盯住汇率制度不可维持性与退出策略的研究
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摘要
十九世纪以来，在国际金融研究的领域中，对汇率制度选择的争论一直没有停止过。20世纪90年代，一些发展中国家和新兴市场经济国家频繁暴发的金融危机，使得人们再一次对汇率制度的选择进行了激烈的讨论和深入的研究。研究发现，在国际资本高度流动的情况下，这些国家实行的盯住汇率制度是导致货币危机的根源。因此，在开放的经济条件下，盯住汇率制度是否可以维持以及如何退出盯住汇率制度是一个值得研究的问题。
笔者研究发现，在开放的经济条件下，盯住汇率制度是不可维持的。本文分别从汇率制度演化的历史视角和货币危机理论与现实的视角研究了盯住汇率制度的不可维持性。首先，从国际货币体系安排演化的历史视角，对盯住汇率制度的不可维持性进行研究。笔者采用当今国际上三大主要的汇率制度实际分类法，分别对汇率制度进行分类，然后详细研究国际汇率制度演化的历史趋势，并重点研究了20世纪90年代以来的国际汇率制度演化的历史趋势。研究发现，在世界经济一体化深入，国际资本流动日益频繁的开放的经济条件下，国际汇率制度演化呈现两极化的趋势。也就是说越来越多的国家要么选择固定汇率制度，要么选择浮动汇率制度，而居于两者之间的盯住汇率制度越来越少。这从汇率制度选择的历史现实性说明了在开放经济条件下盯住汇率制度的不可维持性。也可以说，这是由于外部经济环境的变化，使得盯住汇率制度不具有适应性，从而不具可维持性。其次，从货币危机的视角，分析了盯住汇率制度不可维持性的内生性以及在投机冲击下盯住汇率制度崩溃的机制。笔者从盯住汇率制度的纪律约束假设、可信度假设、单向投机冲击以及调整机制方面，分析了盯住汇率制度不可维持性的内生性。同时结合三代货币危机模型，分析在不同的投机冲击下，盯住汇率制度崩溃的路径和机理。还从实证的角度，分析盯住汇率制度与货币危机的关系，发现盯住汇率制度暴发货币危机的概率远远高于其他汇率制度。
本论文的第二部分重点研究如何退出盯住汇率制度。首先，结合第一代、第二代货币危机模型，构建了盯住汇率制度退出的理论模型。在第一代货币危机的基础上，在退出盯住汇率制度有社会成本和随时存在财政政策改革的情况下，财政支出一次性增加的冲击时，研究退出盯住汇率制度最优时间。并把银行系统融入到第二代货币危机模型中，构建了考虑银行成本的盯住汇率制度不同的策略的理论模型，分析了主动退出和危机驱动退出盯住汇率制度对经济的影响。其次，对退出盯住汇率制度事件进行实证分析，研究影响退出盯住汇率制度成功与否的因素。并选择一些国家／地区退出盯住汇率制度的典型案例进行比较研究，总结退出盯住汇率制度的成功经验和失败的教训。同时，结合退出盯住汇率制度的经验，进一步研究了实现盯住汇率制度平稳退出的制度安排。
本论文还利用盯住汇率制度不可维持性以及退出盯住汇率制度理论和经验教训，对我国人民币汇率制度的改革进行深入探讨。结合我国的实际情况，提出人民币汇率制度改革的中期目标是建立复合的有管理的浮动汇率制度，最终目标是自由浮动汇率制度。同时，认为人民币汇率制度改革是一个渐进的过程，并提出进一步完善人民币汇率形成机制的政策建议。
Since the nineteenth century, there has been an ongoing debate on the exchange rate regime choice. The debate has gained fresh vigor since the series of financial and monetary crises in some emerging market countries during the late 1990s, and deep researches were made to explain the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the currency crisis. The findings show that under the perfect the capital mobility, the pegged exchange rate regimes are the sources of the currency crisis. So it is important to make deep research about the Sustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes and the strategies for exiting from the pegged exchange rate regimes.
The study finds that the pegged exchange rate regime is unsustainable under the open economy conditions. At first, I deplore the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes from the evolution of the international monetary system perspective according different classification of the exchange rate regime. The findings indicate that as countries integrating the global economy, they tend to give up the pegged exchange rate regimes, and adopt either fully fixed or fully flexible exchange rate arrangement. Therefore the pegged exchange rate arrangements become fewer and fewer, but the fixed and the floating become more and more. And then the paper explores the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes from the currency crisis theory and practice perspectives. I think the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes is endogenous because the discipline hypothesis and credibility of the pegged regimes are weaker and uncredible under the perfect capital mobility. The study also analyses the collapse path and mechanism of the pegged regime under the one-way speculative attack based on the currency crisis model. I also investigate empirically the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the currency crisis and find that the pegged regimes are more vulnerable to currency crisis.
