大股东控制下的中国上市公司投资行为特征研究
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摘要
自Modigliani和Miller(1958)在新古典范式下提出著名的MM定理以来,西方学者逐步放宽MM定理的新古典假设,修正“无关性”命题的适用范围,在现实条件下不断丰富和发展了现代公司财务理论。Jensen和Meckling(1976),Myers和Majluf(1984)先后从代理问题和信息不对称方面修正了企业融资选择与投资效率无关的命题,对企业投资的理论研究进行了拓展。近二十年来,公司治理研究在世界范围内的深入和行为公司财务理论的兴起,不仅重塑和发展了传统公司财务研究的理论假设,而且越来越呈现出在治理机制与财务决策主体行为特征相结合的框架内探索企业投资行为机理的崭新研究视角。
近年来,企业投资问题的研究越来越受到了国内学者的关注。但由于起步较晚,国内在该领域的研究要么拘泥于新古典财务理论框架下的传统假设,要么大都仍然沿用“传统”的委托代理思路,依据逆向选择和管理者道德风险的分析框架来研究大小股东代理冲突下的公司投资问题。具体而言:一方面,现有研究尚未充分关注转型时期治理结构中大股东及其代理人的驱利动机和行为特征对公司投资决策的影响,从而使得现有研究成果与上市公司投资行为特征之间存在着明显的差距;另一方面,大股东股权融资偏好所面临的市场融资条件及其对企业投资行为的影响,在当前国内财务研究领域中几乎尚未涉及。
为此,本文充分借鉴了公司治理理论和行为公司财务理论的最新研究成果,立足于我国上市公司特有的股权制度安排和控制权结构现状,以转型时期大股东及其代理人的利益动机和行为特征作为研究的切入点,以投融资相关论作为展开分析的依据,将上市公司融资偏好及其市场实现条件对企业投资决策的影响纳入统一的分析框架,从公司治理理论和行为公司财务理论相融合的层面,深入探讨大股东控制下的上市公司投资行为特征及其效率问题。以期为规范上市公司治理现状下的投资行为模式,改善股票市场融资条件对公司投资行为的传导机制,提供更为深入、更为贴近转型时期公司特征的理论依据和经验证据。全文共分为九章。
第一章绪论。首先给出了本文选题的理论价值及现实意义;其次总括了本文的研究内容、逻辑思路、研究方法并对所涉及的主要概念进行了界定;最后提出了本文的几个主要创新点。
第二章企业投资问题研究的相关理论与文献评述。在简要评述新古典投融资无关论及其局限性的基础上,首先阐明了公司治理与公司财务研究相融合的理论必然性。然后通过梳理公司财务的研究文献,以企业投资问题的研究为主线,从治理结构、信息非对称和行为公司财务三个方面勾勒出本文研究的理论框架和理论依据。
第三章我国上市公司的治理结构背景与股权融资偏好的市场条件分析。本章分别对我国上市公司的治理结构特征和大股东股权融资偏好的市场条件进行解构、剖析和提炼,为本文后面章节的研究提供了现实背景。本章第一节对我国上市公司股权结构和控制权结构现状的分析表明:在转型时期特定的股权制度安排下,由于国有股终极所有者实质上的缺位,大股东控制和内部人控制高度重叠、相互依存的格局更容易导致大股东与内部管理者的合谋寻租。本章第二节综合我国股票市价高估的现状和市场非充分有效的特征,从配股和增发两个方面探讨了二元股权结构下的市场融资条件和大股东股权融资偏好的财富分配动因。
第四章大股东控制下的内部人寻租与公司投资行为研究。笔者首先从大股东及其代理人构成的控制权利益集团内部,研究了大股东与代理人之间利益关系对企业投资行为的影响。本章基于内部人控制和寻租均能导致企业资金配置效率低下的成因阐释,在两层代理框架下构建了国有上市公司部门经营者寻租所引致的扭曲性过度投资行为模型。模型研究和扩展分析表明:经营者寻租和国有代理人补偿行为的相互作用,使得资金在企业高效和低效部门之间的配置产生结构性扭曲,容易形成越低效越寻租、越寻租越过度投资、越过度投资越低效的恶性循环机制。
第五章大股东控制下的自利动机与公司投资行为研究。基于控制权收益驱动公司资本配置行为的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构及其导致的控制权分配格局,从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面,对形成我国上市公司控制权收益的资本配置行为进行了实证研究。研究发现:上市公司资本配置行为在形成控制权收益的同时并没有通过提高公司业绩而增加控制权的共享收益,资本配置决策在很大程度上是大股东控制下的自利行为。
第六章大股东控制下的代理人过度自信与公司投资行为研究。以过度自信这一典型的高管人员非理性特征为切入点,展开大股东控制下的代理人非理性特征与公司投资行为研究。基于我国上市公司对高管人员的股权激励模式和持股变动特征,结合我国上市公司的治理结构现状,对高管人员过度自信的驱动外因、行为特质和现实表现等进行了理论分析;对高管人员过度自信与公司投资增长水平、投资的现金流敏感性进行了实证检验。研究发现:在我国上市公司特定的控制权结构下,与其他高管人员相比,过度自信高管人员更有可能引发低效率的过度投资行为。
