光伏建筑推广政策研究
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摘要
光伏建筑已经成为建筑节能的重要方式。许多发达国家如日本和德国的光伏建筑在有效的推广政策推动下,已经非常普及。我国近年来也出台了一些致力于推广光伏建筑的政策,然而实施效果并不理想。本文研究的目的就是为光伏建筑推广政策的制定提供参考。
本文首先以科技有效供给模型为基础,明确了光伏建筑推广过程中的四大主体包括政府、光伏建筑科技供给方、房地产开发商和消费者。运用演化博弈理论和效用需求理论深入剖析各主体之间的关系得出:有效的推广政策是改变开发商群体的策略,使其逐步提高光伏建筑的开发量;加大研发固定资产投入可以加速光伏建筑的技术进步;补贴短期内可以显著提高消费者对光伏建筑的需求。
通过对我国的光伏建筑推广的现状分析,找出了光伏建筑推广的主要障碍,包括:光伏建筑造价高、光伏建筑相关市场不健全、既有建筑的光伏系统安装难以启动、光伏建筑缺乏行业标准、光伏建筑核心技术落后等。
采用比较分析法,从政策实施效果的角度分析日本、德国以及西班牙三个光伏建筑推广较为成功的国家的政策变迁,总结其成功的经验,主要包括:对消费者采取以上网电价为主要形式的补贴;重视对光伏建筑一体化技术的研究;大力扶持优秀的光伏企业;重视对光伏建筑的宣传。
最后我国光伏建筑推广政策提出建议,对光伏企业的政策主要为税收优惠,政府补贴以及示范工程;对房地产开发商的政策主要采取建立完善的光伏建筑行业标准,促进开发商与光伏建筑其他相关主体的合作和财税激励政策。针对消费者的最佳补贴政策为上网电价。
通过以上研究得出结论:①只有制定使光伏企业、房地产开发商和消费者同时获益的推广政策,才能从根本上实现光伏建筑市场化的推广。②发达国家的实践表明上网电价是目前光伏建筑推广最为有效的政策。③应针对我国光伏建筑推广的利益主体制定有效的推广政策。
Building Integrated Photovoltaics has become an important way of building energy efficiency. Many developed countries such as Japan and Germany's BIPV in the effective promotion policy, have been very popular. In recent years , China also issued some dedicated to promoting BIPV, however implementation effect is not good. The purpose of this study is the reference for government making Promotion Policy of BIPV.
This paper firstly with technology effective supply model as the foundation, clear four subjects of BIPV in popularizing process include government, BIPV technology suppliers, real estate developers and consumers. Using evolutionary game theory and utility demand theory thoroughly analyzed the relationship between different subjects that: effective promotion policies is to change the strategy, make the developer community of its gradually raise photovoltaic architecture; back hurriedly Increase R&D fixed assets investments can accelerate the technology progress; subsidies can significantly improve consumer short-term demand for BIPV.
Based on the present situation of the BIPV promotion analysis, found the main obstacle of BIPV promotion, including: the cost is high, and photovoltaic construction related market is not perfect, both photovoltaic system installation, and photovoltaic building it is hard to start the industry standard, lack of core technologies.
By the comparative analysis, from the perspective of policy implementation effect from Japan, Germany and Spain three BIPV promotion of the more successful national policy changes, summarizes its successful experience for consumers, including: to power tariff for the main forms of compensation; Emphasis on solar building integrated technology research; We will vigorously support outstanding photovoltaic enterprise; Emphasis on solar building propaganda.
Finally our BIPV promotion policy suggestions on photovoltaic enterprise policy, mainly for the preferential tax, the government subsidies and demonstration project; The policy of real estate developers mainly by establishing perfect photovoltaic construction industry standards, promote developer and photovoltaic building other related subject cooperation and tax incentive policy. The best way is to take Feed-in tariffs .
