审计质量与审计市场行为主体关系研究
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摘要
在经历了本世纪初一系列上市公司会计造假和注册会计师审计失败的重大案例之后,人们对独立审计质量问题更加感到困惑。但是,随着国际经济一体化的快速推进和我国经济改革的不断深入及资本市场的规模化发展,独立审计的作用却日益重要。因此,加强防范和不断解决独立审计中可能出现和已经出现的问题将是一个持久的过程。从理论上说,审计质量既是审计信息的使用者和社会公众对注册会计师审计服务及其产品的评价,也是审计市场行为主体在特定的制度背景下行为的结果;防范和解决独立审计质量问题的主要途径就是实行适当的审计质量评价和有效的制度变革。而实际上,任何评价体系都难免存在不足,任何制度措施都会因相关行为主体的策略行为和环境的变化而难以持久有效。所以研究在变化的制度背景下审计质量的评价及审计质量与审计市场行为主体的关系,对于引导相关行为主体的市场行为和提高政策的有效性均具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
从表面上看,审计质量的评价是一个评价方法问题,上市公司审计质量问题是一个注册会计师执业水平和审计报告的真实性问题。而实质上,这两类问题的背后都隐藏着深刻的社会背景、复杂的经济利益关系和内在的行为逻辑,也反映了审计的技术特征,而且二者是不可分离的。本文试图在变化的制度背景下,比较系统地研究审计质量的评价及审计市场行为主体行为与审计质量的关系。我们在总结其他作者的零散研究成果和分析以往研究不足的基础上,着重集成地研究了三大紧密相关的问题:(1) 审计质量的概念和审计质量的评价;(2) 审计质量问题产生和制约的机制,即在各种因素的影响下审计市场行为主体是如何相互作用而共同决定审计质量的;(3) 改善我国独立审计质量的途径。
在导论(第一章)中,我们从列举目前国内外审计质量问题的严重性和初步分析以往人们研究此类问题中的不足之处入手,选定了研究的问题,确定了本文研究的主线和所采用的方法。我们也在这一部分里介绍了本文的核心思想、逻辑思路和论文结构。
在第二章里,我们首先依据ISO关于质量的理论,给出了我们对审计质量的定义。接着,我们从审计信息的特征入手,分析了审计质量的特征;再从审计信息的特征和审计质量的特征入手,定性地对影响审计质量的因素进行了理论分析。我们在同时考虑审计服务供给者和评价者的基础上把影响审计质量的因素分为四大类:审计资源因素、审计环境(制度)因素、审计风险因素及审计行为因素,提供了一种新的分析模式。然后,我们评介、分析了各种评价审计质量的方法和模型,引入了审计质量评价的模糊数学方法。最后从投资者和社会公众的角
Today, people become more and more puzzled with the audit quality of CPAs' after experiencing a series of serious cases of corporate fraud and audit failure in the initial years of this century. However, at the same time, the significance of independent audit is also recognized more widely with the fast development of the integration of international economy, economic reform , and capital market in China. Therefore, it will be a long and constant process to strengthen precaution against and solve the audit quality problems which have happened and will possibly occur. Theoretically speaking, audit quality is not only the appraisal, which is made by the users of audit information and the public, of CPAs' service or products but also the behavioral results made by the economic agents in the audit markets under the specific institutional background and a main method for avoiding and solving the audit quality problems is a proper appraisal of audit quality and valid institutional reform. As a matter of fact, all appraisal systems are imperfect and it is difficult for any control measures to keep valid for a long time because of the change of environment and strategical behaviors of the economic agents. The research on the relationship between audit quality and the economic agents in audit markets and the evaluation of audit quality on the changing background of institutions will lead to theoretical contribution and realistic effect on conducting the economic agents and improving efficiency of policy.Apparently, the appraisal of audit quality is a problem of appraisal method and audit quality problem of listed companies is a problem of CPA' s operation ability and authenticity of audit reports. Actually, the two kinds of problems not only conceal deep social background, complicated economic benefit relation , and inherent behavior logic but also reflect
technological features of modern audit. They are inseparable. In this thesis, we try to research systematically the evaluation of audit quality and the relationship between the economic agents in audit markets based on changeable institutions. By assembling other authors' scattered research achievement and analyzing their insufficient aspects, we mainly research three closely linked problems emphatically: firstly, the concept of audit quality and appraisal of audit quality ;secondly, the emergence of audit quality problems and control mechanisms i. e. how to interact and determine the audit quality in audit markets for the economic agents under the influence of various kinds of factors; and thirdly , the way to improve audit quality in our country.In the introduction (chapter one), after giving several examples of serious quality problems in China and in USA and analysing the weakness in the past research on this kind of problems, we put forwards those problems, which we will concentrate on, and the red thread of the research method. In this chapter, we also introduce the core thought, logic outline and organizational structure of the thesis.In chapter two, firstly, we draw the concept of audit quality from ISO quality theory. Secondly, we analyse the character of audit quality from the character of audit information. Thirdly, we present qualitatively a theoretical analysis on the factors of influencing audit quality from the character of audit information and audit quality, considering the foundation of suppliers and providers of audit service. In the mean while , we divide those factors that influence audit quality into four big classes: audit resource factors, audit environmental factors, audit risk factors , and audit behaviorial factors. We offer a new kind of analytical mode. Fourthly, we appraise and analyse all kinds of appraisal methods and appraisal modes of audit quality and then introduce a new method to appraise audit quality—fuzzy mathematics method. Finally,
