竞争性垄断市场研究
详细信息    本馆镜像全文|  推荐本文 |  |   获取CNKI官网全文
摘要
一.论文选题
     20世纪90年代以来,以信息技术为主导的高科技革命成果的推广应用,经济全球化的浪潮以不可遏止的态势对世界每个角落的冲击,各国的社会和经济发生着深刻的变化,经济社会发展的新特征大量涌现。这些特征促进了以美国为首的经济发达国家20世纪90年代新经济形态的形成。这种经济是基于信息技术的全球化,以互联网为主要工具,信息通讯技术产业为支柱,全球化大市场为基础,经济结构、经济组织、经济运行呈现出全新特点的经济。国内外理论界将这种新型经济称之为“新经济”、“信息经济”、“网络经济”、“数字经济”等。作者认为,由于这种新型经济的基本特征是网络(networking),这种网络不仅包括互联网、软件开发、硬件制造这些新兴产业的虚拟网络,还包括了电信、微波技术、广播电视等具体的物理网络,这些网络或多或少地具有某些有别于传统产业的经济特征,这些特征是本文研究的基础,我们把建立在这些特征之上的经济称为“网络经济”。
     在网络经济的环境下,电子信息技术高速发展,形成了以信息产品制造、软件开发、信息资源开发以及信息服务等新的产业群,集合成为新兴的产业——信息通讯技术(Information and Communication Technology)产业。近十多年来信息通讯技术快速发展,尤其伴随着经济全球化,ICT在当前已被认为是经济的主要驱动力,因为它带动当前网络经济热潮和美国新经济的发展,同时ICT也被认为加剧了全球化的垄断与竞争,因为信息技术网络的全球化,使得获取知识与技术成为了厂商经济活动的关键。如今,无论是发达国家还是发展中国家,ICT产业都在其发展战略中占有重要的地位,日益成为促进国民经济增长的主要产业部门,它的发展水平已经成为衡量一个国家经济发展水平的重要标志,不仅如此,它的深远影响还在于促进了世界经济一体化的进程和提升了发展中国家在国际分工中的地位。ICT产业的繁荣带动了一大批相关产业如信息服务业的发展,并不断融入到传统产业,使其焕发新的生机与活力,从各方面改变着人们的生产生活方式。据资料显示,发达国家信息通讯产业的产值占国民生产总值的比重已达40-60%,年增长率为传统产业的3-5倍。信息产业领域就业人数的增长速度亦高
Since 1990s, the tide of economic globalization has been sweeping over the world in a powerful way, which was driven by information technology and popularized by the achievements of high-tech revolution, thus make social and economic environment of all countries experienced the process of changing gradually. As a result, a large amount of new characteristics of economy have emerged, which accelerated to form new economic configurations in developed countries like U.S.A.. So this kind of new economy is based on globalization of information technology, transmitted by the internet, and dominated by information and communication technical industry, therefore economic structures, organizations and operating processes have changed a lot and demonstrated some new economic characteristics which are different from that of traditional economics.Under the condition of network economy, the electronic information technology developing rapidly, and has formed new industry groups, such as information products manufacturing, software development, development of information resources and information service, etc., all of these groups have combined to from a new industry—Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Industry. Nowadays, ICT industry is playing an important role both in developed nations and developing nations, and has became a key department which accounts for promoting a nation's economic growth increasingly, its development level has already been a sign of weighing a national economic development levels. Moreover, its far-reaching influence has also consists in quickening the process of economic integration of the world and promoting the position in international division of developing countries. The prosperity of ICT industry has brought along lots of relevant industries like information service industry, and has been incorporating into traditional industries, thus created new chances and challenges for them, and made changes to people's style of production and life in every aspect.Through some character showed at present in ICT industry, we have seen three kinds of situation that demonstrated in its development:
    Prosperity and recession coexist. On one hand, If we have some knowledge about the history of computer and network industry, we can find that some unknown little companies like Microsoft and Intel in the past had become monopolistic companies with enormous market share within very short time, and their value soaring correspondently. Some other new network equipment suppliers such as Cisco and Netscape also have made much difference in their fast development. Yahoo and Amazon have been worldwide famous network companies within a few years, and their market scale are expanding constantly as well. On the other hand, some monopolistic computer companies in the past have lost its previous dominant position gradually, examples as IBM and Apple computer manufactures, furthermore, other monopolistic companies in the past even have already become impoverished, such as Wang computer company. In general, lots of cases of amalgamation, reorganization happened among companies, as a result, prosperity and recession coexist in ICT industry, its developing speed and changing frequency in the industry are greatly higher than that of some traditional industries.Amalgamation and separation coexist. There are a large amount of amalgamation and separation cases in ICT industry. Which happened among the communication companies, communication companies and computer companies, as well as network companies and publishing companies. In addition, there are also some upstream and downstream suppliers of a big company integrated. However, not all of these amalgamation were successful