Through the above research conclusion: (1) the formulation make photovoltaic enterprise, real estate developers and consumers and the promotion of policy, can benefit from accomplishing the BIPV market promotion. (2) practice of the developed countries that Feed-in tariff is the most effective policy for BIPV promotion. (3) the government should focus on our BIPV promotion interest bodies to make effective promotion policy
本文首先以科技有效供给模型为基础,明确了光伏建筑推广过程中的四大主体包括政府、光伏建筑科技供给方、房地产开发商和消费者。运用演化博弈理论和效用需求理论深入剖析各主体之间的关系得出:有效的推广政策是改变开发商群体的策略,使其逐步提高光伏建筑的开发量;加大研发固定资产投入可以加速光伏建筑的技术进步;补贴短期内可以显著提高消费者对光伏建筑的需求。
通过对我国的光伏建筑推广的现状分析,找出了光伏建筑推广的主要障碍,包括:光伏建筑造价高、光伏建筑相关市场不健全、既有建筑的光伏系统安装难以启动、光伏建筑缺乏行业标准、光伏建筑核心技术落后等。
采用比较分析法,从政策实施效果的角度分析日本、德国以及西班牙三个光伏建筑推广较为成功的国家的政策变迁,总结其成功的经验,主要包括:对消费者采取以上网电价为主要形式的补贴;重视对光伏建筑一体化技术的研究;大力扶持优秀的光伏企业;重视对光伏建筑的宣传。
最后我国光伏建筑推广政策提出建议,对光伏企业的政策主要为税收优惠,政府补贴以及示范工程;对房地产开发商的政策主要采取建立完善的光伏建筑行业标准,促进开发商与光伏建筑其他相关主体的合作和财税激励政策。针对消费者的最佳补贴政策为上网电价。
通过以上研究得出结论:①只有制定使光伏企业、房地产开发商和消费者同时获益的推广政策,才能从根本上实现光伏建筑市场化的推广。②发达国家的实践表明上网电价是目前光伏建筑推广最为有效的政策。③应针对我国光伏建筑推广的利益主体制定有效的推广政策。
Building Integrated Photovoltaics has become an important way of building energy efficiency. Many developed countries such as Japan and Germany's BIPV in the effective promotion policy, have been very popular. In recent years , China also issued some dedicated to promoting BIPV, however implementation effect is not good. The purpose of this study is the reference for government making Promotion Policy of BIPV.
This paper firstly with technology effective supply model as the foundation, clear four subjects of BIPV in popularizing process include government, BIPV technology suppliers, real estate developers and consumers. Using evolutionary game theory and utility demand theory thoroughly analyzed the relationship between different subjects that: effective promotion policies is to change the strategy, make the developer community of its gradually raise photovoltaic architecture; back hurriedly Increase R&D fixed assets investments can accelerate the technology progress; subsidies can significantly improve consumer short-term demand for BIPV.
Based on the present situation of the BIPV promotion analysis, found the main obstacle of BIPV promotion, including: the cost is high, and photovoltaic construction related market is not perfect, both photovoltaic system installation, and photovoltaic building it is hard to start the industry standard, lack of core technologies.
By the comparative analysis, from the perspective of policy implementation effect from Japan, Germany and Spain three BIPV promotion of the more successful national policy changes, summarizes its successful experience for consumers, including: to power tariff for the main forms of compensation; Emphasis on solar building integrated technology research; We will vigorously support outstanding photovoltaic enterprise; Emphasis on solar building propaganda.
Finally our BIPV promotion policy suggestions on photovoltaic enterprise policy, mainly for the preferential tax, the government subsidies and demonstration project; The policy of real estate developers mainly by establishing perfect photovoltaic construction industry standards, promote developer and photovoltaic building other related subject cooperation and tax incentive policy. The best way is to take Feed-in tariffs .