第七章大股东控制下的股权融资偏好与公司投资行为研究。首先基于股权融资的市场时机理论,结合我国股票市价高估、二元定价差异的市场条件和再融资政策,系统考察了大股东股权融资偏好的市场实现条件。在此基础上,将上市公司控制权特征和治理结构因素一并纳入研究设计框架,实证考察了大股东股权融资偏好实现程度对企业投资水平的影响。研究结果发现:股权融资的规模越小,企业投资水平对股票市价的敏感性越高;股权融资的规模越大,大股东和内部人控制下的公司投资行为倾向于更大规模的扩张。
第八章政策建议。针对以上各部分的研究结论,从控制权制衡机制设想、非理性投资行为的组织制约形式设计、完善股票市场对上市公司投融资效率的促进机能和传导机制等方面,提出了规范上市公司投融资行为的对策建议。
第九章结论。总结了各章的研究结论,提出了本文的局限性和后续研究的设想。综上,本文在国内外相关研究的基础上,从公司治理和行为公司财务相融合的层面,立足于我国上市公司转型时期的特征,研究的改进和创新体现在以下方面:
①国内目前有关上市公司非效率投资的治理成因研究,几乎都没有对大股东和内部人控制权同构下的代理层次现状进行系统梳理,研究内容也未在这一现实背景下较为深入的展开。本文从内部人控制和寻租均能导致企业资金配置效率低下的理论成因出发,在两层代理框架下构建了国有上市公司内部经营者寻租所引致的扭曲性过度投资行为模型。运用非线性规划的Kuhn-Tucker求解方法对模型进行了扩展分析,导出了上市公司投资资金配置的非效率机制。
②国内目前有关治理结构影响上市公司投资行为的研究文献,大都停留于股权结构影响企业投资行为这一较为泛化的研究层面,而以上市公司控制权为切入点的进一步深入研究尚未展开。本文基于控制权收益驱动公司资本配置行为的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构及其导致的控制权分配格局,运用非参数Mann-Whitney U检验和GLS回归方法,从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面,对形成大股东控制权收益的投资行为进行了实证研究。
③国内学者在行为公司财务领域的研究尚处于起步阶段,对于在我国上市公司特有的治理结构下,高管人员的过度自信对企业投资决策的影响,当前的研究尚未涉及。本文在理论分析的基础上,将我国股票市场投资者非理性行为纳入约束条件,构建了高管人员过度自信下的公司投资决策模型,并通过实证研究发现:在我国上市公司大股东与内部人交替控制的治理结构现状下,与其他高管人员相比,过度自信的高管人员更有可能引发配置效率低下的过度投资行为。
④目前国内有关股权融资对企业投资行为的影响研究,大多是在股权融资偏好的主题研究中,作为股权融资偏好影响结果之一的形式出现,并且仍采用有效市场假设下的传统财务理论分析范式,尚未从非充分有效市场的融资条件视角,系统性的关注股权融资对企业投资行为的影响。本文从我国股票市价普遍高估的现状、股权设置二元结构下的股票定价差异和再融资政策所形成的市场融资条件出发,较为深入和细致的检验了大股东股权融资偏好的市场实现条件,进而结合我国上市公司的控制权特征,实证考察了大股东股权融资偏好实现程度对企业投资水平的影响。
From M-M theorem which was put forward by Modigliani and Miller(1958), basing on the neo-classical paradigm, many western scholars began to relax the Neo-classical assumption of M-M theorem gradually, and modify the application scope of“irrelevancy”proposition, in realistic condition, to enrich and develop modern corporate finance theory continually. Jensen & Meckling(1976), Myers & Majluf(1984) revised the proposition that corporate financing selection is irrelevant to investment efficiency, from the agent problem and information asymmetry respectively, it expanded the corporate investment theory. In recent 20 years, with lucubrating on corporate governance worldwide and springing up of behavioral corporate finance theory, it not only remodeled and developed the theoretic hypothesis of traditional corporate financing, but also shown up a new viewpoint of research on mechanism of the acts of corporate investment, in frame of the combination of governance mechanism and behavior character of financial decision-making body.
