资本市场结构及创业资本退出机制研究
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摘要
从国内看,不论是创业资本投资的数量上,还是从投资金额上看,海外创业资本明显超过了本土创业资本,究其原因,本土创业投资机构与海外创业资本机构在资金退出方面,处于明显的劣势。
可以说,退出是创业资本正常运转的关键环节,创业投资的成功与否最终取决于创业资本退出的成功与否。如果退出环节不畅,创业资本所形成的股权难以在最佳时机变现,就必然会影响到创业投资家、创业资本家的投资积极性,并抑制创业资本规模的进一步扩大。
在退出方面,国际创业资本基金置身海外,有比较发达的资本市场可以依托,可以选择比较灵活的方式实现退出,不但你可以将投资的创业企业实现海外上市,从而直接退出,而且还可以配合国外大的企业,实施战略收购,灵活运用国际资本市场的优势,实现创业资本的成功退出。
而国内创业投资机构没有在海外设立投资机构的自由,不能利用国际资本市场,而国内资本市场不健全,创业资本退出方式单一,本土创业资本很难做海外上市项目,直接退出的方式就只是股权转让、并购等。
国外的研究对创业资本形成因素、运作做了较多的分析和研究,重点放在对创业资本的治理结构和激励约束机制,创业资本的契约、定价、和创业资本退出的收益分析上。
我国创业资本研究成果现状分析,还处在对美国和欧洲创业资本研究的学习阶段,我国的市场环境、产业政策、制度环境和社会信用文化环境都明显区别于欧美国家甚至于港台地区,资本市场单一,退出渠道不畅,严重制约了创业企业的发展。
第一部分概述部分探讨了创业投资的概念、投资过程、核心特征,在此基础上,阐述了在我国发展创业投资的意义及现状。
第二部分首先介绍了资本市场的概念,然后详细地对中美两国资本市场结构、资本市场的层次、资本市场的国际化程度、上市公司法人治理结构、股票发行制度、股票市场上市要求、股票市场监管等进行了对比,重点介绍了美国纽约证券交易所、NASDAQ交易所和中国的主板市场、中小板市场,得出结论:
1、美国股票市场交易品种多、规模大、流通性强,对广大参与者有巨大的吸引力;发育程度日益加深,不同层次的市场结构适应不同企业的融资需求;法律健全、信息披露要求高、上市公司的透明度高,投资者收益得到较好的比较。中国股票市场由于发展历史较短,同时又是从计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型的产物,因此与美国股票市场相比还存在着许多差距。
2、美国股票市场投资收益相对稳定与风险较小,中国股票市场属于风险较高的新兴市场。
3、美国上市公司股权分散,中国上市公司一股独大。
4、美国的股票市场具有多层次的市场格局,中国股票市场的层次较为单一。不同层次的市场对应于不同规模企业的不同融资成本和风险,股票市场通过层次细分可以最大化的实现资本的供需平衡。美国不同层次的市场以不同的公司为服务对象,形成一个体系健全的“梯级市场”和多元化的市场格局。中国股票市场较为单一,主板A股市场规模最大,二板市场规模较小,三板市场规模最小。股票市场不能适应不同规模企业的融资需求。
第三部分侧重于创业资本退出的理论分析。不同类型的创业资本相对于创业企业发展的不同阶段,对于初创期企业,主要是天使资本为其提供资本支持;对于成长期企业,主要是创业资本为其服务;而对于成熟期的企业,产业资本或公众资本来保证其资本融通。从上述资本的阶段性分工看,后期的资本可以自然成为前期资本的接棒者,创业资本只有在接力中退出,从而使得创业资本退出贯穿于创业企业整个发展阶段。
从对美国、日本、新加坡、印度等国的研究发现,创业资本占国内生产总值的比重比较高的国家都是资本市场发展比较好的国家。
从资本市场的角度看,创业资本的退出方式大体上分为私募资本市场退出方式、公开资本市场退出方式以及创业企业内部退出方式三大类。私募资本市场退出方式和公开资本市场退出方式这两类是创业资本退出的主要方式。
对于初创期的企业,由于发展的不确定性,其发展过程中的风险也比较大,天使投资人向后传递投资,愿意承接的大多数是创业资本基金。对于成长期和扩张期的企业,发展过程中风险逐渐降低,创业资本的投资所形成的股权通过私募资本市场由大企业的收购而实现退出。
对于成长期与扩张期企业,其退出渠道主要是通过公开资本市场的IPO退出。创业企业根据发展程度的不同,可以选择在主板或者创业板上市。通过IPO,股权实现了由创业资本向公众投资者的传递。
内部退出渠道主要包括创业企业股份赎回与创业企业破产清算两种。通过中美两国创业企业退出方式的比较,通过IPO退出的创业资本在美国平均为50%左右,而我国仅为4.76%,中国股票市场的不发达情况与德国的以银行为中心的资本市场有一定相似之处。相对于美国,股票市场的不发达,在一定程度上制约了欧洲创业资本的发展。
对NASDAQ综合指数和风险投资支持的IPO融资额做回归分析,结果发现,NASDAQ综合指数对风险投资支持企业进行IPO所获的融资额的影响是显著的,即在公开权益市场价值较高的时候,有更多风险投资支持的企业从公开权益市场获得融资,从而风险资本得以从此撤出。
同样,NASDAQ综合指数对风险投资支持企业兼并与收购的金额的影响是显著的,即在公开权益市场价值较高的时候,有更多风险投资支持的企业通过公开权益市场进行兼并与收购,风险资本由此也可以得以撤出。可见,公开权益市场的繁荣在很大程度上影响着风险投资的退出及其循环发展。
影响资本退出的因素还包括风险投资家的经验、市场环境、以及在风险资本进入创业企业时签订的契约等。
优质项目可以选择一次性退出,对于并非十分优质的项目,采用分阶段退出要比最终实现一次性退出能够获得更多的资本增值,本文设计了一个模型,证明了分阶段退出在某些假设条件下是优于一次性退出策略的。
第四部分对优化资本市场结构提出了一些政策性的建议。对应创业投资的阶段,创业资本基金主要在创业板与产权交易市场两大平台上退出,通过创业企业IPO与投资股权柜台交易方式变现投资。
首先要建立创业板。创业板主要是面向成长性的创业企业,为中小企业提供股权融资市场,也为创业资本提供退出机会。我国已经具备开设创业板的客观的经济条件。
深圳的创业板就是现在的中小企业板,门槛还应该更低些,以适应广大创业企业的要求。基于深圳和香港之间的地缘和经贸往来的历史联系,深圳创业板的推出在设计之初就应在与香港创业板市场合作的框架下考虑其制度的设计。深圳创业板市场和香港创业板市场的互补作用有利于两个市场进行有机的重新整合,从而加快香港金融市场结构的调整和金融服务的优化及成本的降低,形成优势互补,共同发展的新格局。
同时要大力发展产权市场。目前,我国产权交易市场步履维艰,影响了我国中小企业融资与股权流动,对我国创业投资退出也起不到支持作用。
着眼于多层次资本市场体系,从产权交易市场与代办股份转让系统、柜台交易市场等市场的相互关系出发,结合我国国情,我国产权交易全国统一市场的制度设计在目前条件下应大力完善代办股份转让系统功能和手段,最终过渡到柜台交易市场。
Domestically, viewing from both the number of venture capital investment and the amount of investment money, overseas venture capital is obviously over the local venture capital. Among the causes, the basic reason is that local venture investment institutions in venture capital withdraw from agencies under a clear disadvantage than overseas venture investment.
