知识异质性个体间策略指导与学习行为的理论和实验研究
|
摘要
在中国特定知识传统下,人们正经历从依赖科层化的垂直行政权力支配体系向市场化水平协调规则体系的社会转型,此时考察个体观念转变的知识更新过程显得尤为必要。通过对南京市住宅小区的两次抽样调查(30个小区878名业主、28个小区865名业主)发现,住宅小区共享资源治理转型困境的实质是治理主体自身决策知识限制导致的认知不协调。政府退出供给之后,绝大多数业主的认知状态是:趋于支配共享资源决策权利、同时回避与之对应、对等的供给共享资源的责任,缺乏市场条件下自我治理的决策知识。由此引出:如何刻画知识异质性个体在同一个社会环境中互动协调、调整信念和决策规则以习得新场景下决策知识的过程?
围绕上述问题,本文结合动态过程和均衡选择两种分析范式,基于个体知识习得行为考察个体间协调互动的治理模式选择问题。全文研究工作如下:
(1)将知识学习行为嵌入在社会经济转型过程中考察。住宅小区共享资源治理问题,在经典文献中属于公共物品和集体行动理论范畴。针对转型期经济的特殊性,本文率先从微观主体认知状态和学习行为角度考察这一特殊的公共物品的治理转型问题,研究个体认知状态调整、知识习得与制度转型的内在关联,强调个体信念调整、知识更新重于制度转型。整合当前个体层面的学习模型,用于探讨个体间协调互动、完成共享资源治理转型的过程。
(2)系统研究重复协调博弈中的策略指导行为。将策略指导研究从两人3×3协调博弈拓展到3人3×3×3最小努力协调博弈,重点考察知识异质性与策略指导行为发生的关联,适应性学习、老练学习和策略指导行为的关系,并分析策略指导行为发生的激励和风险。
(3)学习理论模型的实验表征。首次在博弈实验中引入知识异质性设置,并将参与同一博弈的同组被试双方知识状态设置差异,考察不同知识状态下的行为表现。将与被试博弈的另一方用固定选择纳什均衡行动作为策略指导的计算机代替,考察被策略指导的被试信念调整过程。将3人3×3×3最小努力协调博弈转化成形同2人3×3的记录形式,便于博弈学习模型的参数估计和拟合效果评价。用实验记录界定了EHOS模型的三类不同行动:往前推算一步的“Level 1”行动、往前推算两步的“Level2”行动和不做换位思考、随机决策的“Level 0”行动。
实验研究结果表明:
(1)在两人3×3纯策略纳什均衡博弈、3人3×3×3博弈,均存在显著的策略指导行为。存在策略指导行为的被试组收敛可能性显著高于不存在策略指导行为的被试组。知识异质被试组发生策略指导可能性显著低于知识同质的被试组。同一组参与者规模增大,使得策略指导对博弈均衡收敛的促进作用减弱。成功的指导者得到的支付显著比未收敛者多,但显著低于追随者(适应性学习者)。
(2)在知识同质(AP)、固定匹配和知识异质、固定匹配两类重复博弈实验中,EHOS模型的拟合效果最优,即能够同时体现具备双方决策知识(AP)的个体信念形成和决策过程中“前瞻”和“后顾”特征,且该类个体更易于成为策略指导者。与强化模型、虚拟博弈学习和γ-加权信念比较,拟合效果显著改善。在知识同质(AP)、随机匹配和知识同质(AP)、与固定行动选择的计算机匹配两类重复博弈实验中,强化学习模型的拟和效果最好,这与所面临的场景有关,前者是高度不确定性,而后者是与确定行动选择的计算机互动。
(3)对应现实问题,作为住宅小区共享资源局部治理制度的微观主体,业主的知识更新是决定该项制度变迁成败的关键所在。作为住宅小区共享资源外部主体的政府,能够做的是积极实现从管理到服务的职能转变,从制度上为共享资源自我治理扫清障碍,避免实施强化业主完全依赖政府的信念、阻碍学习新决策知识的政府行为。
It is necessary to explore the updating process of individual knowledge, which through out the transition from hierarchical institutions of decision to horizontal coordination in market system, under traditional knowledge in a specific planning economy. Using the sampled investigation data from Nanjing residential communities, statistical results show that the essence of transition dilemma of Common Pool Resource governance in residential community is owners' cognitive dissonance lead by the bound of decision knowledge. After the absence of state provision, most owners still prefer to gain the decision-making right of the commons while averse from the matching duty of providing. Then we present the problem on capturing the process of interactive coordination, adjusting of belief and decision-make rule and acquiring new knowledge.
Applying paradigm of evolutionary dynamic process and equilibrium analysis, this paper explored the choice of governing model based on individual knowledge acquirement. The main work of this paper is as following.
(1) The problem on common pool resource governance in residential community is treated as public good and collective action theory in classic literature. Considering the particularity of transition economy, we firstly introduced knowledge learning behavior into social economic transiting process, focusing on the inner relationship among individual cognitive state adjusting, acquisition of knowledge and institutional change. We also integrated existing individual learning models, using on individual coordination during CPR provision.
(2) This paper systemically researched strategic teaching behavior during repeated coordination games. The research was extent from two persons 3×3×3 repeated coordination game to three persons minimum effort game, then the relation between knowledge heterogeneity and strategic teaching was investigated. In this paper we also paid attention to the motivation and risk of strategic teaching.
(3) For the first time, this paper introduced the setting of knowledge heterogeneity in experimental game, that made one of partners know both the payoffs according to his choices and other partners', while another only know his own payoffs according to his choices, then we can studied the performance under different knowledge states. Here we also demonstrated how subjects adjust their belief and decision make rule when we replaced their opponents by computers who chose fixed action from beginning to end. We distinguished Level 0 players who randomized and chose each strategy with probability 1/3, Level 1 players who chose the best response to his opponent's last period's action, and Level 2 players whose best response to last period's outcome is the strategy which his opponent could be choosing according to Ehrblatt-Hyndman-Ozbay-Schotter model, using experimental data.
The experiment results indicate that, (1) for two persons 3×3 and three persons 3×3×3 pure strategy games, there are strategic teaching behavior significantly. The matched subjects with teaching behavior converge more frequently than these without teaching behavior. The matched subjects with knowledge heterogeneity converge less frequently than these with knowledge homogeneity. When the scale of players expands, the role of teaching in facilitating convergence to unique pure strategy equilibria is decreasing. As their motive, successful teachers' payoffs more than those players who do not converge, while less than followers significantly.