After analyzing the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes, the part II of the paper focuses on the strategies for exiting from
the pegged exchange rate regimes. At first, the paper develops the exiting model based on the currency crisis. I put the fiscal shock into the first generation currency crisis to determine the optimal time to exiting from the pegged exchange rate regimes when the fiscal shocks happen, and then incorporate the bank system into the second generation currency model to analyze the different exiting strategies under the outside shock. The paper also analyses empirically the determinants of exits from the pegged exchange rate regimes, and researches some countries' typical exiting cases.
At last, the paper discusses some issues about the reform of RMB's exchange rate regime. Considering the internal factors in our country, the paper puts forward to build the managed floating plus as the middle-term goal of the reform of RMB's exchange rate regime.
笔者研究发现，在开放的经济条件下，盯住汇率制度是不可维持的。本文分别从汇率制度演化的历史视角和货币危机理论与现实的视角研究了盯住汇率制度的不可维持性。首先，从国际货币体系安排演化的历史视角，对盯住汇率制度的不可维持性进行研究。笔者采用当今国际上三大主要的汇率制度实际分类法，分别对汇率制度进行分类，然后详细研究国际汇率制度演化的历史趋势，并重点研究了20世纪90年代以来的国际汇率制度演化的历史趋势。研究发现，在世界经济一体化深入，国际资本流动日益频繁的开放的经济条件下，国际汇率制度演化呈现两极化的趋势。也就是说越来越多的国家要么选择固定汇率制度，要么选择浮动汇率制度，而居于两者之间的盯住汇率制度越来越少。这从汇率制度选择的历史现实性说明了在开放经济条件下盯住汇率制度的不可维持性。也可以说，这是由于外部经济环境的变化，使得盯住汇率制度不具有适应性，从而不具可维持性。其次，从货币危机的视角，分析了盯住汇率制度不可维持性的内生性以及在投机冲击下盯住汇率制度崩溃的机制。笔者从盯住汇率制度的纪律约束假设、可信度假设、单向投机冲击以及调整机制方面，分析了盯住汇率制度不可维持性的内生性。同时结合三代货币危机模型，分析在不同的投机冲击下，盯住汇率制度崩溃的路径和机理。还从实证的角度，分析盯住汇率制度与货币危机的关系，发现盯住汇率制度暴发货币危机的概率远远高于其他汇率制度。
本论文的第二部分重点研究如何退出盯住汇率制度。首先，结合第一代、第二代货币危机模型，构建了盯住汇率制度退出的理论模型。在第一代货币危机的基础上，在退出盯住汇率制度有社会成本和随时存在财政政策改革的情况下，财政支出一次性增加的冲击时，研究退出盯住汇率制度最优时间。并把银行系统融入到第二代货币危机模型中，构建了考虑银行成本的盯住汇率制度不同的策略的理论模型，分析了主动退出和危机驱动退出盯住汇率制度对经济的影响。其次，对退出盯住汇率制度事件进行实证分析，研究影响退出盯住汇率制度成功与否的因素。并选择一些国家／地区退出盯住汇率制度的典型案例进行比较研究，总结退出盯住汇率制度的成功经验和失败的教训。同时，结合退出盯住汇率制度的经验，进一步研究了实现盯住汇率制度平稳退出的制度安排。
本论文还利用盯住汇率制度不可维持性以及退出盯住汇率制度理论和经验教训，对我国人民币汇率制度的改革进行深入探讨。结合我国的实际情况，提出人民币汇率制度改革的中期目标是建立复合的有管理的浮动汇率制度，最终目标是自由浮动汇率制度。同时，认为人民币汇率制度改革是一个渐进的过程，并提出进一步完善人民币汇率形成机制的政策建议。
Since the nineteenth century, there has been an ongoing debate on the exchange rate regime choice. The debate has gained fresh vigor since the series of financial and monetary crises in some emerging market countries during the late 1990s, and deep researches were made to explain the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the currency crisis. The findings show that under the perfect the capital mobility, the pegged exchange rate regimes are the sources of the currency crisis. So it is important to make deep research about the Sustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes and the strategies for exiting from the pegged exchange rate regimes.
The study finds that the pegged exchange rate regime is unsustainable under the open economy conditions. At first, I deplore the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes from the evolution of the international monetary system perspective according different classification of the exchange rate regime. The findings indicate that as countries integrating the global economy, they tend to give up the pegged exchange rate regimes, and adopt either fully fixed or fully flexible exchange rate arrangement. Therefore the pegged exchange rate arrangements become fewer and fewer, but the fixed and the floating become more and more. And then the paper explores the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes from the currency crisis theory and practice perspectives. I think the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes is endogenous because the discipline hypothesis and credibility of the pegged regimes are weaker and uncredible under the perfect capital mobility. The study also analyses the collapse path and mechanism of the pegged regime under the one-way speculative attack based on the currency crisis model. I also investigate empirically the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the currency crisis and find that the pegged regimes are more vulnerable to currency crisis.
