机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应研究
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摘要
近年来,投资者保护尤其是中小投资者利益保护问题受到国内外理论界和实务界的普遍关注。然而,已有文献主要从法律制度对投资者的权利保护角度研究投资者保护问题,很少关注所有权安排对中小投资者利益保护所产生的影响。
根据产权理论,所有权和制度环境在决定经济行为时相互作用并影响经济行为决策。机构投资者作为重要的所有权安排,通过与企业控制人之间的利益博弈制衡,可能会影响中小投资者利益保护。特别是进入20世纪80年代后,机构投资者在全球迅猛发展,并成为企业所有权结构的重要组成部分,对中小投资者利益保护产生了更为深远的影响。现有文献对发展机构投资者经济后果的研究,并没有得到一致的结论,一定程度上是由于机构投资者作为追求自身利益的经济体,对经济的影响可能依赖于其所处的制度环境,不同制度环境下的相似研究,可能会得到不一致的结论。那么,机构投资者是否有可能保护中小投资者利益,以及在什么条件下能够产生这种利益保护作用就具有重要的研究意义。基于上述考虑,文章在对现有文献梳理的基础上,从中小投资者利益实现的研究视角出发,结合中国具体制度环境,通过理论分析和实证检验,研究机构投资者对中小投资者的利益保护效应及其产生作用的制度条件。
文章共分七章。第一章导论,提出了文章所要研究的问题、研究意义以及研究内容与方法,并对文章所涉及到的关键概念进行界定;第二章文献综述,对投资者保护所涉及到的代表性研究文献,以及机构投资者的相关文献进行了系统的梳理,并通过对已有文献的评述,进一步深化了文章的研究问题。第三章制度背景,回顾和分析了与研究主题相关的制度背景,并结合制度背景,分析了中国中小投资者利益保护的特点和机构投资者的特征。第四章通过理论分析,指出了机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应的作用机理,并结合中国的制度背景,提出了文章的研究假设。第五章和第六章对第四章所提出的研究假设进行实证检验和分析;最后,第七章总结文章的主要研究成果,并提出文章的研究不足和未来进一步研究的方向。
通过上述研究和分析,文章得到以下主要研究结论:
第一,在限定制度因素条件下,从中小投资者利益实现视角看,机构投资者存在产生中小投资者利益保护效应的可能性。机构投资者作为重要的所有权制度安排,通过其对中小投资者利益实现的价值效应和信息效应,对中小投资者实现其投资利益的基础——企业价值以及中小投资者交易时机选择所依赖的相关信息产生影响,促进中小投资者实现其投资利益,产生中小投资者利益保护效应。
第二,机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应受到其所处制度环境的制约。
首先,机构投资者自身实力和规模影响其对中小投资者利益保护效应的发挥,机构投资者较强的实力和规模有助于其发挥保护中小投资者利益作用。
其次,上市公司终极控制人特征、上市公司所在地市场环境因素、以及股票市场行情等因素影响机构投资者对中小投资者的利益保护效应。上市公司的国有控制特征降低了机构投资者的价值效应,但增强了机构投资者的信息效应;上市公司所在地市场化程度和法治水平的提高能够促进机构投资者发挥其市场价值效应,但是没有证据表明上市公司所在地市场环境因素会影响机构投资者对上市公司会计盈余信息含量的作用;在股票市场行情的下跌阶段,机构投资者提高了股价的稳定性,而在股票市场行情上涨阶段,机构投资者进一步推动了股票市场的波动。
文章创新之处主要体现在如下方面:
第一,对现有投资者保护理论进行了有益扩展。文章针对已有文献主要从投资者法律保护视角探讨投资者权利保护的研究现状,从产权理论视角出发,分析指出利益实现视角是研究投资者利益保护的有效途径,并从投资者利益实现角度构建了中小投资者利益保护的理论框架,发展了投资者保护理论。
第二,拓展了对发展机构投资者这种制度安排经济后果的研究。文章在投资者保护理论框架下,分析机构投资者对中小投资者在股票市场利益实现过程的影响,从中小投资者利益实现视角,研究了机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应,拓展了对发展机构投资者这种制度安排经济后果的研究。
第三,文章的实证结果,提供了不同制度条件下,机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应的深入证据,为发展和规范机构投资者提供了施政依据;也为现实中对中小投资者利益实施保护提供了实证支持。
In recent years, the investor protection, especially minority investor profit protection, become a hot issue in theory and practice. But the existing literature mostly study investor protection problem from the perspective of legal system, and the profit protection effect of firm ownership arrangement on minority investors is little considered.