It can be said that venture capital exit is the most important part of the whole venture capital market. The success of entrepreneurial investment is ultimately depends on the venture capital exit. Without flexible and effective withdrawal mechanism, withdraw link impeded, by the formation of venture capital in the best time to stake realized, it will affect the venture investors, venture capitalists for investment, venture capital and inhibit the further expansion of the scale.
In withdrawing part, the international venture capital fund exposure overseas, a more developed capital markets can rely on, they can take a more flexible approach to withdraw. Not only will you be entrepreneurial enterprises investing listing abroad, thereby withdrawing directly, but also can match abroad large enterprises, the implementation of strategic purchase, flexibility in the use of the international capital market advantage to the success of venture capital exit.
There is no freedom for domestic venture investment institutions to establish investment institutions abroad, so venture investment institution can not access to international capital markets. While the domestic capital market is not perfect and there is only a single way of venture capital exit, it is very difficult to do local venture capital projects overseas listing directly from the only way the transfer of equity, such as mergers and acquisitions.
Foreign countries has studied a lot on the venture capital formation and operation, focusing on venture capital management structure and incentive and restraint mechanisms, venture capital leases, pricing, and venture capital from the proceeds analysis.
Analysis on the status quo of venture capital in china, we are still in the study stage of the United States and the European venture capital research. China's market environment, industrial policy, social credit system environment and cultural environment has been clearly distinguished from Europe and the United States and even Hong Kong and Taiwan, a single capital market, withdraw from the channels are sluggish, has seriously hampered the development of entrepreneurial enterprises.
The first part outlines the concept, investment process, the core features of venture capital, and based on this, expounded the development of venture investment in China and the significance of the status quo.
The second part introduces the concept of the capital market, and then detail on comparing US and China exchanges in the capital market structure, the level of capital market and capital markets in the international market, the corporate governance structure of listed companies, stock issuing system, the stock market listing requirements , the stock market regulatory systems, focusing on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ Stock Exchange and the China motherboard market, small and medium-sized board market, concluded:
1、The United States stock market has more trading varieties , larger scale, stronger circulation-related, vast number of participants has enormous appeal. It increasingly deepen the development, different levels of the market structure to the financing needs of different enterprises, legal sound, information disclosure requirements, listing corporate transparency, income investors get a better comparison. The development of China's stock market because of a relatively short history, but also from a planned economic system to a market economic system transformation product, there are still many gaps compared with the United States stock market.