in terms of the investors and the public, we make quantitative and quasi-quantitative analysis on audit quality of CPA firms from audit goal and audit ability , put forward a fuzzy mathematics model to appraise audit quality of CPA firms in China and display a practical appraisal of audit quality on the CPA firms in our country. We also analyze the status quo of independent audit quality in our country.Chapter three is a concrete analysis on the economic agents' contract relationship and their behavioral characters in audit markets. In this chapter, we study the behavioral characters of those agents (certified public accountants, investors, creditors, administrative authorities of enterprises, governments, associations of certified public accountants) in various kinds of contractual relationship, where the center is the contractual relationship between audit principals and CPA s. It is the kinds of contractual relationship and behavioral characters that decide the influence of the agents on audit quality and function consequence. By the way, we also analyze the institutional background and the history of the audit market in our country. The institutional background and the history make effect on audit quality through the effect on all kinds of economic agents .Chapter four is not only the promotion of chapter three but also the center of this thesis. In this chapter, by using modern economics theory and behavior science theory, we analyze the relationship of principal—agent and game relationship among all kinds of agents and draw some corresponding policy suggestions considering the dual role of behavioral factors according to above analysis. We set up and then research a few typical information economics models : principal-agent model based on audit quality and CPAs' behavior .audit quality price signaling model and CPA' s selection model, game model on audit quality between CPAs, the optimized model of government supervision, model of
games between CPA and corporate administrative authorities, enterprise principal-agent model based on accounting information, model of games between government supervisors and the supervised. In this chapter, furthermore , we discuss the governance of governments , listed companies and CICPA and the rights and responsibities for every agent respectively. Our results show that the following measures are all favorable to rise audit independence and expand the size of accounting firms, that is to say, to improve audit quality.(1) Optimization of supervision;(2) Improvement of CPA' s income; (3)proper appraisal on audit quality;(4)Expansion of the propaganda of accounting firms;(5)The appropriate monopoly structure of audit markets.(6)Optimization of the governance of government, listed companies and CICPA;(7)Correct distribution of rights and duties;(8) Defence of the society fairness.So, it is a system engineering to improve audit quality.In chapter five, at the first, we take the accounting firms in China as samples and adopt the logistic regression model to research the impactions of the economic agents in audit markets on scale of accounting firms and independence respectively. The result says that, in our country, the formation process of big accounting firms is mainly the result of government behavior. But it is a trend to form scale through market behavior andt CPA' s behavior will be dominant. Independence of CPA audit has been tremendously influenced by the behavior of the government and enterprises, while little influenced by investors, specially for medium and small investors. Thus, there will be obvious effect on improvement of audit quality by strengthening the government supervision
and consummate the market mechanism of in our country. At last, we use the four kinds of factors that influences audit quality to analyse the case of Yinguang xia-Zhong Tianqing The result shows the behavioral factors are decisive and inherent factor, environment factors are external*factors which can play a fundamental function. These factors can not only lead the economic agents to improve audit quality but also facilitate their behavior to leave emergence of the problems of audit quality.In chapter six, we analyse the possible defections of governance of listed companies and the government, the structure of audit markets, organization and positioning of CICPA, judicial construction , social moral and fairness. These