国有上市公司经营者行为与资本结构
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摘要
随着国家市场化经济转轨进程的持续推进,体制外经济的发展取得了举世瞩目的成就。与之相比,体制内经济的发展则是稍逊一筹。如何搞活国有经济,使经济主体具备竞争优势、有效发展,是摆在政府、企业界及诸多专家学者面前的一项紧迫任务。鉴于资本结构对于企业价值的重要意义,这个问题的解决是搞活企业,提升企业业绩的关键所在。
西方资本结构理论以传统资本结构理论为起点,始于20世纪50年代,主要经历了传统资本结构理论、现代资本结构理论、新资本结构理论三个阶段。但我国始于20世纪90年代的资本结构理论及实证研究却表明,国外这些先进的资本结构理论并不能对我国国有企业的融资实践作出很好的解释,很多在西方发达国家已经得到验证的理论在现阶段的中国并不适用。
前景理论是行为经济学中目前较为成熟的理论之一。它的研究是从现实经济活动出发,考虑人的行为心理特征,它研究“实际发生了什么”,分析在不确定条件下人们决策过程中非理性的本质原因。因此,前景理论更真实地描述和解释了人在面对风险时的行为,这是理性决策研究者没有意识到的行为模式。前景理论认为人们更加看重的是财富的变化量而不是最终量;人们面临条件相当的损失时是风险偏好的;面临条件相当的收益时倾向于规避风险,获取固定收益;盈利带来的快乐与相等量的损失带来的痛苦是不相等,后者大于前者。
本文以我国转轨经济的特殊制度背景为基点,通过对影响我国国有上市公司经营者行为的效用进行分析,引入前景理论,建立经营者价值模型,并且通过实证证明,经营者价值与资本结构有显著的相关性。当企业业绩激励机制缺乏,内外部控制机制不完善的情况下,经营者在追求自身价值最大化的过程中,会导致其产生股权融资偏好。针对这种由经营者行为所导致的股权融资偏好,本文还提出了相应的建议,以供参考。
With the sustained upgrading of our country's marketed-oriented economic transfer, the non-system economy made great progress, but the economic within the system did not. How to vitalize the national economy by reforming the state owned enterprises and make them become efficiency and own competitive edge is a urgent problem of the government、enterprises and scholars. Owing to the great influence imposed on the market value by the capital structure of the enterprises, the problem is solved good or not is key thing to vitalize the national economy and improve the enterprises' performance.
With the traditional capital structure being the initial stage, the western capital structure theory started in 1950s and it experienced three stages of traditional capital structure、modern capital structure、new capital structure. But the domestic correlative Theoretical and Empirical Studies which started at 1990s show that these foreign advanced theories about capital structure did not give satisfied expression to the financing actions of the state-owned enterprises of our country. Lots of capital structure theory which have been proved does not fit our country in the current time.
Prospect theory is one of the most important theories in behavioral economics. Its study focus on the real economy activities and consider the behavioral and psychology characters of people. It studies what happens in real life and analyzed the irrational essential reasons of people' s decision progress under the uncertain condition. So Prospect theory truly describes and explains the action when people face risk, and this the action model that logical decision researcher have realized. Prospect theory says that people pay more attention to the variable quantity of wealth than the quantity of wealth itself; when people face the same loss, they are risk preference; when people face the same profits they always want to get the fixed income and avoid risks; the happiness that comes from profits is not equal to the hurt that comes from loss, and the last one is bigger than the first one.
Based on the special institutional background of transition economy and analyze the utility which influence the behavior of the state-owned list companies' operators, this article introduces prospect theory into utility function, and makes a new value model of operators. And then it used an empirical proof prove that the value of operators have a remarkable relationship with the capital structure. When When the Performance incentive mechanism doesn' t work and the control mechanism inside and outside the company is not perfect, operators are always equity finance preference to maximize their own value. In the end, the article provides some advice to deal with this equity finance preference.