(2) For repeated fixed matching experimental games with knowledge heterogeneity and knowledge homogeneity, EHOS model best fits these data. It captures both backward-looking and forward-looking characters in the process of individual belief formation and decision-making. Its Goodness-of-fit is also improved. For repeated random matching experimental games with knowledge heterogeneity and playing with computers who chose the same action during games, reinforcement model performs best, which is led by the extent of uncertainty of situations players facing.
(3) Corresponding to issues come from transition of governance of common pool resource in residential community, its key factor is the knowledge updating process of house-owners, as they are the main inner partner of governing the common pool resource. As an outer partner, what the government should do is to transform its duty from management to service, clear away the obstacles of self-governing, and avoid to reinforce house-owners' dependent on the government and discourage them to learning new decision knowledge.
围绕上述问题,本文结合动态过程和均衡选择两种分析范式,基于个体知识习得行为考察个体间协调互动的治理模式选择问题。全文研究工作如下:
(1)将知识学习行为嵌入在社会经济转型过程中考察。住宅小区共享资源治理问题,在经典文献中属于公共物品和集体行动理论范畴。针对转型期经济的特殊性,本文率先从微观主体认知状态和学习行为角度考察这一特殊的公共物品的治理转型问题,研究个体认知状态调整、知识习得与制度转型的内在关联,强调个体信念调整、知识更新重于制度转型。整合当前个体层面的学习模型,用于探讨个体间协调互动、完成共享资源治理转型的过程。
(2)系统研究重复协调博弈中的策略指导行为。将策略指导研究从两人3×3协调博弈拓展到3人3×3×3最小努力协调博弈,重点考察知识异质性与策略指导行为发生的关联,适应性学习、老练学习和策略指导行为的关系,并分析策略指导行为发生的激励和风险。
(3)学习理论模型的实验表征。首次在博弈实验中引入知识异质性设置,并将参与同一博弈的同组被试双方知识状态设置差异,考察不同知识状态下的行为表现。将与被试博弈的另一方用固定选择纳什均衡行动作为策略指导的计算机代替,考察被策略指导的被试信念调整过程。将3人3×3×3最小努力协调博弈转化成形同2人3×3的记录形式,便于博弈学习模型的参数估计和拟合效果评价。用实验记录界定了EHOS模型的三类不同行动:往前推算一步的“Level 1”行动、往前推算两步的“Level2”行动和不做换位思考、随机决策的“Level 0”行动。
实验研究结果表明:
(1)在两人3×3纯策略纳什均衡博弈、3人3×3×3博弈,均存在显著的策略指导行为。存在策略指导行为的被试组收敛可能性显著高于不存在策略指导行为的被试组。知识异质被试组发生策略指导可能性显著低于知识同质的被试组。同一组参与者规模增大,使得策略指导对博弈均衡收敛的促进作用减弱。成功的指导者得到的支付显著比未收敛者多,但显著低于追随者(适应性学习者)。
(2)在知识同质(AP)、固定匹配和知识异质、固定匹配两类重复博弈实验中,EHOS模型的拟合效果最优,即能够同时体现具备双方决策知识(AP)的个体信念形成和决策过程中“前瞻”和“后顾”特征,且该类个体更易于成为策略指导者。与强化模型、虚拟博弈学习和γ-加权信念比较,拟合效果显著改善。在知识同质(AP)、随机匹配和知识同质(AP)、与固定行动选择的计算机匹配两类重复博弈实验中,强化学习模型的拟和效果最好,这与所面临的场景有关,前者是高度不确定性,而后者是与确定行动选择的计算机互动。
(3)对应现实问题,作为住宅小区共享资源局部治理制度的微观主体,业主的知识更新是决定该项制度变迁成败的关键所在。作为住宅小区共享资源外部主体的政府,能够做的是积极实现从管理到服务的职能转变,从制度上为共享资源自我治理扫清障碍,避免实施强化业主完全依赖政府的信念、阻碍学习新决策知识的政府行为。
It is necessary to explore the updating process of individual knowledge, which through out the transition from hierarchical institutions of decision to horizontal coordination in market system, under traditional knowledge in a specific planning economy. Using the sampled investigation data from Nanjing residential communities, statistical results show that the essence of transition dilemma of Common Pool Resource governance in residential community is owners' cognitive dissonance lead by the bound of decision knowledge. After the absence of state provision, most owners still prefer to gain the decision-making right of the commons while averse from the matching duty of providing. Then we present the problem on capturing the process of interactive coordination, adjusting of belief and decision-make rule and acquiring new knowledge.
Applying paradigm of evolutionary dynamic process and equilibrium analysis, this paper explored the choice of governing model based on individual knowledge acquirement. The main work of this paper is as following.
(1) The problem on common pool resource governance in residential community is treated as public good and collective action theory in classic literature. Considering the particularity of transition economy, we firstly introduced knowledge learning behavior into social economic transiting process, focusing on the inner relationship among individual cognitive state adjusting, acquisition of knowledge and institutional change. We also integrated existing individual learning models, using on individual coordination during CPR provision.
(2) This paper systemically researched strategic teaching behavior during repeated coordination games. The research was extent from two persons 3×3×3 repeated coordination game to three persons minimum effort game, then the relation between knowledge heterogeneity and strategic teaching was investigated. In this paper we also paid attention to the motivation and risk of strategic teaching.
(3) For the first time, this paper introduced the setting of knowledge heterogeneity in experimental game, that made one of partners know both the payoffs according to his choices and other partners', while another only know his own payoffs according to his choices, then we can studied the performance under different knowledge states. Here we also demonstrated how subjects adjust their belief and decision make rule when we replaced their opponents by computers who chose fixed action from beginning to end. We distinguished Level 0 players who randomized and chose each strategy with probability 1/3, Level 1 players who chose the best response to his opponent's last period's action, and Level 2 players whose best response to last period's outcome is the strategy which his opponent could be choosing according to Ehrblatt-Hyndman-Ozbay-Schotter model, using experimental data.