2、The United States stock market investment returns relative stability and less risky, the Chinese stock market is more risky emerging markets.
3、The United States listed company shares dispersed, China's listed companies have domination of a single shareholder.
4、The United States stock market has multiple levels, the level of China's stock market relatively homogeneous. Different levels of the market corresponding to the different size of enterprises of different financing costs and risks, the stock market can be subdivision through the levels to maximize the supply and demand balance for capital. Different levels of the market service for the different company clients in the United States, forming a sound system of "cascade market" and diversified market structure. China's stock market relatively single, main board A-stock market has the biggest scale, the second-board market smaller, the third-board market is the smallest. The stock market can not meet the funding needs of enterprises of different sizes.
Part III focuses on the theoretical analysis of venture capital exit. Different types of entrepreneurial enterprises relative to the different stages of development. For start-up period enterprises, mainly natural capital to provide capital support; For growing period enterprises, mainly venture capital to service capital support; And for maturity period enterprises, industries capital or public capital to ensure its capital pooling. From the above short-term capital division, the later capital can naturally become the successor of the pre-capital, venture capital withdraw from the relay, and as a result withdraw from the venture capital business enterprises throughout the entire development stage.
Study on United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, India and other countries, we can find that venture capital share of the GDP has a relatively high proportion of the capital market are relatively good of the national capital market development state.
From the perspective of the capital market, venture capital exit means generally divided into three ways: private capital market exit, open capital market exit and inside entrepreneurial enterprises exit. Private capital market exit and open capital market exit are two main forms of venture capital exit.
For the initial phase of enterprises, because of its uncertainty of development, relatively has large risk, during the period of natural investors transmit investment backward, it is mostly the venture capital funds willing to undertake the ability. For growing period enterprises and maturity period enterprises, the development process gradually reduce risk, the equity form by the venture capital investment can realize by acquisition of big companies through private capital market.
For the growing and expansion enterprises, the main channel of its withdrawal from the capital market is through the IPO way of open capital market. Entrepreneurial enterprises may choose creative board market or main board market to list under different degrees of development. Through IPO, the shares achieved by the venture capital investors transmit to the public.
Internal withdrawal exit channels mainly include two ways: venture enterprise shares redemption and entrepreneurial enterprise bankruptcy and liquidation.
Through comparison between China and the United States entrepreneurial enterprises exit channels, through the IPO withdrawal way in the United States has an average of about 50 percent, while China has only 4.76 percent. There are certain similarities between the Chinese stock market situation of underdevelopment and the German bank as the center of the capital market. Compared to the United States, the stock market's underdevelopment, to a certain extent, has hampered the development of the European venture capital.
Regress analysis on the NASDAQ composite index and venture capital support for the IPO financing, results showed that the impact of the NASDAQ Composite Index on venture capital available to support enterprises IPO financing is significant, that is, in the open market value of the higher interests of the time, more venture capital to support the rights and interests of enterprises from the open market access to finance, thereby risk capital to withdraw from.
Similarly, the Nasdaq composite index is significant to the impact of the amount of risk investment support enterprise takeover and purchase, that is, in the open market value of the higher interests of the time, more venture capital to support the rights and interests of enterprises through open market mergers and acquisitions, risk capital can withdraw through this way. Clearly, public interest market’s prosperity influent the withdrawal and development cycle of risk investment to a large extent.
The factors affecting capital from venture capitalists also include the experience of the market environment, as well as in venture capital into the venture enterprises such as leases signed.
The factors affecting capital withdrawal also include the experience of venture capitalists, the market environment, as well as the leases signed when venture capital into the venture enterprises, etc.
Risk investment institutions in the withdrawal stage face the risk of can not withdraw from the ideal price or even can not withdraw, thus affecting the development cycle of the risk investment institutions, which includes internal factors also include external factors.
High quality item can choose a one-time withdrawal from the project. For the not very good quality projects, adopt a phased withdrawal than a one-time withdrawal can gain more capital appreciation from the ultimate realization. We designed a model to prove that a phased withdrawal under certain assumptions is superior to a one-time exit strategy.
The fourth part made a number of policy recommendations for optimize the capital market structure. In venture capital investments stage, venture capital funds mainly withdraw from two major platforms:the pioneering plate(GEM) and property rights trading market,through entrepreneurial enterprises IPO shares and investment counters realized investment transactions.
We must first establish the GEM. GEM is mainly for the growth of entrepreneurial enterprises, to provide equity financing for small and medium enterprises market, as well as providing venture capital exit opportunities. China already has set up GEM objective economic conditions.