西方资本结构理论以传统资本结构理论为起点,始于20世纪50年代,主要经历了传统资本结构理论、现代资本结构理论、新资本结构理论三个阶段。但我国始于20世纪90年代的资本结构理论及实证研究却表明,国外这些先进的资本结构理论并不能对我国国有企业的融资实践作出很好的解释,很多在西方发达国家已经得到验证的理论在现阶段的中国并不适用。
前景理论是行为经济学中目前较为成熟的理论之一。它的研究是从现实经济活动出发,考虑人的行为心理特征,它研究“实际发生了什么”,分析在不确定条件下人们决策过程中非理性的本质原因。因此,前景理论更真实地描述和解释了人在面对风险时的行为,这是理性决策研究者没有意识到的行为模式。前景理论认为人们更加看重的是财富的变化量而不是最终量;人们面临条件相当的损失时是风险偏好的;面临条件相当的收益时倾向于规避风险,获取固定收益;盈利带来的快乐与相等量的损失带来的痛苦是不相等,后者大于前者。
本文以我国转轨经济的特殊制度背景为基点,通过对影响我国国有上市公司经营者行为的效用进行分析,引入前景理论,建立经营者价值模型,并且通过实证证明,经营者价值与资本结构有显著的相关性。当企业业绩激励机制缺乏,内外部控制机制不完善的情况下,经营者在追求自身价值最大化的过程中,会导致其产生股权融资偏好。针对这种由经营者行为所导致的股权融资偏好,本文还提出了相应的建议,以供参考。
With the sustained upgrading of our country's marketed-oriented economic transfer, the non-system economy made great progress, but the economic within the system did not. How to vitalize the national economy by reforming the state owned enterprises and make them become efficiency and own competitive edge is a urgent problem of the government、enterprises and scholars. Owing to the great influence imposed on the market value by the capital structure of the enterprises, the problem is solved good or not is key thing to vitalize the national economy and improve the enterprises' performance.
With the traditional capital structure being the initial stage, the western capital structure theory started in 1950s and it experienced three stages of traditional capital structure、modern capital structure、new capital structure. But the domestic correlative Theoretical and Empirical Studies which started at 1990s show that these foreign advanced theories about capital structure did not give satisfied expression to the financing actions of the state-owned enterprises of our country. Lots of capital structure theory which have been proved does not fit our country in the current time.
Prospect theory is one of the most important theories in behavioral economics. Its study focus on the real economy activities and consider the behavioral and psychology characters of people. It studies what happens in real life and analyzed the irrational essential reasons of people' s decision progress under the uncertain condition. So Prospect theory truly describes and explains the action when people face risk, and this the action model that logical decision researcher have realized. Prospect theory says that people pay more attention to the variable quantity of wealth than the quantity of wealth itself; when people face the same loss, they are risk preference; when people face the same profits they always want to get the fixed income and avoid risks; the happiness that comes from profits is not equal to the hurt that comes from loss, and the last one is bigger than the first one.
Based on the special institutional background of transition economy and analyze the utility which influence the behavior of the state-owned list companies' operators, this article introduces prospect theory into utility function, and makes a new value model of operators. And then it used an empirical proof prove that the value of operators have a remarkable relationship with the capital structure. When When the Performance incentive mechanism doesn' t work and the control mechanism inside and outside the company is not perfect, operators are always equity finance preference to maximize their own value. In the end, the article provides some advice to deal with this equity finance preference.
引文
[1]Myers S C,Majluf N S.Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information those Investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):187-221