In recent years, domestic scholars more and more focused on the study of corporate investment. Due to the start late, it either constrained in the traditional hypothesis of neo-classical corporate financing theory, or followed the“traditional”clue of agent, and according as the research frame of adverse selection and manager’s moral risk to analyze the problem of corporate investment, under the condition of agent conflict between large and small shareholders. In detail, in one hand the existing researches did not give enough attention to influence on corporate investment decision-making by profit seeking motivation and behavior character of large shareholder and his agent in governance framework during the transition period, so that there is an obvious disparity between existing research achievement and investment behavior under the statue of domination distribution of listed companies, in other hand the research field of financing in domestic, it is almost not to treat of the marketing financing condition facing by financing preference of large shareholder, and its influence on corporate investment.
Therefore, this paper uses the newly research achievements of corporate governance theory and behavioral corporate financing theory for reference adequately, based on share arrangement system and statue quo of domination structure which are unique by listed companies in China, and make behavior character of large shareholder and his agent as the cut-in point, according to related theory of Investment and financing, put the financing preference of listed companies and its financing condition, both of which have effect on the decision-making of corporate Investment, into the analysis frame. Based on the combination of corporate governance theory and behavioral corporate financing theory, this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed companies deeply and systematically. In order to make a criterion to behavior model of investment under the statue quo of governance in listed companies, improve transmission mechanism of financing condition in stock market to investment behavior, support empirical proof and referenced basis which are much more systemic and more close to the corporate character in transition period.
Chapter 1 is Introduction,which firstly gives the theoretical value and practical significance of the topic。Then it summarizes the main content ,logical thinking , and research methods of the paper。Also the definition of key concepts involved in the paper is given。Lastly it comes up with a number of innovations。
Chapter 2 introduces related theory of enterprise investment study and gives a detailed review on it.Based on Neo-classical theory that investment and financing are independent,it illustrates the inevitability of integration of research in corporate governance and corporate finance .After sorting out the literature on corporate finance, it outlines the theoretical framework of the paper from the management structure, the company's financial information asymmetry and behavioral corporate finance aspects ,taking corporation investment problem as main logic line. And it provides a theoretical basis and guidance for the latter part of the paper.
Chapter 3 analyzes listed companies’background of governance structure and its market condition of financing preference. In this part, features of listed companies’governance structure are anatomized, analyzed and extracted. As well as market conditions of large shareholders equity financing ,which provide the latter chapters of the paper with a realistic background. The first part of this chapter gives a description of ownership structure and control right structure. The study of this part illustrates :In transitional economy system, due to the essential absence of the state-owned shares’ultimate owner, it’s the high degree of overlap and mutual reliance between large shareholder control and insider control that make large shareholder and insider conspired to seek for lease . The second part of this chapter describes the overvaluation of stocks and incomplete marketization in china’s stock market, then discusses market financing conditions under the binary share structure and the motivation of wealth distribution for large share holder preferring stock-right financing from the point of rationing shares and new issuance.
Chapter 4 analyzes rent-seeking of insiders and corporate investment behavior under the control of large share holder. The paper studies the influence of large share holder and insider’s same interest upon firm’s investment behavior, from the perspective of the corporate internal control interest group formed by large shareholders and agents. Based on the causation of insider control and rent-seeking leading to the capital arranging inefficacy in the state listed companies, this paper constructs the overinvestment behavior model leaded by the insider rent-seeking activity under a uniform two-tiered analysis frame. Through expanding the model, the investigative result is gained. The mutual effect of the rent-seeking and compensating behavior causes the distortization of capital collocating between the efficient branch and the inefficient branch, and result in the vicious circle in which the more inefficient the departmental operation is the more severe the rent-seeking degree is ;the more severe the rent-seeking degree is the more excessive the investment is ; the more excessive the investment is the more inefficient the departmental operation is.
Chapter 5 analyzes self-interest motivation and corporate investment when large share holder control. Based on the theory of the control benefit driving capital allocation and the control arrangement under the special equity structure in Chinese listed company, this paper empirically studies the capital allocation resulting in control benefit firstly from fixed asset investment and equity merge. the capital allocation resulting in control benefit is not increase the public benefit of control through improving corporation achievement , so the capital allocation decision is more likely to be the self- benefit behavior of the control shareholder.
