转型经济下我国上市公司债务期限结构的影响因素研究
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摘要
债务期限结构是企业财务决策的重要内容，它不仅关系到企业的财务成本和债务偿还计划，还影响企业债权人的经济效益与经营风险。传统的财务理论早在20世纪70年代就开始了对债务期限结构问题的研究，其中代表性的理论包括，委托代理理论、信号传递理论、资产期限匹配理论以及税收理论等，并已经识别出诸如企业的资产期限、企业规模、成长性、违约率和实际税率等许多影响债务期限结构选择的因素。尽管如此，这些研究成果大部分是基于英、美等发达国家的制度背景发展起来的，很少有研究关注债务期限结构在不同制度环境下的差异，尤其是我国转型经济这一特殊的制度背景。
众所周知，我国上市公司的债务期限结构十分特殊，与西方发达国家以长期债务为主的债务融资结构相比，我国的企业更多地依赖于短期债务，而长期负债的比例很低。造成这一现象的原因有来自企业内部的因素，但更大程度上是由于制度的差异所导致的。目前，我国正处于经济转型时期，由于历史、体制等原因，我国的企业一直以来面临着较高的外部不确定性，企业必须时刻关注制度变迁过程中自身所面临的发展机遇以及制度变迁对企业发展战略、投融资行为、经营决策、交易成本的影响。这期间，企业所表现出来的“行为短期化”、“双重依赖”、“扩张冲动”、“投资饥渴”等按照成熟市场条件衡量的企业不理智行为很可能是转型经济条件下企业为适应外部制度环境的理性选择。那么，在转型经济的特殊环境下，我国企业是如何进行债务期限选择的?影响他们债务期限结构选择的因素又有哪些?国外影响债务期限结构选择的因素是否以相类似的方式影响中国上市公司的债务期限?等等，这些问题有待于理论模型的建立和实证的检验。
遵循理论研究、实证分析和提出政策建议的思路，本文在国内外理论和实证研究的基础上，结合我国转型经济的制度背景和金融环境，从宏观因素、公司特征、治理结构三个层面入手，对我国上市公司的债务期限结构的影响因素做了系统深入的理论分析。同时，选取我国非金融类上市公司为样本，综合运用多元回归模型、动态调整模型、二分类Probit，Logit模型以及差分估计方法，对影响我国上市公司债务期限结构的各层面因素进行实证检验，为上市公司债务期限结构的优化提供了理论和实践依据。
根据理论和实证研究结果，作者发现：(1)宏观环境的变化，包括宏观经济发展、金融体制、资本市场以及法制环境对我国上市公司的债务期限结构具有重要的影响。其中，金融机构规模、债券市场规模、法律制度和执法效率与债务期限结构显著正相关；利率期限结构、股票市场规模、资本市场信息披露的失真程度与公司债务期限结构负相关；经济发展水平与债务期限结构的关系则不显著。并且不同规模的上市公司受宏观因素影响的程度也有所不同，债券市场的发展和法制环境的改进对大公司的债务期限结构影响较大，而小公司则更可能从金融系统的发展中受益。此外，我国上市公司债务期限结构存在明显的地区和行业差异。(2)影响国外公司债务期限结构选择的公司特征因素，也几乎以类似的方式影响我国上市公司的债务期限结构。其中，资产期限、资产构成、公司规模、实际税率与债务期限结构正相关；自由现金流量、非预期盈余与债务期限结构负相关；而成长性、违约风险对债务期限结构则无显著影响。总体而言，债务期限结构的期限匹配假设、代理成本假设、信息不对称假设能较好地解释我国上市公司的债务融资行为。此外，动态模型的结果还证实了交易成本是影响我国债务期限结构的一个重要因素。(3)公司治理结构与公司债务期限结构之间存在着相互的作用，上市公司的公司治理水平越高，越有利于公司获得长期外部融资。其中股权集中度与公司债务期限结构负相关；董事会独立性与公司债务期限结构正相关；国有股权与公司债务期限结构之间是非线性的；管理者持股和机构投资者持股对公司债务期限结构的影响则不显著。另外，不同国家控制方式下的上市公司债务期限结构也存在着差异，且第一大股东性质变更会对公司债务期限结构产生重要的影响。
本文的创新之处主要体现在：(1)对现有债务期限结构问题的研究框架进行了补充。本文借鉴了国外有关的理论和实证研究成果，结合我国转型经济的制度特点，对上市公司的债务期限决策进行理论和实证研究，探讨特殊制度环境下公司债务期限结构的影响因素，解析制度差异对债务期限决策的影响，丰富和完善了现有的债务期限理论体系。国外现有的研究成果大多集中于公司层面，本文融合了多维度视角，从宏观层面、微观层面和公司内部治理多个层面对债务期限结构影响因素的全方位考察深化了原有的分析框架，有利于系统把握影响我国上市公司债务期限决策的重要因素，进而更好地揭示我国上市公司短期债务融资占绝对主导地位的深层次原因，这种全方位的研究在以前的文献中也较为鲜见。(2)改进了现有的国内相关实证研究的研究方法。考虑到公司的债务期限结构是长期决策的结果，本文适当加长了时间进行动态分析。通过使用我国非金融类上市公司面板数据，并控制时间特征效应和不可观察公司特征因素，构建债务期限结构的动态调整模型(DPD－GMM)分析公司因素如何影响中国上市公司债务期限结构选择。研究发现，调整成本(交易成本)影响我国上市公司债务期限结构的优化。(3)在对特定的背景下对债务期限结构进行检验时，得出了一些与先前研究不同的结论。比如，经济发展水平虽然使债务总量增加，但并未改变长期债务与短期债务之间的比例；我国上市公司的股权融资和长期债务融资之间存在着较强的替代关系使得股票市场规模与公司债务期限结构负相关；公司违约风险对债务期限结构无显著影响，政府的预算软约束使负债融资成本几乎不受违约风险的影响等等。此外，本文还对各子样本受相关因素影响的差异作了分类讨论。(4)首次把我国的公司治理问题与债务期限结构联系起来，证实了公司治理结构与公司债务期限结构之间存在着相互的作用。实证研究表明，上市公司的内部治理水平越高，越有利于公司获得长期外部融资。本文还重点分析了政府干预的影响，发现国有股权与公司债务期限结构之间呈U型关系，上市公司的债务期限结构随国家持股规模先下降，然后上升，且拐点发生在国家达到控股水平以后。同时，不同国家控制方式下的上市公司债务期限结构也存在着差异，国家直接控股公司的债务期限结构显著高于国家间接控股公司和非国家控股公司。最后，本文通过分析第一大股东性质变更对公司债务期限结构产生的影响，发现国有直接控制权的转移会导致公司债务期限结构出现结构性的调整。
