国际环境合作的经济学分析
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摘要
随着全球气候变暖、恐怖主义、贫困等全球性共同问题日益严峻，迫切的需要对其给予一个恰当的解决方案。由于这些问题的独特公共品属性，不能按照传统的方式，即利用税收或科斯定理的方式加以解决，而只能通过自愿性的国际多边合作协议来完成。多边环境合作也取得了一些成果，例如阻止臭氧层破坏的《蒙特利尔议定书》和最近颇受关注的《京都议定书》。前者取得了显著的减排效果，而后者要么是协定目标非常模糊，要么是虽然存在一个协定目标但是有约束的签约国数量非常少。虽然在保护环境和遏制环境恶化等原则上是取得基本一致意见的，但是在达成一个确定目标上却非常困难。
国际环境合作尤其是气候合作的难点在于难以达成一个稳固、规模大、方案“满意”的合作组织。在气候谈判的过程中各方并不是如何更好的保护环境（增加减排承诺）而是尽可能的规避己方责任，这一困境的根源在于两个方面：一个是气候问题本身具有一个不同于常规公共品的独特属性——国际公共品与区域公共品的联合属性，即缺乏一个有效地中央强权，各独立国家难以达成具有约束性的协议；另一方面是气候变化本身具有不确定性，这一不确定性同样使得各方对于气候变化抱有很强的侥幸心理，并不是切实地认为气候问题必须要由己方解决，更不愿意放弃过多的经济利益来获取气候利益。针对以上问题，本文主要研究了以下内容：
第一，针对气候问题的国际公共品属性，按照学界的一般共识，通常采用自发减排来完成，其理论基础为国际环境合作（IEA）。本文第二章通过建立静态、对称IEA模型来得到IEA的基本结论，即环境合作的规模和效果受制于三个核心要素：边际收益、边际成本和博弈形式。以碳排放为例，碳排放的边际收益越高、碳排放的边际成本（污染损失成本）越低，则均衡的碳排放量越大；按照博弈形式来分，古诺博弈的均衡合作规模比较小，而具有先行者优势的领导者博弈均衡合作规模较大。
第二，放松第二章的同质国家假设，按照当前各国实际，构建非对称国际环境合作模型。鉴于异质性条件下均衡解的难以解读性，本文采用了模拟的形式。与RICE等模型不同，我们对具有国际公共品属性的碳排放做了内生性处理，并以能源为媒介内生化了具有区域公共品属性的硫排放过程，这一包含多重公共品属性的假设更符合实际。模拟结果发现，碳排放与硫排放间的相互溢出效应会一定程度上强化一国的碳减排动机，但是由于硫的终端减排成本相比源头减排（提升能源效率和采用替代清洁能源）要低得多，因此这种溢出效应要在长期才能体现出来。我们还进一步模拟了合作规模对一国福利的影响，如果按照单纯的效率最优为原则，且联合国家福利采用国家的福利加总形式，以中国为例，由于中国的短期边际减排成本较低，因此承担了过量的减排责任，与任何国家合作减排的效果均不佳。这也进一步说明采用效率准则和线性福利加总模式对发展中国家极为不利，这也是采用“共同而有区别责任”的根本原因。
第三，鉴于国际环境模型对两个基本要素：环境技术的来源以及影响国际环境合作的非直接经济因素的内生化处理难度极大，借鉴既有文献，本文做了外生性假定，因此不能给出深层次的政策建议，故在第四章和第五章单独研究了这两个关键变量。
第四章主要研究了环境效率的来源。与既有文献着重突出研发不同，我们还考虑了两种形式的溢出效应：区域关联溢出效应和贸易关联溢出效应。在对环境技术的度量上，我们也分别采用基于投入的DEA方法和基于产出的方向距离函数法。以中国29个省份2001-2008年间的数据为样本，结果显示两种环境效率溢出模式并不相同，前者体现了正向的环境效率溢出效应，而后者却是负向作用。通过分析环境效率的其他影响因素还发现：降低工业资本密集度、优化产业结构有利于改善地区环境效率；研发强度对地区环境效率提升有促进作用，但对其他地区环境效率的吸收能力并没有一致的作用。结果提醒我们，需要进一步提升产业间结构和产业内结构，同时应该转变研发思想，提高对生态环境的关注程度和决策比重。
第五章主要研究了影响环境合作的主要因素。以“蒙特利尔协议”为对象，该协议在控制臭氧层破坏物质方面取得了显著的效果，对于其签约影响因素应该考虑到政治、经济等多方面的原因，签约背后的战略性利益是签约的重要驱动力。我们定义的战略性利益不尽包括短期的经济利益，如减排成本、污染成本等，还包括远期收益，主要包括随着环境协议的签署，将导致全球性的市场变革波动，那些由于研发能力的国家将以此获得的额外收益，主要包括产品市场垄断收益和专利权收益。我们采用结构方程模型估计了潜在战略利益、大国作用等因素对协议签约延迟的影响，结果发现获得战略性利益的能力越强，签约延迟时间越短；与既有结论相似，结果还发现一个国家越有影响力、受协议的负面影响越小、民主程度和开放程度越高，其签约动机就越强，签约延迟时间也越短。
It’s a common principle to protect the environment and curb the deterioration ofthe environment but it is very difficult to reach the target. We should give a propersolution to the increasingly serious and urgent problems such as global warming,terrorism, poverty. These issues have some distinguishing characteristics, so theycannot be resolved by tax or the Coase theorem, except by voluntary internationalmultilateral cooperation agreement. Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol arethe reprehensive multilateral environmental agreements. The former achieved agood reduction effect, while the latter have large scale, but there isn’t a bindingarticle.