Chapter 6 analyzes agent’s overconfidence and firm’s investment under the control of large share holder. The dissertation investigates irrational characteristics of agents and firm’s investment behavior when large share holder controls, from the perspective of overconfidence, which is the typical irrational characteristic of general manager. Based on the stock-right inspire mode and stockholding change of agents in Chinese listed companies, this chapter studies the relationship between the general manager’s overconfidence in Chinese listed company and the corporation investment decision with theoretical and empirical analysis under the special governance structure in Chinese listed company. The results show that compared with moderate-confidence general manager, the overconfident general managers are more lead to inefficient overinvestment under the special control-right structure of Chinese listed companies.
Chapter 7 analyzes stock-right financing preference and corporate investment when large share holder control. Based on theory of market timing and combined with market condition of overvalued stock price and refinancing policy. The dissertation systemic investigates the market qualification needed to realize stock-right financing preference of large share holder. Then set refinancing policy and stock price, which are the main factor of market financing condition, into a uniform study design framework. And empirically testes conductive effect of financing condition in stock market upon corporation investment behavior, which is achieved by the actual result of stock-right financing preference belong to large shareholder. The results show that less quantity of stock-right finance, higher sensitive between investment level and stock price; more quantity of stock-right finance, level of investment tends to expanding under large stockholder and insider control.
Chapter 8 gives some suggestion, from the perspective of controlling power countervails mechanism, design of organization restrain for irrational investment behavior, improving stock market’s conductive mechanism and so on.
Chapter 9 comes up with conclusion. The paper sum up conclusions of preceding chapters and sections, also points out limit of the study. At the same time, gives some advice for future research.
This paper start with the aspect of the coexist and combination of corporate governance and behavioral corporate financing in modern enterprise theory, based on the combination of theory development above and character of listed companies in China in transition period, make up the shortage that research on corporate investment are much more constrained in traditional frame of the neo-classical paradigm. To some extent, it enriches and develops the investment theory and empirical system of listed companies in China. In following, there are its amelioration and innovation points:
The recent studies on the ineffective investment caused by governance structure are not analyzing the agent actuality of large shareholder an insider control and the study contents are not evolving under the background .Based on the causation of insider control and rent-seeking leading to the capital arranging inefficacy in the state listed companies, this paper constructs the overinvestment behavior model leaded by the insider rent-seeking activity under a uniform two-tiered analysis frame. Through expanding the model, the investigative result is gained.
The recent studies on the effect of governance structure to the investment behavior are almost lag behind on the effect of stock-right structure to the investment behavior, but the study on the effect of control right to the investment behavior is not lucubrated .Based on the theory of the control benefit driving capital allocation and the control arrangement under the special equity structure in Chinese listed company, this paper empirically studies the capital allocation resulting in control benefit firstly from fixed asset investment and equity merge. the capital allocation resulting in control benefit is not increase the public benefit of control through improving corporation achievement , so the capital allocation decision is more likely to be the self- benefit behavior of the control shareholder.
The study of domestic scholar on the behavioral corporation finance is still on preliminary stage, the effect of executive’s overconfidence to the corporation investment under governance structure of Chinese listed companies is not investigated .Based on theoretical analysis of external factors of driven and behavioral form of executive’s overconfidence in listed companies, put the irrational behavior of investor in stock market into constraints term, establish decision-making model of corporate investment under the executive’s overconfidence.The results show that compared with moderate-confidence general manager, the overconfident general managers are more lead to inefficient overinvestment under the special control-right structure of Chinese listed companies.
The studies of domestic scholar on the effect of stock-right refinance to the corporation investment is almost presented as one result of the stock-right refinance preference, and still suppose that the market is efficient. Begin with the statue quo of that price in stock market is overrated in China, pricing diversity under the dual-structure of share setting and the market’s financing environment which is form by these diversity, link to the refinancing policy in stock market in China, this paper checks up the implemental condition of share financing preference of large shareholder and its influence on corporate financing behavior deeply and painstakingly, and prove that the transmission mechanism, that is through share refinancing channel, financing environment in stock market in China effects corporate investment behavior, is existing.At the same time, this paper investigates the effect of the stock-right refinance preference of large shareholder to corporation investment under control structure of Chinese listed companies.
