[51]Weibull W.Evolutionary Game Theory[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1995.
[52]Kaushik Basu.Civil Institutions and Evolution:Concepts,Cri-tique and Models[J].Journal of
Development Economics,1995,(46).
[53]Bester H,Guth W.Is Altruism Evolutionarily stable[J].Journal ofEconomic Behavior & Organization,1998,(34).
[54]Guttman M.On the Evolutionary Stability of Preferences forReciprocity[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2000,(16).
[55]Errmn Haruvy,Ashutosh Prasad.Optimal Freeware Quality in the Presence of Network Externalities:an Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach[J],Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2001,(11).
[56]Nyborg K,Rege M.On Social Norms:the Evolution of Con-siderate Smoking Behavior[J] Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2003,(52).
[57]Daniel G.,Arce M.,Todd S.The Dilemma of the Prisoners'Dilemmas[J]. KYKLOS,2005, 58(1).
[58]Josef Hofbauera,William H.Sandholmb,.Evolution in games withrandomly disturbed payoffs[J].Journal of Eco nomic Theory,2007,132.
[59]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈论[J].上海财经大学学报,2001,(5).
[60]张良桥.理性与有限理性：论经典博弈理论与进化博弈理论之关系[J].世界经济,2001,(8).
[61]盛昭瀚,蒋德鹏.演化经济学[M].上海：三联书店,2002,4.
[62]孙庆文,陆柳,严广乐,车宏安.不完全信息条件下演化博弈均衡的稳定性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003,23(7).
[63]吴昊,杨梅英,陈良猷.合作竞争博弈中的复杂性与演化均衡的稳定性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(2).
[64]崔浩,陈晓剑,张道武.共同治理结构下企业所有权配置的进化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2004,13(6).
[65]易余胤,盛昭瀚,肖条军.企业自主创新、模仿创新行为与市场结构的演化[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(1).
[66]石岿然,肖条军.零售市场价格策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(4).
[67]胡明礼,刘思峰,方志耕,阮爱清.企业集群演进的进化博弈链模型研究[J].科技进步与对策,2006,11.
[68]刘振彪,陈晓红.企业家创新投资决策的进化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(1).
[69]赵晗萍,冯允成,蒋家东.基于进化博弈的供应链市场进入博弈分析[J].计算机集成制造系统,2006,12(10).
[70]施蒂格勒(George Joseph Stigler)著,潘振民译.产业组织和政府管制[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1996.
[71]刘友金,刘莉君.基于混沌理论的集群式创新网络演化过程研究[J].科学学研究,2008,26(1)：185-190.
[72]仇保兴.发展小企业集群要避免的陷阱——过度竞争所致的“柠檬市场”[J].北京大学学报(哲社版),1999,(1)：25-29.
[73]刘恒江,陈继祥.要素、动力机制与竞争优势：产业集群的发展逻辑[J].中国软科学,2005(2)：125-130.
[74]符正平.论企业集群的产生条件与形成机制[J].中国工业经济,2002(10)：20-26.
[75]Bian Y. Bringing strong ties back in: Indirect ties, network bridges, and job searches in China[J]. American Sociological Review,1997,62(3):366-383.
[76]边燕杰,丘海雄.企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2000,(2)：87-99.
[77]姜翰,杨鑫,金占明.战略模式选择对企业关系治理行为影响的实证研究——从关系强度角度出发[J].管理世界,2008(3)：115-125.
[78]姚小涛,张田,席酉民.强关系与弱关系：企业成长的社会关系依赖研究[J].管理科学学报.2008.11(1)：143-152.
[79]杨中华,卫武.基于关系强度理论的集群网络知识流动分析[J].图书情报工作,2009,53(6)：24-27.
[80]蔡铂,聂鸣.社会网络对产业集群技术创新的影响[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2003.7：57-60.
[81]李世杰,李凯.企业集群的契约治理机制研究[J].中国集体经济,2009,2：14-18.
[2]魏后凯.中国制造业集中状况及其国际比较[J].中国工业经济,2002,(1)：41-49.
[3]Burt S. The contingent value of social capital [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997,42: 339-365.
[4][英]马歇尔.朱志泰译.经济学原理[M].北京：商务印书馆,1997.
[5][德]阿尔弗雷德·韦伯.李刚剑译.工业区位论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1997.
[6]Krugman P. Geography and Trade[M].Cambridge, Mass:MIT Press,1991.
[7]Tichy G. Clusters: less dispensable and more risky than ever [A].M.Steiner.Clusters and Regional Specialisation [C].Londan:Pion Limited,207 Brondesbury Park,NW2 5JM,1998.
[8]Granovetter M.The Strength of Weak Ties[J].American Journal of Sociology,1973, (78): 1360-80.