It’s very difficult to achieve an international environmental agreement,especially on the carbon abatement cooperation. There are two reasons for thispuzzle, first, the supply of international public goods is inefficiency for sort ofcentral power; second, the influence of carbon emission is uncertain, this uncertaintyalso makes it possible for some nations to have strong excuse of carbon reduction isunnecessary. To solve the above problem, this paper mainly studies the following:
First, for international public goods property of the carbon emission, inaccordance with the general consensus of academics, the theoretical solution is theinternational environmental agreement (IEA). Chapter II establishes a staticsymmetry IEA model to get the IEA's basic conclusion, the scale and effects ofcooperation subject to the three core elements: the marginal revenue, marginal cost,and the form of game. Using carbon emissions as an example, the higher themarginal emission revenue, the less marginal emission cost (pollution cost), therewill be more equilibrium carbon emissions. At the same time, cournot game hassmaller cooperation scale than the leader game, for a leader with first-moveradvantage in the game.
Second, we relax the homogeneous state assumption. Given the equilibriumsolution is difficult to interpret under the heterogeneity conditions; this article uses the simulation form. Different with RICE and other models, we endogenous thecarbon&sulfur emissions using the energy as the medium, this emission processcontains multiple public goods properties and is more conform to reality thanexogenous assumption.
The simulation results showed that the spillover effect of the interactionbetween carbon emissions and sulfur emissions, to a certain extent, will increase acountry's carbon reduction motivation, but due to the sulfur terminal abatement costsis much lower than the source reduction (e.g. improving energy efficiency and usealternative clean energy), so the spillover effects will be reflected only in thelong-term. We further simulated the impact of the scale of cooperation on a country'swelfare. China, for example, due to the short-term marginal abatement costs is muchlower than other countries therefore undertaken an excessive amount of emissionsreductions responsibility, in other words, it’s bad idea for china to cooperation withany State. This is the reason for using “common but differentiated responsibilities”in international environmental cooperation.
Third, given the IA model uses an exogenous assumption in the two basicelements: the source of environmental technologies, as well as non-direct economicfactors in international environmental cooperation. It is extremely difficult toendogenous these elements in the IA model, so we couldn’t give deep-level policyrecommendations. To solve these problems we give a separate study of the two keyvariables in Chapters IV and V.
Chapter IV measures the environmental efficiency of Chinese29provincesbetween2001and2008, using input-oriented DEA and output-oriented DDF method.We analyze the environmental efficiency spillover effect under the trade andneighbor linkage. The two channels are different, under the former, environmentalefficiency spillover effects is positive, while the latter is negative. The regions withlower industrial capital intensity, lower proportion of industry in the nationaleconomy and higher R&D density tend to have higher environmental efficiency, butthe R&D absorptive capacity has no consistent effect on the environmentalefficiency. The results remind us that we need to further optimize the inter-industrystructure and intra-industry structure, and more R&D should concern on the ecological environment.
