风险投资对企业融资能力的影响
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摘要
随着我国经济的增长,风险投资以其投资行为的独特性及其与高成长性风险企业的特殊关联性在近年来的经济实践中得以迅速发展。风险投资在经济社会与被融资企业中的作用非常广泛,而如何充分利用风险投资的特点和优势,发挥其对我国高成长性企业融资的积极作用从而达到促进国内风险企业融资,提高风险企业融资能力的目的是本文的研究重点。
本文首先梳理了国内外学者在风险投资方面所做的研究,简单阐述了与风险投资相关的委托代理理论和信贷配给理论,概括了风险投资的运行特点和运行规律。这里,本文给出了一个道德风险下的信贷配给模型,以说明现实经济中的企业一般都存在信贷配给问题。接着,本文列举了影响企业融资能力的一些主要因素,并通过理论分析说明道德风险、企业家自有资产、企业质量等是决定企业融资能力的关键因素。之后,本文重点分析了风险投资在克服道德风险、信息不对称等方面的作用,并通过建立加入监管和增值服务的融资模型得出风险投资可以影响企业融资,显著提高企业融资能力,放松企业融资约束的结论。最后,我们运用收集的深圳中小企业板上市公司数据,以代表企业融资能力的带息债务比全部投入资本为被解释变量,以是否有风险投资持股这一虚拟变量为解释变量,将其他一些影响企业融资能力的因素作为控制变量,建立多元回归模型和二阶最小二乘模型,系统地分析风险投资的作用。我们分析得出的主要结论是:在其他一些因素一定的情况下,有风险投资持股企业的带息债务比全部投入资本要大于没有风险投资持股企业的带息债务比全部投入资本,这说明有风险投资持股企业的融资能力要明显大于没有风险投资持股的企业。文章的最后,结合理论分析和实证检验的结果,本文认为国内应当加快发展风险投资业,发展风险投资中介机构,培育有利于风险投资发展的环境,从而最大限度的发挥风险投资的积极作用,以达到通过促进风险投资发展而促进国内企业融资的目的。
In China, because of its special investment style and its particular relevance with high-growth enterprises, venture capital develops phenomenally in today’s economic practice.
As we know, venture capital plays a very extensive role in the economic and in the firms they financed. And it is important to take full use of venture capital’s features and advantages to play its positive impact on China’s high growth enterprises. The focus of this article is to promote the financing behavior of domestic venture-enterprises and raise their financing capacity.
In this paper, we first reviewed the domestic and foreign academics in venture capital and then briefly addressed principal-agent theory and Credit rationing theories which have a high relevance with venture capital, outlined venture capital’s operating characteristics and operating rules.
Here, we present a credit rationing model in terms of moral hazard to illustrate the real economy. Then, we list some of the main factors which can influence the enterprises’financing capacity. Next, we give a theoretical analysis which suggests that moral hazard, entrepreneur's own assets, enterprise quality, etc are the key factors which can determine the enterprises’financing capacity.
And then, this article gives a high attention to the role of venture capital in overcoming the moral hazard and information asymmetry. Through the establishment of a financing model including value-added services and supervision we obtained the result that venture capital can affect corporate finance, improve the ability of financing and relax corporate finance constraints.
Finally, we used collected data on the Shenzhen SME board of listed companies to establish a multi-regression model and the second-order least squares model to give a systematic analysis of the role of venture capital.
Our main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that in the condition that all the other factors are fixed firms with venture capital are more likely to have a higher interest-bearing debt than the firms without venture capital which means firms with venture capital have a greater financing capacity than those without venture capital In the end of the article, combined with theoretical analysis and empirical test results, this paper argues that we should accelerate the development of domestic venture capital industry, the development of venture capital intermediaries, to cultivate an environment conducive to the development of venture capital to maximize the positive role of venture capital in order to achieve the purposes that by promoting the development of venture capital to promote domestic corporate financing.