Based on Property theory, ownership and system affect the economic decision together. Institutional investors, as the important ownership arrangement, may affect the minority investor profit protection through its restricting effect on firm insiders from "tunneling", which may have great influence on minority investor protection. Especially since the 80s of 20th century, Institutional investor has developed quickly in the world, and become the important part of firm ownership structure, which may bring profound effect on minority investor profit protection. The existing literature on economic consequences of developing Institutional investors has no consistent conclusion. So it deserve research that could Institutional investor protect minority investor profit, and what is the condition in which it can have investor profit protection on minority investor. Based on the above consideration, this paper explores the interests protection effect of institutional investors on minority investors, and its system condition through theory analysis and empirical test in china system condition from the perspective of minority investors interests realization.
The paper includes seven chapters. The first chapter put forward the research question, the research significance, the research content and the method, and the key concepts definition involved in the paper; The second chapter review on the representative literatures, which involves the study of investor protection, as well as the relevant documents of institutional investors, and based on the existing literature review, the chapter further deepen the research question. The third chapter is system background, reviewing and analyzing the research background and system related on the theme, and analyzing the background and characteristics of institutional investors to protect the minority investor interests. The fourth chapter indicates the interests protection effect mechanism of institutional investors on minority investors through theoretical analysis, and puts forward the research hypothesis combining with the Chinese system background. The fifth and sixth chapters empirically test the research hypothesis; finally, in chapter seventh, we summarize the main research results, and put forward the research weakness and further research direction.
Through the research and analysis, we draw the main conclusions as follows:
First, institutional investors may protect minority investor profit in given system conditions from the perspective of minority investor interests realization. Institutional investor, as important firm ownership arrangement, can promote the interests realization of minority investors through its value effect and information effect.
Second, the profit protection effect of institutional investor to minority shareholders is affected by the system conditions. On the one hand, the scale and strength of Institutional investor affect this profit protection effect. The stronger economic strength and the bigger size of Institutional investor play greater effect .On the other hand, the ultimate control characteristic and area marketization degree of the listed company affect its effect, The listed company with state-owned control feature reduces the value effect of institutional investor, but enhanced its information effect; In the place where the marketization degree is higher , institutional investors can improve its value effect, but there is no evidence that it will affect the institutional investor's information effect; In the stock market decline period, institutional investors reduced the price volatility in the stock market, and in the market advancing period, institutional investors promoted the stock market volatility.
The mainly contributions are embodied in the followings:
First, extending the existing investor protection theory. Based on property right theory, the paper indicates that interests realization of minority investors is a effective perspective of minority investors interests research, and established the minority investors interests protection theoretical framework from minority investors interests realization perspective,which develop investor protection theory.
Second, expanding the economic consequences research of developing Institutional investors. This paper discusses the interests protection effect of institutional investor to minority investor in the theoretical framework of investor protection, which extend the economic consequences study of developing institutional investor.
Third, the empirical test results, in given system conditions, provide evidence of institutional investor protecting minority investor interests, which have policy meaning on how to develop and regulating institutional investors.