cases, there are also some failed businesses. Some cases happened in a country, like the merger between Time Warner and AOL, another cases happened between multinational companies, such as the merger between BT in Britain and MCI in U.S.A. Meanwhile, There are still many separation cases, such as the business of mobile communication has been separated from fixed communication networks. In nowadays, some specific businesses in large companies are separated from each other, these detailed businesses are R&D, producing and marketing, etc., which proves that, on one hand, the comprehensive competence of many companies has being strengthened constantly, and their producing and marketing scale becoming larger than before, while other companies are concentrating on its own core to
    competences and developing with specialization, Standardization and Simplification.Monopolization and competition interacting. The trends of economic globalization and liberalization lead to unprecedented openness and competition, thus come to a state of monopolization with larger scale and higher level. In ICT industry, such inherent natures as network effects, standardization and compatibility, etc. have pushed monopoly and competition to a higher and more powerful degree. As for monopoly in ICT industry, it could be monopolization in producing scale, or in differentiated products, as well as monopolization in technologies or intellectual property rights. The monopolist could be a dominant enterprise with monopolistic power or large scale, or a small and medium-sized enterprise which responsible for certain links through whole industrial chains. Meanwhile, the state of competition is getting fiercer and more diverse in the condition of highly monopolization. Besides traditional competition as in products quality, pricing, marketing, the competitive goalare much higher and strategies are more complicated------to set up product standardsand cover whole market. In a word, monopolization and competition in ICT industry do not stand for two extremes any longer, and act or be in opposition each other as in traditional industries, on the contrary, the more developed the industry is, the more inseparable of monopolization and competition are, they have been inter-weaving, inter-permeating and integrating in a dynamic economic environment.We could find some literatures discussing networking economics, but we find a few articles on monopolization and competition in certain ICT industry. Many domestic researchers treated with the same terms as "information industry", "digital industry", etc., and have not undertaken deeper research into a specific industry or a certain market. But the fact is that the impact of network economy has made market, structure and behaviors in ICT industry much different from traditional industries, moreover, monopoly and competition is one of the eternal themes in studying industrial organization. In this case, it is necessary for us to start with the inner relationships based on information and communication technologies in ICT industry, and to systematically investigate characteristics of monopoly and competition, enterprises' behavior and operating mechanism in ICT industry, with the purpose of
    understanding the dynamic changes of market structure, behavior and performance in ICT industry, and to find out the differences of monopoly and competition between traditional industries and ICT industries, therefore to contribute to structuring the theoretical system of network economics and ICT industry and put forward some regulatory suggestions.The combination of highly monopolization and competition has lead to a new market structures in ICT industry competitive monopolization. As the matter of competitive monopolization, the author holds a view that two kinds of integration in value chain of ICT industry have caused great dynamic changes, thus pave the way for analyzing trends of monopolization with multi-dimensions. The backgrounds and foundations of monopolization are as follows: complementary nature of ICT products, mechanism of risk-sharing and cost-sharing among companies, cooperative standard setting as well as information and communication technologies globalization. So, all these factors could explain the changing and restructuring of ICT industry, the consequence is that a kind of new market structure being formed ,say, Competitive Monopolization.Because entry and exit barriers in ICT industry are not very high, which increased the numbers of realistic and potential competitor that incumbent had to deal with. As a result, keen competition caused competition mode diversified. Consequently, some multifarious new competitive strategies