Through the above research conclusion: (1) the formulation make photovoltaic enterprise, real estate developers and consumers and the promotion of policy, can benefit from accomplishing the BIPV market promotion. (2) practice of the developed countries that Feed-in tariff is the most effective policy for BIPV promotion. (3) the government should focus on our BIPV promotion interest bodies to make effective promotion policy
引文
[1]王恒一.太阳能与建筑结合的形式[J].太阳能,2008,(02):42-45.
[2]孙哲.自愿参与的博弈分析—不对等的三方博弈模型[J].经济学人,2004,(02):2-11.
[3]闫瑾.发展绿色建筑的政策激励研究[J].统计与决策,2008,(10):119-121 .
[4]王洪波,刘长滨,王煜.我国节能建筑市场供求分析及激励政策对象选择[J].建筑经济,2007,(12):99-101.
[5]施骞,柴永斌.推动我国绿色建筑发展的政策与措施分析[J].建筑施工,2008,28,(3):200-202.
[6]张仕廉,李学征,刘一.绿色建筑经济激励政策分析[J].生态经济,2006,(5):312-315.
[7]张磊.光伏建筑呼唤激励政策[J].建筑科技,2005,(17):12-13.
[8]Raul P. Lejano,Climis A. Davos. Cooperative Solutions for Sustainable Resource Management[J]. Environmental Management,1999,24(2):180-195.
[9]Marshall.A.:Principles of Economics[M].London:Macmillan, 1920:226-232.
[10]贾丽红.对外部性概念的考察[J].华南师范大学学(社会科学版),2002(06) :15-18 .
[11]黄敬宝.外部性理论的演进及其启示[J].生产力研究,2007,(06) :22-24.
[12]Wolfgang Haber. Landscape ecology as a bridge from ecosystems to human ecology[J]. Ecological Research, 2004,19(1):546-552.
[13]Frank W?tzold,Martin Drechsler. Spatially Uniform versus Spatially Heterogeneo- us Compensation Payments for Biodiversity-Enhancing Land-Use Measures[J]. Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005,31(1):213-223.
[14]王宁.关于开征燃油税的若干经济分析[J].当代经济,2009(21):27-31.
[15]李世涌.外部性理论及其内部化研究综述[J].中国市场,2007(31):117-119.
[16]杨新年,邹春霞.科技有效供给能力论[M].科学出版社,2006.
[17]易余胤,刘汉民.经济研究中的演化博弈理论[J].商业经济与管理,2005,(08):18-20.
[18]Kosfeld M. Why Shops Close Again: An Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation of Shopping Hours[J] .European Economic Review,2002,(46) :51-72 .
[19]刘璐菊.博弈理论在生物学当中的应用[D] .大连:大连理工大学,2006 .
[20]张丽萍.基于演化博弈的营销渠道合作关系研究[D] .上海:同济大学,2006 .
[21]Guttman J M. On the Evolutionary Stability of Preferences for Reciprocity[J] .European Journal of Political Economy, 2000, (16) :31-50 .
[22]韩晓娜.我国建筑节能公共政策环境分析及对策研究[D] .天津:天津理工大学,2008 .
[23]董晶华.国内外激励企业技术创新政策研究及比较[J].江苏科技信息,2009,(11):23-27.
[24]杨西伟.太阳能与建筑一体化发展现状——部分省市太阳能热利用技术与建筑结合推广应用管理情况的调研[J].建筑科技,2009,(2):36-45.
[25]刘青荣.日本太阳能光伏发电系统的政策和实力[J].华东电力,2009,(02):56-58.
[26]朴向金.日本重视太阳能光伏发电[J].国外建材科技,2007,(01):35-36.
[27]阳芳.利用光伏上网电价政策促进我国光伏产业发展的思考——德国光伏上网电价政策及其对我国的启示[J].价格理论与实践,2010,(8):78-80.
[28]张彧.德国太阳能光伏建筑的发展和应用[J].世界建筑,2010,(10):45-49.