Shenzhen's GEM is now SME board, the threshold should be lower to accommodate
the need of the vast number of entrepreneurial enterprises. Shenzhen and Hong Kong, based on the geopolitical factor and the historical link of economic and trade exchanges, the Shenzhen GEM system should design under the framework of in cooperation with the Hong Kong GEM market in the beginning. The complementary effect of Shenzhen and Hong Kong GEM markets is conducive to the organic re-integration of the two markets, thus speeding up Hong Kong's financial market restructuring and financial services optimization and cost reduction, form a new pattern of complementary advantages and common development.
At the same time we must vigorously develop the equity market. At present, China's property right trading market very difficult, affected our SME financing and equity flows, from the China Venture Capital also serve to support the role.
Focus on multi-level capital market system, from the mutual relations among property rights trading market, commissioned shares transfer system and counter trading market, in light of China's national conditions, China's property rights trading unified national market system design in the current circumstances should vigorously improve the functions and tools of commissioned shares transfer system, and ultimate transition to the counter trading market.
可以说,退出是创业资本正常运转的关键环节,创业投资的成功与否最终取决于创业资本退出的成功与否。如果退出环节不畅,创业资本所形成的股权难以在最佳时机变现,就必然会影响到创业投资家、创业资本家的投资积极性,并抑制创业资本规模的进一步扩大。
在退出方面,国际创业资本基金置身海外,有比较发达的资本市场可以依托,可以选择比较灵活的方式实现退出,不但你可以将投资的创业企业实现海外上市,从而直接退出,而且还可以配合国外大的企业,实施战略收购,灵活运用国际资本市场的优势,实现创业资本的成功退出。
而国内创业投资机构没有在海外设立投资机构的自由,不能利用国际资本市场,而国内资本市场不健全,创业资本退出方式单一,本土创业资本很难做海外上市项目,直接退出的方式就只是股权转让、并购等。
国外的研究对创业资本形成因素、运作做了较多的分析和研究,重点放在对创业资本的治理结构和激励约束机制,创业资本的契约、定价、和创业资本退出的收益分析上。
我国创业资本研究成果现状分析,还处在对美国和欧洲创业资本研究的学习阶段,我国的市场环境、产业政策、制度环境和社会信用文化环境都明显区别于欧美国家甚至于港台地区,资本市场单一,退出渠道不畅,严重制约了创业企业的发展。
第一部分概述部分探讨了创业投资的概念、投资过程、核心特征,在此基础上,阐述了在我国发展创业投资的意义及现状。
第二部分首先介绍了资本市场的概念,然后详细地对中美两国资本市场结构、资本市场的层次、资本市场的国际化程度、上市公司法人治理结构、股票发行制度、股票市场上市要求、股票市场监管等进行了对比,重点介绍了美国纽约证券交易所、NASDAQ交易所和中国的主板市场、中小板市场,得出结论:
1、美国股票市场交易品种多、规模大、流通性强,对广大参与者有巨大的吸引力;发育程度日益加深,不同层次的市场结构适应不同企业的融资需求;法律健全、信息披露要求高、上市公司的透明度高,投资者收益得到较好的比较。中国股票市场由于发展历史较短,同时又是从计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型的产物,因此与美国股票市场相比还存在着许多差距。
2、美国股票市场投资收益相对稳定与风险较小,中国股票市场属于风险较高的新兴市场。
3、美国上市公司股权分散,中国上市公司一股独大。
4、美国的股票市场具有多层次的市场格局,中国股票市场的层次较为单一。不同层次的市场对应于不同规模企业的不同融资成本和风险,股票市场通过层次细分可以最大化的实现资本的供需平衡。美国不同层次的市场以不同的公司为服务对象,形成一个体系健全的“梯级市场”和多元化的市场格局。中国股票市场较为单一,主板A股市场规模最大,二板市场规模较小,三板市场规模最小。股票市场不能适应不同规模企业的融资需求。
第三部分侧重于创业资本退出的理论分析。不同类型的创业资本相对于创业企业发展的不同阶段,对于初创期企业,主要是天使资本为其提供资本支持;对于成长期企业,主要是创业资本为其服务;而对于成熟期的企业,产业资本或公众资本来保证其资本融通。从上述资本的阶段性分工看,后期的资本可以自然成为前期资本的接棒者,创业资本只有在接力中退出,从而使得创业资本退出贯穿于创业企业整个发展阶段。
从对美国、日本、新加坡、印度等国的研究发现,创业资本占国内生产总值的比重比较高的国家都是资本市场发展比较好的国家。
从资本市场的角度看,创业资本的退出方式大体上分为私募资本市场退出方式、公开资本市场退出方式以及创业企业内部退出方式三大类。私募资本市场退出方式和公开资本市场退出方式这两类是创业资本退出的主要方式。
对于初创期的企业,由于发展的不确定性,其发展过程中的风险也比较大,天使投资人向后传递投资,愿意承接的大多数是创业资本基金。对于成长期和扩张期的企业,发展过程中风险逐渐降低,创业资本的投资所形成的股权通过私募资本市场由大企业的收购而实现退出。
对于成长期与扩张期企业,其退出渠道主要是通过公开资本市场的IPO退出。创业企业根据发展程度的不同,可以选择在主板或者创业板上市。通过IPO,股权实现了由创业资本向公众投资者的传递。
内部退出渠道主要包括创业企业股份赎回与创业企业破产清算两种。通过中美两国创业企业退出方式的比较,通过IPO退出的创业资本在美国平均为50%左右,而我国仅为4.76%,中国股票市场的不发达情况与德国的以银行为中心的资本市场有一定相似之处。相对于美国,股票市场的不发达,在一定程度上制约了欧洲创业资本的发展。
对NASDAQ综合指数和风险投资支持的IPO融资额做回归分析,结果发现,NASDAQ综合指数对风险投资支持企业进行IPO所获的融资额的影响是显著的,即在公开权益市场价值较高的时候,有更多风险投资支持的企业从公开权益市场获得融资,从而风险资本得以从此撤出。