After analyzing the unsustainability of the pegged exchange rate regimes, the part II of the paper focuses on the strategies for exiting from
the pegged exchange rate regimes. At first, the paper develops the exiting model based on the currency crisis. I put the fiscal shock into the first generation currency crisis to determine the optimal time to exiting from the pegged exchange rate regimes when the fiscal shocks happen, and then incorporate the bank system into the second generation currency model to analyze the different exiting strategies under the outside shock. The paper also analyses empirically the determinants of exits from the pegged exchange rate regimes, and researches some countries' typical exiting cases.
At last, the paper discusses some issues about the reform of RMB's exchange rate regime. Considering the internal factors in our country, the paper puts forward to build the managed floating plus as the middle-term goal of the reform of RMB's exchange rate regime.
引文
6 详见华妤、马跃(2003)，“资本账户和经常账户负面冲击与盯住汇率制度危机的理论分析”，《世界经济》2003年第10期。
7 详见赵伟、杨会臣(2005)，“盯住汇率制度可持续性：一个基于汇率预期的分析框架” 《世界经济》2005年第7期。
13 详见Eichengreen, Barry and Paul Masson 第(1998) "Exit Strategies: Policy Options for Countries Seeking Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility", IMF Occasional Paper 168.
5 详见Collins,1996;Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein, 2001, Balino Bennet and Borensztein, 1999.
5 见2005年10月14日中国人民银行公布的《2005年第3季度金融运行报告》。
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7 详见赵伟、杨会臣(2005)，“盯住汇率制度可持续性：一个基于汇率预期的分析框架” 《世界经济》2005年第7期。
13 详见Eichengreen, Barry and Paul Masson 第(1998) "Exit Strategies: Policy Options for Countries Seeking Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility", IMF Occasional Paper 168.
5 详见Collins,1996;Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein, 2001, Balino Bennet and Borensztein, 1999.
5 见2005年10月14日中国人民银行公布的《2005年第3季度金融运行报告》。
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[3] 卜永祥、Rod Tyers．中国均衡实际有效汇率：一个总量一般均衡分析[J]．经济研究，2001，6：21-32
[4] 卜永祥、秦宛顺．关税、货币政策与中国实际均衡汇率[J]．经济研究，2002，5：13-21．
[5] 卜永祥．资本流动、定价行为与汇率制度的福利分析[J]．金融研究，2003，1：12-23．
[6] 陈建梁．评人民币汇率调整的理论依据——兼评实际汇率分析法[J]．经济研究，2000，162-65．
[7] 陈平、王曦．人民币汇率的非均衡分析与汇率制度的宏观效率[J]．经济研究，2002，6：23-31．
[8] 陈学彬．近期人民币实际汇率变动态势分析——兼谈分析实际汇率应注意的问题[J]．经济研究，1999，1：22-28．
[9] 陈雨露，边卫红．开放经济中的货币政策操作目标理论——纳入汇率因素的货币状况指数(MCI)[J]．国际金融研究，2003，10：18-25．
[10] 储幼阳．人民币均衡汇率实证研究[J]．国际金融研究，2004，5：19-24．
[11] 戴金平，万志宏．政府声誉、投机性货币冲击与固定汇率的维持[J]．世界经济，2000，12：18．
[12] 戴维．里维里恩，克里斯．米尔纳，赵锡军、应维伟译．国际货币经济学前沿问题．北京：中国税务出版社，2000年版。
[13] 邓乐平，冯用富，晋重文．浮动汇率制度下货币政策的独立性[J]．金融研究，2002，3：56-64．
[14] 窦祥胜，杨炘．人民币均衡汇率估计——不同方法的比较[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2004，4：34-41．
[15] 冯用富．汇率制度：理论架构与中国金融进一步开放中的选择．四川：西南财经大学出版社，2001年版。
[16] 冯芸，吴冲锋．一种新的汇率波动度量方法：波动率法[J]．世界经济，2001，8：43．
[17] 高海红．实际汇率与经济增长：运用边限检验方法检验巴拉萨-萨缪尔森假说[J]．世界经济，2003，7：3-14．
[18] 高海红，陈晓莉．汇率与经济增长：对亚洲经济体的检验[J]．世界经济，2005，10：3-18．
[19] 高扬．发展中国远期外汇品种的优先次序[J]．国际经济评论，2005，9-10：42-45
[20] 郭建泉．汇率制度的演变趋势及中国的选择[J]．管理世界，2001，3：12-20．
[21] 郭建泉，周茂荣．弹性汇率制度下资本控制的经济效应——一个基于修正的Dornbusch‘超 调’模型的动态学分析[J]．经济研究，2003，5：48-56．
[22] 郭建泉，周茂荣．放弃成本、政府偏好与资本控制——一个基于经济结构和审慎管理的汇率制度选择模型[J]．经济研究，2004，5：67-74．
[23] 贺力平．探讨人民币升值的长期影响[J]．国际经济评论，2005，11-12：10-12．
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