defections mean institutional obstacle to improve audit quality. In this chapter, we put forward some concrete measures to change the situation, including to perfect and give free rein to market mechanism, strengthen effectively supervision, implement comprehensive administration, safeguard the society fairness, perfect the accounting firms' control mechanism of quality, and improve the CPAs' professional level.The last chapter ( chapter seven) is the summary of the thesis, from which we reach our conclusion as follows:(1) Under the current situation, only when we combine scale of accounting firms and punishment on them in the past to measure their audit quality, may we appraise CPAs' audit quality more objectively, more correctly ,and more fully and concisely.(2) The factors that effect audit quality can be divided into four classes: environment factors, resource factors, risk factors and behavioral factors. Among these factors, behavioral factors are a decisive and inherent, while environment factors are external factors which play a fundamental function. The factors environment can not only
lead the economic agents s to improve audit quality, but also facilitate their behavior to leave simply emerge the problems of audit quality.(3) When the audit quality problems happen .ultimate liabilities should be born by those who can avoid them at minimum cost but have not done. The CPAs and listed companies should bear civil and criminal responsibilities for audit failure and accounting fraud. While audit failure and accounting fraud appear by a large scale, the governments should bear community and administrative responsibilities for failure in making policy and marled supervision and more severe punishment on supervisor' s corruption behaviors is indispensable.(4) The behavioral characteristics of the economic agents in audit market and the contract relationship between them are inherent and original aspects which influence audit quality while external institutions are constraint conditions which influence audit quality by changing the utility function and gain of those agents and the contract relationships between them(5) It is urgent task to reform the institutions which impair audit quality in China. The contents of reform include perfecting the governance of listed companies and governments, optimizing audit market structure, revising legal issues, upholding society fairness , and raising moral standards. In addition, it is also important to improve CPAs' income and develop accounting education.
从表面上看,审计质量的评价是一个评价方法问题,上市公司审计质量问题是一个注册会计师执业水平和审计报告的真实性问题。而实质上,这两类问题的背后都隐藏着深刻的社会背景、复杂的经济利益关系和内在的行为逻辑,也反映了审计的技术特征,而且二者是不可分离的。本文试图在变化的制度背景下,比较系统地研究审计质量的评价及审计市场行为主体行为与审计质量的关系。我们在总结其他作者的零散研究成果和分析以往研究不足的基础上,着重集成地研究了三大紧密相关的问题:(1) 审计质量的概念和审计质量的评价;(2) 审计质量问题产生和制约的机制,即在各种因素的影响下审计市场行为主体是如何相互作用而共同决定审计质量的;(3) 改善我国独立审计质量的途径。
在导论(第一章)中,我们从列举目前国内外审计质量问题的严重性和初步分析以往人们研究此类问题中的不足之处入手,选定了研究的问题,确定了本文研究的主线和所采用的方法。我们也在这一部分里介绍了本文的核心思想、逻辑思路和论文结构。
在第二章里,我们首先依据ISO关于质量的理论,给出了我们对审计质量的定义。接着,我们从审计信息的特征入手,分析了审计质量的特征;再从审计信息的特征和审计质量的特征入手,定性地对影响审计质量的因素进行了理论分析。我们在同时考虑审计服务供给者和评价者的基础上把影响审计质量的因素分为四大类:审计资源因素、审计环境(制度)因素、审计风险因素及审计行为因素,提供了一种新的分析模式。然后,我们评介、分析了各种评价审计质量的方法和模型,引入了审计质量评价的模糊数学方法。最后从投资者和社会公众的角
Today, people become more and more puzzled with the audit quality of CPAs' after experiencing a series of serious cases of corporate fraud and audit failure in the initial years of this century. However, at the same time, the significance of independent audit is also recognized more widely with the fast development of the integration of international economy, economic reform , and capital market in China. Therefore, it will be a long and constant process to strengthen precaution against and solve the audit quality problems which have happened and will possibly occur. Theoretically speaking, audit quality is not only the appraisal, which is made by the users of audit information and the public, of CPAs' service or products but also the behavioral results made by the economic agents in the audit markets under the specific institutional background and a main method for avoiding and solving the audit quality problems is a proper appraisal of audit quality and valid institutional reform. As a matter of fact, all appraisal systems are imperfect and it is difficult for any control measures to keep valid for a long time because of the change of environment and strategical behaviors of the economic agents. The research on the relationship between audit quality and the economic agents in audit markets and the evaluation of audit quality on the changing background of institutions will lead to theoretical contribution and realistic effect on conducting the economic agents and improving efficiency of policy.Apparently, the appraisal of audit quality is a problem of appraisal method and audit quality problem of listed companies is a problem of CPA' s operation ability and authenticity of audit reports. Actually, the two kinds of problems not only conceal deep social background, complicated economic benefit relation , and inherent behavior logic but also reflect