同样,NASDAQ综合指数对风险投资支持企业兼并与收购的金额的影响是显著的,即在公开权益市场价值较高的时候,有更多风险投资支持的企业通过公开权益市场进行兼并与收购,风险资本由此也可以得以撤出。可见,公开权益市场的繁荣在很大程度上影响着风险投资的退出及其循环发展。
影响资本退出的因素还包括风险投资家的经验、市场环境、以及在风险资本进入创业企业时签订的契约等。
优质项目可以选择一次性退出,对于并非十分优质的项目,采用分阶段退出要比最终实现一次性退出能够获得更多的资本增值,本文设计了一个模型,证明了分阶段退出在某些假设条件下是优于一次性退出策略的。
第四部分对优化资本市场结构提出了一些政策性的建议。对应创业投资的阶段,创业资本基金主要在创业板与产权交易市场两大平台上退出,通过创业企业IPO与投资股权柜台交易方式变现投资。
首先要建立创业板。创业板主要是面向成长性的创业企业,为中小企业提供股权融资市场,也为创业资本提供退出机会。我国已经具备开设创业板的客观的经济条件。
深圳的创业板就是现在的中小企业板,门槛还应该更低些,以适应广大创业企业的要求。基于深圳和香港之间的地缘和经贸往来的历史联系,深圳创业板的推出在设计之初就应在与香港创业板市场合作的框架下考虑其制度的设计。深圳创业板市场和香港创业板市场的互补作用有利于两个市场进行有机的重新整合,从而加快香港金融市场结构的调整和金融服务的优化及成本的降低,形成优势互补,共同发展的新格局。
同时要大力发展产权市场。目前,我国产权交易市场步履维艰,影响了我国中小企业融资与股权流动,对我国创业投资退出也起不到支持作用。
着眼于多层次资本市场体系,从产权交易市场与代办股份转让系统、柜台交易市场等市场的相互关系出发,结合我国国情,我国产权交易全国统一市场的制度设计在目前条件下应大力完善代办股份转让系统功能和手段,最终过渡到柜台交易市场。
Domestically, viewing from both the number of venture capital investment and the amount of investment money, overseas venture capital is obviously over the local venture capital. Among the causes, the basic reason is that local venture investment institutions in venture capital withdraw from agencies under a clear disadvantage than overseas venture investment.
It can be said that venture capital exit is the most important part of the whole venture capital market. The success of entrepreneurial investment is ultimately depends on the venture capital exit. Without flexible and effective withdrawal mechanism, withdraw link impeded, by the formation of venture capital in the best time to stake realized, it will affect the venture investors, venture capitalists for investment, venture capital and inhibit the further expansion of the scale.
In withdrawing part, the international venture capital fund exposure overseas, a more developed capital markets can rely on, they can take a more flexible approach to withdraw. Not only will you be entrepreneurial enterprises investing listing abroad, thereby withdrawing directly, but also can match abroad large enterprises, the implementation of strategic purchase, flexibility in the use of the international capital market advantage to the success of venture capital exit.
There is no freedom for domestic venture investment institutions to establish investment institutions abroad, so venture investment institution can not access to international capital markets. While the domestic capital market is not perfect and there is only a single way of venture capital exit, it is very difficult to do local venture capital projects overseas listing directly from the only way the transfer of equity, such as mergers and acquisitions.
Foreign countries has studied a lot on the venture capital formation and operation, focusing on venture capital management structure and incentive and restraint mechanisms, venture capital leases, pricing, and venture capital from the proceeds analysis.
Analysis on the status quo of venture capital in china, we are still in the study stage of the United States and the European venture capital research. China's market environment, industrial policy, social credit system environment and cultural environment has been clearly distinguished from Europe and the United States and even Hong Kong and Taiwan, a single capital market, withdraw from the channels are sluggish, has seriously hampered the development of entrepreneurial enterprises.