近年来,企业投资问题的研究越来越受到了国内学者的关注。但由于起步较晚,国内在该领域的研究要么拘泥于新古典财务理论框架下的传统假设,要么大都仍然沿用“传统”的委托代理思路,依据逆向选择和管理者道德风险的分析框架来研究大小股东代理冲突下的公司投资问题。具体而言:一方面,现有研究尚未充分关注转型时期治理结构中大股东及其代理人的驱利动机和行为特征对公司投资决策的影响,从而使得现有研究成果与上市公司投资行为特征之间存在着明显的差距;另一方面,大股东股权融资偏好所面临的市场融资条件及其对企业投资行为的影响,在当前国内财务研究领域中几乎尚未涉及。
为此,本文充分借鉴了公司治理理论和行为公司财务理论的最新研究成果,立足于我国上市公司特有的股权制度安排和控制权结构现状,以转型时期大股东及其代理人的利益动机和行为特征作为研究的切入点,以投融资相关论作为展开分析的依据,将上市公司融资偏好及其市场实现条件对企业投资决策的影响纳入统一的分析框架,从公司治理理论和行为公司财务理论相融合的层面,深入探讨大股东控制下的上市公司投资行为特征及其效率问题。以期为规范上市公司治理现状下的投资行为模式,改善股票市场融资条件对公司投资行为的传导机制,提供更为深入、更为贴近转型时期公司特征的理论依据和经验证据。全文共分为九章。
第一章绪论。首先给出了本文选题的理论价值及现实意义;其次总括了本文的研究内容、逻辑思路、研究方法并对所涉及的主要概念进行了界定;最后提出了本文的几个主要创新点。
第二章企业投资问题研究的相关理论与文献评述。在简要评述新古典投融资无关论及其局限性的基础上,首先阐明了公司治理与公司财务研究相融合的理论必然性。然后通过梳理公司财务的研究文献,以企业投资问题的研究为主线,从治理结构、信息非对称和行为公司财务三个方面勾勒出本文研究的理论框架和理论依据。
第三章我国上市公司的治理结构背景与股权融资偏好的市场条件分析。本章分别对我国上市公司的治理结构特征和大股东股权融资偏好的市场条件进行解构、剖析和提炼,为本文后面章节的研究提供了现实背景。本章第一节对我国上市公司股权结构和控制权结构现状的分析表明:在转型时期特定的股权制度安排下,由于国有股终极所有者实质上的缺位,大股东控制和内部人控制高度重叠、相互依存的格局更容易导致大股东与内部管理者的合谋寻租。本章第二节综合我国股票市价高估的现状和市场非充分有效的特征,从配股和增发两个方面探讨了二元股权结构下的市场融资条件和大股东股权融资偏好的财富分配动因。
第四章大股东控制下的内部人寻租与公司投资行为研究。笔者首先从大股东及其代理人构成的控制权利益集团内部,研究了大股东与代理人之间利益关系对企业投资行为的影响。本章基于内部人控制和寻租均能导致企业资金配置效率低下的成因阐释,在两层代理框架下构建了国有上市公司部门经营者寻租所引致的扭曲性过度投资行为模型。模型研究和扩展分析表明:经营者寻租和国有代理人补偿行为的相互作用,使得资金在企业高效和低效部门之间的配置产生结构性扭曲,容易形成越低效越寻租、越寻租越过度投资、越过度投资越低效的恶性循环机制。
第五章大股东控制下的自利动机与公司投资行为研究。基于控制权收益驱动公司资本配置行为的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构及其导致的控制权分配格局,从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面,对形成我国上市公司控制权收益的资本配置行为进行了实证研究。研究发现:上市公司资本配置行为在形成控制权收益的同时并没有通过提高公司业绩而增加控制权的共享收益,资本配置决策在很大程度上是大股东控制下的自利行为。
第六章大股东控制下的代理人过度自信与公司投资行为研究。以过度自信这一典型的高管人员非理性特征为切入点,展开大股东控制下的代理人非理性特征与公司投资行为研究。基于我国上市公司对高管人员的股权激励模式和持股变动特征,结合我国上市公司的治理结构现状,对高管人员过度自信的驱动外因、行为特质和现实表现等进行了理论分析;对高管人员过度自信与公司投资增长水平、投资的现金流敏感性进行了实证检验。研究发现:在我国上市公司特定的控制权结构下,与其他高管人员相比,过度自信高管人员更有可能引发低效率的过度投资行为。
第七章大股东控制下的股权融资偏好与公司投资行为研究。首先基于股权融资的市场时机理论,结合我国股票市价高估、二元定价差异的市场条件和再融资政策,系统考察了大股东股权融资偏好的市场实现条件。在此基础上,将上市公司控制权特征和治理结构因素一并纳入研究设计框架,实证考察了大股东股权融资偏好实现程度对企业投资水平的影响。研究结果发现:股权融资的规模越小,企业投资水平对股票市价的敏感性越高;股权融资的规模越大,大股东和内部人控制下的公司投资行为倾向于更大规模的扩张。
第八章政策建议。针对以上各部分的研究结论,从控制权制衡机制设想、非理性投资行为的组织制约形式设计、完善股票市场对上市公司投融资效率的促进机能和传导机制等方面,提出了规范上市公司投融资行为的对策建议。
第九章结论。总结了各章的研究结论,提出了本文的局限性和后续研究的设想。综上,本文在国内外相关研究的基础上,从公司治理和行为公司财务相融合的层面,立足于我国上市公司转型时期的特征,研究的改进和创新体现在以下方面:
①国内目前有关上市公司非效率投资的治理成因研究,几乎都没有对大股东和内部人控制权同构下的代理层次现状进行系统梳理,研究内容也未在这一现实背景下较为深入的展开。本文从内部人控制和寻租均能导致企业资金配置效率低下的理论成因出发,在两层代理框架下构建了国有上市公司内部经营者寻租所引致的扭曲性过度投资行为模型。运用非线性规划的Kuhn-Tucker求解方法对模型进行了扩展分析,导出了上市公司投资资金配置的非效率机制。
②国内目前有关治理结构影响上市公司投资行为的研究文献,大都停留于股权结构影响企业投资行为这一较为泛化的研究层面,而以上市公司控制权为切入点的进一步深入研究尚未展开。本文基于控制权收益驱动公司资本配置行为的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司特有的股权结构及其导致的控制权分配格局,运用非参数Mann-Whitney U检验和GLS回归方法,从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面,对形成大股东控制权收益的投资行为进行了实证研究。
③国内学者在行为公司财务领域的研究尚处于起步阶段,对于在我国上市公司特有的治理结构下,高管人员的过度自信对企业投资决策的影响,当前的研究尚未涉及。本文在理论分析的基础上,将我国股票市场投资者非理性行为纳入约束条件,构建了高管人员过度自信下的公司投资决策模型,并通过实证研究发现:在我国上市公司大股东与内部人交替控制的治理结构现状下,与其他高管人员相比,过度自信的高管人员更有可能引发配置效率低下的过度投资行为。
④目前国内有关股权融资对企业投资行为的影响研究,大多是在股权融资偏好的主题研究中,作为股权融资偏好影响结果之一的形式出现,并且仍采用有效市场假设下的传统财务理论分析范式,尚未从非充分有效市场的融资条件视角,系统性的关注股权融资对企业投资行为的影响。本文从我国股票市价普遍高估的现状、股权设置二元结构下的股票定价差异和再融资政策所形成的市场融资条件出发,较为深入和细致的检验了大股东股权融资偏好的市场实现条件,进而结合我国上市公司的控制权特征,实证考察了大股东股权融资偏好实现程度对企业投资水平的影响。