are adapted by incumbents and entrants. The consequence of competitive monopolization is that monopolistic position of entrants is no longer unalterable, but probably be replaced by entrants with competitive power at any time.The new mode of monopoly and competition in ICT industry are challenging traditional antitrust laws and regulations. If we judge some cases with traditional standards without considering new characteristics of ICT industry, it is possible that our current policies would curb competition and damage consumer's welfare. Therefore, the authorities of antitrust and regulation faced difficult problems, in that the market structure of "winner take most" is the natural equilibrium in network market, and conditions that such intervention seeks to establish already exist in this
    market, if the authorities of antitrust and regulation want to establish a competitive market structure that each enterprise has roughly equal market shares according to their imagination, the result may be undesirable. Therefore, government agencies should pay more attention to the competitive strategies adapted by companies, but not market share and concentration degree in ICT industry itself. In other words, the SCP paradigm established by The Harvard School is not suitable in understanding the monopolization and competition in ICT Industry, some ideas from Chicago school may be convictive instead. Some possible innovations:Firstly, with regards to mainstream views about some natures and features of networks, such as high fixed cost and low margin cost, winner take all, demand-side economies of scale as well as increasing marginal returns, the author considers that there are some problems of inaccurateness or incompleteness in these descriptions. Therefore, based on some researching achievements abroad and at home, the author revises these problems from a scientific and comprehensive perspective.Secondly, the author regards information technology as the endogenous variable in analyzing market structure of ICT Industry, and combined some economic rules of network economy, thus made further understanding of marker structure, conducts and performances. On the basis of studies above, the author put forward a concept of competitive monopolization.Thirdly, tying and predatory pricing that involved abusing market power in accordance with American current antitrust law system are not always lawbreaking in software industry, instead, considering particular features of certain industry and dynamic competing condition, more prudential measures should be taken when judging high-tech industries by citing traditional antitrust laws. In the condition of network economy, a new antitrust law is urgently needed to meet changes on economy and technology. Shortcomings and further researches needed:The article is based on cases and data from developed countries, especially from U.S.A., whose ICT industry is fully developed, so materials of ICT Industry in China
    in this article is lacked. There are two reasons could explain, one is that ICT Industry in our country started late, though developed rapidly, statistical standards in each region are different, therefore it is difficult to compute and compare the materials and data among different regions. The other is that some economic features and technological features embodied by ICT Industry in China are the same as that in early stage of developed countries, and correlative political systems are incomplete and imperfect in China, for example, China still has no antitrust law.The author attempts to take technological innovation and progress of ICT Industry as the key through whole article, and as the main reason in demonstrating marker structures of competitive monopolization, but only did a not very good job in this, with the result is that the structure of article shows a little incompact, some materials lack necessary relations, thus made it difficult to express fundamental ideas distinctly and accurately.The problem of monopoly and competition is always a complicated and empirical subject, in which much knowledge and researches are necessary, therefore, understanding and having good command of this problem is a highly difficult task. Especially in the condition of network economy, theories literatures and empirical materials are not easily available, it is very hard to put forward a different idea form traditional market structure. In addition, ICT Industry is developing vigorously and rapidly, there are still some industrial features have not demonstrated, therefore our study is limited to phenomena that could be observed. Although the author tried her best and made great effort, shortcomings and defects are still unavoidable, opinions and criticisms from any experts would be the author's appreciation.