The first part outlines the concept, investment process, the core features of venture capital, and based on this, expounded the development of venture investment in China and the significance of the status quo.
The second part introduces the concept of the capital market, and then detail on comparing US and China exchanges in the capital market structure, the level of capital market and capital markets in the international market, the corporate governance structure of listed companies, stock issuing system, the stock market listing requirements , the stock market regulatory systems, focusing on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ Stock Exchange and the China motherboard market, small and medium-sized board market, concluded:
1、The United States stock market has more trading varieties , larger scale, stronger circulation-related, vast number of participants has enormous appeal. It increasingly deepen the development, different levels of the market structure to the financing needs of different enterprises, legal sound, information disclosure requirements, listing corporate transparency, income investors get a better comparison. The development of China's stock market because of a relatively short history, but also from a planned economic system to a market economic system transformation product, there are still many gaps compared with the United States stock market.
2、The United States stock market investment returns relative stability and less risky, the Chinese stock market is more risky emerging markets.
3、The United States listed company shares dispersed, China's listed companies have domination of a single shareholder.
4、The United States stock market has multiple levels, the level of China's stock market relatively homogeneous. Different levels of the market corresponding to the different size of enterprises of different financing costs and risks, the stock market can be subdivision through the levels to maximize the supply and demand balance for capital. Different levels of the market service for the different company clients in the United States, forming a sound system of "cascade market" and diversified market structure. China's stock market relatively single, main board A-stock market has the biggest scale, the second-board market smaller, the third-board market is the smallest. The stock market can not meet the funding needs of enterprises of different sizes.
Part III focuses on the theoretical analysis of venture capital exit. Different types of entrepreneurial enterprises relative to the different stages of development. For start-up period enterprises, mainly natural capital to provide capital support; For growing period enterprises, mainly venture capital to service capital support; And for maturity period enterprises, industries capital or public capital to ensure its capital pooling. From the above short-term capital division, the later capital can naturally become the successor of the pre-capital, venture capital withdraw from the relay, and as a result withdraw from the venture capital business enterprises throughout the entire development stage.
Study on United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, India and other countries, we can find that venture capital share of the GDP has a relatively high proportion of the capital market are relatively good of the national capital market development state.
From the perspective of the capital market, venture capital exit means generally divided into three ways: private capital market exit, open capital market exit and inside entrepreneurial enterprises exit. Private capital market exit and open capital market exit are two main forms of venture capital exit.
For the initial phase of enterprises, because of its uncertainty of development, relatively has large risk, during the period of natural investors transmit investment backward, it is mostly the venture capital funds willing to undertake the ability. For growing period enterprises and maturity period enterprises, the development process gradually reduce risk, the equity form by the venture capital investment can realize by acquisition of big companies through private capital market.
For the growing and expansion enterprises, the main channel of its withdrawal from the capital market is through the IPO way of open capital market. Entrepreneurial enterprises may choose creative board market or main board market to list under different degrees of development. Through IPO, the shares achieved by the venture capital investors transmit to the public.
Internal withdrawal exit channels mainly include two ways: venture enterprise shares redemption and entrepreneurial enterprise bankruptcy and liquidation.
Through comparison between China and the United States entrepreneurial enterprises exit channels, through the IPO withdrawal way in the United States has an average of about 50 percent, while China has only 4.76 percent. There are certain similarities between the Chinese stock market situation of underdevelopment and the German bank as the center of the capital market. Compared to the United States, the stock market's underdevelopment, to a certain extent, has hampered the development of the European venture capital.
Regress analysis on the NASDAQ composite index and venture capital support for the IPO financing, results showed that the impact of the NASDAQ Composite Index on venture capital available to support enterprises IPO financing is significant, that is, in the open market value of the higher interests of the time, more venture capital to support the rights and interests of enterprises from the open market access to finance, thereby risk capital to withdraw from.
Similarly, the Nasdaq composite index is significant to the impact of the amount of risk investment support enterprise takeover and purchase, that is, in the open market value of the higher interests of the time, more venture capital to support the rights and interests of enterprises through open market mergers and acquisitions, risk capital can withdraw through this way. Clearly, public interest market’s prosperity influent the withdrawal and development cycle of risk investment to a large extent.
The factors affecting capital from venture capitalists also include the experience of the market environment, as well as in venture capital into the venture enterprises such as leases signed.
The factors affecting capital withdrawal also include the experience of venture capitalists, the market environment, as well as the leases signed when venture capital into the venture enterprises, etc.
Risk investment institutions in the withdrawal stage face the risk of can not withdraw from the ideal price or even can not withdraw, thus affecting the development cycle of the risk investment institutions, which includes internal factors also include external factors.
High quality item can choose a one-time withdrawal from the project. For the not very good quality projects, adopt a phased withdrawal than a one-time withdrawal can gain more capital appreciation from the ultimate realization. We designed a model to prove that a phased withdrawal under certain assumptions is superior to a one-time exit strategy.
