开放对制度变迁的影响机制研究
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摘要
自1960年代以来,制度变迁理论取得了较大的进展,然而,已有理论关于开放对制度变迁的影响机制的分析,仍然有待于进一步深化。在对现有理论进行评述的基础上,本文把开放导致的环境变化、资源流动和制度变迁联系起来,揭示出开放对制度变迁的影响机制和路径,并着重分析了开放对制度变迁的三个影响机制:制度竞争机制、制度学习机制,以及制度主体的进入、退出机制。然后,本文运用这一分析思路来分析入世对中国市场化转型方式、速度、政府职能转化、企业市场化、统一市场形成和经济绩效等方面的影响。
如果考虑到资源的跨国界充分流动,这时的制度变迁在本文中被称为开放条件下的制度变迁。从封闭转向开放意味着市场规模、相对价格、风险、外部性等因素的变化。这些因素的变化会强化市场竞争,并引起制度主体、产品和要素的跨区域流动,形成制度学习、制度竞争以及进入、退出三种机制,使不同制度安排的净收益、净收益格局和制度选择集合发生变化,进而推动制度变迁。概括地说,开放对制度变迁的影响途径或路线可表示为:开放—环境变化—市场竞争(资源流动)—开放对制度变迁的影响机制(制度学习、制度竞争、制度主体的进入、退出)—制度的净收益和净收益格局变化、制度选择集合变化—制度变迁。
在开放条件下,产品和要素的市场竞争会强化制度竞争。本文构建了一个n个地区同时展开市场竞争和制度竞争的动态博弈模型。分析表明,开放度越大,制度转型进程越快,这是因为开放度越大,给定其他地区的制度,本地区的制度创新的边际收益会越大,而给定本地区的制度,则其他地区的制度创新会使本地区边际收益下降越大。同时,技术等其他因素的同等变化对制度变迁的影响将会随开放度的增大而增大。
开放同样会强化制度学习机制。制度学习一方面能扩大制度选择集合,另一方面能够降低发明成本、选择成本、摩擦成本和协调成本等制度变革的成本,因而能促进制度的变迁。但是,开放条件下的制度学习会受到默示知识、不完全合同,以及制度可移植性问题的困扰,降低学习的效果,甚至还可能产生负面效应。
在开放条件下,制度主体的进入和退出会改变制度主体的力量对比、分摊制
Although theory of institutional change has made great progress since 1960, existing theories fail to explain well the channel and mechanism through which openness influence institutional change. Based on a survey of related research, the paper relates environmental change cause by openness and flow of resource with institutional change. Then the channel and mechanism through which openness influence institutional change is analyzed, of them machnism of institutional change, institutional learning, and entry-exit are paid more attention to. Next, this framework is used to study the effects of China's WTO accession on the pattern, speed and economic performance of its transition toward market economy.If the free flow of resource across border is taken into account, institutional change is called in the paper change under opening-up condition. From state of autarky to openness means some factors change, for example, market scale, relative price, risks, externality and so on. These changes in turn make market competition more severe and cause products and production factor to flow across border. In this way, mechanism of institutional change, institutional competition and entry-exit come into being, which alter net benefits, net benefits structure of different institution and set of institution. Then, institutional change takes place. This is the channel through which openness gives an impact to institutional change.Under an opening-up condition, market competition will make institution competition more intensive. A game model including n countries which competes with each other both in market and institution is developed in this paper. The model indicates that the larger the openness, the faster the institutional change. It is because that given other countries' institution, the marginal revenue of one country's institutional change will increase with the degree of openness. On the other hand, if one country does not change its institution while another country does, its marginal revenue will decrease with the degree of openness. At the same time, changes in other factors such as technology will have more impacts on institutional change if openness
如果考虑到资源的跨国界充分流动,这时的制度变迁在本文中被称为开放条件下的制度变迁。从封闭转向开放意味着市场规模、相对价格、风险、外部性等因素的变化。这些因素的变化会强化市场竞争,并引起制度主体、产品和要素的跨区域流动,形成制度学习、制度竞争以及进入、退出三种机制,使不同制度安排的净收益、净收益格局和制度选择集合发生变化,进而推动制度变迁。概括地说,开放对制度变迁的影响途径或路线可表示为:开放—环境变化—市场竞争(资源流动)—开放对制度变迁的影响机制(制度学习、制度竞争、制度主体的进入、退出)—制度的净收益和净收益格局变化、制度选择集合变化—制度变迁。
在开放条件下,产品和要素的市场竞争会强化制度竞争。本文构建了一个n个地区同时展开市场竞争和制度竞争的动态博弈模型。分析表明,开放度越大,制度转型进程越快,这是因为开放度越大,给定其他地区的制度,本地区的制度创新的边际收益会越大,而给定本地区的制度,则其他地区的制度创新会使本地区边际收益下降越大。同时,技术等其他因素的同等变化对制度变迁的影响将会随开放度的增大而增大。
开放同样会强化制度学习机制。制度学习一方面能扩大制度选择集合,另一方面能够降低发明成本、选择成本、摩擦成本和协调成本等制度变革的成本,因而能促进制度的变迁。但是,开放条件下的制度学习会受到默示知识、不完全合同,以及制度可移植性问题的困扰,降低学习的效果,甚至还可能产生负面效应。
在开放条件下,制度主体的进入和退出会改变制度主体的力量对比、分摊制
Although theory of institutional change has made great progress since 1960, existing theories fail to explain well the channel and mechanism through which openness influence institutional change. Based on a survey of related research, the paper relates environmental change cause by openness and flow of resource with institutional change. Then the channel and mechanism through which openness influence institutional change is analyzed, of them machnism of institutional change, institutional learning, and entry-exit are paid more attention to. Next, this framework is used to study the effects of China's WTO accession on the pattern, speed and economic performance of its transition toward market economy.If the free flow of resource across border is taken into account, institutional change is called in the paper change under opening-up condition. From state of autarky to openness means some factors change, for example, market scale, relative price, risks, externality and so on. These changes in turn make market competition more severe and cause products and production factor to flow across border. In this way, mechanism of institutional change, institutional competition and entry-exit come into being, which alter net benefits, net benefits structure of different institution and set of institution. Then, institutional change takes place. This is the channel through which openness gives an impact to institutional change.Under an opening-up condition, market competition will make institution competition more intensive. A game model including n countries which competes with each other both in market and institution is developed in this paper. The model indicates that the larger the openness, the faster the institutional change. It is because that given other countries' institution, the marginal revenue of one country's institutional change will increase with the degree of openness. On the other hand, if one country does not change its institution while another country does, its marginal revenue will decrease with the degree of openness. At the same time, changes in other factors such as technology will have more impacts on institutional change if openness
引文
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