引文
1.[美]卡尔·夏皮罗,哈尔-瓦里安著.信息规则:网络经济的策略指导[M],张帆译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000年版。
    2.[美]迈克尔·波特,加里·哈默等.未来的战略[M],徐振东、张志武译.成都:四川人民出版社,2000年版。
    3.[美]迈克尔·波特.竞争优势[M],陈小悦译.北京:华夏出版社,1997年版。
    4.[美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.反托拉斯经济学——兼并、协约和策略行为[M],张群群、黄涛译.北京:经济科学出版社,1999年版。
    5.[美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M],段毅才,王伟译.北京:商务印书馆,2002年版。
    6.[美]奥兹·谢伊.网络产业经济学[M],张磊译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2002年版。
    7.[美]克雷顿·克里斯腾森.创新者的窘境[M],吴潜龙译.南京:江苏人民出版社,2001年版。
    8.[美]戴维·莫谢拉.权力的浪潮——全球信息技术的发展与前景1964—2010[M],高铦,高戈,高多译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002年版。
    9.[美]萨尔坦·科马里著.信息时代的经济学[M],姚坤,何卫红译.南京:江苏人民出版社,2001年版。
    10.[美]小贾尔斯·伯吉斯著.管制和反垄断经济学[M],冯金华译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003年版。
    11.[美]W·吉帕·维斯库斯,约翰·M·弗农,小约瑟夫·E·哈林顿著.反垄断与管制经济学[M],陈甬军等译.北京:机械工业出版社,2004年版。
    12.[美]约瑟夫·熊彼特.资本主义、社会主义和民主主义[M],吴良健译.北京:商务印书馆,1999年版。
    13.[美]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M],郭大力,王亚南译.北京:商务印书馆,1972年版。
    14.[美]皮特.纽曼编.新帕尔格雷夫法经济学大辞典[M],北京:法律出版社,2003年版。
    15.[英]曼纽尔·卡斯特.网络社会的崛起[M],夏铸久,王志弘译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2001年版。
    16.[英]戴维·M·纽伯里.网络型产业的重组与规制[M],何玉梅译.北京:人民邮电出版社,2002年版。
    17.[英]马歇尔.经济学原理[M],朱志泰译.北京:商务印书馆,1981年版。
    18.[英]多纳德.海,德理克.莫瑞斯.产业经济学与组织[M],钟鸿钧等译.北京:经济科学出版社,2001年版。
    19.[日]青木昌彦,安藤晴彦编著.模块时代—新产业结构的本质[M],周国荣译.上海:上海远东出版社,2003年版。
    20.曹建海.过度竞争论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000年版。
    21.方向前,方兴东.挑战Intel[M].北京:中国海关出版社,2004年版。
    22.方兴东.创新式摧毁力——跨越互联网断层[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004年版。
    23.李荣融主编.并购重组—企业发展的必由之路[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004年版。
    24.刘东等.企业网络论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003年版。
    25.刘志彪等.经济结构优化论[M].北京:人民出版社,2003年版。
    26.戚聿东.中国现代垄断经济研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999年版。
    27.邵春光.中国如何应变全球IT产业链新变化——2002—2003年电子信息产业经济运行状况与发展趋势[M].北京:人民出版社,2002年版。
    28.王传辉.反垄断的经济学分析[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004年版。
    29.张磊.产业融合与互联网管制[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2001年版。
    30.周振华.信息化与产业融合[M].上海:上海三联书店,2003年版。
    31.朱彤.网络效应经济理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004版。
    1.[日]植草益.信息通讯业的产业融合[J].中国工业经济,2001年第2期。
    2.蔡文英.网络经济时代垄断的新特点[J].云南财贸学院学报,2001年第9期。
    3.陈富良.新经济的行业初始垄断经营权研究[J].经济与管理研究,2001年第6期。
    4.陈守明.网络经济中的赢家通吃现象与企业对策[J].外国经济与管理,1999年第11期。
    5.陈宇.反垄断法应如何应对IT行业的市场控制——反思“微软世纪之诉”[J].财经理论与实践,2003年第4期。
    6.迟晓英,宣国良.价值链研究发展综述[J].外国经济与管理,2000年第1期。
    7.杜传忠.网络型寡占市场结构与中国产业的国际竞争力[J].中国工业经济,2003年第6期。
    8.冯丽,李海舰.从竞争范式到垄断范式[J].中国工业经济,2003年第9期。
    9.洪银兴.新经济条件下的信息产业[J].南京社会科学,2002年第3期。
    10.胡汉辉,邢华.产业融合理论以及对我国发展信息产业的启示[J].中国工业经济,2003年第2期。
    11.黄仁伟,吴雪明.试析信息技术对美国“新经济结构”的影响[J].世界经济研究,1999年第6期。
    12.李怀,高良谋.新经济的冲击与竞争性垄断市场结构——观察微软案例的一个理论框架[J].经济研究,2001年第10期。
    13.李良智.竞争市场与垄断市场:一个基于福利的分析[J].当代财经,2003年第8期。
    14.李玉剑,宣国良.专利联盟:战略联盟研究的新领域[J].中国工业经济,2004年第2期。
    15.廖振中等.论知识经济时代反垄断法的制度设计和价值取向[J].社会科学研究,2003年第1期。
    16.卢明华,李国平.全球电子信息产业价值链及对我国的启示[J].北京大学学报,2004年第7期。
    17.陆国庆.基于信息技术革命的产业创新模式[J].产业经济研究,2003年第4期。
    18.马健.产业融合理论研究评述[J].经济学动态,2002年第5期。
    19.汤丹等.国际并购浪潮中的中小企业发展研究[J].经济与管理研究,2004年第1期。
    20.王晓晔.反垄断悖论[J].国际贸易,2000第2期。
    21.王俊豪.对可竞争市场理论的评论[J].商业经济与管理,2001年第4期。
    22.吴汉洪.西方产业组织理论关于市场结构与创新关系的争论[J].教学与研究,2002年第11期。
    23.乌家培.网络经济及其对经济理论的影响[J].学术研究,2000年第1期。
    24.颜光华,林明.外国中小企业战略管理探析[J].外国经济与管理,2004年第4期。
    25.张曼.论数字产业对传统反垄断理论与实践的启示[J].经济评论,2002年第4期。
    26.曾楚宏,林丹明.信息技术应用与企业边界的变动[J].中国工业经济,2004年第10期。
    27.周洛华,黄烨菁.对发展中国家信息产业贸易政策的思考——以信息产品特性为视角的解释[J].世界经济研究,1999年第5期。
    28.周振华.产业融合拓展化:主导因素及基础条件分析(下)[J].社会科学,2003年第4期。
    29.朱瑞博.价值模块整合与产业融合[J].中国工业经济,2003年第8期。
    1. Adams, W. J. and Yellen J.L.(1976): Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, XC, pp.475-498.
    2. Alfonso, G, and Salvatore, T. (1998): Does technological convergence imply convergence in markets? Evidence form the electronics Industry, Research Policy. 27, 44-463..
    3. Arthur, W. B. (1989): Competing technologies, increasing re'turns, and lock-in by historical events, Economic Journal, 642-665.
    4. Arthur, W. B. (1990): Positive feedbacks in the economy, Scientific American 262, 92-99.
    5. Arthur, W. B. (1996): Increasing Returns and the Two Worlds of Business. Harvard Business Review (July-August).
    6. A.J. Carty (1999): The Age of Convergence, Technology for Success Conference, paper for Technology for Success Conference Edmonton, Alberta.
    7. Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella(2001): Market for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.