The fourth part made a number of policy recommendations for optimize the capital market structure. In venture capital investments stage, venture capital funds mainly withdraw from two major platforms:the pioneering plate(GEM) and property rights trading market,through entrepreneurial enterprises IPO shares and investment counters realized investment transactions.
We must first establish the GEM. GEM is mainly for the growth of entrepreneurial enterprises, to provide equity financing for small and medium enterprises market, as well as providing venture capital exit opportunities. China already has set up GEM objective economic conditions.
Shenzhen's GEM is now SME board, the threshold should be lower to accommodate
the need of the vast number of entrepreneurial enterprises. Shenzhen and Hong Kong, based on the geopolitical factor and the historical link of economic and trade exchanges, the Shenzhen GEM system should design under the framework of in cooperation with the Hong Kong GEM market in the beginning. The complementary effect of Shenzhen and Hong Kong GEM markets is conducive to the organic re-integration of the two markets, thus speeding up Hong Kong's financial market restructuring and financial services optimization and cost reduction, form a new pattern of complementary advantages and common development.
At the same time we must vigorously develop the equity market. At present, China's property right trading market very difficult, affected our SME financing and equity flows, from the China Venture Capital also serve to support the role.
Focus on multi-level capital market system, from the mutual relations among property rights trading market, commissioned shares transfer system and counter trading market, in light of China's national conditions, China's property rights trading unified national market system design in the current circumstances should vigorously improve the functions and tools of commissioned shares transfer system, and ultimate transition to the counter trading market.
引文
1. Bygrave W. D. and Timmons J. A., Venture Capital at the Crossroad, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
2. Compers P. A. and lerner J., The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Create New Wealth, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001.
3. Kortum S. and Lerner J., Assessing Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31: 674-692.
4. Seppa T., Essays on valuation and syndication of venture capital investment, Doctoral Dissertation, Helsinki University of Technology, 2003.
5. Mayer C., Schoors K., Yafeh Y., Sources of funds and investment activities of venture capital funds: evidence from Germany Isreal Japan and the UK, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, 11(3): 586-608.
6. Sahlman W. A. , The structure and governance of venture capital organization, Journal of Finance Economics, 1990, 27(2): 473-531.
7. Wang Susheng and Hailan Zhou, Staged financing in venture capital: moral hazard and risks, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, 10(1): 131-155.
8. Kaplan S. N. and Stromberg P., Venture capitalists as principals: contracting, screening, and monitoring, American Economic Review, 2001,92(2): 426-430.
9. Wells W. A., Venture capital decision making, unpubished Doctoral Dissertation, Doctoral Dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1974.
10. Poindexter J. B., The efficiency of financial markets: the venture capital case, Doctoral Dissertation, New York University, 1976.
11. Tyebjee T. T. and BRUNO A. V., A model of venture capitalist investment activity, Management Science, 1984, 30: 1051-106.
12. MacMillan I. C., Siegel R. and Subbanarasimha P. N., Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals, Journal of Business Venturing, 1985, 1: 119-128.
13. Ray D., Venture capital and entrepreneurial development in Singapore, International Small Business Journal, 1991, 10: 11-26.
14. Fried V. H. and Hisrich R. D., Toward a model of venture capital investment decision making, Financial Management, 1994, 23: 28-37.
15. Smith J. E. and Nau R. F.,Valuing risky projects: option pricing theory and decision analysis, Management Science, 1995, 41: 795-816.
16. Dixon R., Venture capitalist and the appraisal of investment, OMEGA, 1991, 19: 333-344.
17. Zider B., How venture capital works, Harvard Business Review, 1998, 76: 131-139.
18. Shepherd D. A.,Ettenson R. and Crouch A., New venture strategy and profitability: a venture capitalist’s assessment , Journal of Business Venturing, 2000,15: 449-467.
19. Mainprize B., Hindle K., Smith B. and Mitchell R., Toward the standardization of venture capital investment evaluation: decision criteria for rating investee business plans , Paper presented at the Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Proceedings of the Twenty-second Annual Entrepreneurship Research Conference, Massachusetts: Babson College, 2002.
20. Saaty T. L.,Notes on a scaling method for priorities in hierarchical structures, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1977,15: 234-281.
21. Laarhoven P. and Pedrgcz W.,A fuzzy extension of Saaty’s prionty theory, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1983,11: 229-241.
22. Laarhoven P. and Pedrgcz W., A fuzzy extension of Saaty’s prionty theory, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1983, 11: 229-241.
