企业经营者报酬支付论
摘要
物质资本的所有权与经营控制权相分离是现代企业制度的重要特征。企业经营者与企业出资人之间存在着利益差别，二者追求的目标并不完全一致，他们不可避免地存在“冲突”。企业经营者报酬支付契约的执行有利于协调经营者与出资人之间的这种利益“冲突”，从而减少经营者“道德风险”所带来的危害。企业实践已经证明，有效的经营者报酬支付安排能够促使经营者在决策时更多地考虑出资人的利益。已有的理论成果主要集中于企业经营者报酬支付的“外部”问题，作者认为以往的研究存在以下三个方面的不足：(1)企业经营者报酬支付本身的性质特征；(2)企业经营者绩效评价的目标设定；(3)对我国企业经营者报酬支付的全面系统的研究。本文的目的在于对上述三个问题进行较为深入的研究。
论文由绪论、理论回顾与文献综述、企业经营者报酬支付理论、企业经营者绩效评价目标的设定、我国企业经营者报酬支付的现状与改进、结论共6章构成。
绪论部分阐明了论文目的、研究界定与论文思路；
第1章是对企业经营者报酬支付相关理论、文献的回顾与综述；
第2章以企业经营者报酬支付综合模型为基础，详细论述了企业经营者报酬的支付构成、支付形式与支付时间的安排、支付水平等理论问题，提出了作者独到的见解；
第3章论证了如何设定企业经营者绩效评价的目标。作者将经营者个体对企业(出资人)的贡献区分为经营者外在贡献和经营者内在贡献两大类，并对相应的评价指标进行了阐释。作者还提出了一种设置经营者绩效评价目标基准值的新的理论和方法；
第4章结合我国企业经营者报酬支付的实践，在对我国企业经营者报酬支付的政策背景和经营者对报酬支付现状的相关判断加以概述的基础上，进一步详细深入地论述了我国企业经营者报酬的支付方式、支付水平，以及我国企业经营者的绩效评价问题，并提出了作者的相关思考与改进建议；
第5章是对全文研究结论的总结。
The separation of ownership and control in corporations is a central feature of modern economies. The interests of professional managers may not necessarily coincide with those of absent, dispersed owners. Executive compensation payment contract is critical in aligning the interests of divergent organizational groups, usually used to alleviate conflicts between corporation investors and managers and to reduce the moral hazard problems. Business practices have proved that effective arrangements of executive compensation help to make agent act in the best interest of principals. On the academic side, much valuable studies in executive compensation has focused mainly on exterior factors, pay-performance sensitivity. In my opinion, there leave some unexplored concerns: (l)executive compensation's interior characters; (2)executive performance evaluation measures and standards; (3)comprehensive research on our country's executive compensation payment. And the purpose of this dissertation is to do some work on those three issues.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 0 is introduction. Chapter 1 reviews the relative theoretical background and literature. Chapter 2 starts with an executive compensation payment model. Based on the model, I discuss the structure, payment forms and levels of executive compensation. Chapter 3 expounds how to evaluate manager's contributions to the firm. In this chapter, I analyse executive's external and internal contributions, and provide viewpoints on selecting performance measures and standards for executive evaluation. Chapter 4 generalizes the present situations of executive's compensation payment in our country and gives relevant improvement suggestions. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
论文由绪论、理论回顾与文献综述、企业经营者报酬支付理论、企业经营者绩效评价目标的设定、我国企业经营者报酬支付的现状与改进、结论共6章构成。
绪论部分阐明了论文目的、研究界定与论文思路；
第1章是对企业经营者报酬支付相关理论、文献的回顾与综述；
第2章以企业经营者报酬支付综合模型为基础，详细论述了企业经营者报酬的支付构成、支付形式与支付时间的安排、支付水平等理论问题，提出了作者独到的见解；
第3章论证了如何设定企业经营者绩效评价的目标。作者将经营者个体对企业(出资人)的贡献区分为经营者外在贡献和经营者内在贡献两大类，并对相应的评价指标进行了阐释。作者还提出了一种设置经营者绩效评价目标基准值的新的理论和方法；
第4章结合我国企业经营者报酬支付的实践，在对我国企业经营者报酬支付的政策背景和经营者对报酬支付现状的相关判断加以概述的基础上，进一步详细深入地论述了我国企业经营者报酬的支付方式、支付水平，以及我国企业经营者的绩效评价问题，并提出了作者的相关思考与改进建议；
第5章是对全文研究结论的总结。
The separation of ownership and control in corporations is a central feature of modern economies. The interests of professional managers may not necessarily coincide with those of absent, dispersed owners. Executive compensation payment contract is critical in aligning the interests of divergent organizational groups, usually used to alleviate conflicts between corporation investors and managers and to reduce the moral hazard problems. Business practices have proved that effective arrangements of executive compensation help to make agent act in the best interest of principals. On the academic side, much valuable studies in executive compensation has focused mainly on exterior factors, pay-performance sensitivity. In my opinion, there leave some unexplored concerns: (l)executive compensation's interior characters; (2)executive performance evaluation measures and standards; (3)comprehensive research on our country's executive compensation payment. And the purpose of this dissertation is to do some work on those three issues.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 0 is introduction. Chapter 1 reviews the relative theoretical background and literature. Chapter 2 starts with an executive compensation payment model. Based on the model, I discuss the structure, payment forms and levels of executive compensation. Chapter 3 expounds how to evaluate manager's contributions to the firm. In this chapter, I analyse executive's external and internal contributions, and provide viewpoints on selecting performance measures and standards for executive evaluation. Chapter 4 generalizes the present situations of executive's compensation payment in our country and gives relevant improvement suggestions. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
引文
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