资本社会化及其相关制度比较研究
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摘要
资本社会化是伴随着生产社会化而显示出来的一种历史趋势,是分散的小规模资本集中成为社会大资本的过程。马克思在《资本论》中提出了资本社会化的光辉思想,并论证了其实现形式、发展前景和存在的问题。其后,世界各国的经济实践证实了资本社会化发展的历史必然性。无论是在发达资本主义国家还是在改革开放后的社会主义国家,股份制经济都成了经济舞台的主角,广大公众和普通劳动者持有股份的现象正变得越来越普遍,一个既持有公司股份又参加体力或脑力劳动的特殊阶层——“劳动者兼投资者”正在形成。
资本社会化促进了社会财富在所有权和管理权上相互分离,促进了社会结构的演变和公司治理结构的优化,为“重建个人所有制”准备了条件。同时,资本社会化不可避免地带有旧制度的一些缺点,主要表现为它会再生出一系列对公众投资者的欺诈侵害行为。证券市场是资本社会化的主要场所,证券市场上的丑闻事件不断出现,应了马克思的话,“财产在这里是以股票的形式存在的,所以它的运动和转移就纯粹变成了交易所赌博的结果”。就近几年来,国外的安然事件、世通事件等,国内的银广夏事件、中科创业案、蓝田股份事件等等,都严重打击了广大投资者的信心。
所以,本文认为,资本社会化的历史趋势不可阻挡,劳动者通过多种形式持有股份,从而成为“不仅仅靠劳动过活的阶级”,这是一种历史的必然。但是,在资本社会化的过程,必须完善各种相关制度,反对投机欺诈行为,保护广大“劳动者兼投资者”的利益,使公众的社会化财产更加安全。
本文除导论和结束语之外,共分八章。
导论部分根据世界和中国股份制经济发展的现实,提出本文的选题意义,论述了本文的理论背景、主要研究方法和创新之处。
第一章是对资本社会化理论的回顾。这一章首先介绍了经济学中所使用的资本概念的复杂性,并说明了本文所使用的资本概念的含义。其次,回顾了马克思有关社会资本和资本社会化理论的主要内容,说明了马克思的资本集中理论、股份资本理论和虚拟资本理论等与资本社会化理论的统一性。最后,回顾了恩格斯、列宁和希法亭等人对马克思资本社会化理论的发展。
第二章论述了伴随着资本社会化的发展,资本主义国家的社会经济状况正在发生的变化。积极的方面包括,阶级结构发生了变迁,阶级关系变得相对缓和,大资本家阶级和传统意义上的产业工人阶级的地位都在下降,中产阶级已占到大多数,阶级之间的对立情绪有所调和;机构投资者得到巨大发展,其对企业的经营决策影响越来越大;企业内部治理结构更加科学合理。消极的方面主要是证券欺诈行为,会导致财富的非公平转移。
第三章论述资本社会化与企业制度变迁。这一章实质上是对第二章的补充。资本社会化的影响最主要的方面是使企业制度发生了根本变化,企业在生产性本质的基础上形成了另一种重要的契约性本质;企业的组织形式由个人业主制
Capital socialization is a historical trend shown with the production socialization. It is a process that make the separated and little capital be socialized huge capital. In On the Capital, Karl.Marx brought forward the great thought of capital socialization, and demonstrated its realization form, development foreground and existing problem. Then, the economical practice all over the world approved the its historical inevitability. Stock economy has been the main role both in developed capitalism countries and in innovating socialism countries. The public and the general labors are holding more and more stocks, and a new class named laborers and also investors are coming into being.Capital socialization accelerates the separation of social asset's ownership and supervise rights. It is boosting the alteration of social structure and optimizing the company's management structure. It is promoting the economical development, and has prepared the condition for rebuilding the individual procession. At the same time, capital socialization has inevitably the demerits of the old institution, such as series of cheating and aggrieving act to the public investors. What Mark said was right, that here the assets exited in a form of stock, so its movement and transfer had became purely a result of gambling in exchange. In resent years, Enron debacle, world communication company case, yinguangxia affair, zhongkechuangye case, lantian affair, etc, all seriously beat the investors' confidence.So the dissertation reckons that the historical trend of capital socialization cannot be blocked, and that it is a historical necessity that the laborers become class not only depending on labor. In the process of capital socialization, all related institutions must be made perfect to fight against the speculation and cheating acts and to protect the interests of laborers also investors, and to make the socialized assets more save.Except the Introduction and the Conclusion, this dissertation is includes 8 chapters.The introduction, from the reality of world and Chinese economical development, brings forward the dissertation's purpose, theory background, main methods and the innovation.Chapter 1 is a review of the capital socialization theory. First, the chapter introduces the complexity of the notion of capital in economy, and explains the meaning in this article. Second, the chapter reviews Marx's theory on social capital and capital socialization, and shows the agreement among it and capital concentration theory, stock capital theory and fictitious capital theory. Third,
