关于印度反倾销机制问题的研究
摘要
20世纪90年代以来,随着经济全球化态势的日渐明朗,国际经济贸易自由化也飞速发展。作为国际经济贸易的重要救济手段,反倾销措施无论从使用的频率、规模还是力度上都超过了以往任何时期。发达国家是反倾销的传统国家,立法较早,对国际上其他经济体具有显著的示范作用;而发展中国家,尤其自九十年代后期以来,也不甘示弱,在反倾销的使用上呈现后来者居上的态势,并且,对于同为发展中国家的贸易伙伴毫不手软。
印度作为世界第二大发展中国家,自加入WTO以来,一方面依据其承诺,降低关税税率和取消数量限制;另一方面为了保护面临激烈市场竞争的国内产业,正越来越频繁地动用反倾销措施。迄今为止,印度已成为全球展开反倾销调查最多的国家,同时也是针对我国产品发起反倾销最多的国家。据统计,自1994年印度对我国发起第1个反倾销调查案以来,截至2006年7月31日,印度对我国反倾销立案调查已有98起,占其反倾销案总数的47.3%,总计涉案金额7.6亿美元,创各国反倾销摩擦之最。因此研究印度的反倾销机制及其相关问题,会给我国带来很多有价值的启示,从而更好地解决印度对华反倾销问题。
本文将主要从实证角度,通过多元回归模型,来理性地分析印度不断实施反倾销指控的宏观经济动因,以试图探寻其规律性及具体对策,从而更好地指导我国对印度出口企业的行为。
As a widely-used trade policy tool in WTO system, antidumping has been existing for more than 200 years. With the intensity of economic globalization and trade liberalization, gradual saturation of world market, and restricted-use of traditional trade measures of protection in countries, the conflict between dumping and antidumping has become more and more fierce and turns into the“chronic and stubborn disease”of international economic relationship. Alongside the gradual forming and spreading of antidumping as a kind of world trend, since 1990s, more and more developing countries have joined the ranks of international antidumping, among which, countries, such as India, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico, have even become the main force .
As a second biggest developing country in the world, India is playing a more and more important role in Asia and even world stages. As a result of it, it is arousing general concern and study of personages of various circles. In the last few years, as a member state of WTO, India , on one hand, rested on its commitment to other members of WTO and gradually opened the domestic market to import goods through reducing tariff and canceling restriction in quantity etc.; on the other hand, India took the antidumping measures more and more frequently to protect the domestic industries which faced with fierce international competition. So far, India has become either one of the countries which suffer most antidumping indictment by other countries and regions, or the country which initiates most antidumping investigations against other countries and regions in the world. According to statistics, ever since India initiated the first antidumping lawsuit against China in 1994, up to July 31st, 2006, India has all together initiated 98 antidumping cases against China, accounting for the total 47.3%, amount to $760 million. Therefore, study on Indian antidumping mechanism and correlated with this will bring a good deal of valuable enlightment to our nation and thereby help to better settle the questions related to antidumping against China.
This paper will take“theory system—actual condition—empirical analysis—enlightment”as a basic frame, put antidumping mechanism of India into historical developing track, from a horizontal angle, analyzing the present situation of Indian antidumping in international antidumping field, and from a vertical angle, summarizing the laws and trends of the development of Indian antidumping, and by adopting mathematical statistics models, bring to light the inherent laws of India being a developing country in a particular economic institution. After that, accordingly, we’ll make our own export policy and measures which are flexible and directed against India. This paper consists of 5 parts.
The first two parts, the foundation of the paper, briefly introduce the basic theory of antidumping and Indian AD mechanism so as to gain an intrinsic understanding and grasp on correlated issues.
The third part mainly focuses on the present situation of the practice of Indian AD and accordingly draws the following conclusions: (1) Indian AD occupies a pivotal position in the current international antidumping, for India ranks first in the world in terms of not only the number of cases initiated but also the number of measures used and exceeds the traditional old-line filing countries. (2) Indian AD chiefly concentrates on such industries as chemical industry, plastics & rubber, mechanical & electrical equipment, metal, textile, paper, minerals, which is in line with the whole world. Of the industries, some are capital-intensive and tech-intensive such as chemical industry and mechanical & electrical equipment; some are labor-intensive like textile and plastics & rubber; some are superior industries of developed countries; some are the ones of developing countries. (3) Major targets of Indian AD lie in the following 3 categories. The first, some of the countries and regions in Asia in which economy develops more quickly; the second, countries like Russia which are changing their economic systems; the third, developed countries in Europe and America, for instance, USA and EU.