The experiment results indicate that, (1) for two persons 3×3 and three persons 3×3×3 pure strategy games, there are strategic teaching behavior significantly. The matched subjects with teaching behavior converge more frequently than these without teaching behavior. The matched subjects with knowledge heterogeneity converge less frequently than these with knowledge homogeneity. When the scale of players expands, the role of teaching in facilitating convergence to unique pure strategy equilibria is decreasing. As their motive, successful teachers' payoffs more than those players who do not converge, while less than followers significantly.
(2) For repeated fixed matching experimental games with knowledge heterogeneity and knowledge homogeneity, EHOS model best fits these data. It captures both backward-looking and forward-looking characters in the process of individual belief formation and decision-making. Its Goodness-of-fit is also improved. For repeated random matching experimental games with knowledge heterogeneity and playing with computers who chose the same action during games, reinforcement model performs best, which is led by the extent of uncertainty of situations players facing.
(3) Corresponding to issues come from transition of governance of common pool resource in residential community, its key factor is the knowledge updating process of house-owners, as they are the main inner partner of governing the common pool resource. As an outer partner, what the government should do is to transform its duty from management to service, clear away the obstacles of self-governing, and avoid to reinforce house-owners' dependent on the government and discourage them to learning new decision knowledge.
引文
[1]梁启超.李鸿章[A].饮冰室合集·专集(第二册)[M].北京:中华书局,1989.
[2]朱宪辰.共享资源制度安排[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[3]李泽厚.启蒙与救亡的双重变奏[A].李泽厚十年集(第三卷下)[M].北京:东方出版社,1987:17-44.
[4]汪丁丁.知识沿时间和空间的互补性以及相关的经济学[J].经济研究.1997(6):70-78.
[5]费孝通.乡土中国[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1998.
[6]林毓生.中国传统的创造性转化[J].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1994.
[7]Noth D.C.理解经济变迁过程[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[8]张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁[A].盛洪,张宇燕.从计划经济到市场经济[C].北京:中国财政经济出版社,1998.
[9]苏明.中国财政赤字的现状与政策取向[J].西部论丛,2002(1):27-32.
[101李斌.中国住房改革制度的分割性[J].社会学研究,2002(2):80-87.
[11]Krueger,A O.Institutions for the New Private Sector[A].The Emeregence of Market Economy in Central and East Europe,Blackwell Publisher,Cambridge,MA,1992.
[12]中国战略与管理研究会社会结构转型课题组.中国社会结构转型的中近期趋势与隐患[J].战略与管理,1998(5):101-104.
[13]张木生.中国公共财政的困境[J].战略与管理,2001(2):101-104.
[14]程晓农.转型中的中国经济体制[J].战略与管理,2000(6):115-117.
[15]Masahiko 昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社,2001.
[16]朱宪辰,黄凯南.基于生物学基础的行为假设与共同知识演化分析[J].制度经济学研究,2004(4):65-88.
[17]Hardin Garrett.The Tragedy of the Commons[J].Science,1968,162:1243-1248.
[18]朱宪辰,章平,黄凯南.共享资源治理转型过程中个体认知状态的实证研究[J].经济研究,2006(12):101-113.
[19]Friedman M.Essays in Positive Economics[M].University of Chicago Press(1953),1970,pp.3-43.
[20]Akerlof George A.The Market for "Lemons":Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500.
[21]汪丁丁.知识的经济学性质[J].读书,1995(12):57-62.
[22]Tamborini R.Knowledge and economic behaviour:A constructivist approach[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,vol.7,1997(1):49-72.
[23]马克斯 H 博伊索特.知识资产:在信息经济中赢得竞争优势[M].上海:世纪出版集团,上海人民出版社,2005:14-15.
[24]张茉楠.从有限理性到适应性理性[J].经济社会体制比较,2004(6):79-84.
[25]Brenner,Thomas.Agent Learning Representation:Advice on Modelling Economic Learning[A].Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L.Judd(ed.),Handbook of Computational Economics,Elsevier,2006,2,chapter 18:895-947.
[261Antoine Terracol,Jonathan Vaksmann,Dumbing down rational players:Learning and teaching in an experimental game.Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla07017,Université Panthéon-Sorbonne(Paris 1),Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne,revised,2007.
[27]Ehrblatt,W.Z.,Hyndman,K.,Ozbay,E.Y.,Schotter,A.Convergence:An experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated games,mimeo,2007.
[28]Camerer,C.,T.Ho,J.thong.Sophisticated EWALearning and Strategic.Teaching in Repeated Games[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2002,104(1):137-188.
[29]Colombatto E.Is there an Austrian approach to transition[J]? The Review of Austrian Economics,2002,15(1):61-74.
[30]Bazel.Y.Economic Analysis of Property Rights[M].Cambridge University Press,1989.
[31]朱宪辰,章平.共享资源自发供给制度的产生[J].财经研究,2005(7):5-15.
[32]Alchian,A.,H.Demsets.Production,Information Costs,and Economic.Organization [J].American Economic Review,1972,62(5):777-795.
[33]林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁[A].陈昕主编.财产权利与制度变迁--产权学派与新制度学派译集[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[34]Olson,M.The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1965.
[35]Libecap Gary D.Contracting for Property Rights[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1989:1-28.
[36]Ostrom Elinor.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M].Cambridge University Press.
[37]Barbara Allen,Edella Schlager,2000.Covenant Institutions and the Commons;Colorado Water Resource Management[A].International Association for the Study of Common Property Bloomington,In May 31 June 4.2000.
[38]Herzberg Roberta,2005.Commentary Commentary on Richard Wagner' s "Self-governance,polycentrism,and federalism:Recurring themes in Vincent Ostrom' s scholarly oeuvre"[J].Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2005,57:189 -197.
[39]Hodgson Georey M.Reclaiming habit for institutional economics[J].Journal of Economic Psychology 2004,25:651- 660.
[40]Ostrom,Vincent.The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration[M].The University of Alabama Press,1989.
[41]Hayek,F A,Economics and Knowledge[J].Economica,New Series,1937,4,13:33-54.
[42]Buchanan,James M.An Economic Theory of Clubs[J].Economica,1965,32(125):1-14.
[43]Sandler,Todd and John Tschirhart.The Economic Theory of Clubs:An Evaluative Survey[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1980,18(4):1481-1521.
[44]Mueller D C.Public Choice Ⅱ[M].Combridge:Cambridge University Press,1989.
[45]Baland Jean-Marie,Jean-Philippe Platteau.Collective action on the commons:the role of inequality[J].CRED.Belogium:University of Namur,2002.