Debt maturity structure is one of most important issues in corporate finance. The costs and benefits of debtor and creditor that are associated with the use of debt financing can provide a potential explanation for the optimal debt maturity structure chosen by a firm. Traditional financial theories turned to this issue since 1970's. The existing theories on debt maturity choice included agency cost hypothesis, signaling hypothesis, tax hypothesis, and maturity matching hypothesis etc. Many determinants of debt maturity structures were identified such as asset maturity, size, growth opportunity, default risk and tax rate. However, much of these researches have been directed largely towards companies listed in developed countries, such as the U.S., U.K. and Western Europe. Only a few studies paid attention to the debt maturity choice in different institutional environments, especially in a transition economy which changed from former planned economic.
As well known, Chinese listed companies replied deeply on short debt in financing structure, which are different from western developed countries. With higher exterior uncertainty in the transition, Chinese companies have to pay attention to the effect of institutional transition on their development opportunity, strategy, financing behavior, management decision and trade cost all along. Therefore, their "reasonless behaviors" are much more likely to be the necessary choices for acclimatizing themselves to institutional environment. Given the special institutional environment may be interesting and important for academics, managers, and policy makers to determine how institutional environment affects the debt maturity structure of Chinese listed company choice, and whether the debt maturity structure theories developed in Western countries can be applied to Chinese companies in the same way. In particular, it is interesting to investigate how Chinese listed companies chose their debt maturity in the transition, and what factors should be responsible for the choice of debt maturity structures of Chinese listed companies. All these problems are open for theoretical analysis and empirical test.
Following the thought of theoretical analysis, empirical test and then giving the proposition, this dissertation suggests a general framework to understand the debt maturity structure of Chinese companies. Based on reviewing relevant literatures and combined the institutional environment of Chinese transition economy, the author suggests that firms with different attributes of macroeconomics-specific, firm-specific and governance-specific maintain different debt maturity structures each of which is optimal to them. Then, with a new and comprehensive panel of publicly listed companies in China, the author uses econometrical technologies of linear regression, dynamic adjustment model, binary logistic and differences estimation to develop the optimal debt maturity structure model for Chinese listed companies.