本文首先梳理了国内外学者在风险投资方面所做的研究,简单阐述了与风险投资相关的委托代理理论和信贷配给理论,概括了风险投资的运行特点和运行规律。这里,本文给出了一个道德风险下的信贷配给模型,以说明现实经济中的企业一般都存在信贷配给问题。接着,本文列举了影响企业融资能力的一些主要因素,并通过理论分析说明道德风险、企业家自有资产、企业质量等是决定企业融资能力的关键因素。之后,本文重点分析了风险投资在克服道德风险、信息不对称等方面的作用,并通过建立加入监管和增值服务的融资模型得出风险投资可以影响企业融资,显著提高企业融资能力,放松企业融资约束的结论。最后,我们运用收集的深圳中小企业板上市公司数据,以代表企业融资能力的带息债务比全部投入资本为被解释变量,以是否有风险投资持股这一虚拟变量为解释变量,将其他一些影响企业融资能力的因素作为控制变量,建立多元回归模型和二阶最小二乘模型,系统地分析风险投资的作用。我们分析得出的主要结论是:在其他一些因素一定的情况下,有风险投资持股企业的带息债务比全部投入资本要大于没有风险投资持股企业的带息债务比全部投入资本,这说明有风险投资持股企业的融资能力要明显大于没有风险投资持股的企业。文章的最后,结合理论分析和实证检验的结果,本文认为国内应当加快发展风险投资业,发展风险投资中介机构,培育有利于风险投资发展的环境,从而最大限度的发挥风险投资的积极作用,以达到通过促进风险投资发展而促进国内企业融资的目的。
In China, because of its special investment style and its particular relevance with high-growth enterprises, venture capital develops phenomenally in today’s economic practice.
As we know, venture capital plays a very extensive role in the economic and in the firms they financed. And it is important to take full use of venture capital’s features and advantages to play its positive impact on China’s high growth enterprises. The focus of this article is to promote the financing behavior of domestic venture-enterprises and raise their financing capacity.
In this paper, we first reviewed the domestic and foreign academics in venture capital and then briefly addressed principal-agent theory and Credit rationing theories which have a high relevance with venture capital, outlined venture capital’s operating characteristics and operating rules.
Here, we present a credit rationing model in terms of moral hazard to illustrate the real economy. Then, we list some of the main factors which can influence the enterprises’financing capacity. Next, we give a theoretical analysis which suggests that moral hazard, entrepreneur's own assets, enterprise quality, etc are the key factors which can determine the enterprises’financing capacity.
And then, this article gives a high attention to the role of venture capital in overcoming the moral hazard and information asymmetry. Through the establishment of a financing model including value-added services and supervision we obtained the result that venture capital can affect corporate finance, improve the ability of financing and relax corporate finance constraints.
Finally, we used collected data on the Shenzhen SME board of listed companies to establish a multi-regression model and the second-order least squares model to give a systematic analysis of the role of venture capital.
Our main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that in the condition that all the other factors are fixed firms with venture capital are more likely to have a higher interest-bearing debt than the firms without venture capital which means firms with venture capital have a greater financing capacity than those without venture capital In the end of the article, combined with theoretical analysis and empirical test results, this paper argues that we should accelerate the development of domestic venture capital industry, the development of venture capital intermediaries, to cultivate an environment conducive to the development of venture capital to maximize the positive role of venture capital in order to achieve the purposes that by promoting the development of venture capital to promote domestic corporate financing.
引文
②姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,2003(5):84-85.
[1]方晓霞.中国企业融资制度变迁与行为分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999:56-76.
[2]梁能.公司治理结构中国的实践与美国的经验[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:40-56.
[3]刘曼红主编.风险投资创新与金融[M].北京:中国人民大学出版,1998:234-267.
[4]刘曼红,兹维·博迪.风险投资与中国金融体制改革[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002:296-316.
[5]李松涛,俞自由.推动风险投资发展政策手段的分析[J].软科学,2000, (3):24-27.
[6]林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2001,(1):73-75.
[7]孟宪昌.风险投资与高技术企业成长[M].成都:西南财经大学出版社,2003:123-135.
[8]陶永勇.高新技术企业技术创新与风险投资研究[J].工业技术经济,2004,(4):27-29.
[9]万解秋,郑红亮.资本市场与投资分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002:176-187.
[10]王松奇,李扬,王国刚.中国创业投资体系研究[J].财贸经济,1999,(2):34-35.
[11]吴晓求.中国资本市场股权分裂与流动性变革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004:136-143.
[12]王信.创业基金的关系型投资及其在公司治理结构中的作用[J].经济社会体制比较,1999,(2):23-25.
[13]许长新.风险投资中资本与技术的博弈[J].财经研究,2003,(11):42-43.
[14]尹福生.风险投资理论与中国应用研究[D].武汉:武汉大学,2004.
[15]姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,2003(5):84-85.
[16]张东生,刘健钧.论创业投资风险控制的制度安排[J].财贸经济,2000,(3):124-126.
[17]张东生,刘健钧.创业投资基金运作机制的制度经济学分析[J].经济研究,2000,(4):86-87.
[18]朱光荣.风险投资在促进创新型中小企业成长中的作用[J].乡镇经济,2007,(8):21-22.