From M-M theorem which was put forward by Modigliani and Miller(1958), basing on the neo-classical paradigm, many western scholars began to relax the Neo-classical assumption of M-M theorem gradually, and modify the application scope of“irrelevancy”proposition, in realistic condition, to enrich and develop modern corporate finance theory continually. Jensen & Meckling(1976), Myers & Majluf(1984) revised the proposition that corporate financing selection is irrelevant to investment efficiency, from the agent problem and information asymmetry respectively, it expanded the corporate investment theory. In recent 20 years, with lucubrating on corporate governance worldwide and springing up of behavioral corporate finance theory, it not only remodeled and developed the theoretic hypothesis of traditional corporate financing, but also shown up a new viewpoint of research on mechanism of the acts of corporate investment, in frame of the combination of governance mechanism and behavior character of financial decision-making body.
In recent years, domestic scholars more and more focused on the study of corporate investment. Due to the start late, it either constrained in the traditional hypothesis of neo-classical corporate financing theory, or followed the“traditional”clue of agent, and according as the research frame of adverse selection and manager’s moral risk to analyze the problem of corporate investment, under the condition of agent conflict between large and small shareholders. In detail, in one hand the existing researches did not give enough attention to influence on corporate investment decision-making by profit seeking motivation and behavior character of large shareholder and his agent in governance framework during the transition period, so that there is an obvious disparity between existing research achievement and investment behavior under the statue of domination distribution of listed companies, in other hand the research field of financing in domestic, it is almost not to treat of the marketing financing condition facing by financing preference of large shareholder, and its influence on corporate investment.
Therefore, this paper uses the newly research achievements of corporate governance theory and behavioral corporate financing theory for reference adequately, based on share arrangement system and statue quo of domination structure which are unique by listed companies in China, and make behavior character of large shareholder and his agent as the cut-in point, according to related theory of Investment and financing, put the financing preference of listed companies and its financing condition, both of which have effect on the decision-making of corporate Investment, into the analysis frame. Based on the combination of corporate governance theory and behavioral corporate financing theory, this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed companies deeply and systematically. In order to make a criterion to behavior model of investment under the statue quo of governance in listed companies, improve transmission mechanism of financing condition in stock market to investment behavior, support empirical proof and referenced basis which are much more systemic and more close to the corporate character in transition period.