[46]Sugden,R.On the Economics of Philanthropy[J].Economic Journal,1982,92:341 - 350.
[47]Sugden,R.Reciprocity:The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions [J].Economic Journal,1984,94:772- 787.
[48]Andreoni,J.Giving with impure altruism:applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1989,47:1447- 1458.
[49]Young,D.J.A "fair share" model of public good provision[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1989(11):137- 147.
[50]Yuval Shilony.Diversity and ingenuity in voluntary collective action[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2000,16:429- 443.
[51]Ruttan Lore M.Games and the CPR Toolkit[J].The Common Property Resource Digest.Quarterly Publication of the International Association for the Study of Common Property,2000,55.
[52]Simon,H.关于人为事物的科学[M].北京:解放军出版社,1987:38.
[53]Simon,H.管理行为[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1988:18.
[54]Wilson RoBert A.,Frank C.keil:MIT 认知科学百科全书.上海:上海外语教育出版社,2000.
[55]Semin,G.R.,Smith,E.R.Interfaces of social psychology with situated and embodied cognition[J].Cognitive Systems Research,2002,3,385-396.
[56]Schwarz,N.(2006).Feelings,fit,and "funny effects":A situated cognition perspective[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2006.
[57]Hogarth,R.M.& Reder,M.W.Perspectives from Economics and Psychology[A],in:Hogarth,R.M.,Reder,M.W.Rational Choice - The Contrast between Economics and Psychology[M].Chicago & London:University of Chicago Press,1987:1-23.
[58]Tilman Slembeck.Learning in Economics:Where Do We Stand? Microeconomics 0004007,Economics Working Paper Archive EconWPA,2000.
[59]Jordan,J S.Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1995,9:8-20.
[60]Young,P.H.Individual Strategy and Social Structure- An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1998.
[61]Camerer,Colin F.,Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong.A Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of Games[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119(3):861-898.
[62]Arifovic,J.,J.hedyard.Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games[J].Journal of Public Economic Theory,2004,6:205-238.
[63]余晖,秦虹.公私合作制的中国试验[M].上海:世纪出版集团、上海人民出版社,2005.
[64]毛寿龙,李梅,陈幽泓.西方政府的治道变革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1998.
[65]毛寿龙,李梅.中国法治政府的进程[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[66]贺雪峰,仝志辉.论村庄社会关联[J].中国社会科学.2002(3):124-134.
[67]仝志辉,贺雪峰.村庄权力结构的三层分析[J].中国社会科学,2002(1):158-167.
[68]王习明,贺雪峰,罗兴佐,陈涛.乡村水利与农地制度创新--以荆门市“划片承包”调查为例[J].管理世界,2003(9):76-88.
[69]Camerer,Colin F.Behavioral Game Theory:Experiments in Strategic Interaction[M].Princeton University Press,2003.
[70]王永兴.转型经济学研究范式评述[J].江苏社会科学,2007(5):77-80.
[71]黄凯南.西方演化选择理论新进展[J].经济学动态,2006(9):66-71.
[72]Nelson R,S Winter.经济变迁的演化理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997。
[73]Greif,A.Cultural beliefs and organization of society:a historical and theoretical reflection of collectivist and individualist societies[J].Journal of Political Economy,1994,102(5):912-49.
[74]Masahiko Aoki.Schumpeterian Innovation of Institution[C].The Tenth Conference of the International Schumpeter Society held in Milan on June 10,2004.
[75]Hayek F A.Economics and Knowledge[J].Economica,1937,4:33-54.
[76]弗兰克·奈特.风险、不确定性和利润[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005:211.
[77]加里·贝克尔.人类行为的经济分析[M].上海:三联书店,1995.
[78]黄春兴,方壮志.不确定场景的经济理性:以SARS危机下的个人行动为例[A].第三届法与经济分析学术研讨会,台北,2005.
[79]钟惠波.知识的经济学分析:一个文献综述--基于古典与新古典范式的视点[J].中国软 科学,2006(12):146-152.
[80]Becker G S,Murphy K M.The Division of Labor,Coordination Costs,and Knowledge[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1992,7(4):1137-1160.
[81]汪丁丁.知识沿时间和空间的互补性以及相关的经济学[J].经济研究,1997(6):70-78.
[82]汪丁丁.知识表达、知识互补性、知识产权均衡[J].经济研究,2002(10):83-92.
[83]Drucker P F.The Age of Discontinuity:Guidelines to our Changing Society[M].London:PAN Books LTD,1971.
[84]赫伯特·西蒙.西蒙选集[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2001.
[85]Tamborini R.Knowledge and economic behaviour:A constructivist approach[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1997,7(1):49-72.
[86]First European Conference on Cognitive Economics,2nd CALL FOR PAPERS.
[87]Rizzello,S.Economic Change,Subjective Perception and Institutional Evolution[J].Metroeconomica,2000,51(2):127-150.
[88]Bicchieri,Cristina.Rationality and Coordination.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993.
[89]North,D C.Economics and Cognitive Science.Economic History 9612002,EconWPA,revised,1996.
[90]Witt,U.Learning to Consume - A Theory of Wants and the Growth of Demand[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2001(11):23-36.
[91]Rescorla,R.A.& Wagner,A.R.A Theory of Pavlovian Conditioning:Variations in the Effectiveness of Reinforcement and Non-reinforcement[A].in A.H.Black & W.F.Prokasy(eds.):Classical Conditioning Ⅱ.Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall,1972.
[92]Mackintosh,NJ.Parlor and Associationism[J].The Spanish Journal of Psychology,2003(6):177-184.
[93]Bandura,A.Social Learning Theory[M].New York:General Learning Press.1977.
[94]Smith,M.K.The cognitive orientation to learning[EB/OL],the encyclopedia of informal education,http://www.infed.org/biblio/learning-cognitive.htm,1999.
[95]Jean Piaget.发生认识论原理[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997.
[96]North,Douglass C.Economics and Cognitive Science.Economic History 9612002,EconWPA,revised,1996.
[97]Camerer,C.F.,Ho,T.Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games [J].Econometrica,1999,67:827-874.
[98]Fudenberg D and D.Levine.The Theory of Learning in Games[M].The M.I.T.Press,Cambridge,MA,1998.中译本,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[99] Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps . Lectures on Learning and Equilibrium in Strategic-Form Games[M]. CORE Lecture Series, 1990.