The chapter IV studies the factors which influence signature of the IEA. Usingthe Montreal Protocol as an example. Montreal Protocol is widely considered as themost successful environment protection agreement. It’s believed that the ratificationof the protocol is not only influenced by environmental factors, but also economicand political factors. The authors use a SEM framework to investigate the impact ofvarious country characteristics on the duration of time taken to ratify the protocol.The most significant finding is that the legislative delay is negatively related to thestrategic interests. The latter finding is consistent with earlier research that founddemocratic freedoms, state importance and openness will reduce the delay ofratification.
国际环境合作尤其是气候合作的难点在于难以达成一个稳固、规模大、方案“满意”的合作组织。在气候谈判的过程中各方并不是如何更好的保护环境（增加减排承诺）而是尽可能的规避己方责任，这一困境的根源在于两个方面：一个是气候问题本身具有一个不同于常规公共品的独特属性——国际公共品与区域公共品的联合属性，即缺乏一个有效地中央强权，各独立国家难以达成具有约束性的协议；另一方面是气候变化本身具有不确定性，这一不确定性同样使得各方对于气候变化抱有很强的侥幸心理，并不是切实地认为气候问题必须要由己方解决，更不愿意放弃过多的经济利益来获取气候利益。针对以上问题，本文主要研究了以下内容：
第一，针对气候问题的国际公共品属性，按照学界的一般共识，通常采用自发减排来完成，其理论基础为国际环境合作（IEA）。本文第二章通过建立静态、对称IEA模型来得到IEA的基本结论，即环境合作的规模和效果受制于三个核心要素：边际收益、边际成本和博弈形式。以碳排放为例，碳排放的边际收益越高、碳排放的边际成本（污染损失成本）越低，则均衡的碳排放量越大；按照博弈形式来分，古诺博弈的均衡合作规模比较小，而具有先行者优势的领导者博弈均衡合作规模较大。
第二，放松第二章的同质国家假设，按照当前各国实际，构建非对称国际环境合作模型。鉴于异质性条件下均衡解的难以解读性，本文采用了模拟的形式。与RICE等模型不同，我们对具有国际公共品属性的碳排放做了内生性处理，并以能源为媒介内生化了具有区域公共品属性的硫排放过程，这一包含多重公共品属性的假设更符合实际。模拟结果发现，碳排放与硫排放间的相互溢出效应会一定程度上强化一国的碳减排动机，但是由于硫的终端减排成本相比源头减排（提升能源效率和采用替代清洁能源）要低得多，因此这种溢出效应要在长期才能体现出来。我们还进一步模拟了合作规模对一国福利的影响，如果按照单纯的效率最优为原则，且联合国家福利采用国家的福利加总形式，以中国为例，由于中国的短期边际减排成本较低，因此承担了过量的减排责任，与任何国家合作减排的效果均不佳。这也进一步说明采用效率准则和线性福利加总模式对发展中国家极为不利，这也是采用“共同而有区别责任”的根本原因。
第三，鉴于国际环境模型对两个基本要素：环境技术的来源以及影响国际环境合作的非直接经济因素的内生化处理难度极大，借鉴既有文献，本文做了外生性假定，因此不能给出深层次的政策建议，故在第四章和第五章单独研究了这两个关键变量。
第四章主要研究了环境效率的来源。与既有文献着重突出研发不同，我们还考虑了两种形式的溢出效应：区域关联溢出效应和贸易关联溢出效应。在对环境技术的度量上，我们也分别采用基于投入的DEA方法和基于产出的方向距离函数法。以中国29个省份2001-2008年间的数据为样本，结果显示两种环境效率溢出模式并不相同，前者体现了正向的环境效率溢出效应，而后者却是负向作用。通过分析环境效率的其他影响因素还发现：降低工业资本密集度、优化产业结构有利于改善地区环境效率；研发强度对地区环境效率提升有促进作用，但对其他地区环境效率的吸收能力并没有一致的作用。结果提醒我们，需要进一步提升产业间结构和产业内结构，同时应该转变研发思想，提高对生态环境的关注程度和决策比重。
第五章主要研究了影响环境合作的主要因素。以“蒙特利尔协议”为对象，该协议在控制臭氧层破坏物质方面取得了显著的效果，对于其签约影响因素应该考虑到政治、经济等多方面的原因，签约背后的战略性利益是签约的重要驱动力。我们定义的战略性利益不尽包括短期的经济利益，如减排成本、污染成本等，还包括远期收益，主要包括随着环境协议的签署，将导致全球性的市场变革波动，那些由于研发能力的国家将以此获得的额外收益，主要包括产品市场垄断收益和专利权收益。我们采用结构方程模型估计了潜在战略利益、大国作用等因素对协议签约延迟的影响，结果发现获得战略性利益的能力越强，签约延迟时间越短；与既有结论相似，结果还发现一个国家越有影响力、受协议的负面影响越小、民主程度和开放程度越高，其签约动机就越强，签约延迟时间也越短。
It’s a common principle to protect the environment and curb the deterioration ofthe environment but it is very difficult to reach the target. We should give a propersolution to the increasingly serious and urgent problems such as global warming,terrorism, poverty. These issues have some distinguishing characteristics, so theycannot be resolved by tax or the Coase theorem, except by voluntary internationalmultilateral cooperation agreement. Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol arethe reprehensive multilateral environmental agreements. The former achieved agood reduction effect, while the latter have large scale, but there isn’t a bindingarticle.