Chapter 1 is Introduction,which firstly gives the theoretical value and practical significance of the topic。Then it summarizes the main content ,logical thinking , and research methods of the paper。Also the definition of key concepts involved in the paper is given。Lastly it comes up with a number of innovations。
Chapter 2 introduces related theory of enterprise investment study and gives a detailed review on it.Based on Neo-classical theory that investment and financing are independent,it illustrates the inevitability of integration of research in corporate governance and corporate finance .After sorting out the literature on corporate finance, it outlines the theoretical framework of the paper from the management structure, the company's financial information asymmetry and behavioral corporate finance aspects ,taking corporation investment problem as main logic line. And it provides a theoretical basis and guidance for the latter part of the paper.
Chapter 3 analyzes listed companies’background of governance structure and its market condition of financing preference. In this part, features of listed companies’governance structure are anatomized, analyzed and extracted. As well as market conditions of large shareholders equity financing ,which provide the latter chapters of the paper with a realistic background. The first part of this chapter gives a description of ownership structure and control right structure. The study of this part illustrates :In transitional economy system, due to the essential absence of the state-owned shares’ultimate owner, it’s the high degree of overlap and mutual reliance between large shareholder control and insider control that make large shareholder and insider conspired to seek for lease . The second part of this chapter describes the overvaluation of stocks and incomplete marketization in china’s stock market, then discusses market financing conditions under the binary share structure and the motivation of wealth distribution for large share holder preferring stock-right financing from the point of rationing shares and new issuance.
Chapter 4 analyzes rent-seeking of insiders and corporate investment behavior under the control of large share holder. The paper studies the influence of large share holder and insider’s same interest upon firm’s investment behavior, from the perspective of the corporate internal control interest group formed by large shareholders and agents. Based on the causation of insider control and rent-seeking leading to the capital arranging inefficacy in the state listed companies, this paper constructs the overinvestment behavior model leaded by the insider rent-seeking activity under a uniform two-tiered analysis frame. Through expanding the model, the investigative result is gained. The mutual effect of the rent-seeking and compensating behavior causes the distortization of capital collocating between the efficient branch and the inefficient branch, and result in the vicious circle in which the more inefficient the departmental operation is the more severe the rent-seeking degree is ;the more severe the rent-seeking degree is the more excessive the investment is ; the more excessive the investment is the more inefficient the departmental operation is.
Chapter 5 analyzes self-interest motivation and corporate investment when large share holder control. Based on the theory of the control benefit driving capital allocation and the control arrangement under the special equity structure in Chinese listed company, this paper empirically studies the capital allocation resulting in control benefit firstly from fixed asset investment and equity merge. the capital allocation resulting in control benefit is not increase the public benefit of control through improving corporation achievement , so the capital allocation decision is more likely to be the self- benefit behavior of the control shareholder.
Chapter 6 analyzes agent’s overconfidence and firm’s investment under the control of large share holder. The dissertation investigates irrational characteristics of agents and firm’s investment behavior when large share holder controls, from the perspective of overconfidence, which is the typical irrational characteristic of general manager. Based on the stock-right inspire mode and stockholding change of agents in Chinese listed companies, this chapter studies the relationship between the general manager’s overconfidence in Chinese listed company and the corporation investment decision with theoretical and empirical analysis under the special governance structure in Chinese listed company. The results show that compared with moderate-confidence general manager, the overconfident general managers are more lead to inefficient overinvestment under the special control-right structure of Chinese listed companies.
Chapter 7 analyzes stock-right financing preference and corporate investment when large share holder control. Based on theory of market timing and combined with market condition of overvalued stock price and refinancing policy. The dissertation systemic investigates the market qualification needed to realize stock-right financing preference of large share holder. Then set refinancing policy and stock price, which are the main factor of market financing condition, into a uniform study design framework. And empirically testes conductive effect of financing condition in stock market upon corporation investment behavior, which is achieved by the actual result of stock-right financing preference belong to large shareholder. The results show that less quantity of stock-right finance, higher sensitive between investment level and stock price; more quantity of stock-right finance, level of investment tends to expanding under large stockholder and insider control.
Chapter 8 gives some suggestion, from the perspective of controlling power countervails mechanism, design of organization restrain for irrational investment behavior, improving stock market’s conductive mechanism and so on.