The fourth part, by employing the approach of empirical analysis, principally explores the effect of macroeconomic determinants on AD use in India and accordingly draws the following conclusions: Indian’s major motivation derives from the protection from domestic industries, based on which, in recent years, it has filed more and more AD against other nations and regions and become the country that initiates the most AD in the present world; and AD measures have turned into a forceful tool used to adjust its import & export policy.
The fifth part is the conclusion part, mainly expounding the enlightened significance to China, including: (1) the positive attitude itself is worth to learning that India takes to file AD referring to WTO rules in order to effectively protect its domestic industries; (2) due to the fact that India’s major motivation of more and more AD filing comes from protection from domestic industries, our nation should adjust the structure of export to India purposefully, that is, appropriately changing the core exports from competitive commodities to complements so as to reduce conflicts in markets, alleviate trade crash and promote economic prosperity of the two nations; (3)“China Threatens Theory”deliberately made by India is one of the major motivations spurring its frequent AD initiations against China, therefore our two nations should positively develop political and cultural contacts so that Indian people could understand China and Chinese commodities very well.
Although the study has shortcomings, its analyzing results still provide some experimental evidence for correlated issues of AD mechanism. Furthermore, the frame put forward by the paper is also helpful to further study AD mechanism of India and even other developed or developing countries from a fresh perspective. Understanding the reasons of AD will not only help to urge our nation to purposefully adjust our trade development strategy, thus effectively reducing AD pressure, quickly merging with world and better getting involved into globalization, but also help to form a just, fair and harmonious world trading order and economic developing environment.
印度作为世界第二大发展中国家,自加入WTO以来,一方面依据其承诺,降低关税税率和取消数量限制;另一方面为了保护面临激烈市场竞争的国内产业,正越来越频繁地动用反倾销措施。迄今为止,印度已成为全球展开反倾销调查最多的国家,同时也是针对我国产品发起反倾销最多的国家。据统计,自1994年印度对我国发起第1个反倾销调查案以来,截至2006年7月31日,印度对我国反倾销立案调查已有98起,占其反倾销案总数的47.3%,总计涉案金额7.6亿美元,创各国反倾销摩擦之最。因此研究印度的反倾销机制及其相关问题,会给我国带来很多有价值的启示,从而更好地解决印度对华反倾销问题。
本文将主要从实证角度,通过多元回归模型,来理性地分析印度不断实施反倾销指控的宏观经济动因,以试图探寻其规律性及具体对策,从而更好地指导我国对印度出口企业的行为。
As a widely-used trade policy tool in WTO system, antidumping has been existing for more than 200 years. With the intensity of economic globalization and trade liberalization, gradual saturation of world market, and restricted-use of traditional trade measures of protection in countries, the conflict between dumping and antidumping has become more and more fierce and turns into the“chronic and stubborn disease”of international economic relationship. Alongside the gradual forming and spreading of antidumping as a kind of world trend, since 1990s, more and more developing countries have joined the ranks of international antidumping, among which, countries, such as India, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico, have even become the main force .
As a second biggest developing country in the world, India is playing a more and more important role in Asia and even world stages. As a result of it, it is arousing general concern and study of personages of various circles. In the last few years, as a member state of WTO, India , on one hand, rested on its commitment to other members of WTO and gradually opened the domestic market to import goods through reducing tariff and canceling restriction in quantity etc.; on the other hand, India took the antidumping measures more and more frequently to protect the domestic industries which faced with fierce international competition. So far, India has become either one of the countries which suffer most antidumping indictment by other countries and regions, or the country which initiates most antidumping investigations against other countries and regions in the world. According to statistics, ever since India initiated the first antidumping lawsuit against China in 1994, up to July 31st, 2006, India has all together initiated 98 antidumping cases against China, accounting for the total 47.3%, amount to $760 million. Therefore, study on Indian antidumping mechanism and correlated with this will bring a good deal of valuable enlightment to our nation and thereby help to better settle the questions related to antidumping against China.
This paper will take“theory system—actual condition—empirical analysis—enlightment”as a basic frame, put antidumping mechanism of India into historical developing track, from a horizontal angle, analyzing the present situation of Indian antidumping in international antidumping field, and from a vertical angle, summarizing the laws and trends of the development of Indian antidumping, and by adopting mathematical statistics models, bring to light the inherent laws of India being a developing country in a particular economic institution. After that, accordingly, we’ll make our own export policy and measures which are flexible and directed against India. This paper consists of 5 parts.