[100]Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps. Learning Mixed Equilibria [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993(5): 320-367.
[101]Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine. Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play [J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1994(19):1065-1090.
[102]Nyarko, Y., Schotter, A., 2002. An experimental study of belief learning usingelicited beliefs. Econometrica 70 (3): 971 - 1006.
[103]Jackson, Matthew O., Kalai, Ehud. Social Learning in Recurring Games [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 1997, 21(1-2): 102-134.
[104]Bernheim, D. B. Rationalizable strategic behavior [J]. Econometrical, 1984(52):1007-1028.
[105]Milgrom, P., & J Roberts. Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal-form games [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1991(3):82-100.
[106]Knight, J. Institutions and Social Conflict [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[107]Holland JH. Outline for a logical theory in adaptive systems [J]. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 1962, 3:297-314.
[108]Calderini, M., Metcalfe, S. Compound Learning, Neural Nets and the Competitive Process [J]. Economics of Innovation & New Technology, 1998(7): 271-302.
[109]Heinemann, M. Adaptive Learning of Rational Expectations Using Neural Networks [J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2000(24): 1007-1026.
[110] Jordan, J. S. Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1991(3): 60-81.
[111]Bray, M. Learning, Estimation, and the Stability of Rational Expectations [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982(26): 318-339.
[112]Marcet, A. & Sargent, T. J. Convergence of Least Squares Learning Mechanisms in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989(48): 337-368.
[113]Bullard, J. & Duffy, J. Learning in a Large Square Economy. Working Paper 94-013A, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1994.
[114]Berninghaus, S. K., Ehrhart, K.-M. Time Horizon and Equilibrium Selection in Tacit Coordination Games: Experimental Results [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1998(37): 231-248.
[115]Grosskopf,B.Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition[J].Experimental Economics,2003(6):141-158.
[116]Chen,S.-H.,Duffy,J.,Yeh,C.H.Equilibrium Selection via Adaptation:Using Genetic Programming to Model Learning in a Coordination Game.The Electronic Journal of Evolutionary Modeling and Economic Dynamics,no.1002,2002.
[117]Brown,G.W.Iterative Solution of Gamesby Fictitious Play[A].Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation.John Wiley and Sons,1951:374-376.
[118]Hofbauer,J.,Sigmund,K.Evolutionstheorie and dynamische Systeme[M].Berlin,Paul Parey,1984.
[119]Roth,A.E.& Erev,I.Learning in extensive form games:Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term[5].Games and Economics Behavior,1995,8:164-212.
[120]Slonim,R.and A.E.Roth.Learning in high Republic[J].Econometrica,1998(66):569-596.
[121]Brenner,T.Modelling Learning in Economics[M].Cheltenham,Edward Elgar,1999.
[122]Borgers,T.& Sarin,R.Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1997(77):1-16.
[123]Arthur,W.B.Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents:A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality[J].The American Economic Review,1991(81):353-359.
[124]Erev,I.,Roth,A.Prediction how people play games:Reinforcement learning in games with unique strategy equilibrium[J].American Economic Review,1998,88:848-881.
[125]Cheung,Y,W.,Friedman,D.Individual Learning in Normal Form Games:Some Laboratory Results[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1997(19):46-76.
[126]Camerer,Colin F.,Teck-Hua Ho.Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Coordination Games:Probability Rules,Heterogeneity and Time-Variation[J].Journal of Mathematical Psychology,1998,42:305-26.
[127]Schelling T.The Strategy of Conflict[M].Harvard University Press,1960.
[128]Mehta J,Chris Starmer,Robert Sugden.The Nature of Salience:An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games[J].The American Economic Review,1994,84:658-673.
[129]李军林.聚点理论及其发展[J].经济理论与经济管理,2007(2):37-41.
[130]Camerer C,Ho T-H.Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games[J].Econometrica,1999,67:837-874.
[131]Camerer,C.F.,Ho,T-H,Chong,J-K.A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of One-Shot Games[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,August 2004,119(3),861-898.
[132]Merlo,A.,Schotter,A.A Surprise-Quiz View of Learning in Economic Experiments [M].Games and Economic Behavior,1999,28:25-54.
[133]Merlo,A.,Schotter,A.Learning by Not Doing:An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning[3].Games and Economic Behavior,2003,42(1):116-136.
[134]Hayek FA.致命的自负[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[135]Schelling T.微观动机和宏观行为[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005:14.
[136]Hodgson Geoffrey M.Meanings of Methodological Individualism[J].Journal of Economic Methodology,2007,14(2):211-26.
[137]Hayek,FA.个人主义与经济秩序[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989.
[138]Smith,Vernon L.Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics[J].The American Economic Review,2003,93(3):465-508
[139]古元峰.奥地利学派的回应--与主流经济学的异同和整合[EB/OL].http://www.cenet.org.cn/article.asp?articleid=16009.2004.11.2.
[140]Chase V M,Hertwig R,Gigerenzer G.Visions of rationality[J].Trends in Cognitive Sciences,2,1998:206-214.
[141]Andy Clark.经济理性:个体学习与外部结构的互动[A].约翰·N·德勒巴克,约翰·V·C·奈.新制度经济学前沿[C].北京:经济科学出版社,2003:324.
[142]Denzau A T & North D C.Shared Mental Models:Ideologies and Institutions[J].Kyklos Blackwell Publishing.1994,47(1):3-31.
[143]Alchian A.Uncertainty,Evolution and Economic Theory[J].Journal of Political Economy.1950,58:211-222.
[144]Gabaix X,Laibson D.Bounded Rationality and Directed Cognition[J].Harvard University Working Paper,2000.
[145]Simon H A.Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning[J].Organization Science.1991(2):125-134.
[146]Simon H A.Models of Bounded Rationality Vol.3.[M].Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,1997.
[147]Hayek F A.Sensory Order[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1952.
[148]张良桥.论人类决策过程的进化模型[EB/OL].http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=1091,2003.6.18.
[149]Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry.Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1994,7(1):62-91.
[150]Mookherjee D.,Sopher B.Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant-sum Games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1997(19):97-132.
[151]Nagel R.Unraveling in Guessing Games:An Experimental Study[J].The American Economic Review,1995,85:1313-1326.
[152]Huyck J V,Raymond Battalio,Richard Bell.Tacit Coordination Games,Strategic Uncertainty,and Coordination Failure[J].American Economic Review 1990,80(1):234-248.