    8. Atip Asvanund, Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Michael Smith(2001): Bigger May Not Be Better: An Empirical Analysis of Optimal Membership Rules in Peer-To-Peer Networks, paper for Telecommunications Policy. Research Conference (TPRC), Alexandria, Virginia, October 27-29. Smith, Michael. 2001.
    9. Bakos, Y., and Kemerer, C(1992): Recent Applications of Economic Theory in Information Technology, Research Decision Support Systems, 8, 5, 365-386.
    10. Baumol,W. J., (1982): Contestable Markets.. An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, American Economic Review, 72: 1-15.
    11. Benjamin Gomes-Casseres (1994): Group Versus Group: How Alliance Networks Compete, Harvard Business Review, July-August,
    12. Benjamin Gomes-Casseres (1997): Alliance Strategies of Small Firms, SMEs in the Age of Globalization. Small Business Economics, 9, 33-44.
    13. Bernd Woeckener (2000): The Competition Of User Networks: Ergodicity, Lock-Ins, And Metastability, Journal Of Economic Behavior And Organization, Vol. 41, 85-99.
    14. Besen, S, and Joseph Farrell (1994): Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, Journal of Economics Perspectives, 8, 2, 117-131.
    15. Brynjolfsson, E., and Kemerer, C(1996): Network Externalities in Microcomputer Software: An Economic Analysis of the Spreadsheet Market, Management Science 42, 12, 1627-1647.
    16. Buchanan, J. and Stubblebine, W. (1962): Externality, Economic, November, 371-384.
    17. Bulow, J.I. (1982): Durable Goods Monopolists, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, 314-332.
    18. Byrne, J. A.,(1993): The Virtual Corporation, Business Week, February 8, 1993, pp. 98-102.
    19. Carl Shapiro(1999): Competition Policy in the Information Economy, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/comppolicy.pdf
    20. Carl Shapiro(2000): Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion? http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/standards.pdf.
    21. Cheung, S. S. (1973): The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, Journal of Law and Economics 16 April, 11-33.
    22. Choi, P. J. (1994): Network Externality, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Obsolescence, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 42, 167-181.
    23. Chou, D. and Shy, O. (1990): Network effects without network externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization 8, 259-270.
    24. Church, J and Gandal, N. (1992): Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization, Journal of Industrial Economics, March, 85-104
    25. Church, J and Gandal, N. (1993): Complementary network externalities and technological adoption, international Journal of Industrial Organization 11,239-260.
    26. Cowan, R. (1991): Tortoises and Hares: Choice among Technologies of Unknown Merit, 101 Economic Journal, 801-814.
    27. Cristina Bores, Carme Saudna, Ricard Tortes(2001): Technological Convergence: a Strategic Perspective, Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona.
    28. Coase, R.H., (1972): Durability and Monopoly, Journal of Law and Economics, 1:143-149.
    29. Dahlman, C. (1979): The Problem of Externality, 22 Journal of Law and Economics,141-163.
    30. Daniel Cerqueira and Toker Doganoglu (2004): Dynamic R&D Incentives with network Externalities, paper for Kiel-Munich Workshop on the Economics of Information and Network Industries, 30-31 August 2004.
    31. David, P. A. (1985): Clio and the economics of QWERTY, American Economic Review 75, 332-337.
    32. Dennis Weller (2003): Liberalization, Information Technology, and Market Structure, OECD Business and Industry Forum, 1 October 2003.
    33. Dhebar, A. (1995): Complementary, Compatibility ,and Product Change: Breaking with the Past? Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 12, 136-152.
    34. Downes, L., and Mui, C. Unleashing the Killer App(1998): Digital Strategies for Market Dominance, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
    35. Dybvig, P. H., and Spatt, C(1983): Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, 20, 231-247.
    36. Economides, N. (1989): Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities, American Economic Review, Vol. 79, 1165-1181.
    37. Economides Nicholas, Charles Himmelberg (1995): Critical Mass and Network Size with Application to the US FAX Market, Discussion Paper no. EC-95-11, Stem School of Business, NYU, August. http://raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks/papers.html.
    38. Economides Nicholas and Himmelberg, Charles(1995): Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications, in Gerard Brock, ed., Toward a competitive Telecommunications Industry: Selected Papers from the 1994 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, July 1995, 31-42.
    39. Economides Nicholas, Lawrence White(1996): One-Way networks, Two-Way Networks, Compatibility, and Antitrust [A]. In DAVID G, David W, (eds.) Opening Networks to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing ofAccess[M]. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Press,.
    40. Economides, N. (1996): The Economics of Network, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14,no. 6, 675-699.
    41. Economides, N. (1996): Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitations for Enter, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 12, 211-232.
    42. Economides Nicholas(1998): Competition and Vertical Integration in the Computing Industry, Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stem School of Business, Department of Economics.
    43. Economides, Nicholas and Fredrick Flyer, (1998): Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods, Discussion Paper EC-98-02, Stern School of Business, N.Y.U., http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-02.pdf.