The first two parts, the foundation of the paper, briefly introduce the basic theory of antidumping and Indian AD mechanism so as to gain an intrinsic understanding and grasp on correlated issues.
The third part mainly focuses on the present situation of the practice of Indian AD and accordingly draws the following conclusions: (1) Indian AD occupies a pivotal position in the current international antidumping, for India ranks first in the world in terms of not only the number of cases initiated but also the number of measures used and exceeds the traditional old-line filing countries. (2) Indian AD chiefly concentrates on such industries as chemical industry, plastics & rubber, mechanical & electrical equipment, metal, textile, paper, minerals, which is in line with the whole world. Of the industries, some are capital-intensive and tech-intensive such as chemical industry and mechanical & electrical equipment; some are labor-intensive like textile and plastics & rubber; some are superior industries of developed countries; some are the ones of developing countries. (3) Major targets of Indian AD lie in the following 3 categories. The first, some of the countries and regions in Asia in which economy develops more quickly; the second, countries like Russia which are changing their economic systems; the third, developed countries in Europe and America, for instance, USA and EU.
The fourth part, by employing the approach of empirical analysis, principally explores the effect of macroeconomic determinants on AD use in India and accordingly draws the following conclusions: Indian’s major motivation derives from the protection from domestic industries, based on which, in recent years, it has filed more and more AD against other nations and regions and become the country that initiates the most AD in the present world; and AD measures have turned into a forceful tool used to adjust its import & export policy.
The fifth part is the conclusion part, mainly expounding the enlightened significance to China, including: (1) the positive attitude itself is worth to learning that India takes to file AD referring to WTO rules in order to effectively protect its domestic industries; (2) due to the fact that India’s major motivation of more and more AD filing comes from protection from domestic industries, our nation should adjust the structure of export to India purposefully, that is, appropriately changing the core exports from competitive commodities to complements so as to reduce conflicts in markets, alleviate trade crash and promote economic prosperity of the two nations; (3)“China Threatens Theory”deliberately made by India is one of the major motivations spurring its frequent AD initiations against China, therefore our two nations should positively develop political and cultural contacts so that Indian people could understand China and Chinese commodities very well.
Although the study has shortcomings, its analyzing results still provide some experimental evidence for correlated issues of AD mechanism. Furthermore, the frame put forward by the paper is also helpful to further study AD mechanism of India and even other developed or developing countries from a fresh perspective. Understanding the reasons of AD will not only help to urge our nation to purposefully adjust our trade development strategy, thus effectively reducing AD pressure, quickly merging with world and better getting involved into globalization, but also help to form a just, fair and harmonious world trading order and economic developing environment.
引文
[1]陈汉林:《印度反倾销反补贴实证分析》,当代亚太,2003 年第 2期,45-47
[2] 李盾:《中印贸易摩擦-争端的特点、原因、解决机制及发展趋势》,国际贸易,2006 年第 2 期,12-15
[3] 沈瑶:《倾销与反倾销的历史起源》,世界经济,2002 年第 8 期,195
[4] 杨丹:《印度的反倾销程序法》,广西社会科学,2003 年第 3 期,109-111
[5] 杨仕辉、常素萍:《人民币升值压力与外国对华贸易壁垒》,经济管理,2004 年第 21 期,84-87
[6] 杨仕辉、张娟:《不完全信息条件下倾销与反倾销动态博弈》,中国管理科学,2000 年第 1 期,43-50
[7] 张为付:《倾销与反倾销的历史演变及时代特征》,中国贸易救济信息网,2003-12-29
[8] 赵建军:《印度对中国反倾销及对中印贸易的影响》,亚太经济,2003 年第 1 期,32-34
[9] Anderson, J.E. 1992. Domino Dumping I: Competitive Exporters. The American Economy Review, 182, 65-83.
[10] Anderson, J.E. 1993. Domino Dumping II: Antidumping. International Economics, 35, 133-150.
[11] ARADHNA AGGARWAL 2004. Macro Economics Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries. World Development, 32(6),1043.
[12] Becker, B., Theuringer, M. 2001. Macroeconomic determinants of contingent protection: The case of the EU. Zeitschrift fur Witschaftspolitik, 50(3).
[13] Blonigen, Bruce A. and Chad P Bown. 2003. Antidumping and Retaliation Threats. International Economics, 60, 249-273.
[14] Bohara, A., Kaempfer, W., 1991. A test of tariff endogeneity in the United States. American Economic Review 81,952–960.