[19]赵国祈.国内风险投资问题研究进展[J].中国软科学,2000,(5):65-67.
[20]郑辉.风险投资双重委托代理研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2007.
[21]朱卫平.企业家本位论—中小企业所有权制度安排研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2004:280-290.
[22]张元萍.风险投资运行机制与模式[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
[23]Baltensperger E. Credit Rationing Theory: Issues and Questions[J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1978, 10(2):170-183.
[24]Bygrave, W. D. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 1987, 2(2):139-154.
[25]Bob Zider. How venture capital works[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1998, (11-12):131-139.
[26]Cumming D. J., MacIntosh J. G. A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2003, 27(3):511-548.
[27]Megginson, William L., Weiss, Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2003, 27(3):511-548.
[28]Dean A. Shepherd. Venture capitalists’assessment of new venture survival[J]. Management Science, 1999, 45(5):621-632.
[29]Diamond D. Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank and Directly Placed Deb[J]. Journal of Political, 1991, 99(4):689—721.
[30]Fried J., Howitt P. Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract Theory[J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1980, 12(3):471-487.
[31]Gompers P. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, (42):133-156.
[32]Gompers, Lerner. An analysis of compensation in the US venture capital partnership[J] Journal of Financial Economic, 1999, 51(1):3-44.
[33]Himmeiberg C. P., Petersen B. C. R&D and internal finance: a panel study of small firms in high-teach industries[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1994, 76:38-51.
[34]Holmstrom B. Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspectives[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66(2)169—182.
[35]Jaffee, D.M., Modigliani F. A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing[J. The American Economic Review, 1969, 59(5):850-872.
[36]Jain B., Kini O. The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1994, 49(7):1699-1726.
[37]J.Lerner. The syndication of venture capital investments[J]. Financial Management, 1994, 23(3):16-27.
[38]Kaplan, Steven, Per Stromberg. Financial contracting theory meets the real world:an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts[J]. Review of Economics Studies, 2003, 12(3):471-487.
[39]Kaplan, Steven, Per Stromberg. Characteristics, contracts, and actions: evidence from venture capitalist analysis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2004, 5:2177-2210.
[40]Lerner, J. Venture capitalists and oversight of privately-held firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50(1):301-318.
[41]Lin T H, Smith R L. Insider reputation and selling decisions: the unwinding of venture capital investments during equity IPOs[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1998, (4):241-263.
[42]Morsfield S., Tan C.DO. Venture capitalists constrain or encourage earnings management in initial public offerings. Unpublished Working Paper, 2003, City University of New York.
[43]Oakey R. P. Innovation and regional growth in small high technology firms: evidence from Britain and the USA. Regional Studies, 1984, 18:237-255.
[44]Raphacl Amit, James Brander, Chrisoph Sott. Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence[J]. Journal of Business venturing, 1988, 3(2):137-157.
[45]Sahlman W. A. The structure and governance of venture capital organizations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(3):473-521.
[46]Sahlman, W. A. Insights from the venture capital model of project governance[J]. Business Economics, 1994, 29(3):35-42.
[47]Sapienza H. J., Gupta A. K. Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalist-CEO interaction[J]. Academic Management Journal, 1994, 37(2):161-163.
[48]Stiglitz, J.E., Weiss. Credit Rationing with Many Borrowers[J]. The American Economic Review, 1987, 77:228-231.
[49]Tykvova T., Mannheim Z. Are IPOs of different VCs different? Working Paper, 2004, University of Frankfurt.
[50]Tyebjee. T. T., Bruno A. V. A model of venture capitalist investment activity[J].Lji. Management Science, 1984, 30(9): 1051-1066.
[1]方晓霞.中国企业融资制度变迁与行为分析[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999:56-76.
[2]梁能.公司治理结构中国的实践与美国的经验[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:40-56.
[3]刘曼红主编.风险投资创新与金融[M].北京:中国人民大学出版,1998:234-267.
[4]刘曼红,兹维·博迪.风险投资与中国金融体制改革[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002:296-316.
[5]李松涛,俞自由.推动风险投资发展政策手段的分析[J].软科学,2000, (3):24-27.
[6]林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资[J].经济研究,2001,(1):73-75.
[7]孟宪昌.风险投资与高技术企业成长[M].成都:西南财经大学出版社,2003:123-135.
[8]陶永勇.高新技术企业技术创新与风险投资研究[J].工业技术经济,2004,(4):27-29.
[9]万解秋,郑红亮.资本市场与投资分析[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002:176-187.