[153]Crawford V P.Introduction to Experimental Game Theory[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2002,104:1-15.
[154]张良桥.协调博弈与均衡选择[J].求索,2007(5):50-52.
[155]Urs Fischbacher.z-Tree:Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments[J].Experimental Economics,2007,10(2):171-178.
[156]汪丁丁.何谓“直面现象”的经济学?[J]读书,2004(2):116-21.
[157]郑江淮.经济变迁再解释[J].财经,2008,205.
[2]朱宪辰.共享资源制度安排[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005.
[3]李泽厚.启蒙与救亡的双重变奏[A].李泽厚十年集(第三卷下)[M].北京:东方出版社,1987:17-44.
[4]汪丁丁.知识沿时间和空间的互补性以及相关的经济学[J].经济研究.1997(6):70-78.
[5]费孝通.乡土中国[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1998.
[6]林毓生.中国传统的创造性转化[J].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1994.
[7]Noth D.C.理解经济变迁过程[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[8]张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁[A].盛洪,张宇燕.从计划经济到市场经济[C].北京:中国财政经济出版社,1998.
[9]苏明.中国财政赤字的现状与政策取向[J].西部论丛,2002(1):27-32.
[101李斌.中国住房改革制度的分割性[J].社会学研究,2002(2):80-87.
[11]Krueger,A O.Institutions for the New Private Sector[A].The Emeregence of Market Economy in Central and East Europe,Blackwell Publisher,Cambridge,MA,1992.
[12]中国战略与管理研究会社会结构转型课题组.中国社会结构转型的中近期趋势与隐患[J].战略与管理,1998(5):101-104.
[13]张木生.中国公共财政的困境[J].战略与管理,2001(2):101-104.
[14]程晓农.转型中的中国经济体制[J].战略与管理,2000(6):115-117.
[15]Masahiko 昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社,2001.
[16]朱宪辰,黄凯南.基于生物学基础的行为假设与共同知识演化分析[J].制度经济学研究,2004(4):65-88.
[17]Hardin Garrett.The Tragedy of the Commons[J].Science,1968,162:1243-1248.
[18]朱宪辰,章平,黄凯南.共享资源治理转型过程中个体认知状态的实证研究[J].经济研究,2006(12):101-113.
[19]Friedman M.Essays in Positive Economics[M].University of Chicago Press(1953),1970,pp.3-43.
[20]Akerlof George A.The Market for "Lemons":Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84(3):488-500.
[21]汪丁丁.知识的经济学性质[J].读书,1995(12):57-62.
[22]Tamborini R.Knowledge and economic behaviour:A constructivist approach[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,vol.7,1997(1):49-72.
[23]马克斯 H 博伊索特.知识资产:在信息经济中赢得竞争优势[M].上海:世纪出版集团,上海人民出版社,2005:14-15.
[24]张茉楠.从有限理性到适应性理性[J].经济社会体制比较,2004(6):79-84.
[25]Brenner,Thomas.Agent Learning Representation:Advice on Modelling Economic Learning[A].Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L.Judd(ed.),Handbook of Computational Economics,Elsevier,2006,2,chapter 18:895-947.
[261Antoine Terracol,Jonathan Vaksmann,Dumbing down rational players:Learning and teaching in an experimental game.Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla07017,Université Panthéon-Sorbonne(Paris 1),Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne,revised,2007.
[27]Ehrblatt,W.Z.,Hyndman,K.,Ozbay,E.Y.,Schotter,A.Convergence:An experimental study of teaching and learning in repeated games,mimeo,2007.
[28]Camerer,C.,T.Ho,J.thong.Sophisticated EWALearning and Strategic.Teaching in Repeated Games[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2002,104(1):137-188.
[29]Colombatto E.Is there an Austrian approach to transition[J]? The Review of Austrian Economics,2002,15(1):61-74.
[30]Bazel.Y.Economic Analysis of Property Rights[M].Cambridge University Press,1989.
[31]朱宪辰,章平.共享资源自发供给制度的产生[J].财经研究,2005(7):5-15.
[32]Alchian,A.,H.Demsets.Production,Information Costs,and Economic.Organization [J].American Economic Review,1972,62(5):777-795.
[33]林毅夫.关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁[A].陈昕主编.财产权利与制度变迁--产权学派与新制度学派译集[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[34]Olson,M.The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1965.
[35]Libecap Gary D.Contracting for Property Rights[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1989:1-28.
[36]Ostrom Elinor.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M].Cambridge University Press.
[37]Barbara Allen,Edella Schlager,2000.Covenant Institutions and the Commons;Colorado Water Resource Management[A].International Association for the Study of Common Property Bloomington,In May 31 June 4.2000.
[38]Herzberg Roberta,2005.Commentary Commentary on Richard Wagner' s "Self-governance,polycentrism,and federalism:Recurring themes in Vincent Ostrom' s scholarly oeuvre"[J].Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2005,57:189 -197.
[39]Hodgson Georey M.Reclaiming habit for institutional economics[J].Journal of Economic Psychology 2004,25:651- 660.
[40]Ostrom,Vincent.The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration[M].The University of Alabama Press,1989.
[41]Hayek,F A,Economics and Knowledge[J].Economica,New Series,1937,4,13:33-54.
[42]Buchanan,James M.An Economic Theory of Clubs[J].Economica,1965,32(125):1-14.
[43]Sandler,Todd and John Tschirhart.The Economic Theory of Clubs:An Evaluative Survey[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1980,18(4):1481-1521.
[44]Mueller D C.Public Choice Ⅱ[M].Combridge:Cambridge University Press,1989.
[45]Baland Jean-Marie,Jean-Philippe Platteau.Collective action on the commons:the role of inequality[J].CRED.Belogium:University of Namur,2002.
[46]Sugden,R.On the Economics of Philanthropy[J].Economic Journal,1982,92:341 - 350.
[47]Sugden,R.Reciprocity:The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions [J].Economic Journal,1984,94:772- 787.
[48]Andreoni,J.Giving with impure altruism:applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1989,47:1447- 1458.
[49]Young,D.J.A "fair share" model of public good provision[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1989(11):137- 147.
[50]Yuval Shilony.Diversity and ingenuity in voluntary collective action[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2000,16:429- 443.
[51]Ruttan Lore M.Games and the CPR Toolkit[J].The Common Property Resource Digest.Quarterly Publication of the International Association for the Study of Common Property,2000,55.