[9]Grabher GThe Weakness of Strong Ties:The Lock-in of Regional Development in Ruhr Area [A]. Grabher G. The embedded firm. On the socio-economics of industrial networks [C]. Routledge, London and New York: 1993:255-277.
[10]仇保兴.小企业集群研究[M].上海：复旦大学出版社.1999：71-79.
[11]王缉慈.创新的空间——企业集群与区域发展[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2001.
[12]魏守华,王缉慈,赵雅沁.产业集群：新型区域经济发展理论[J].经济经纬,2002(2)：18-20.
[13]王珺.衍生型集群：珠江三角洲西岸地区产业集群生产机制研究[J].管理世界,2005(8)：80-86.
[14]叶建亮.知识溢出与企业集群[J].经济科学,2001(3)：23-30.
[15]贾生华.产业演进、协同创新与民营企业持续成长：理论研究与浙江经验[M].浙江大学出版社,2007.
[16]朱瑞博.模块化抗产业集群内生性风险的机理分析[J].中国工业经济,2004,(5).
[17]曹瑄玮,席酉民.产业集群发展中路径依赖的形成——社会心理学的观点[J].经济社会体制比较(双月刊),2007(4)：36-42.
[18]Fu-Renlin, Michael S. Reengineering the Order Fulfillment Process in Supply Chain Networks[J]. The International Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems,1998, (10).
[19]Christopher C, Suvir V. Strategic Risk Management: The New Competitive Edge [J]. Long Range Planning,1999, (4).
[20]Cooper C, Lambert M, Pagh D. Supply Chain Management: Implementation Issues Research Opportunities [J]. The International Journal of Logistics Management,1998, (2).
[21]Walker T.Emerging trends in supply.chain architecture [J]. International Journal of Production Research,2005,43(6):3517-3528.
[22]马士华,林勇,陈志祥.供应链管理[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2000.
[23]霍佳震,吴群,谌飞龙.集群供应链网络的联结模式与共治框架[J].中国工业经济,2007,10：13-20.
[24]周健,李必强.供应链组织的复杂适应特征及其推论[J].运筹与管理,2004,13(6)：120-124.
[25]范旭等.复杂供应链网络中的不确定性分析[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2006,3(3)：20-24.
[26]李玉琼.网络环境下企业生态系统创新共生战略[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[27]夏兰,周钟山.基于网络结构视角的产业集群演化和创新[M].北京：中国市场出版社,2006.
[28]盖文启.创新网络：区域经济发展新思维[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.
[29]李凯,李士杰.装备制造业集群网络结构研究与实证[J].管理世界,2004(12)：68-76.
[30]夏德,程国平.企业集群与供应链的共生性研究[J].研究与发展管理,2003,15(6)：62-66.
[31]黎继子,蔡根女.基于cluster供应链组织系统体系结构[J].科研管理,2004,25(3)：77-80.
[32]戚桂清,杨锡怀,李森.基于重复博弈的集群供应链网络竞合关系分析[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2006,27(2)：233-236.
[33]Aspremont, Claude and J acquemin, Alexis, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly wit h Spillovers:Erratum [J]. American Economic Review, June 1990,80,641-2.
[34]Smilor, Raymond W. and Gibson, David V."Technology Transfer in Muti-OrganizationalEnvironments: The Case of R&D Consortia"IEEE Transactions on Engineering Manage-ment,Vol.38,No.1,February 1991.
[35]Branstetter, Lee and Sakakibara, Mariko,"Japanese Research Consortia:A Microecono-metric Analysis of Industrial Policy",The Jour-nal of Industrial Economics,Vol.XLVI,No.2,June 1998.
[36]Ingham,Marc and Mothe,Caroline,"How to learnin R&D Partnerships?",R&D Management 28,4,1998.
[37]傅家骥.技术创新学[M].北京：清华大学出版社,1998.
[38]郭晓川.企业网络合作化技术创新及其模式比较[J].科学管理研究,1998,(10).
[39]裴学敏,陈金贤.知识资产对合作创新过程的影响分析[J],科研管理,1999(1).
[40]周玉泉,李垣.合作学习、组织柔性与创新方式选择的关系研究[J].科研管理,2006,27(2)：9-14.
[41]苏越良.网络环境下合作技术创新奉献[J].系统工程,2005,23(4)：7-13.
[42]许箫迪,王子龙.基于战略联盟的企业协同创新模型研究[J].科学管理研究,2005,23(6)：12-15.
[43]幸理.企业合作创新中模块化理论的运用[J].当代经济,2006,(7).
[44]刘兰剑,党兴华.合作技术创新界面管理研究及其新进展[J].科研管理,2007,28(3)：1-8.
