森林资源社区共管中的农民合作问题研究
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摘要
自上个世纪80年代以来,各地自然保护管理部门先后探索将森林资源社区共管作为解决保护区和周边农民冲突的一种战略途径。经验证明共管实践依赖于一套嵌合在当地和区域水平上的社会关系——社区农民的集体行动,本研究试图解析林缘社区农民合作的经济学逻辑,并通过分析农民合作的基础、性质和边界,从而对“共管如何可能”及共管诸多特征提供一个微观解释。
研究表明,只要政治或社会条件配合,一群相互依赖的农民,能够跨越集体行动的困境,在社区公共资源管理和自我发展上产生卓越的绩效,这是共管实践的社区行为基础。本研究的模型证明互惠行为和强互惠行为是指引农民自发合作的两只“看不见的手”,它们可能在一个演化的意义下逐渐消除个体搭便车、规避责任或其他机会主义行为倾向,且内生于此的合作均衡状态能抵制一定程度的内外部冲击实现自我稳定,这些为共管实践的多样性和持续性提供理论与实践层面的解释。
然而社区、市场和国家三维体制的摩擦正逐渐侵蚀着农民合作的传统基础,特别是市场经济增强了农村家庭的独立性和流动性,这既为高层次、大范围的农民合作提供了机遇,却又深刻地改变了农民行为互动的传统博弈框架,这或许是我们面临的最大难题。笔者不想把难题全部交给政府,但我们坚定地认为共管机构及政府行政需要接受而不是拒绝森林资源管理的复杂性,从而更加谨慎地在制度上权衡取舍。
Since the last century 80s, Forest Protected Areas Authority had explored co-management as a strategic solution approach to the conflict between the protected areas and surrounding community farmers. However, experience has shown that the co-management relies on the social relations embedded in the local and regional level-collective action between farmers. This article attempts to resolve the economic logic of farmers cooperating, to analyze the basis, the nature and the boundaries of farmers cooperation, so as to provide a microscopic explanation for "how is co-management possible" and its many characteristics.
My research finds, in a particular social and political conditions, a crowd of interdependent farmers, can cross the plight of collective action, then generate superior performance of community public resource management and self-development, which is an important basis for co-management practice. The model demonstrates reciprocal and strong reciprocity behaviors are the two "invisible hand" which guide the spontaneous cooperation between farmers. Because they may gradually eliminate each individual's behavior tendencies such as free ride taking, avoiding responsibility, or other opportunistic behavior in the sense of evolution. And to a certain extent, the cooperation structure shaped by reciprocal and strong reciprocity behavior will be able to withstand external or external shocks and achieve self-stability, which provide an explanation for the diversity and continuity of co-management practice.
However, the friction among community, market and state three-dimensional system is gradually eroding the traditional basis for farmers cooperation. In particular, the Market Economy increased independence and mobility of rural households, which provided an opportunity for the high-level and wide range farmers cooperation. But it profoundly changed the traditional game framework of farmers'behavior interactions which may be our biggest challenge. This article does not want to give all the problems to the government, but it insists that the co-management institutions and administration should accept rather than refuse the complexity of forest resources governing, and thereby make institutional trade-offs more carefully.
研究表明,只要政治或社会条件配合,一群相互依赖的农民,能够跨越集体行动的困境,在社区公共资源管理和自我发展上产生卓越的绩效,这是共管实践的社区行为基础。本研究的模型证明互惠行为和强互惠行为是指引农民自发合作的两只“看不见的手”,它们可能在一个演化的意义下逐渐消除个体搭便车、规避责任或其他机会主义行为倾向,且内生于此的合作均衡状态能抵制一定程度的内外部冲击实现自我稳定,这些为共管实践的多样性和持续性提供理论与实践层面的解释。
然而社区、市场和国家三维体制的摩擦正逐渐侵蚀着农民合作的传统基础,特别是市场经济增强了农村家庭的独立性和流动性,这既为高层次、大范围的农民合作提供了机遇,却又深刻地改变了农民行为互动的传统博弈框架,这或许是我们面临的最大难题。笔者不想把难题全部交给政府,但我们坚定地认为共管机构及政府行政需要接受而不是拒绝森林资源管理的复杂性,从而更加谨慎地在制度上权衡取舍。
Since the last century 80s, Forest Protected Areas Authority had explored co-management as a strategic solution approach to the conflict between the protected areas and surrounding community farmers. However, experience has shown that the co-management relies on the social relations embedded in the local and regional level-collective action between farmers. This article attempts to resolve the economic logic of farmers cooperating, to analyze the basis, the nature and the boundaries of farmers cooperation, so as to provide a microscopic explanation for "how is co-management possible" and its many characteristics.
My research finds, in a particular social and political conditions, a crowd of interdependent farmers, can cross the plight of collective action, then generate superior performance of community public resource management and self-development, which is an important basis for co-management practice. The model demonstrates reciprocal and strong reciprocity behaviors are the two "invisible hand" which guide the spontaneous cooperation between farmers. Because they may gradually eliminate each individual's behavior tendencies such as free ride taking, avoiding responsibility, or other opportunistic behavior in the sense of evolution. And to a certain extent, the cooperation structure shaped by reciprocal and strong reciprocity behavior will be able to withstand external or external shocks and achieve self-stability, which provide an explanation for the diversity and continuity of co-management practice.