[52]Simon,H.关于人为事物的科学[M].北京:解放军出版社,1987:38.
[53]Simon,H.管理行为[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1988:18.
[54]Wilson RoBert A.,Frank C.keil:MIT 认知科学百科全书.上海:上海外语教育出版社,2000.
[55]Semin,G.R.,Smith,E.R.Interfaces of social psychology with situated and embodied cognition[J].Cognitive Systems Research,2002,3,385-396.
[56]Schwarz,N.(2006).Feelings,fit,and "funny effects":A situated cognition perspective[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2006.
[57]Hogarth,R.M.& Reder,M.W.Perspectives from Economics and Psychology[A],in:Hogarth,R.M.,Reder,M.W.Rational Choice - The Contrast between Economics and Psychology[M].Chicago & London:University of Chicago Press,1987:1-23.
[58]Tilman Slembeck.Learning in Economics:Where Do We Stand? Microeconomics 0004007,Economics Working Paper Archive EconWPA,2000.
[59]Jordan,J S.Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1995,9:8-20.
[60]Young,P.H.Individual Strategy and Social Structure- An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1998.
[61]Camerer,Colin F.,Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong.A Cognitive Hierarchy Theory of Games[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2004,119(3):861-898.
[62]Arifovic,J.,J.hedyard.Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games[J].Journal of Public Economic Theory,2004,6:205-238.
[63]余晖,秦虹.公私合作制的中国试验[M].上海:世纪出版集团、上海人民出版社,2005.
[64]毛寿龙,李梅,陈幽泓.西方政府的治道变革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1998.
[65]毛寿龙,李梅.中国法治政府的进程[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[66]贺雪峰,仝志辉.论村庄社会关联[J].中国社会科学.2002(3):124-134.
[67]仝志辉,贺雪峰.村庄权力结构的三层分析[J].中国社会科学,2002(1):158-167.
[68]王习明,贺雪峰,罗兴佐,陈涛.乡村水利与农地制度创新--以荆门市“划片承包”调查为例[J].管理世界,2003(9):76-88.
[69]Camerer,Colin F.Behavioral Game Theory:Experiments in Strategic Interaction[M].Princeton University Press,2003.
[70]王永兴.转型经济学研究范式评述[J].江苏社会科学,2007(5):77-80.
[71]黄凯南.西方演化选择理论新进展[J].经济学动态,2006(9):66-71.
[72]Nelson R,S Winter.经济变迁的演化理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997。
[73]Greif,A.Cultural beliefs and organization of society:a historical and theoretical reflection of collectivist and individualist societies[J].Journal of Political Economy,1994,102(5):912-49.
[74]Masahiko Aoki.Schumpeterian Innovation of Institution[C].The Tenth Conference of the International Schumpeter Society held in Milan on June 10,2004.
[75]Hayek F A.Economics and Knowledge[J].Economica,1937,4:33-54.
[76]弗兰克·奈特.风险、不确定性和利润[M].北京:商务印书馆,2005:211.
[77]加里·贝克尔.人类行为的经济分析[M].上海:三联书店,1995.
[78]黄春兴,方壮志.不确定场景的经济理性:以SARS危机下的个人行动为例[A].第三届法与经济分析学术研讨会,台北,2005.
[79]钟惠波.知识的经济学分析:一个文献综述--基于古典与新古典范式的视点[J].中国软 科学,2006(12):146-152.
[80]Becker G S,Murphy K M.The Division of Labor,Coordination Costs,and Knowledge[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1992,7(4):1137-1160.
[81]汪丁丁.知识沿时间和空间的互补性以及相关的经济学[J].经济研究,1997(6):70-78.
[82]汪丁丁.知识表达、知识互补性、知识产权均衡[J].经济研究,2002(10):83-92.
[83]Drucker P F.The Age of Discontinuity:Guidelines to our Changing Society[M].London:PAN Books LTD,1971.
[84]赫伯特·西蒙.西蒙选集[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2001.
[85]Tamborini R.Knowledge and economic behaviour:A constructivist approach[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,1997,7(1):49-72.
[86]First European Conference on Cognitive Economics,2nd CALL FOR PAPERS.
[87]Rizzello,S.Economic Change,Subjective Perception and Institutional Evolution[J].Metroeconomica,2000,51(2):127-150.
[88]Bicchieri,Cristina.Rationality and Coordination.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993.
[89]North,D C.Economics and Cognitive Science.Economic History 9612002,EconWPA,revised,1996.
[90]Witt,U.Learning to Consume - A Theory of Wants and the Growth of Demand[J].Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2001(11):23-36.
[91]Rescorla,R.A.& Wagner,A.R.A Theory of Pavlovian Conditioning:Variations in the Effectiveness of Reinforcement and Non-reinforcement[A].in A.H.Black & W.F.Prokasy(eds.):Classical Conditioning Ⅱ.Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall,1972.
[92]Mackintosh,NJ.Parlor and Associationism[J].The Spanish Journal of Psychology,2003(6):177-184.
[93]Bandura,A.Social Learning Theory[M].New York:General Learning Press.1977.
[94]Smith,M.K.The cognitive orientation to learning[EB/OL],the encyclopedia of informal education,http://www.infed.org/biblio/learning-cognitive.htm,1999.
[95]Jean Piaget.发生认识论原理[M].北京:商务印书馆,1997.
[96]North,Douglass C.Economics and Cognitive Science.Economic History 9612002,EconWPA,revised,1996.
[97]Camerer,C.F.,Ho,T.Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games [J].Econometrica,1999,67:827-874.
[98]Fudenberg D and D.Levine.The Theory of Learning in Games[M].The M.I.T.Press,Cambridge,MA,1998.中译本,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[99] Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps . Lectures on Learning and Equilibrium in Strategic-Form Games[M]. CORE Lecture Series, 1990.
[100]Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps. Learning Mixed Equilibria [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993(5): 320-367.
[101]Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine. Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play [J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1994(19):1065-1090.
[102]Nyarko, Y., Schotter, A., 2002. An experimental study of belief learning usingelicited beliefs. Econometrica 70 (3): 971 - 1006.
[103]Jackson, Matthew O., Kalai, Ehud. Social Learning in Recurring Games [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 1997, 21(1-2): 102-134.
[104]Bernheim, D. B. Rationalizable strategic behavior [J]. Econometrical, 1984(52):1007-1028.