[10]王松奇,李扬,王国刚.中国创业投资体系研究[J].财贸经济,1999,(2):34-35.
[11]吴晓求.中国资本市场股权分裂与流动性变革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004:136-143.
[12]王信.创业基金的关系型投资及其在公司治理结构中的作用[J].经济社会体制比较,1999,(2):23-25.
[13]许长新.风险投资中资本与技术的博弈[J].财经研究,2003,(11):42-43.
[14]尹福生.风险投资理论与中国应用研究[D].武汉:武汉大学,2004.
[15]姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,2003(5):84-85.
[16]张东生,刘健钧.论创业投资风险控制的制度安排[J].财贸经济,2000,(3):124-126.
[17]张东生,刘健钧.创业投资基金运作机制的制度经济学分析[J].经济研究,2000,(4):86-87.
[18]朱光荣.风险投资在促进创新型中小企业成长中的作用[J].乡镇经济,2007,(8):21-22.
[19]赵国祈.国内风险投资问题研究进展[J].中国软科学,2000,(5):65-67.
[20]郑辉.风险投资双重委托代理研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2007.
[21]朱卫平.企业家本位论—中小企业所有权制度安排研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2004:280-290.
[22]张元萍.风险投资运行机制与模式[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
[23]Baltensperger E. Credit Rationing Theory: Issues and Questions[J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1978, 10(2):170-183.
[24]Bygrave, W. D. Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 1987, 2(2):139-154.
[25]Bob Zider. How venture capital works[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1998, (11-12):131-139.
[26]Cumming D. J., MacIntosh J. G. A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2003, 27(3):511-548.
[27]Megginson, William L., Weiss, Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2003, 27(3):511-548.
[28]Dean A. Shepherd. Venture capitalists’assessment of new venture survival[J]. Management Science, 1999, 45(5):621-632.
[29]Diamond D. Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank and Directly Placed Deb[J]. Journal of Political, 1991, 99(4):689—721.
[30]Fried J., Howitt P. Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract Theory[J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1980, 12(3):471-487.
[31]Gompers P. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, (42):133-156.
[32]Gompers, Lerner. An analysis of compensation in the US venture capital partnership[J] Journal of Financial Economic, 1999, 51(1):3-44.
[33]Himmeiberg C. P., Petersen B. C. R&D and internal finance: a panel study of small firms in high-teach industries[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1994, 76:38-51.
[34]Holmstrom B. Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspectives[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66(2)169—182.
[35]Jaffee, D.M., Modigliani F. A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing[J. The American Economic Review, 1969, 59(5):850-872.
[36]Jain B., Kini O. The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1994, 49(7):1699-1726.
[37]J.Lerner. The syndication of venture capital investments[J]. Financial Management, 1994, 23(3):16-27.
[38]Kaplan, Steven, Per Stromberg. Financial contracting theory meets the real world:an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts[J]. Review of Economics Studies, 2003, 12(3):471-487.
[39]Kaplan, Steven, Per Stromberg. Characteristics, contracts, and actions: evidence from venture capitalist analysis[J]. Journal of Finance, 2004, 5:2177-2210.
[40]Lerner, J. Venture capitalists and oversight of privately-held firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50(1):301-318.
[41]Lin T H, Smith R L. Insider reputation and selling decisions: the unwinding of venture capital investments during equity IPOs[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1998, (4):241-263.
[42]Morsfield S., Tan C.DO. Venture capitalists constrain or encourage earnings management in initial public offerings. Unpublished Working Paper, 2003, City University of New York.
[43]Oakey R. P. Innovation and regional growth in small high technology firms: evidence from Britain and the USA. Regional Studies, 1984, 18:237-255.
[44]Raphacl Amit, James Brander, Chrisoph Sott. Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence[J]. Journal of Business venturing, 1988, 3(2):137-157.
[45]Sahlman W. A. The structure and governance of venture capital organizations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(3):473-521.
[46]Sahlman, W. A. Insights from the venture capital model of project governance[J]. Business Economics, 1994, 29(3):35-42.
[47]Sapienza H. J., Gupta A. K. Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalist-CEO interaction[J]. Academic Management Journal, 1994, 37(2):161-163.
[48]Stiglitz, J.E., Weiss. Credit Rationing with Many Borrowers[J]. The American Economic Review, 1987, 77:228-231.
[49]Tykvova T., Mannheim Z. Are IPOs of different VCs different? Working Paper, 2004, University of Frankfurt.
[50]Tyebjee. T. T., Bruno A. V. A model of venture capitalist investment activity[J].Lji. Management Science, 1984, 30(9): 1051-1066.