However, the friction among community, market and state three-dimensional system is gradually eroding the traditional basis for farmers cooperation. In particular, the Market Economy increased independence and mobility of rural households, which provided an opportunity for the high-level and wide range farmers cooperation. But it profoundly changed the traditional game framework of farmers'behavior interactions which may be our biggest challenge. This article does not want to give all the problems to the government, but it insists that the co-management institutions and administration should accept rather than refuse the complexity of forest resources governing, and thereby make institutional trade-offs more carefully.
引文
①见Garrett Hardin(1968)。
②国有化的原因除了主流的类似于“公地悲剧”理论影响外,还有两个重要原因是：一方面,发展中国家的政府认为发展国家经济需要大量的原材料,只有中央通过各级政府统一调配、“科学管理”才能满足经济建设的需要：另一方面,局部地区资源系统遭受破坏的事实,使得政府不相信生存依赖于自然资源的农民,能够解决人口增长、经济利益和资源保护之问的矛盾。
③虽然Dasgupta& Heal再三强调在具体场景中政府管理国有森林成本可能非常高,这对多种管理方案的选择会产生影响,但是政策很少注意到Dasgupta and Heal的告诫。
①Elinor Ostrom论述道：广袤的森林被国有化之后,社区居民若没有被赋予管理和利用森林的机会,那么,政府机构就会被视为无关的局外人。根据社区的逻辑,为了社区成员的利益而利用局外人的财产并不是什么羞耻的事情,在这样的条件下,就难以制止非法的木材采伐和为移动性耕地而焚烧树木的行为。顺便提一下,Elinor Ostrom是美国印第安纳大学教授,因为在公共事物治理研究方面的杰出成就被授予2009年度的诺贝尔经济学奖,本文在很多地方参考了Ostrom教授的研究成果,借此文,向她表示祝贺和感谢。
①本节的主要内容曾以《农民的强互惠行为与森林资源管理》为题发表于江西农业大学学报(社会科学版)上,见韦惠兰,吴香炼(2009)。
①关于森林资源社区共管的脆弱性已经产生了专门的学术著作,见韦惠兰,宋桂英(2009)。
①对此表现最为明显,并对后来社会主义国家产生重要影响的是列宁的《农业问题》,该著作充满了对小农和小农生产形式的轻蔑。对此,可见詹姆斯.斯科特(James C.Scott)的深刻评述(1998)。
②详细的案例见杨继斌《修桥记——农民自建基础设施样本观察》,载于2009年6月29日的《南方周末》。
①帕萨.达斯古普特(Partha Dasgupta)经济发展与社会资本观.载《社会资本：一个多角度的视角》.北京：中国人民大学出版社.2004,P451。
①见安妮鲁德.克里希娜(Anirudh Krishna).创造与利用社会资本.载《社会资本：一个多角度的视角》北京：中国人民大学出版社.2004,P91
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②国有化的原因除了主流的类似于“公地悲剧”理论影响外,还有两个重要原因是：一方面,发展中国家的政府认为发展国家经济需要大量的原材料,只有中央通过各级政府统一调配、“科学管理”才能满足经济建设的需要：另一方面,局部地区资源系统遭受破坏的事实,使得政府不相信生存依赖于自然资源的农民,能够解决人口增长、经济利益和资源保护之问的矛盾。
③虽然Dasgupta& Heal再三强调在具体场景中政府管理国有森林成本可能非常高,这对多种管理方案的选择会产生影响,但是政策很少注意到Dasgupta and Heal的告诫。
①Elinor Ostrom论述道：广袤的森林被国有化之后,社区居民若没有被赋予管理和利用森林的机会,那么,政府机构就会被视为无关的局外人。根据社区的逻辑,为了社区成员的利益而利用局外人的财产并不是什么羞耻的事情,在这样的条件下,就难以制止非法的木材采伐和为移动性耕地而焚烧树木的行为。顺便提一下,Elinor Ostrom是美国印第安纳大学教授,因为在公共事物治理研究方面的杰出成就被授予2009年度的诺贝尔经济学奖,本文在很多地方参考了Ostrom教授的研究成果,借此文,向她表示祝贺和感谢。
①本节的主要内容曾以《农民的强互惠行为与森林资源管理》为题发表于江西农业大学学报(社会科学版)上,见韦惠兰,吴香炼(2009)。
①关于森林资源社区共管的脆弱性已经产生了专门的学术著作,见韦惠兰,宋桂英(2009)。
①对此表现最为明显,并对后来社会主义国家产生重要影响的是列宁的《农业问题》,该著作充满了对小农和小农生产形式的轻蔑。对此,可见詹姆斯.斯科特(James C.Scott)的深刻评述(1998)。
②详细的案例见杨继斌《修桥记——农民自建基础设施样本观察》,载于2009年6月29日的《南方周末》。
①帕萨.达斯古普特(Partha Dasgupta)经济发展与社会资本观.载《社会资本：一个多角度的视角》.北京：中国人民大学出版社.2004,P451。
①见安妮鲁德.克里希娜(Anirudh Krishna).创造与利用社会资本.载《社会资本：一个多角度的视角》北京：中国人民大学出版社.2004,P91
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