Chapter 9 comes up with conclusion. The paper sum up conclusions of preceding chapters and sections, also points out limit of the study. At the same time, gives some advice for future research.
This paper start with the aspect of the coexist and combination of corporate governance and behavioral corporate financing in modern enterprise theory, based on the combination of theory development above and character of listed companies in China in transition period, make up the shortage that research on corporate investment are much more constrained in traditional frame of the neo-classical paradigm. To some extent, it enriches and develops the investment theory and empirical system of listed companies in China. In following, there are its amelioration and innovation points:
The recent studies on the ineffective investment caused by governance structure are not analyzing the agent actuality of large shareholder an insider control and the study contents are not evolving under the background .Based on the causation of insider control and rent-seeking leading to the capital arranging inefficacy in the state listed companies, this paper constructs the overinvestment behavior model leaded by the insider rent-seeking activity under a uniform two-tiered analysis frame. Through expanding the model, the investigative result is gained.
The recent studies on the effect of governance structure to the investment behavior are almost lag behind on the effect of stock-right structure to the investment behavior, but the study on the effect of control right to the investment behavior is not lucubrated .Based on the theory of the control benefit driving capital allocation and the control arrangement under the special equity structure in Chinese listed company, this paper empirically studies the capital allocation resulting in control benefit firstly from fixed asset investment and equity merge. the capital allocation resulting in control benefit is not increase the public benefit of control through improving corporation achievement , so the capital allocation decision is more likely to be the self- benefit behavior of the control shareholder.
The study of domestic scholar on the behavioral corporation finance is still on preliminary stage, the effect of executive’s overconfidence to the corporation investment under governance structure of Chinese listed companies is not investigated .Based on theoretical analysis of external factors of driven and behavioral form of executive’s overconfidence in listed companies, put the irrational behavior of investor in stock market into constraints term, establish decision-making model of corporate investment under the executive’s overconfidence.The results show that compared with moderate-confidence general manager, the overconfident general managers are more lead to inefficient overinvestment under the special control-right structure of Chinese listed companies.
The studies of domestic scholar on the effect of stock-right refinance to the corporation investment is almost presented as one result of the stock-right refinance preference, and still suppose that the market is efficient. Begin with the statue quo of that price in stock market is overrated in China, pricing diversity under the dual-structure of share setting and the market’s financing environment which is form by these diversity, link to the refinancing policy in stock market in China, this paper checks up the implemental condition of share financing preference of large shareholder and its influence on corporate financing behavior deeply and painstakingly, and prove that the transmission mechanism, that is through share refinancing channel, financing environment in stock market in China effects corporate investment behavior, is existing.At the same time, this paper investigates the effect of the stock-right refinance preference of large shareholder to corporation investment under control structure of Chinese listed companies.
引文
① 股权分散下,公司治理研究侧重于股东与经营者之间的代理问题(Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986)。
① Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson(1988),Kaplan and Zingales(1997), Cleary(1999),冯巍(1999),郝颖(2005),童盼(2005)
② Jensen(1986),Franks and Harris(1988),Berkovitch, Elazar and Narayanan(1993),Andrade(2001)。
① 蒋殿春(2003),肖作平(2004),李善民和刘智(2003)。
② 冯根福和吴林江(2000),曹廷求和孙文祥(2004),肖作平(2004)。
① 为避免行文的赘述,并保持研究思路和研究主线的联贯性,本文在此不再详细罗列该三个因素的具体回归结果。
② 由于 IPO+1 的 M/Bewa 和 M/Bt-1 是相同的,因此对 M/Bewa 的回归检验从 IPO+2 开始。
① 由于 IPO+1 的 M/Bewa 和 M/Bt-1 是相同的,因此对 M/Bewa 的回归检验从 IPO+2 开始。
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① Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson(1988),Kaplan and Zingales(1997), Cleary(1999),冯巍(1999),郝颖(2005),童盼(2005)
② Jensen(1986),Franks and Harris(1988),Berkovitch, Elazar and Narayanan(1993),Andrade(2001)。
① 蒋殿春(2003),肖作平(2004),李善民和刘智(2003)。
② 冯根福和吴林江(2000),曹廷求和孙文祥(2004),肖作平(2004)。
① 为避免行文的赘述,并保持研究思路和研究主线的联贯性,本文在此不再详细罗列该三个因素的具体回归结果。
② 由于 IPO+1 的 M/Bewa 和 M/Bt-1 是相同的,因此对 M/Bewa 的回归检验从 IPO+2 开始。
① 由于 IPO+1 的 M/Bewa 和 M/Bt-1 是相同的,因此对 M/Bewa 的回归检验从 IPO+2 开始。
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