[15] Brander, J.A., Kugman, P.A. 1983. Reciprocal Dumping Model of Internaional Trade. International Economics, 15, 313-321.
[16] Davies, S., Mcguinness, A. 1982. Dumping at Less Than Marginal Cost. International Economics, 12, 169-182.
[17] DeVault, J., 1990. The administration of US antidumping duties: some empirical observations. The World Economy 13,75–88.
[18] Dornbusch, R., Frankel, J., 1987. Macroeconomics and protection. In: Stern, R. (Ed.), US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 77– 130.
[19] Feinberg, R. M.1989. Exchange rates and unfair trade. Review of Economics and Statistics, 7, 704—707.
[20] Feinberg, R.M., Olson, K. 2004. The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Roles of Retaliation in Filings.
[21] Gunnar Niels, Adriaan ten Kate. 2004. Anti-dumping Protection in a Liberalising Country: Mexico’s Anti-dumping Policy and Practice. The World Economy, 27(7),967-983.
[22] Hall, H.K., Kao, C., Nelson, D., 1998. Women and tariffs: testing gender gap in a Downs–Mayer model. Economic Inquiry 36,320– 332.
[23] Knetter, M. M.,& Prusa, T. J. 2003. Macroeconomic factors and anti-dumping filings: Evidence from four countries, International Economics, 61(1), 1—17.
[24] Leidy, M.P. 1997. Macroeconomic conditions and pressures for protection under antidumping and countervailing duty laws: Empirical evidence from the United States. IMF Working Paper, 44, March 1.
[25] Magee, S., Young, L., 1987. Endogenous protection in the United States, 1900–1984. In: Stern, R. (Ed.), US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, UK, pp.145–195.
[26] Messerlin, P., Reed, G. 1995. Antidumping policies in the United States and the European Community. The Economic Journal ,105, 1565-1575.
[27] Panagariya, A., Gupta, P. 1998. Antidumping Duty versus Price Negotiations. The World Economy, 821, 1003-1020.
[28] Prusa, T.J., Skeath, S. 2002. The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings. NBER Working Paper, 8424.
[29] Prusa, T.J. 1992. Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn? International Economics,33, 1-20
[30] Rosendorff, B.P. 1996. Voluntary Export Restraints, antidumping Procedures and Domestic Politics. AmericanEconomics Review, 86, 545-561.
[31] Stegemann, K., 1990. EC anti-dumping policy: are price undertakings a legal substitute for illegal price fixing? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 126, 268– 297.
[32] Tharakan, P.K.M. 1991. Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. North-Holland. Amsterdam.
[33] Tharakan, P.K.M. 1995. Political economy of antidumping undertakings in the European Community.European Economic Review, 35, 1341-1359.
[1] 对外贸易经济合作部国际经贸关系司译:《世界贸易组织乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判结果法律文本》,法律出版社,2001,147
[2] 李炼:《关于我国反倾销对策的法律分析》,中国社会科学出版 社,1998,1:107-116
[3] 李炼:《反倾销:法律与实务》,中国发展出版社,1999
[4] 曼昆:《经济学原理》,梁小民译,机械工业出版社,2003,3:281
[5] 潘悦:《反倾销摩擦》,社会科学文献出版社,2005,1:1-34
[6] 尚明:《反倾销;WTO规则及中外法律与实践》,法律出版社,2003,5
[7] 吴清津:《WTO 反倾销规则》,广东人民出版社,2001,1:1-25
[8] 杨仕辉:《反倾销的国际比较、博弈与我国对策研究》,科学出 版社,2005,1:1-66
[9] 张玉卿:《国际反倾销法律与实务》,中国对外经贸出版社,1993
[2] 李盾:《中印贸易摩擦-争端的特点、原因、解决机制及发展趋势》,国际贸易,2006 年第 2 期,12-15
[3] 沈瑶:《倾销与反倾销的历史起源》,世界经济,2002 年第 8 期,195
[4] 杨丹:《印度的反倾销程序法》,广西社会科学,2003 年第 3 期,109-111
[5] 杨仕辉、常素萍:《人民币升值压力与外国对华贸易壁垒》,经济管理,2004 年第 21 期,84-87
[6] 杨仕辉、张娟:《不完全信息条件下倾销与反倾销动态博弈》,中国管理科学,2000 年第 1 期,43-50
[7] 张为付:《倾销与反倾销的历史演变及时代特征》,中国贸易救济信息网,2003-12-29
[8] 赵建军:《印度对中国反倾销及对中印贸易的影响》,亚太经济,2003 年第 1 期,32-34
[9] Anderson, J.E. 1992. Domino Dumping I: Competitive Exporters. The American Economy Review, 182, 65-83.