technological features of modern audit. They are inseparable. In this thesis, we try to research systematically the evaluation of audit quality and the relationship between the economic agents in audit markets based on changeable institutions. By assembling other authors' scattered research achievement and analyzing their insufficient aspects, we mainly research three closely linked problems emphatically: firstly, the concept of audit quality and appraisal of audit quality ;secondly, the emergence of audit quality problems and control mechanisms i. e. how to interact and determine the audit quality in audit markets for the economic agents under the influence of various kinds of factors; and thirdly , the way to improve audit quality in our country.In the introduction (chapter one), after giving several examples of serious quality problems in China and in USA and analysing the weakness in the past research on this kind of problems, we put forwards those problems, which we will concentrate on, and the red thread of the research method. In this chapter, we also introduce the core thought, logic outline and organizational structure of the thesis.In chapter two, firstly, we draw the concept of audit quality from ISO quality theory. Secondly, we analyse the character of audit quality from the character of audit information. Thirdly, we present qualitatively a theoretical analysis on the factors of influencing audit quality from the character of audit information and audit quality, considering the foundation of suppliers and providers of audit service. In the mean while , we divide those factors that influence audit quality into four big classes: audit resource factors, audit environmental factors, audit risk factors , and audit behaviorial factors. We offer a new kind of analytical mode. Fourthly, we appraise and analyse all kinds of appraisal methods and appraisal modes of audit quality and then introduce a new method to appraise audit quality—fuzzy mathematics method. Finally,
in terms of the investors and the public, we make quantitative and quasi-quantitative analysis on audit quality of CPA firms from audit goal and audit ability , put forward a fuzzy mathematics model to appraise audit quality of CPA firms in China and display a practical appraisal of audit quality on the CPA firms in our country. We also analyze the status quo of independent audit quality in our country.Chapter three is a concrete analysis on the economic agents' contract relationship and their behavioral characters in audit markets. In this chapter, we study the behavioral characters of those agents (certified public accountants, investors, creditors, administrative authorities of enterprises, governments, associations of certified public accountants) in various kinds of contractual relationship, where the center is the contractual relationship between audit principals and CPA s. It is the kinds of contractual relationship and behavioral characters that decide the influence of the agents on audit quality and function consequence. By the way, we also analyze the institutional background and the history of the audit market in our country. The institutional background and the history make effect on audit quality through the effect on all kinds of economic agents .Chapter four is not only the promotion of chapter three but also the center of this thesis. In this chapter, by using modern economics theory and behavior science theory, we analyze the relationship of principal—agent and game relationship among all kinds of agents and draw some corresponding policy suggestions considering the dual role of behavioral factors according to above analysis. We set up and then research a few typical information economics models : principal-agent model based on audit quality and CPAs' behavior .audit quality price signaling model and CPA' s selection model, game model on audit quality between CPAs, the optimized model of government supervision, model of