The main findings of the dissertation are as follows:
First, the Change of macroeconomics environment including economic development, financial system, capital market and legal system has important influence on debt maturity structure of Chinese listed companies. The development of financial intermediaries, legal order and efficiency are significantly positively related to debt maturity, and term structure, the development of stock markets, lack of information disclosure in financial market are significantly negatively related to debt maturity, while the coefficient of economic development is insignificant. It is also found that the influence of macroeconomics environment is not same for listed companies with different size. It is the development of bond market and legal environment that have much more effects on big firms, while the improvement of bank system affects small firm better. Besides, there are significant difference for debt maturity structure of Chinese listed company in each region and industry.
Second, the debt maturity structure theories developed in Western countries can be applied to Chinese companies almost in the same way. Firms with shorter asset maturity, more fixed asset, larger size or higher interest rate use more long-term debt. Firms with more free cash flow or better quality issue more short-term debt. The relationship between the growth opportunity, default risk and debt maturity is statistically insignificant. Therefore, maturity matching hypothesis, agency cost hypothesis and signaling hypothesis are proved to explain the debt financing behavior of Chinese listed company appropriately. Moreover, the result of dynamic model offers strong evidence that transaction cost affect debt maturity of Chinese companies.
Third, debt maturity structure and corporate governance are substitutes. Firm's debt maturity increases with the improvement of corporate governance. Lower ownership concentration and more independent board of directors are helpful for companies to get long-term credit. The relationship between state ownership and debt maturity structure is non-monotonic. There is no evidence for the effect of managerial and institutional ownership in china. In addition, the change of character of the first shareholders has significant impact on corporate debt maturity structure due to the difference between listed companies controlled by government directly and indirectly.
This dissertation has the following innovations or improvements:
Firstly, this paper is a complement of existing research for debt maturity structure, which empirically analyses the debt maturity choice of Chinese listed companies based on extant works in western development countries and institutional characteristic of transition economy in China. It consummates the existing theory system of debt maturity by discussing the determinants of debt maturity structures in specific institutional environment, and resolving the effect of institution on corporate debt maturity choice. Extensively examining the determinants of debt maturity structure from macroeconomics-specific, firm-specific and governance-specific dimensions deepen the extant research frame. It is therefore in favor of understanding the determinants of Chinese listed company's financing behavior systematically, and finding out the deep reason why short-term debt is dominant in Chinese company better.
Secondly, this paper improves the existing analytic approach of domestic research. Given the long-term decision of corporate debt maturity structure, the author constructs a dynamic adjustment model to analyze empirically how firm characteristics affect debt maturity structure choice by Chinese non-financially listed companies' panel data, when controlling time-specific effects and time-invariant unobservable firm specific fixed effects. The result shows that transaction cost keep companies away from optimal debt maturity structure in our country.
Thirdly, some particular conclusions on debt maturity structure have been drawn out at institutional background of Chinese transition economy. For example, the development of economy does not change the proportion of short debt to long debt, although it makes total amount of debt increased; the size of stock market is negatively related to debt maturity structure, to the extent that equity financing and long debt financing substitute mutually; there are no obvious relationship between default risk and corporate debt maturity for soft budget constraint of government. Moreover, this paper also focuses on determinants for each sub-sample, and the difference between them.
Finally, this paper associates problems of corporate governance in China with debt maturity structure choice at first time, and proves that corporate governance structure can act as a substitute for the short-term debt. Firms with higher level of inner governance can get much more long-term debt outside. The paper also put emphasis upon the effect of government intervention, and found a significant U-shaped relation between state ownership and debt maturity structure, suggesting that debt maturity first decreases then increases as the ownership of government shareholder increase. Simultaneously, firms controlled by government directly use much more long-term debt than firms controlled by government indirectly or firms without government control. At last, the author proved that the transformation of direct government control will lead to structural adjustment for corporate debt maturity structure by examining the effect of the first shareholders change empirically.