[10] Anderson, J.E. 1993. Domino Dumping II: Antidumping. International Economics, 35, 133-150.
[11] ARADHNA AGGARWAL 2004. Macro Economics Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries. World Development, 32(6),1043.
[12] Becker, B., Theuringer, M. 2001. Macroeconomic determinants of contingent protection: The case of the EU. Zeitschrift fur Witschaftspolitik, 50(3).
[13] Blonigen, Bruce A. and Chad P Bown. 2003. Antidumping and Retaliation Threats. International Economics, 60, 249-273.
[14] Bohara, A., Kaempfer, W., 1991. A test of tariff endogeneity in the United States. American Economic Review 81,952–960.
[15] Brander, J.A., Kugman, P.A. 1983. Reciprocal Dumping Model of Internaional Trade. International Economics, 15, 313-321.
[16] Davies, S., Mcguinness, A. 1982. Dumping at Less Than Marginal Cost. International Economics, 12, 169-182.
[17] DeVault, J., 1990. The administration of US antidumping duties: some empirical observations. The World Economy 13,75–88.
[18] Dornbusch, R., Frankel, J., 1987. Macroeconomics and protection. In: Stern, R. (Ed.), US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 77– 130.
[19] Feinberg, R. M.1989. Exchange rates and unfair trade. Review of Economics and Statistics, 7, 704—707.
[20] Feinberg, R.M., Olson, K. 2004. The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Roles of Retaliation in Filings.
[21] Gunnar Niels, Adriaan ten Kate. 2004. Anti-dumping Protection in a Liberalising Country: Mexico’s Anti-dumping Policy and Practice. The World Economy, 27(7),967-983.
[22] Hall, H.K., Kao, C., Nelson, D., 1998. Women and tariffs: testing gender gap in a Downs–Mayer model. Economic Inquiry 36,320– 332.
[23] Knetter, M. M.,& Prusa, T. J. 2003. Macroeconomic factors and anti-dumping filings: Evidence from four countries, International Economics, 61(1), 1—17.
[24] Leidy, M.P. 1997. Macroeconomic conditions and pressures for protection under antidumping and countervailing duty laws: Empirical evidence from the United States. IMF Working Paper, 44, March 1.
[25] Magee, S., Young, L., 1987. Endogenous protection in the United States, 1900–1984. In: Stern, R. (Ed.), US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, UK, pp.145–195.
[26] Messerlin, P., Reed, G. 1995. Antidumping policies in the United States and the European Community. The Economic Journal ,105, 1565-1575.
[27] Panagariya, A., Gupta, P. 1998. Antidumping Duty versus Price Negotiations. The World Economy, 821, 1003-1020.
[28] Prusa, T.J., Skeath, S. 2002. The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings. NBER Working Paper, 8424.
[29] Prusa, T.J. 1992. Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn? International Economics,33, 1-20
[30] Rosendorff, B.P. 1996. Voluntary Export Restraints, antidumping Procedures and Domestic Politics. AmericanEconomics Review, 86, 545-561.
[31] Stegemann, K., 1990. EC anti-dumping policy: are price undertakings a legal substitute for illegal price fixing? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 126, 268– 297.
[32] Tharakan, P.K.M. 1991. Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. North-Holland. Amsterdam.
[33] Tharakan, P.K.M. 1995. Political economy of antidumping undertakings in the European Community.European Economic Review, 35, 1341-1359.
[1] 对外贸易经济合作部国际经贸关系司译:《世界贸易组织乌拉圭回合多边贸易谈判结果法律文本》,法律出版社,2001,147
[2] 李炼:《关于我国反倾销对策的法律分析》,中国社会科学出版 社,1998,1:107-116
[3] 李炼:《反倾销:法律与实务》,中国发展出版社,1999
[4] 曼昆:《经济学原理》,梁小民译,机械工业出版社,2003,3:281
[5] 潘悦:《反倾销摩擦》,社会科学文献出版社,2005,1:1-34
[6] 尚明:《反倾销;WTO规则及中外法律与实践》,法律出版社,2003,5
[7] 吴清津:《WTO 反倾销规则》,广东人民出版社,2001,1:1-25
[8] 杨仕辉:《反倾销的国际比较、博弈与我国对策研究》,科学出 版社,2005,1:1-66
[9] 张玉卿:《国际反倾销法律与实务》,中国对外经贸出版社,1993