[29]刘一儒.政府采购[J].经济,2011,(Z1):15-16.
[30]韦英华.实施政府绿色采购的方向选择研究[J].商品与质量,2011,(S1):10-12.
[2]孙哲.自愿参与的博弈分析—不对等的三方博弈模型[J].经济学人,2004,(02):2-11.
[3]闫瑾.发展绿色建筑的政策激励研究[J].统计与决策,2008,(10):119-121 .
[4]王洪波,刘长滨,王煜.我国节能建筑市场供求分析及激励政策对象选择[J].建筑经济,2007,(12):99-101.
[5]施骞,柴永斌.推动我国绿色建筑发展的政策与措施分析[J].建筑施工,2008,28,(3):200-202.
[6]张仕廉,李学征,刘一.绿色建筑经济激励政策分析[J].生态经济,2006,(5):312-315.
[7]张磊.光伏建筑呼唤激励政策[J].建筑科技,2005,(17):12-13.
[8]Raul P. Lejano,Climis A. Davos. Cooperative Solutions for Sustainable Resource Management[J]. Environmental Management,1999,24(2):180-195.
[9]Marshall.A.:Principles of Economics[M].London:Macmillan, 1920:226-232.
[10]贾丽红.对外部性概念的考察[J].华南师范大学学(社会科学版),2002(06) :15-18 .
[11]黄敬宝.外部性理论的演进及其启示[J].生产力研究,2007,(06) :22-24.
[12]Wolfgang Haber. Landscape ecology as a bridge from ecosystems to human ecology[J]. Ecological Research, 2004,19(1):546-552.
[13]Frank W?tzold,Martin Drechsler. Spatially Uniform versus Spatially Heterogeneo- us Compensation Payments for Biodiversity-Enhancing Land-Use Measures[J]. Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005,31(1):213-223.
[14]王宁.关于开征燃油税的若干经济分析[J].当代经济,2009(21):27-31.
[15]李世涌.外部性理论及其内部化研究综述[J].中国市场,2007(31):117-119.
[16]杨新年,邹春霞.科技有效供给能力论[M].科学出版社,2006.
[17]易余胤,刘汉民.经济研究中的演化博弈理论[J].商业经济与管理,2005,(08):18-20.
[18]Kosfeld M. Why Shops Close Again: An Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation of Shopping Hours[J] .European Economic Review,2002,(46) :51-72 .
[19]刘璐菊.博弈理论在生物学当中的应用[D] .大连:大连理工大学,2006 .
[20]张丽萍.基于演化博弈的营销渠道合作关系研究[D] .上海:同济大学,2006 .
[21]Guttman J M. On the Evolutionary Stability of Preferences for Reciprocity[J] .European Journal of Political Economy, 2000, (16) :31-50 .
[22]韩晓娜.我国建筑节能公共政策环境分析及对策研究[D] .天津:天津理工大学,2008 .
[23]董晶华.国内外激励企业技术创新政策研究及比较[J].江苏科技信息,2009,(11):23-27.
[24]杨西伟.太阳能与建筑一体化发展现状——部分省市太阳能热利用技术与建筑结合推广应用管理情况的调研[J].建筑科技,2009,(2):36-45.
[25]刘青荣.日本太阳能光伏发电系统的政策和实力[J].华东电力,2009,(02):56-58.
[26]朴向金.日本重视太阳能光伏发电[J].国外建材科技,2007,(01):35-36.
[27]阳芳.利用光伏上网电价政策促进我国光伏产业发展的思考——德国光伏上网电价政策及其对我国的启示[J].价格理论与实践,2010,(8):78-80.
[28]张彧.德国太阳能光伏建筑的发展和应用[J].世界建筑,2010,(10):45-49.
[29]刘一儒.政府采购[J].经济,2011,(Z1):15-16.
[30]韦英华.实施政府绿色采购的方向选择研究[J].商品与质量,2011,(S1):10-12.