[2]吴晓求.资本结构和公司治理的若干理论问题.中国经济信息,2003(5):64、66-69
[3]沈艺峰.资本结构理论史.经济科学出版社,1999
[4]阿斯瓦斯.达摩达兰.应用公司财务.机械工业出版社2000
[5]卢福财.企业融资效率分析.经济管理出版社,2001
[6]Wald,J.K.,How firm characteristics affect capital structure:an international comparison[J],Journal of Financial Reasearch 22,1999:161-187
[7]曹志广、杨军敏.国外资本结构理论研究评述.首都经贸大学学报,2007(1):92-99
[8]Jensen,Michael C and William H.Meckling,1976" Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of Financial Economics,2:205-360
[9]Stephen A.Ross.The Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive-Signalling Approach[J].Bell Journal of Economics,Vol.8,No.1(Spring,1977):23-40
[10]Hayne E.Leland;David H.Pyle.Informational Asymmetries,Financial Structure,and Financial Intermediation[J].The Journal of Finance,Vol.32,No.2,Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association,Atlantic City,New Jersey,September 16-18,1976.(May,1977):371-387
[11]朱叶.中国上市公司资本结构研究[M].复旦大学出版社,2003
[12]韩传模,孙青霞.中国资本结构实证研究方法的思考.会计研究,2006(9):42-47
[13]Sheridan Titman,Roberto Wessels,The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice[J],The Journal of Finance,1988(03):163-179
[14]黄庆堂,黄兰英.资本结构对企业合并绩效影响之研究[J].台湾银行季刊,第46卷第4期
[15]陆正飞、辛宇.上市公司资本结构主要影响因素之实证研究.会计研究,1998(08):34-35
[16]冯根福,吴林江,刘世彦.我国上市公司资本结构形成的影响因素分析[J].经济学家,2000(05):59-66
[17]陈维云、张宗益.对资本结构财务影响因素的实证研究.财经理论与实践,2002(01):76-77
[18]斯韦托扎尔.平乔维奇(蒋琳琦译).产权经济学——一种关于比较体制的理论[M].经济科学出版社,1999
[19]陆正飞、叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析.经济研究,2004(04)
[20]冯根福,马亚军.上市公司高管人员自利对资本结构影响的实证分析.财贸经济,2004,(6)
[21]叶华.企业高层管理者长效激励机制研究.财会通讯(综合版).2007(04):68-69
[22]中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者队伍制度化建设的现状与发展——2000年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告,《管理世界》2000(04)
[23]李成仁、余嘉明.我国上市公司的股权激励研究.成人高教学刊,2007(6):32-35
[24]陈冬华、陈信元、万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2005(02):94
[25]林卫星.国有公司、企业内国家工作人员贪污贿赂犯罪的经济分析——从效用函数切入.社会科学家,2005(01):193-196
[26]李新春,苏晓华.总经理继任:西方的理论和我国的实践[J].管理世界,2001(4):145-152
[27]党晓龙,张德。我国大型国有企业经营者继任的现状分析[J],清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(19):60-63.
[28]中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者队伍制度化建设的现状与发展——2000年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告.《管理世界》2000(04)
[29]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[30]辛会玲.经营者对企业破产的个人责任:[硕士论文].上海交通大学,2006
[31]Neumann,Morgenstein O.Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1944.
[32]Leonard J.Savage,Foundations of Statistics,1954
[33]Kahneman,D.and Tversky,A.,"Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision Under Risk",Econometrica,1979
[34]王敬,张莹,李延喜.期望理论及价值函数的实证研究.大连理工大学学报,2006(6):3-41
[35]Zank,Cumulative Prospect theory for parametric and multiattribute utilities[J],Mathematics of Operations Research,2001(26):67-81
[36]Wakker,Zankh,A simple preference-foundation of cumulative prospect theory with power utility[J],European Economic Review,2002(46):1253-1271
[37]Kahneman,Tversky.Advances in prospect theory:cumulative representation of uncertainty[J],Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1992(5):297-324.
[38]张士伟.上市公司股权融资偏好的内部人成因分析.深圳证券交易所第七届会员单位与基金公司研究成果,2005
[39]谢玉华.政企和谐:由权威控制到规则依存[J].中国行政管理.2006(3):41-43
[40]严建苗等.国有企业间经理人市场的声誉机制分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2002(3):36-39
[41]俞乔.市场有效,周期异常与股价波动:——对上海、深圳股票市场的实证分析[J].1994(9):43-50
[42]张亦春,周颖刚.中国股市弱式有效吗?[J].金融研究,2001(3):34-40
[43]胡波等.中国证券市场有效性实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,2002(7):36-39.