根据产权理论,所有权和制度环境在决定经济行为时相互作用并影响经济行为决策。机构投资者作为重要的所有权安排,通过与企业控制人之间的利益博弈制衡,可能会影响中小投资者利益保护。特别是进入20世纪80年代后,机构投资者在全球迅猛发展,并成为企业所有权结构的重要组成部分,对中小投资者利益保护产生了更为深远的影响。现有文献对发展机构投资者经济后果的研究,并没有得到一致的结论,一定程度上是由于机构投资者作为追求自身利益的经济体,对经济的影响可能依赖于其所处的制度环境,不同制度环境下的相似研究,可能会得到不一致的结论。那么,机构投资者是否有可能保护中小投资者利益,以及在什么条件下能够产生这种利益保护作用就具有重要的研究意义。基于上述考虑,文章在对现有文献梳理的基础上,从中小投资者利益实现的研究视角出发,结合中国具体制度环境,通过理论分析和实证检验,研究机构投资者对中小投资者的利益保护效应及其产生作用的制度条件。
文章共分七章。第一章导论,提出了文章所要研究的问题、研究意义以及研究内容与方法,并对文章所涉及到的关键概念进行界定;第二章文献综述,对投资者保护所涉及到的代表性研究文献,以及机构投资者的相关文献进行了系统的梳理,并通过对已有文献的评述,进一步深化了文章的研究问题。第三章制度背景,回顾和分析了与研究主题相关的制度背景,并结合制度背景,分析了中国中小投资者利益保护的特点和机构投资者的特征。第四章通过理论分析,指出了机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应的作用机理,并结合中国的制度背景,提出了文章的研究假设。第五章和第六章对第四章所提出的研究假设进行实证检验和分析;最后,第七章总结文章的主要研究成果,并提出文章的研究不足和未来进一步研究的方向。
通过上述研究和分析,文章得到以下主要研究结论:
第一,在限定制度因素条件下,从中小投资者利益实现视角看,机构投资者存在产生中小投资者利益保护效应的可能性。机构投资者作为重要的所有权制度安排,通过其对中小投资者利益实现的价值效应和信息效应,对中小投资者实现其投资利益的基础——企业价值以及中小投资者交易时机选择所依赖的相关信息产生影响,促进中小投资者实现其投资利益,产生中小投资者利益保护效应。
第二,机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应受到其所处制度环境的制约。
首先,机构投资者自身实力和规模影响其对中小投资者利益保护效应的发挥,机构投资者较强的实力和规模有助于其发挥保护中小投资者利益作用。
其次,上市公司终极控制人特征、上市公司所在地市场环境因素、以及股票市场行情等因素影响机构投资者对中小投资者的利益保护效应。上市公司的国有控制特征降低了机构投资者的价值效应,但增强了机构投资者的信息效应;上市公司所在地市场化程度和法治水平的提高能够促进机构投资者发挥其市场价值效应,但是没有证据表明上市公司所在地市场环境因素会影响机构投资者对上市公司会计盈余信息含量的作用;在股票市场行情的下跌阶段,机构投资者提高了股价的稳定性,而在股票市场行情上涨阶段,机构投资者进一步推动了股票市场的波动。
文章创新之处主要体现在如下方面:
第一,对现有投资者保护理论进行了有益扩展。文章针对已有文献主要从投资者法律保护视角探讨投资者权利保护的研究现状,从产权理论视角出发,分析指出利益实现视角是研究投资者利益保护的有效途径,并从投资者利益实现角度构建了中小投资者利益保护的理论框架,发展了投资者保护理论。
第二,拓展了对发展机构投资者这种制度安排经济后果的研究。文章在投资者保护理论框架下,分析机构投资者对中小投资者在股票市场利益实现过程的影响,从中小投资者利益实现视角,研究了机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应,拓展了对发展机构投资者这种制度安排经济后果的研究。
第三,文章的实证结果,提供了不同制度条件下,机构投资者对中小投资者利益保护效应的深入证据,为发展和规范机构投资者提供了施政依据;也为现实中对中小投资者利益实施保护提供了实证支持。
In recent years, the investor protection, especially minority investor profit protection, become a hot issue in theory and practice. But the existing literature mostly study investor protection problem from the perspective of legal system, and the profit protection effect of firm ownership arrangement on minority investors is little considered.