    44. Economides, Nicholas. (1998): Quality Choice and Vertical Integration, International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    45. Economides Nicholas (2004): Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, Related Publication 03-23, NET Institute Working Paper No. 04-24, NYU, Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No. 03-10.
    46. Eirik Oaatd Kristiansen (1996): R&D In Markets With Network Externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 769-784.
    47. Fabling, R. and Grimes, A.(2004): Three Secrets of Firm Success: Innovation, Innovation, Innovation, a discussion paper, Ministry of Economic Development, January.
    48. Fredericl. Pryor (2002): News From The Monopoly Front: Changes In Industrial Concentration, 1992-1997, Review of Industrial Organization, 20: 183-185.
    49. Gandal, Neil(1994): Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test of the Network Externalities Hypothesis, Rand Journal of Economics, 25, 1,160-170.
    50. Gandal, Neil(1995): Competing Compatibility Standards and Network Externalities in the PC Software Market, Review of Economics & Statistics, 77, 4, 599-608.
    51. Gandal Neil(2002): Compatibility, Standardization, And Network Effects: Some Policy Implications, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 80-91(12).
    52. Geert Duysters, John Hagedoorn (1998): Technological convergence in the IT industry: the role of strategic technology alliances and technological competencies, International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1 November 1998, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 355-368(14).
    53. Geneva (2003): Information And Communication Technology (Ict) Development Indices, World Summit on Information Society, Prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat,http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan007208.pdf
    54. Giancarlo Succi, Paolo Predonzani, Andrea Valerio, Tullio Vernazza (1999): The pivotal role of network externalities in software systems: a case study on Microsoft Word 97, http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~sullivan/EDSER-1/PositionPapers/succi.pdf.
    55. Gilbert R J (1992): Symposium on compatibility: incentive andmarket structure, Journal of Industrial Economics, 1.
    56. Greenstein, Shane. Khanna, Tarun (1997): What does industry convergence mean, in Creative Combinations: Lessons for Managing in a Digital World, David Yoffie(ed), Harvard Business School Press.
    57. Hal R. Varian(1999): Market Structure in the Network Age, Working Paper, UC-Berkeley. Timothy F. Bresnahan, Shane Greenstein(1999): Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry, 12/14/97 Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 47, issue 1, pages 1-40.
    58. Hal R. Varian(2001): High-Technology Industries and Market Structure, Prepared for Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Jackson Hole Symposium. http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/sympos/2001/papers/S02vari.pdf.
    59. J. Yannis Bakos, Michael E. Treaty(1986): Information Technology And Corporate Strategy. A Research Perspective. MIS Quarterly, June. 107-119. http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/~bakos/itandes.pdf
    60. Jacqueline Warnke(1996): Computer manufacturing: change and competition, Monthly Labor Review. (August): Vol. 119, No. 8, 18-29.
    61. James Watson (2004): A major shift in the PC market, http://www.vnunet.eom/print/it/1160094.
    62. Jeffrey Church, Neil Gandal, David Krause (2002): Indirect Network Effects and Adoption Externalities, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Paper No. 02-30.
    63. Jerome Vicente (2003a): Ambivalences of "Silicon Label": Network Externalities vs. Information Externalities in Location Dynamics, Manufacture des Tabaes 21, allee de Brienne F-31000 TOULOUSE
    64. Jonas Lind(2005): Ubiquitous Convergence: market redefinitions generated by technological change and the Industry Life Cycle, Paper for the DRUID Academy Winter 2005 Conference, January 27-29, 2005.
    65. Joseph Farrell and Saloner, G.(1985): Standardization, compatibility, and innovation, Rand Journal of Economics 16, pp.70-83.
    66. Joseph Farrell and Saloner, G.(1986a): Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, American Economic Review, December, 76:5, pp. 940-955.
    67. Joseph Farrell and Shapiro, C. (1988): Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 14, pp. 123-137.
    68. Joseph Farrell (1986): Standardization and Variety, Economic Letters, Vol. 20, pp.71-74.
    69. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro(1989): Optimal contracts with lock-in. American Economic Review, 79(1):51-68.
    70. Joseph Farrell and Saloner, G. (1992): Converters, compatibility, and control of interfaces, Journal of Industrial Economics 40, pp.9-36.
    71. Joseph Fan'ell and Monroe, H. K.(1998): The Vertical Organization of Industry: System Competition Versus Component Competition, Journal of Management Strategy, Vol. 7, No.2, pp.144-182.
    72. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro(2004): Intellectual Property, Competition, and Information Technology, Competition Policy Center, Paper CPC04-045, http:/repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=iber/cpc
    73. Katz M. L., and Shapiro C. (1985): Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, American Economic Review, Vol. 75, 424-440.