[44]王爱俭等.中国虚拟经济规模适度性研究——基于资本市场效率视角的分析[J].财贸经济,2006(8):16-20
[45]郁建.浅析新破产法之管理人制度的创新与缺陷.科教文汇,2007(09):164
[2]吴晓求.资本结构和公司治理的若干理论问题.中国经济信息,2003(5):64、66-69
[3]沈艺峰.资本结构理论史.经济科学出版社,1999
[4]阿斯瓦斯.达摩达兰.应用公司财务.机械工业出版社2000
[5]卢福财.企业融资效率分析.经济管理出版社,2001
[6]Wald,J.K.,How firm characteristics affect capital structure:an international comparison[J],Journal of Financial Reasearch 22,1999:161-187
[7]曹志广、杨军敏.国外资本结构理论研究评述.首都经贸大学学报,2007(1):92-99
[8]Jensen,Michael C and William H.Meckling,1976" Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" Journal of Financial Economics,2:205-360
[9]Stephen A.Ross.The Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive-Signalling Approach[J].Bell Journal of Economics,Vol.8,No.1(Spring,1977):23-40
[10]Hayne E.Leland;David H.Pyle.Informational Asymmetries,Financial Structure,and Financial Intermediation[J].The Journal of Finance,Vol.32,No.2,Papers and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association,Atlantic City,New Jersey,September 16-18,1976.(May,1977):371-387
[11]朱叶.中国上市公司资本结构研究[M].复旦大学出版社,2003
[12]韩传模,孙青霞.中国资本结构实证研究方法的思考.会计研究,2006(9):42-47
[13]Sheridan Titman,Roberto Wessels,The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice[J],The Journal of Finance,1988(03):163-179
[14]黄庆堂,黄兰英.资本结构对企业合并绩效影响之研究[J].台湾银行季刊,第46卷第4期
[15]陆正飞、辛宇.上市公司资本结构主要影响因素之实证研究.会计研究,1998(08):34-35
[16]冯根福,吴林江,刘世彦.我国上市公司资本结构形成的影响因素分析[J].经济学家,2000(05):59-66
[17]陈维云、张宗益.对资本结构财务影响因素的实证研究.财经理论与实践,2002(01):76-77
[18]斯韦托扎尔.平乔维奇(蒋琳琦译).产权经济学——一种关于比较体制的理论[M].经济科学出版社,1999
[19]陆正飞、叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析.经济研究,2004(04)
[20]冯根福,马亚军.上市公司高管人员自利对资本结构影响的实证分析.财贸经济,2004,(6)
[21]叶华.企业高层管理者长效激励机制研究.财会通讯(综合版).2007(04):68-69
[22]中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者队伍制度化建设的现状与发展——2000年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告,《管理世界》2000(04)
[23]李成仁、余嘉明.我国上市公司的股权激励研究.成人高教学刊,2007(6):32-35
[24]陈冬华、陈信元、万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2005(02):94
[25]林卫星.国有公司、企业内国家工作人员贪污贿赂犯罪的经济分析——从效用函数切入.社会科学家,2005(01):193-196
[26]李新春,苏晓华.总经理继任:西方的理论和我国的实践[J].管理世界,2001(4):145-152
[27]党晓龙,张德。我国大型国有企业经营者继任的现状分析[J],清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(19):60-63.
[28]中国企业家调查系统.中国企业经营者队伍制度化建设的现状与发展——2000年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告.《管理世界》2000(04)
[29]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京大学出版社,1999
[30]辛会玲.经营者对企业破产的个人责任:[硕士论文].上海交通大学,2006
[31]Neumann,Morgenstein O.Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1944.
[32]Leonard J.Savage,Foundations of Statistics,1954
[33]Kahneman,D.and Tversky,A.,"Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision Under Risk",Econometrica,1979
[34]王敬,张莹,李延喜.期望理论及价值函数的实证研究.大连理工大学学报,2006(6):3-41
[35]Zank,Cumulative Prospect theory for parametric and multiattribute utilities[J],Mathematics of Operations Research,2001(26):67-81
[36]Wakker,Zankh,A simple preference-foundation of cumulative prospect theory with power utility[J],European Economic Review,2002(46):1253-1271
[37]Kahneman,Tversky.Advances in prospect theory:cumulative representation of uncertainty[J],Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1992(5):297-324.
[38]张士伟.上市公司股权融资偏好的内部人成因分析.深圳证券交易所第七届会员单位与基金公司研究成果,2005
[39]谢玉华.政企和谐:由权威控制到规则依存[J].中国行政管理.2006(3):41-43
[40]严建苗等.国有企业间经理人市场的声誉机制分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2002(3):36-39
[41]俞乔.市场有效,周期异常与股价波动:——对上海、深圳股票市场的实证分析[J].1994(9):43-50
[42]张亦春,周颖刚.中国股市弱式有效吗?[J].金融研究,2001(3):34-40
[43]胡波等.中国证券市场有效性实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,2002(7):36-39.
[44]王爱俭等.中国虚拟经济规模适度性研究——基于资本市场效率视角的分析[J].财贸经济,2006(8):16-20
[45]郁建.浅析新破产法之管理人制度的创新与缺陷.科教文汇,2007(09):164