this chapter also reviews the theory development of Engels, Lenin and Hilferding.Chapter 2 discusses the change of society and economy in developed counties along with the development of capital socialization. The positive aspect is that the class structure is changing, that the class relationship is becoming relaxative, that the status of big capitalist and industry working class are all descending, that the middle class have be the majority of the population, and that the opposition emotion between the classes are tempered. Institutional investors get a great development, and its influence to the company's executive decision become more and more important; the inner supervise structure becomes more scientific. The passive aspect is mainly the cheating act in security market, which may lead an unfair assets transfer.Chapter 3 discusses the capital socialization and corporation institution variation, and this chapter is the supply to Chapter 2. The main influence of capital socialization is that the fundamental change happens in corporation institution. The contract essence arises on the basis of production essence. Stock company substitute the individual corporation and partnership corporation, and become the fundamental form. This chapter includes the capital socialization situation in the western countries and in China, and discusses some problems that must be solved in our state-owned company reform.Chapter 4 is about capital socialization and employee stock ownership institu
资本社会化促进了社会财富在所有权和管理权上相互分离,促进了社会结构的演变和公司治理结构的优化,为“重建个人所有制”准备了条件。同时,资本社会化不可避免地带有旧制度的一些缺点,主要表现为它会再生出一系列对公众投资者的欺诈侵害行为。证券市场是资本社会化的主要场所,证券市场上的丑闻事件不断出现,应了马克思的话,“财产在这里是以股票的形式存在的,所以它的运动和转移就纯粹变成了交易所赌博的结果”。就近几年来,国外的安然事件、世通事件等,国内的银广夏事件、中科创业案、蓝田股份事件等等,都严重打击了广大投资者的信心。
所以,本文认为,资本社会化的历史趋势不可阻挡,劳动者通过多种形式持有股份,从而成为“不仅仅靠劳动过活的阶级”,这是一种历史的必然。但是,在资本社会化的过程,必须完善各种相关制度,反对投机欺诈行为,保护广大“劳动者兼投资者”的利益,使公众的社会化财产更加安全。
本文除导论和结束语之外,共分八章。
导论部分根据世界和中国股份制经济发展的现实,提出本文的选题意义,论述了本文的理论背景、主要研究方法和创新之处。
第一章是对资本社会化理论的回顾。这一章首先介绍了经济学中所使用的资本概念的复杂性,并说明了本文所使用的资本概念的含义。其次,回顾了马克思有关社会资本和资本社会化理论的主要内容,说明了马克思的资本集中理论、股份资本理论和虚拟资本理论等与资本社会化理论的统一性。最后,回顾了恩格斯、列宁和希法亭等人对马克思资本社会化理论的发展。
第二章论述了伴随着资本社会化的发展,资本主义国家的社会经济状况正在发生的变化。积极的方面包括,阶级结构发生了变迁,阶级关系变得相对缓和,大资本家阶级和传统意义上的产业工人阶级的地位都在下降,中产阶级已占到大多数,阶级之间的对立情绪有所调和;机构投资者得到巨大发展,其对企业的经营决策影响越来越大;企业内部治理结构更加科学合理。消极的方面主要是证券欺诈行为,会导致财富的非公平转移。
第三章论述资本社会化与企业制度变迁。这一章实质上是对第二章的补充。资本社会化的影响最主要的方面是使企业制度发生了根本变化,企业在生产性本质的基础上形成了另一种重要的契约性本质;企业的组织形式由个人业主制
Capital socialization is a historical trend shown with the production socialization. It is a process that make the separated and little capital be socialized huge capital. In On the Capital, Karl.Marx brought forward the great thought of capital socialization, and demonstrated its realization form, development foreground and existing problem. Then, the economical practice all over the world approved the its historical inevitability. Stock economy has been the main role both in developed capitalism countries and in innovating socialism countries. The public and the general labors are holding more and more stocks, and a new class named laborers and also investors are coming into being.Capital socialization accelerates the separation of social asset's ownership and supervise rights. It is boosting the alteration of social structure and optimizing the company's management structure. It is promoting the economical development, and has prepared the condition for rebuilding the individual procession. At the same time, capital socialization has inevitably the demerits of the old institution, such as series of cheating and aggrieving act to the public investors. What Mark said was right, that here the assets exited in a form of stock, so its movement and transfer had became purely a result of gambling in exchange. In resent years, Enron debacle, world communication company case, yinguangxia affair, zhongkechuangye case, lantian affair, etc, all seriously beat the investors' confidence.So the dissertation reckons that the historical trend of capital socialization cannot be blocked, and that it is a historical necessity that the laborers become class not only