众所周知，我国上市公司的债务期限结构十分特殊，与西方发达国家以长期债务为主的债务融资结构相比，我国的企业更多地依赖于短期债务，而长期负债的比例很低。造成这一现象的原因有来自企业内部的因素，但更大程度上是由于制度的差异所导致的。目前，我国正处于经济转型时期，由于历史、体制等原因，我国的企业一直以来面临着较高的外部不确定性，企业必须时刻关注制度变迁过程中自身所面临的发展机遇以及制度变迁对企业发展战略、投融资行为、经营决策、交易成本的影响。这期间，企业所表现出来的“行为短期化”、“双重依赖”、“扩张冲动”、“投资饥渴”等按照成熟市场条件衡量的企业不理智行为很可能是转型经济条件下企业为适应外部制度环境的理性选择。那么，在转型经济的特殊环境下，我国企业是如何进行债务期限选择的?影响他们债务期限结构选择的因素又有哪些?国外影响债务期限结构选择的因素是否以相类似的方式影响中国上市公司的债务期限?等等，这些问题有待于理论模型的建立和实证的检验。
遵循理论研究、实证分析和提出政策建议的思路，本文在国内外理论和实证研究的基础上，结合我国转型经济的制度背景和金融环境，从宏观因素、公司特征、治理结构三个层面入手，对我国上市公司的债务期限结构的影响因素做了系统深入的理论分析。同时，选取我国非金融类上市公司为样本，综合运用多元回归模型、动态调整模型、二分类Probit，Logit模型以及差分估计方法，对影响我国上市公司债务期限结构的各层面因素进行实证检验，为上市公司债务期限结构的优化提供了理论和实践依据。
根据理论和实证研究结果，作者发现：(1)宏观环境的变化，包括宏观经济发展、金融体制、资本市场以及法制环境对我国上市公司的债务期限结构具有重要的影响。其中，金融机构规模、债券市场规模、法律制度和执法效率与债务期限结构显著正相关；利率期限结构、股票市场规模、资本市场信息披露的失真程度与公司债务期限结构负相关；经济发展水平与债务期限结构的关系则不显著。并且不同规模的上市公司受宏观因素影响的程度也有所不同，债券市场的发展和法制环境的改进对大公司的债务期限结构影响较大，而小公司则更可能从金融系统的发展中受益。此外，我国上市公司债务期限结构存在明显的地区和行业差异。(2)影响国外公司债务期限结构选择的公司特征因素，也几乎以类似的方式影响我国上市公司的债务期限结构。其中，资产期限、资产构成、公司规模、实际税率与债务期限结构正相关；自由现金流量、非预期盈余与债务期限结构负相关；而成长性、违约风险对债务期限结构则无显著影响。总体而言，债务期限结构的期限匹配假设、代理成本假设、信息不对称假设能较好地解释我国上市公司的债务融资行为。此外，动态模型的结果还证实了交易成本是影响我国债务期限结构的一个重要因素。(3)公司治理结构与公司债务期限结构之间存在着相互的作用，上市公司的公司治理水平越高，越有利于公司获得长期外部融资。其中股权集中度与公司债务期限结构负相关；董事会独立性与公司债务期限结构正相关；国有股权与公司债务期限结构之间是非线性的；管理者持股和机构投资者持股对公司债务期限结构的影响则不显著。另外，不同国家控制方式下的上市公司债务期限结构也存在着差异，且第一大股东性质变更会对公司债务期限结构产生重要的影响。
本文的创新之处主要体现在：(1)对现有债务期限结构问题的研究框架进行了补充。本文借鉴了国外有关的理论和实证研究成果，结合我国转型经济的制度特点，对上市公司的债务期限决策进行理论和实证研究，探讨特殊制度环境下公司债务期限结构的影响因素，解析制度差异对债务期限决策的影响，丰富和完善了现有的债务期限理论体系。国外现有的研究成果大多集中于公司层面，本文融合了多维度视角，从宏观层面、微观层面和公司内部治理多个层面对债务期限结构影响因素的全方位考察深化了原有的分析框架，有利于系统把握影响我国上市公司债务期限决策的重要因素，进而更好地揭示我国上市公司短期债务融资占绝对主导地位的深层次原因，这种全方位的研究在以前的文献中也较为鲜见。(2)改进了现有的国内相关实证研究的研究方法。考虑到公司的债务期限结构是长期决策的结果，本文适当加长了时间进行动态分析。通过使用我国非金融类上市公司面板数据，并控制时间特征效应和不可观察公司特征因素，构建债务期限结构的动态调整模型(DPD－GMM)分析公司因素如何影响中国上市公司债务期限结构选择。研究发现，调整成本(交易成本)影响我国上市公司债务期限结构的优化。(3)在对特定的背景下对债务期限结构进行检验时，得出了一些与先前研究不同的结论。比如，经济发展水平虽然使债务总量增加，但并未改变长期债务与短期债务之间的比例；我国上市公司的股权融资和长期债务融资之间存在着较强的替代关系使得股票市场规模与公司债务期限结构负相关；公司违约风险对债务期限结构无显著影响，政府的预算软约束使负债融资成本几乎不受违约风险的影响等等。此外，本文还对各子样本受相关因素影响的差异作了分类讨论。(4)首次把我国的公司治理问题与债务期限结构联系起来，证实了公司治理结构与公司债务期限结构之间存在着相互的作用。实证研究表明，上市公司的内部治理水平越高，越有利于公司获得长期外部融资。本文还重点分析了政府干预的影响，发现国有股权与公司债务期限结构之间呈U型关系，上市公司的债务期限结构随国家持股规模先下降，然后上升，且拐点发生在国家达到控股水平以后。同时，不同国家控制方式下的上市公司债务期限结构也存在着差异，国家直接控股公司的债务期限结构显著高于国家间接控股公司和非国家控股公司。最后，本文通过分析第一大股东性质变更对公司债务期限结构产生的影响，发现国有直接控制权的转移会导致公司债务期限结构出现结构性的调整。
Debt maturity structure is one of most important issues in corporate finance. The costs and benefits of debtor and creditor that are associated with the use of debt financing can provide a potential explanation for the optimal debt maturity structure chosen by a firm. Traditional financial theories turned to this issue since 1970's. The existing theories on debt maturity choice included agency cost hypothesis, signaling hypothesis, tax hypothesis, and maturity matching hypothesis etc. Many determinants of debt maturity structures were identified such as asset maturity, size, growth opportunity, default risk and tax rate. However, much of these researches have been directed largely towards companies listed in developed countries, such as the U.S., U.K. and Western Europe. Only a few studies paid attention to the debt maturity choice in different institutional environments, especially in a transition economy which changed from former planned economic.