    74. Katz, M. and Shapiro C. (1986): Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, Journal of Political Economy,(4): 822-841.
    75. Katz, M. L., And Shapiro, C. (1986): Product Compatibility Choice in a Market Technological Progress, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.38, 146-165.
    76. Katz M. L., and Shapiro C. (1992): Product Introduction andNetwork Externalities, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 40, 55-84.
    77. Katz M L, Shapiro C(1994): Systems competition andnetwork effects, Journal of Economic Perspectives, (8): 93-115.
    78. Krattenmaker, T. and Salop, S. C. (1986): Anti-competitive Exclusion: Raising Rival's Costs to Achieve Power over Price, Yale Law Journal, vol. 96, 209-293.
    79. Kristiansen, E.G., (1996),: R&D in Markets with Network Externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp. 769-784.
    80. Lawrence J. White (2000): Present at the Beginning Of A New Era Far Antitrust: Reflections On 1982-1983, Review of Industrial Organization, 16: 131-149.
    81. Liebowitz S.J. (1983): Tie-in Sales and Price Discrimination, Economic Inquiry 21,387-399.
    82. Liebowitz, S.J. and Margolis, S. E. (1990): The fable of the keys, Journal of Law and Economics 33, 1-26.
    83. Liebowitz, S.J. and Margolis, Stephen E. (1994): Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 133-150.
    84. Liebowitz, S.J. and Margolis, Stephen E. (1995a): Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, 17 Research in Law and Economics, 1-22.
    85. Liebowitz, S. J. and Margolis, S. E. (1995): Path dependence, lock-in and history, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11,205-226.
    86. Liebowitz, S. J. and Margolis, S. E. (1996a): Market processes and the selection of standards, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 9, 283-318.
    87. Liebowitz, S. J. and Margolis, S. E. (1996b): Should technology choice be a concern for antitrust?, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 9, 283-318.
    88. Lopatka, J. E. and Page, W. (1995): Microsoft, monopolization, and network externalities: Some uses and abuses of economic theory in antitrust decision making, The Antitrust Bulletin Summer 40, 317-369.
    89. Maarten C.W. Janssen, Ewa Mendys (2000) : Adoption of Superior Technology in Markets with Heterogeneous Network Externalities and Price Competition. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI2000-87/1
    90. Mark A. Jamison (2002): Network Externalities, Mergers, And Industry Concentration, presentation at the "Corporate Control & Industry Structure in Global Communications" conference sponsored by the London Business School's Global Communications Consortium with the University of Florida's PURC & CIBER, London Business School, 14-15 May 2001.
    91. Max Keilbach, Martin Posch (1998): Network Externalities and the Dynamics of Markets, Interim Reportir-98-089.
    92. Matutes, C. and P. Regibeau (1987): Standardization in multi-component Industries. In: Edited by H. Landis Gabel, Product Standardization and Competitive Strategy. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
    93. Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P. (1988): Mix and Match: Product Compatibility Without Network Externalities, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, 221-234.
    94. Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P. (1992): Compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly, Journal of Industrial Economics 40, 37-54.
    95. McAfee, R. E, McMillan, J. and Whinston M. D. (1989): Multiproduct Monopoly Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1989,371-383.
    96. Micha Gisser and Mark S. Allen (2001): One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy And Microsoft, Review of Industrial Organization, 19: 211-225.
    97. Michael D. Smith, Joseph Bailey, and Erik Brynjolfsson(2000): Market Structure, Competition, and the Role of Small Business, in Erik Brynjolfsson and Brian Kahin, eds., Understanding Digital Markets: Review and Assessment, MIT Press, Boston,
    98. Michael D. Whinston (2001): Exclusivity and tying in U.S. v Microsoft: What we know, and don't know. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2):63-80.
    99. Milton L. Mueller (1999): Digital Convergence and its Consequences, Javnost-The Public (6) no3, pp 11-28, http://dcc.syr.edu/rpl.pdf.
    100. Nicholas and Salop, Steven C(1992): Competition and Integration among Complements and Network Market Structure, Journal of Industrial Economics, 40. 105-123.
    101. Nicolas Jonard, Eric Schenk (1999): Open Standard Compatibility: Network Externalities versus Product Differentiation, http://www-eco.enst-bretagne.fr/Recherche/Biblio/Eric/openstd.pdf.
    102. Nirvikar Singh (2002): Information Technology and India's Economic Development, University Of California Santa Cruz Economics Department, Working Paper Series.
    103. Oren, S, and Smith, S(1981): Critical Mass and Tariff Structure in Electronic Communications Market, Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 2, 467-487.
    104. Oz Shy (1996): Technology Revolutions In The Presence Of Network Externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 785-800.
    105. Oz Shy and Thisse, Jacques-Francois(1999): A Strategic Approach to Software Protection, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Summer, ,Vol.8,No.2,163-190.