games between CPA and corporate administrative authorities, enterprise principal-agent model based on accounting information, model of games between government supervisors and the supervised. In this chapter, furthermore , we discuss the governance of governments , listed companies and CICPA and the rights and responsibities for every agent respectively. Our results show that the following measures are all favorable to rise audit independence and expand the size of accounting firms, that is to say, to improve audit quality.(1) Optimization of supervision;(2) Improvement of CPA' s income; (3)proper appraisal on audit quality;(4)Expansion of the propaganda of accounting firms;(5)The appropriate monopoly structure of audit markets.(6)Optimization of the governance of government, listed companies and CICPA;(7)Correct distribution of rights and duties;(8) Defence of the society fairness.So, it is a system engineering to improve audit quality.In chapter five, at the first, we take the accounting firms in China as samples and adopt the logistic regression model to research the impactions of the economic agents in audit markets on scale of accounting firms and independence respectively. The result says that, in our country, the formation process of big accounting firms is mainly the result of government behavior. But it is a trend to form scale through market behavior andt CPA' s behavior will be dominant. Independence of CPA audit has been tremendously influenced by the behavior of the government and enterprises, while little influenced by investors, specially for medium and small investors. Thus, there will be obvious effect on improvement of audit quality by strengthening the government supervision
and consummate the market mechanism of in our country. At last, we use the four kinds of factors that influences audit quality to analyse the case of Yinguang xia-Zhong Tianqing The result shows the behavioral factors are decisive and inherent factor, environment factors are external*factors which can play a fundamental function. These factors can not only lead the economic agents to improve audit quality but also facilitate their behavior to leave emergence of the problems of audit quality.In chapter six, we analyse the possible defections of governance of listed companies and the government, the structure of audit markets, organization and positioning of CICPA, judicial construction , social moral and fairness. These defections mean institutional obstacle to improve audit quality. In this chapter, we put forward some concrete measures to change the situation, including to perfect and give free rein to market mechanism, strengthen effectively supervision, implement comprehensive administration, safeguard the society fairness, perfect the accounting firms' control mechanism of quality, and improve the CPAs' professional level.The last chapter ( chapter seven) is the summary of the thesis, from which we reach our conclusion as follows:(1) Under the current situation, only when we combine scale of accounting firms and punishment on them in the past to measure their audit quality, may we appraise CPAs' audit quality more objectively, more correctly ,and more fully and concisely.(2) The factors that effect audit quality can be divided into four classes: environment factors, resource factors, risk factors and behavioral factors. Among these factors, behavioral factors are a decisive and inherent, while environment factors are external factors which play a fundamental function. The factors environment can not only
lead the economic agents s to improve audit quality, but also facilitate their behavior to leave simply emerge the problems of audit quality.(3) When the audit quality problems happen .ultimate liabilities should be born by those who can avoid them at minimum cost but have not done. The CPAs and listed companies should bear civil and criminal responsibilities for audit failure and accounting fraud. While audit failure and accounting fraud appear by a large scale, the governments should bear community and administrative responsibilities for failure in making policy and marled supervision and more severe punishment on supervisor' s corruption behaviors is indispensable.(4) The behavioral characteristics of the economic agents in audit market and the contract relationship between them are inherent and original aspects which influence audit quality while external institutions are constraint conditions which influence audit quality by changing the utility function and gain of those agents and the contract relationships between them(5) It is urgent task to reform the institutions which impair audit quality in China. The contents of reform include perfecting the governance of listed companies and governments, optimizing audit market structure, revising legal issues, upholding society fairness , and raising moral standards. In addition, it is also important to improve CPAs' income and develop accounting education.
引文
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7、叶少琴:《中国上市公司注册会计师审计质量研究》,中国财政经济出版社,2004年版。
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