As well known, Chinese listed companies replied deeply on short debt in financing structure, which are different from western developed countries. With higher exterior uncertainty in the transition, Chinese companies have to pay attention to the effect of institutional transition on their development opportunity, strategy, financing behavior, management decision and trade cost all along. Therefore, their "reasonless behaviors" are much more likely to be the necessary choices for acclimatizing themselves to institutional environment. Given the special institutional environment may be interesting and important for academics, managers, and policy makers to determine how institutional environment affects the debt maturity structure of Chinese listed company choice, and whether the debt maturity structure theories developed in Western countries can be applied to Chinese companies in the same way. In particular, it is interesting to investigate how Chinese listed companies chose their debt maturity in the transition, and what factors should be responsible for the choice of debt maturity structures of Chinese listed companies. All these problems are open for theoretical analysis and empirical test.
Following the thought of theoretical analysis, empirical test and then giving the proposition, this dissertation suggests a general framework to understand the debt maturity structure of Chinese companies. Based on reviewing relevant literatures and combined the institutional environment of Chinese transition economy, the author suggests that firms with different attributes of macroeconomics-specific, firm-specific and governance-specific maintain different debt maturity structures each of which is optimal to them. Then, with a new and comprehensive panel of publicly listed companies in China, the author uses econometrical technologies of linear regression, dynamic adjustment model, binary logistic and differences estimation to develop the optimal debt maturity structure model for Chinese listed companies.
The main findings of the dissertation are as follows:
First, the Change of macroeconomics environment including economic development, financial system, capital market and legal system has important influence on debt maturity structure of Chinese listed companies. The development of financial intermediaries, legal order and efficiency are significantly positively related to debt maturity, and term structure, the development of stock markets, lack of information disclosure in financial market are significantly negatively related to debt maturity, while the coefficient of economic development is insignificant. It is also found that the influence of macroeconomics environment is not same for listed companies with different size. It is the development of bond market and legal environment that have much more effects on big firms, while the improvement of bank system affects small firm better. Besides, there are significant difference for debt maturity structure of Chinese listed company in each region and industry.
Second, the debt maturity structure theories developed in Western countries can be applied to Chinese companies almost in the same way. Firms with shorter asset maturity, more fixed asset, larger size or higher interest rate use more long-term debt. Firms with more free cash flow or better quality issue more short-term debt. The relationship between the growth opportunity, default risk and debt maturity is statistically insignificant. Therefore, maturity matching hypothesis, agency cost hypothesis and signaling hypothesis are proved to explain the debt financing behavior of Chinese listed company appropriately. Moreover, the result of dynamic model offers strong evidence that transaction cost affect debt maturity of Chinese companies.
Third, debt maturity structure and corporate governance are substitutes. Firm's debt maturity increases with the improvement of corporate governance. Lower ownership concentration and more independent board of directors are helpful for companies to get long-term credit. The relationship between state ownership and debt maturity structure is non-monotonic. There is no evidence for the effect of managerial and institutional ownership in china. In addition, the change of character of the first shareholders has significant impact on corporate debt maturity structure due to the difference between listed companies controlled by government directly and indirectly.