    106. Pennings, Johannes. Puranam, Phanish (2001): Market Convergence & Firm Strategy: new directions for theory and research, ECIS Conference, The Future of Innovation Studies, Eindhoven, Netherlands.
    107. Penrose, E. (1959): The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Revised edition, 1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    108. Qi Tang(2003): Microsoft, Justice Department and Network Externalities: Who Is Standing In the Way of Invention? http://www.econ.ilstu.edu/dloomis/335web/spapers/tang.PDF
    109. Richard A. Posner(2001): Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust Law Journal. 925-943.
    110. Rohlfs, J(1974): A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, Bell Journal of Economics, 5, 1, 16-37.
    111. Schmalensee, R. (1982): Commodity Bundling by a Single-Product Monopolist, Journal of Law and Economics, ⅩⅩⅤ, 67-71.
    112. Shane Greenstein, Elinor, Wendall Hobbs (2002): Market Structure and Innovation: A Brief Synopsis of Recent Thinking, For the Federal Trade Commission February 20, 2002.
    113. Shapiro, C. and Hal R. Varian Information Rules(1998): A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
    114. Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, Emerson H. Tiller(2001): The New Frontier in e-Business: Integrated Internet Strategy, http://btl.bus.utexas.edu/IBM%20Course%20modules/IBMIntegratedModule2a.pdf
    115. Slive, Joshua and Bernahardt. Dan(1998): Pirated for Profit, The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 31. No 4. 886-889.
    116. Stephen Martin(1994): Industrial Economics, Second edition, Macmillan Publishing Company.
    117. Stigler, G. J. (1968): Barriers to Entry, Economics of Scale and Firm Size, Chapter 6, The Organization of Industry, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois.
    118. Stigler, G. J. (1968): A Note on Block Booking, The Organization of Industry.
    119. Stieglitz, Nils (2003): Digital Dynamics and Types of Industry Convergence-The Evolution of the Handheld Computers Market in the 1990s and beyond, in Christenson & Maskell.
    120. Stuart Graham, David C. Mowery(2004): Software Patents: Good News.or Bad News? Intellectual Property Rights in Frontier Industries: Software and Biotech. http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=944
    121. Sulin Ba, Andrew B. Whinston, and Han Zhang(2000): Small Companies in the Digital Economy, in Erik Brynjolfsson and Bran Kahin, eds., Understanding the Digital. Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
    122. Takeyma, Lisa N.(1994): The Welfare Implication of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externality, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol 42, No 2, 155-166.
    123. Ted Egan (1998): Structural Change and Spatial Dynamics of the U.S. Software Industry, Paper Presented for Sloan Foundation Globalization Workshop Duke University, April 25,1998
    124. Timothy F. Bresnahan(1998): New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure of the Computer Industry, in Competition, Innovation, and the Microsoft Monopoly, Antitrust in the Digital Market, Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds,1999 Boston, Mass. :Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    125. Timothy F. Bresnahan(2000): The Changing Structure of Innovation in Computing: Sources of and Threats to the Dominant U.S. Position, in U.S. Industry in 2000, http://www.stanford.edu/~tbres/research/step.pdf
    126. Timothy F. Bresnahan (2001): Prospects for an Information Technology-Led Productivity Surge, 5/4/01, http://www.stanford.edu/~tbres/reseatch/prospects_for_it_ led_surge.pdf
    127. Timothy J. Sturgeon(2002): Modular production networks: a new American model of Industrial organization, Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 11, Number 3.451-496(46).
    128. Toker Doganoglu and Lukasz Grzybowski (2003): Dynamic Duopoly Competition with Switching Costs and Network Externalities, paper for International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston, Massachusetts, April 4-5, 2003.
    129. Ulrich Witt (1997): "Lock-in" vs."critical masses"—Industrial .Change Under Network Externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 753-773.
    130. William H. Page and John E. Lopatka(1997): Network Externalities, Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/0760art.htm.
    131. Yang, Yi-Nung and Barrett, Christopher C, Nonconcave(1995): Network Externalities, Utah State University Economics Research Institute Study Paper 95-28.
    132. Yoffie, David(1997): Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
    133. FCC(Federal Communication Commission ,Available at http://www.fcc.gov/ NII), (1997),Secnnd Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions-(a) A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce: Agenda For Action;-(b)The NII: an administrative perspective;-(c) The Information Infrastructure: Executive Summary.
    134. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Federation of Inventors' Associations (IFIA) organized and the Argentine Association of Inventors (AAI) organized (2000): Inventors at the Dawn Of The New Millennium: Wipo-Ifia International Symposium, Buenos Aires, September 5 to 8, 2000.
    135. OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Science & Information Technology OECD (2000): A New Economy? The Changing Role of Innovation and Information Technology in Growth.

© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号

地址:北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编:100083

电话:办公室:(+86 10)66554848;文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新:66554700