Based on Property theory, ownership and system affect the economic decision together. Institutional investors, as the important ownership arrangement, may affect the minority investor profit protection through its restricting effect on firm insiders from "tunneling", which may have great influence on minority investor protection. Especially since the 80s of 20th century, Institutional investor has developed quickly in the world, and become the important part of firm ownership structure, which may bring profound effect on minority investor profit protection. The existing literature on economic consequences of developing Institutional investors has no consistent conclusion. So it deserve research that could Institutional investor protect minority investor profit, and what is the condition in which it can have investor profit protection on minority investor. Based on the above consideration, this paper explores the interests protection effect of institutional investors on minority investors, and its system condition through theory analysis and empirical test in china system condition from the perspective of minority investors interests realization.
The paper includes seven chapters. The first chapter put forward the research question, the research significance, the research content and the method, and the key concepts definition involved in the paper; The second chapter review on the representative literatures, which involves the study of investor protection, as well as the relevant documents of institutional investors, and based on the existing literature review, the chapter further deepen the research question. The third chapter is system background, reviewing and analyzing the research background and system related on the theme, and analyzing the background and characteristics of institutional investors to protect the minority investor interests. The fourth chapter indicates the interests protection effect mechanism of institutional investors on minority investors through theoretical analysis, and puts forward the research hypothesis combining with the Chinese system background. The fifth and sixth chapters empirically test the research hypothesis; finally, in chapter seventh, we summarize the main research results, and put forward the research weakness and further research direction.
Through the research and analysis, we draw the main conclusions as follows:
First, institutional investors may protect minority investor profit in given system conditions from the perspective of minority investor interests realization. Institutional investor, as important firm ownership arrangement, can promote the interests realization of minority investors through its value effect and information effect.
Second, the profit protection effect of institutional investor to minority shareholders is affected by the system conditions. On the one hand, the scale and strength of Institutional investor affect this profit protection effect. The stronger economic strength and the bigger size of Institutional investor play greater effect .On the other hand, the ultimate control characteristic and area marketization degree of the listed company affect its effect, The listed company with state-owned control feature reduces the value effect of institutional investor, but enhanced its information effect; In the place where the marketization degree is higher , institutional investors can improve its value effect, but there is no evidence that it will affect the institutional investor's information effect; In the stock market decline period, institutional investors reduced the price volatility in the stock market, and in the market advancing period, institutional investors promoted the stock market volatility.
The mainly contributions are embodied in the followings:
First, extending the existing investor protection theory. Based on property right theory, the paper indicates that interests realization of minority investors is a effective perspective of minority investors interests research, and established the minority investors interests protection theoretical framework from minority investors interests realization perspective,which develop investor protection theory.
Second, expanding the economic consequences research of developing Institutional investors. This paper discusses the interests protection effect of institutional investor to minority investor in the theoretical framework of investor protection, which extend the economic consequences study of developing institutional investor.
Third, the empirical test results, in given system conditions, provide evidence of institutional investor protecting minority investor interests, which have policy meaning on how to develop and regulating institutional investors.
引文
1 姚颐、刘志远,震荡市场、机构投资者与市场稳定,管理世界,2008.8.
2 资料来源:中国证券登记结算有限公司网站,www.chinaclear.cn.
3 2000年《财经》杂志发表了题为《基金黑幕》的文章,几乎同时《中国证券报》刊登了《四问证券投资基金》,两篇文章分析了机构投资者“对倒”、“倒仓”、“独立性”等操纵市场的种种行为,并对机构投资者在中国证券市场上发挥的作用提出了质疑。
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2 资料来源:中国证券登记结算有限公司网站,www.chinaclear.cn.
3 2000年《财经》杂志发表了题为《基金黑幕》的文章,几乎同时《中国证券报》刊登了《四问证券投资基金》,两篇文章分析了机构投资者“对倒”、“倒仓”、“独立性”等操纵市场的种种行为,并对机构投资者在中国证券市场上发挥的作用提出了质疑。
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