[105]Milgrom, P., & J Roberts. Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal-form games [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1991(3):82-100.
[106]Knight, J. Institutions and Social Conflict [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[107]Holland JH. Outline for a logical theory in adaptive systems [J]. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 1962, 3:297-314.
[108]Calderini, M., Metcalfe, S. Compound Learning, Neural Nets and the Competitive Process [J]. Economics of Innovation & New Technology, 1998(7): 271-302.
[109]Heinemann, M. Adaptive Learning of Rational Expectations Using Neural Networks [J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2000(24): 1007-1026.
[110] Jordan, J. S. Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1991(3): 60-81.
[111]Bray, M. Learning, Estimation, and the Stability of Rational Expectations [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982(26): 318-339.
[112]Marcet, A. & Sargent, T. J. Convergence of Least Squares Learning Mechanisms in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989(48): 337-368.
[113]Bullard, J. & Duffy, J. Learning in a Large Square Economy. Working Paper 94-013A, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1994.
[114]Berninghaus, S. K., Ehrhart, K.-M. Time Horizon and Equilibrium Selection in Tacit Coordination Games: Experimental Results [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1998(37): 231-248.
[115]Grosskopf,B.Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition[J].Experimental Economics,2003(6):141-158.
[116]Chen,S.-H.,Duffy,J.,Yeh,C.H.Equilibrium Selection via Adaptation:Using Genetic Programming to Model Learning in a Coordination Game.The Electronic Journal of Evolutionary Modeling and Economic Dynamics,no.1002,2002.
[117]Brown,G.W.Iterative Solution of Gamesby Fictitious Play[A].Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation.John Wiley and Sons,1951:374-376.
[118]Hofbauer,J.,Sigmund,K.Evolutionstheorie and dynamische Systeme[M].Berlin,Paul Parey,1984.
[119]Roth,A.E.& Erev,I.Learning in extensive form games:Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term[5].Games and Economics Behavior,1995,8:164-212.
[120]Slonim,R.and A.E.Roth.Learning in high Republic[J].Econometrica,1998(66):569-596.
[121]Brenner,T.Modelling Learning in Economics[M].Cheltenham,Edward Elgar,1999.
[122]Borgers,T.& Sarin,R.Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1997(77):1-16.
[123]Arthur,W.B.Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents:A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality[J].The American Economic Review,1991(81):353-359.
[124]Erev,I.,Roth,A.Prediction how people play games:Reinforcement learning in games with unique strategy equilibrium[J].American Economic Review,1998,88:848-881.
[125]Cheung,Y,W.,Friedman,D.Individual Learning in Normal Form Games:Some Laboratory Results[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1997(19):46-76.
[126]Camerer,Colin F.,Teck-Hua Ho.Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Coordination Games:Probability Rules,Heterogeneity and Time-Variation[J].Journal of Mathematical Psychology,1998,42:305-26.
[127]Schelling T.The Strategy of Conflict[M].Harvard University Press,1960.
[128]Mehta J,Chris Starmer,Robert Sugden.The Nature of Salience:An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games[J].The American Economic Review,1994,84:658-673.
[129]李军林.聚点理论及其发展[J].经济理论与经济管理,2007(2):37-41.
[130]Camerer C,Ho T-H.Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games[J].Econometrica,1999,67:837-874.
[131]Camerer,C.F.,Ho,T-H,Chong,J-K.A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of One-Shot Games[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,August 2004,119(3),861-898.
[132]Merlo,A.,Schotter,A.A Surprise-Quiz View of Learning in Economic Experiments [M].Games and Economic Behavior,1999,28:25-54.
[133]Merlo,A.,Schotter,A.Learning by Not Doing:An Experimental Investigation of Observational Learning[3].Games and Economic Behavior,2003,42(1):116-136.
[134]Hayek FA.致命的自负[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[135]Schelling T.微观动机和宏观行为[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005:14.
[136]Hodgson Geoffrey M.Meanings of Methodological Individualism[J].Journal of Economic Methodology,2007,14(2):211-26.
[137]Hayek,FA.个人主义与经济秩序[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989.
[138]Smith,Vernon L.Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics[J].The American Economic Review,2003,93(3):465-508
[139]古元峰.奥地利学派的回应--与主流经济学的异同和整合[EB/OL].http://www.cenet.org.cn/article.asp?articleid=16009.2004.11.2.
[140]Chase V M,Hertwig R,Gigerenzer G.Visions of rationality[J].Trends in Cognitive Sciences,2,1998:206-214.
[141]Andy Clark.经济理性:个体学习与外部结构的互动[A].约翰·N·德勒巴克,约翰·V·C·奈.新制度经济学前沿[C].北京:经济科学出版社,2003:324.
[142]Denzau A T & North D C.Shared Mental Models:Ideologies and Institutions[J].Kyklos Blackwell Publishing.1994,47(1):3-31.
[143]Alchian A.Uncertainty,Evolution and Economic Theory[J].Journal of Political Economy.1950,58:211-222.
[144]Gabaix X,Laibson D.Bounded Rationality and Directed Cognition[J].Harvard University Working Paper,2000.
[145]Simon H A.Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning[J].Organization Science.1991(2):125-134.
[146]Simon H A.Models of Bounded Rationality Vol.3.[M].Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,1997.
[147]Hayek F A.Sensory Order[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1952.
[148]张良桥.论人类决策过程的进化模型[EB/OL].http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=1091,2003.6.18.
[149]Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry.Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1994,7(1):62-91.
[150]Mookherjee D.,Sopher B.Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant-sum Games[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1997(19):97-132.
[151]Nagel R.Unraveling in Guessing Games:An Experimental Study[J].The American Economic Review,1995,85:1313-1326.
[152]Huyck J V,Raymond Battalio,Richard Bell.Tacit Coordination Games,Strategic Uncertainty,and Coordination Failure[J].American Economic Review 1990,80(1):234-248.
[153]Crawford V P.Introduction to Experimental Game Theory[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2002,104:1-15.
[154]张良桥.协调博弈与均衡选择[J].求索,2007(5):50-52.
[155]Urs Fischbacher.z-Tree:Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments[J].Experimental Economics,2007,10(2):171-178.
[156]汪丁丁.何谓“直面现象”的经济学?[J]读书,2004(2):116-21.
[157]郑江淮.经济变迁再解释[J].财经,2008,205.