depending on labor. In the process of capital socialization, all related institutions must be made perfect to fight against the speculation and cheating acts and to protect the interests of laborers also investors, and to make the socialized assets more save.Except the Introduction and the Conclusion, this dissertation is includes 8 chapters.The introduction, from the reality of world and Chinese economical development, brings forward the dissertation's purpose, theory background, main methods and the innovation.Chapter 1 is a review of the capital socialization theory. First, the chapter introduces the complexity of the notion of capital in economy, and explains the meaning in this article. Second, the chapter reviews Marx's theory on social capital and capital socialization, and shows the agreement among it and capital concentration theory, stock capital theory and fictitious capital theory. Third,
this chapter also reviews the theory development of Engels, Lenin and Hilferding.Chapter 2 discusses the change of society and economy in developed counties along with the development of capital socialization. The positive aspect is that the class structure is changing, that the class relationship is becoming relaxative, that the status of big capitalist and industry working class are all descending, that the middle class have be the majority of the population, and that the opposition emotion between the classes are tempered. Institutional investors get a great development, and its influence to the company's executive decision become more and more important; the inner supervise structure becomes more scientific. The passive aspect is mainly the cheating act in security market, which may lead an unfair assets transfer.Chapter 3 discusses the capital socialization and corporation institution variation, and this chapter is the supply to Chapter 2. The main influence of capital socialization is that the fundamental change happens in corporation institution. The contract essence arises on the basis of production essence. Stock company substitute the individual corporation and partnership corporation, and become the fundamental form. This chapter includes the capital socialization situation in the western countries and in China, and discusses some problems that must be solved in our state-owned company reform.Chapter 4 is about capital socialization and employee stock ownership institu
引文
1.马克思:《资本论》1—3卷,人民出版社1975年版。
2.《邓小平文选》1—3卷,人民出版社1989年版。
3.科斯:《财产权利与制度变迁》,上海三联书店1996年版。
4.哈罗德.德姆塞茨:《企业经济学》,中国社会科学出版社1999年版。
5.凯恩斯:《就业利息和货币通论》,商务印书馆1993年版。
6.王珏:《现代公有制》,济南出版社1998年版。
7.王珏:《迈向新世纪的中国经济改革》,中国财政经济出版社2001年版。
8.王珏:《耕者有其田 劳者有其股》,广西人民出版社1999年版。
9.曼塞.布莱克福德:《西方现代企业兴起》,经济管理出版社2001年版。
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11.杜煊君:《中国证券市场:监管与投资者保护》,上海财经大学出版社2002年版。
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21.郭锋等:《虚假陈述证券侵权赔偿》,法律出版社2003年版。
22.朱羿锟:《公司控制权配置论》,经济管理出版社2001年版。
23.罗伯特.希勒:《非理性繁荣》,中国人民大学出版社2001年版。
24.王汉亮:《中国国有企业产权问题研究》,北京大学出版社2003年版。
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2.《邓小平文选》1—3卷,人民出版社1989年版。
3.科斯:《财产权利与制度变迁》,上海三联书店1996年版。
4.哈罗德.德姆塞茨:《企业经济学》,中国社会科学出版社1999年版。
5.凯恩斯:《就业利息和货币通论》,商务印书馆1993年版。
6.王珏:《现代公有制》,济南出版社1998年版。
7.王珏:《迈向新世纪的中国经济改革》,中国财政经济出版社2001年版。
8.王珏:《耕者有其田 劳者有其股》,广西人民出版社1999年版。
9.曼塞.布莱克福德:《西方现代企业兴起》,经济管理出版社2001年版。
10.赵晓雷:《现代公司产权理论与实务》,上海财经大学出版社1997年版。
11.杜煊君:《中国证券市场:监管与投资者保护》,上海财经大学出版社2002年版。
12.申海波:《预期理论与资本市场》,上海财经大学出版社2000年版。
13.A.哈耶克:《个人主义与经济秩序》,北京经济学院出版社1991年版。
14.刘伟:《转轨经济中的国家、企业和市场》,华文出版社2001年版。
15.鲁鹏:《制度与发展关系研究》,人民出版社2002年版。
16.约翰.斯科特:《公司经营与资本家阶级》,重庆出版社2002年版。
17.王慎之:《西方经济思想库》第1—3卷,经济科学出版社1996年版。
18.毛振华:《资本化企业制度》,商务印书馆2001年版。
19.张军:《现代产权经济学》,上海三联书店1994年版。
20.李昌达等:《战后西方国家股份制的新变化》,商务印书馆2000年版。
21.郭锋等:《虚假陈述证券侵权赔偿》,法律出版社2003年版。
22.朱羿锟:《公司控制权配置论》,经济管理出版社2001年版。
23.罗伯特.希勒:《非理性繁荣》,中国人民大学出版社2001年版。
24.王汉亮:《中国国有企业产权问题研究》,北京大学出版社2003年版。
25.刘东:《虚拟资本与投资银行》,中国金融出版社2002年版。
26.奥村宏:《21世纪的企业形态》,中国计划出版社2002年版。
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