This dissertation has the following innovations or improvements:
Firstly, this paper is a complement of existing research for debt maturity structure, which empirically analyses the debt maturity choice of Chinese listed companies based on extant works in western development countries and institutional characteristic of transition economy in China. It consummates the existing theory system of debt maturity by discussing the determinants of debt maturity structures in specific institutional environment, and resolving the effect of institution on corporate debt maturity choice. Extensively examining the determinants of debt maturity structure from macroeconomics-specific, firm-specific and governance-specific dimensions deepen the extant research frame. It is therefore in favor of understanding the determinants of Chinese listed company's financing behavior systematically, and finding out the deep reason why short-term debt is dominant in Chinese company better.
Secondly, this paper improves the existing analytic approach of domestic research. Given the long-term decision of corporate debt maturity structure, the author constructs a dynamic adjustment model to analyze empirically how firm characteristics affect debt maturity structure choice by Chinese non-financially listed companies' panel data, when controlling time-specific effects and time-invariant unobservable firm specific fixed effects. The result shows that transaction cost keep companies away from optimal debt maturity structure in our country.
Thirdly, some particular conclusions on debt maturity structure have been drawn out at institutional background of Chinese transition economy. For example, the development of economy does not change the proportion of short debt to long debt, although it makes total amount of debt increased; the size of stock market is negatively related to debt maturity structure, to the extent that equity financing and long debt financing substitute mutually; there are no obvious relationship between default risk and corporate debt maturity for soft budget constraint of government. Moreover, this paper also focuses on determinants for each sub-sample, and the difference between them.
Finally, this paper associates problems of corporate governance in China with debt maturity structure choice at first time, and proves that corporate governance structure can act as a substitute for the short-term debt. Firms with higher level of inner governance can get much more long-term debt outside. The paper also put emphasis upon the effect of government intervention, and found a significant U-shaped relation between state ownership and debt maturity structure, suggesting that debt maturity first decreases then increases as the ownership of government shareholder increase. Simultaneously, firms controlled by government directly use much more long-term debt than firms controlled by government indirectly or firms without government control. At last, the author proved that the transformation of direct government control will lead to structural adjustment for corporate debt maturity structure by examining the effect of the first shareholders change empirically.
引文
1 Eaton，Jonathan and Harvey S．Rosen，“Agency,Delayed Compensation and the Structure of Remuneration．”Journal of Finance，1983，Vol．38，No．5，pp．1489－1505．
1 见Jensen(1986)，“Agency cost of free cash flow，Corporate Finance，and Takeovers”．American Economic Review 76，pp323．
1 相关研究请参见：德国(Edwardaand Fischer，1994；Franks and Mayer，1994；Gorton and Sxhmid，1996)、日本(Prowse，1992；Berglof and Perotti，1994)、意大利(Barca，1995)以及OECD(Maher and Andersson，2000)、东亚(Claessens et al，2000)和许多发展中国家(La Porta et al，1998)。
1 详见Jenscn and Meckling，Theory of the firm：Managerial behavior,agency cost and ownership structure，Journal of Financial Economics，1976，3：305-360．
1 Steiner (1972) and Hackman (1990) 的研究也支持了随着董事规模的增大其有效性变弱，因为协调和处理问题超过规模较大带来的优势(参见Jensen，1993)。
2 Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 在他们的董事会分析中也建议董事会成员限制在7或8人，并提高他们的股份。
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1 见Jensen(1986)，“Agency cost of free cash flow，Corporate Finance，and Takeovers”．American Economic Review 76，pp323．
1 相关研究请参见：德国(Edwardaand Fischer，1994；Franks and Mayer，1994；Gorton and Sxhmid，1996)、日本(Prowse，1992；Berglof and Perotti，1994)、意大利(Barca，1995)以及OECD(Maher and Andersson，2000)、东亚(Claessens et al，2000)和许多发展中国家(La Porta et al，1998)。
1 详见Jenscn and Meckling，Theory of the firm：Managerial behavior,agency cost and ownership structure，Journal of Financial Economics，1976，3：305-360．
1 Steiner (1972) and Hackman (1990) 的研究也支持了随着董事规模的增大其有效性变弱，因为协调和处理问题超过规模较大带来的优势(参见Jensen，1993)。
2 Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 在他们的董事会分析中也建议董事会成员限制在7或8人，并提高他们的股份。
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