23.刘曼红,风险投资:创新与金融,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1998。
24.周乃敏,高技术风险投资公司选项的评价体系研究,技术经济与管理研究,1999,20(2):36-37。
25.马扬,风险投资项目的评估指标研究,科学管理研究,1999,14(6):17-22。
26.樊治平,尤天惠,高新技术企业风险投资的一种决策方法,东北大学学报,1999,20(1):98-100。
27.余晓岭,魏薇,杨忠直,技术开发项目评价方法研究,数量经济与技术经济研究,1998,15(5):55-68。
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46.《中华人民共和国公司法》,2006。
47.《中华人民共和国证券法》,2006。
48.《中华人民共和国中小企业促进法》,2002。
49.外商投资创业投资企业管理规定》,2003。
50.科技部联合六部委,《关于建立风险投机制的若干意见》。
51.深圳市政府,《关于深圳市创业资本投资高新技术产业暂行规定》。
52.美国经济研究局:www.nber.org。
53.美国国家风险投资协会:www.nvca.org。
54.欧洲风险投资协会:www.evca.com。
55. DOWJONES VENTUREONE:www.ventureone.com。
56.深圳创业投资同业公会:www.szvca.com。
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58.上海证券交易所:www.sse.com.cn。
59.香港联交所:www.hkex.com.hk。
60.香港创业板:www.hkgem.com.hk。
61.新加坡证券交易市场:www.ses.com.sg。
62.美国纳斯达克市场:www.nasdaq.com。
63.国家科技部:www.most.gov.cn。
64.中国人民银行:www.pbc.gov.cn。
2. Compers P. A. and lerner J., The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Create New Wealth, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001.
3. Kortum S. and Lerner J., Assessing Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31: 674-692.
4. Seppa T., Essays on valuation and syndication of venture capital investment, Doctoral Dissertation, Helsinki University of Technology, 2003.
5. Mayer C., Schoors K., Yafeh Y., Sources of funds and investment activities of venture capital funds: evidence from Germany Isreal Japan and the UK, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, 11(3): 586-608.
6. Sahlman W. A. , The structure and governance of venture capital organization, Journal of Finance Economics, 1990, 27(2): 473-531.
7. Wang Susheng and Hailan Zhou, Staged financing in venture capital: moral hazard and risks, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004, 10(1): 131-155.
8. Kaplan S. N. and Stromberg P., Venture capitalists as principals: contracting, screening, and monitoring, American Economic Review, 2001,92(2): 426-430.
9. Wells W. A., Venture capital decision making, unpubished Doctoral Dissertation, Doctoral Dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1974.
10. Poindexter J. B., The efficiency of financial markets: the venture capital case, Doctoral Dissertation, New York University, 1976.
11. Tyebjee T. T. and BRUNO A. V., A model of venture capitalist investment activity, Management Science, 1984, 30: 1051-106.
12. MacMillan I. C., Siegel R. and Subbanarasimha P. N., Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals, Journal of Business Venturing, 1985, 1: 119-128.
13. Ray D., Venture capital and entrepreneurial development in Singapore, International Small Business Journal, 1991, 10: 11-26.
14. Fried V. H. and Hisrich R. D., Toward a model of venture capital investment decision making, Financial Management, 1994, 23: 28-37.
15. Smith J. E. and Nau R. F.,Valuing risky projects: option pricing theory and decision analysis, Management Science, 1995, 41: 795-816.
16. Dixon R., Venture capitalist and the appraisal of investment, OMEGA, 1991, 19: 333-344.
17. Zider B., How venture capital works, Harvard Business Review, 1998, 76: 131-139.
18. Shepherd D. A.,Ettenson R. and Crouch A., New venture strategy and profitability: a venture capitalist’s assessment , Journal of Business Venturing, 2000,15: 449-467.
19. Mainprize B., Hindle K., Smith B. and Mitchell R., Toward the standardization of venture capital investment evaluation: decision criteria for rating investee business plans , Paper presented at the Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Proceedings of the Twenty-second Annual Entrepreneurship Research Conference, Massachusetts: Babson College, 2002.
20. Saaty T. L.,Notes on a scaling method for priorities in hierarchical structures, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1977,15: 234-281.
21. Laarhoven P. and Pedrgcz W.,A fuzzy extension of Saaty’s prionty theory, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1983,11: 229-241.
22. Laarhoven P. and Pedrgcz W., A fuzzy extension of Saaty’s prionty theory, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1983, 11: 229-241.
23.刘曼红,风险投资:创新与金融,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1998。
24.周乃敏,高技术风险投资公司选项的评价体系研究,技术经济与管理研究,1999,20(2):36-37。
25.马扬,风险投资项目的评估指标研究,科学管理研究,1999,14(6):17-22。
26.樊治平,尤天惠,高新技术企业风险投资的一种决策方法,东北大学学报,1999,20(1):98-100。
27.余晓岭,魏薇,杨忠直,技术开发项目评价方法研究,数量经济与技术经济研究,1998,15(5):55-68。
28.宋逢明,陈涛涛,高科技投资项目评价指标体系的研究,中国软科学,1994,14(1):90-94。
29.杨青,投资评价,北京:中国经济出版社,2000。
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31.尹淑娅,风险投资中的创业企业价值评估模型及其应用,中国软科学,1999,14(6):78-79,93。
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