It’s very difficult to achieve an international environmental agreement,especially on the carbon abatement cooperation. There are two reasons for thispuzzle, first, the supply of international public goods is inefficiency for sort ofcentral power; second, the influence of carbon emission is uncertain, this uncertaintyalso makes it possible for some nations to have strong excuse of carbon reduction isunnecessary. To solve the above problem, this paper mainly studies the following:
First, for international public goods property of the carbon emission, inaccordance with the general consensus of academics, the theoretical solution is theinternational environmental agreement (IEA). Chapter II establishes a staticsymmetry IEA model to get the IEA's basic conclusion, the scale and effects ofcooperation subject to the three core elements: the marginal revenue, marginal cost,and the form of game. Using carbon emissions as an example, the higher themarginal emission revenue, the less marginal emission cost (pollution cost), therewill be more equilibrium carbon emissions. At the same time, cournot game hassmaller cooperation scale than the leader game, for a leader with first-moveradvantage in the game.
Second, we relax the homogeneous state assumption. Given the equilibriumsolution is difficult to interpret under the heterogeneity conditions; this article uses the simulation form. Different with RICE and other models, we endogenous thecarbon&sulfur emissions using the energy as the medium, this emission processcontains multiple public goods properties and is more conform to reality thanexogenous assumption.
The simulation results showed that the spillover effect of the interactionbetween carbon emissions and sulfur emissions, to a certain extent, will increase acountry's carbon reduction motivation, but due to the sulfur terminal abatement costsis much lower than the source reduction (e.g. improving energy efficiency and usealternative clean energy), so the spillover effects will be reflected only in thelong-term. We further simulated the impact of the scale of cooperation on a country'swelfare. China, for example, due to the short-term marginal abatement costs is muchlower than other countries therefore undertaken an excessive amount of emissionsreductions responsibility, in other words, it’s bad idea for china to cooperation withany State. This is the reason for using “common but differentiated responsibilities”in international environmental cooperation.
Third, given the IA model uses an exogenous assumption in the two basicelements: the source of environmental technologies, as well as non-direct economicfactors in international environmental cooperation. It is extremely difficult toendogenous these elements in the IA model, so we couldn’t give deep-level policyrecommendations. To solve these problems we give a separate study of the two keyvariables in Chapters IV and V.
Chapter IV measures the environmental efficiency of Chinese29provincesbetween2001and2008, using input-oriented DEA and output-oriented DDF method.We analyze the environmental efficiency spillover effect under the trade andneighbor linkage. The two channels are different, under the former, environmentalefficiency spillover effects is positive, while the latter is negative. The regions withlower industrial capital intensity, lower proportion of industry in the nationaleconomy and higher R&D density tend to have higher environmental efficiency, butthe R&D absorptive capacity has no consistent effect on the environmentalefficiency. The results remind us that we need to further optimize the inter-industrystructure and intra-industry structure, and more R&D should concern on the ecological environment.
The chapter IV studies the factors which influence signature of the IEA. Usingthe Montreal Protocol as an example. Montreal Protocol is widely considered as themost successful environment protection agreement. It’s believed that the ratificationof the protocol is not only influenced by environmental factors, but also economicand political factors. The authors use a SEM framework to investigate the impact ofvarious country characteristics on the duration of time taken to ratify the protocol.The most significant finding is that the legislative delay is negatively related to thestrategic interests. The latter finding is consistent with earlier research that founddemocratic freedoms, state importance and openness will reduce the delay ofratification.
引文
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