[45]贾晓霞,周溪召.面向合作研发项目的企业知识集成管理模式研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,3：83-88.
[46]张米尔,江诗松.创新互动与装备制造业结构升级[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2004,10：24-27.
[47]陈云,王浣尘等.产业集群中的信息共享与合作创新研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004(8)：54-57.
[48]Nash J.Non-Cooperative Games[D].Ph.D.thesis,New Jersey:Princeton University,1950.
[49]Maynard J.The Theory of Games and the Evolution ofAnimal Conflict[J].Journal of Theory Biology,1973,(47).
[50]Maynard J,Price R.The Logic of Animal Conflicts[J].Nature,1974,(246):15-18.
[51]Weibull W.Evolutionary Game Theory[M].Cambridge:MIT Press,1995.
[52]Kaushik Basu.Civil Institutions and Evolution:Concepts,Cri-tique and Models[J].Journal of
Development Economics,1995,(46).
[53]Bester H,Guth W.Is Altruism Evolutionarily stable[J].Journal ofEconomic Behavior & Organization,1998,(34).
[54]Guttman M.On the Evolutionary Stability of Preferences forReciprocity[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2000,(16).
[55]Errmn Haruvy,Ashutosh Prasad.Optimal Freeware Quality in the Presence of Network Externalities:an Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach[J],Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2001,(11).
[56]Nyborg K,Rege M.On Social Norms:the Evolution of Con-siderate Smoking Behavior[J] Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2003,(52).
[57]Daniel G.,Arce M.,Todd S.The Dilemma of the Prisoners'Dilemmas[J]. KYKLOS,2005, 58(1).
[58]Josef Hofbauera,William H.Sandholmb,.Evolution in games withrandomly disturbed payoffs[J].Journal of Eco nomic Theory,2007,132.
[59]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈论[J].上海财经大学学报,2001,(5).
[60]张良桥.理性与有限理性：论经典博弈理论与进化博弈理论之关系[J].世界经济,2001,(8).
[61]盛昭瀚,蒋德鹏.演化经济学[M].上海：三联书店,2002,4.
[62]孙庆文,陆柳,严广乐,车宏安.不完全信息条件下演化博弈均衡的稳定性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2003,23(7).
[63]吴昊,杨梅英,陈良猷.合作竞争博弈中的复杂性与演化均衡的稳定性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(2).
[64]崔浩,陈晓剑,张道武.共同治理结构下企业所有权配置的进化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2004,13(6).
[65]易余胤,盛昭瀚,肖条军.企业自主创新、模仿创新行为与市场结构的演化[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(1).
[66]石岿然,肖条军.零售市场价格策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(4).
[67]胡明礼,刘思峰,方志耕,阮爱清.企业集群演进的进化博弈链模型研究[J].科技进步与对策,2006,11.
[68]刘振彪,陈晓红.企业家创新投资决策的进化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(1).
[69]赵晗萍,冯允成,蒋家东.基于进化博弈的供应链市场进入博弈分析[J].计算机集成制造系统,2006,12(10).
[70]施蒂格勒(George Joseph Stigler)著,潘振民译.产业组织和政府管制[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1996.
[71]刘友金,刘莉君.基于混沌理论的集群式创新网络演化过程研究[J].科学学研究,2008,26(1)：185-190.
[72]仇保兴.发展小企业集群要避免的陷阱——过度竞争所致的“柠檬市场”[J].北京大学学报(哲社版),1999,(1)：25-29.
[73]刘恒江,陈继祥.要素、动力机制与竞争优势：产业集群的发展逻辑[J].中国软科学,2005(2)：125-130.
[74]符正平.论企业集群的产生条件与形成机制[J].中国工业经济,2002(10)：20-26.
[75]Bian Y. Bringing strong ties back in: Indirect ties, network bridges, and job searches in China[J]. American Sociological Review,1997,62(3):366-383.
[76]边燕杰,丘海雄.企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2000,(2)：87-99.
[77]姜翰,杨鑫,金占明.战略模式选择对企业关系治理行为影响的实证研究——从关系强度角度出发[J].管理世界,2008(3)：115-125.
[78]姚小涛,张田,席酉民.强关系与弱关系：企业成长的社会关系依赖研究[J].管理科学学报.2008.11(1)：143-152.
[79]杨中华,卫武.基于关系强度理论的集群网络知识流动分析[J].图书情报工作,2009,53(6)：24-27.
[80]蔡铂,聂鸣.社会网络对产业集群技术创新的影响[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2003.7：57-60.
[81]李世杰,李凯.企业集群的契约治理机制研究[J].中国集体经济,2009,2：14-18.