基于拍卖—谈判的多因素采购机制设计研究
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摘要
在现实生活中,谈判或者议价常常是不可避免的重要协商阶段,谈判可以提高先前“合同”的预分配效率。更一般地,两(多)阶段决策机制在其第一阶段的决策中,从大量参赛人员中选择出少量(潜在)获胜者,并在后续决策阶段进行更有效率的取舍和决策。博弈论框架下的两阶段决策机制能够提高决策效率,降低决策成本,具有重要的实际意义和理论价值。具体到采购运作中,复杂采购方案常常是先通过招投标(拍卖)的方式遴选获胜供应商,再与其进行关于质量和价格的进一步谈判。考虑到现实采购中的多因素性,以及复杂采购运作常常包含招投标和其后的议价谈判阶段,分别针对单物品采购和多物品采购,设计了一种先“拍卖”再“议价”的两阶段采购机制,实现了更具分配效率且更符合实际的采购运作。
考虑多因素的单物品两阶段机制的特色在于充分考虑到:采购业务中同时存在关于价格和质量的投标竞争与议价谈判,供应商与采购商在采购的不同阶段的私有信息披露问题,以及谈判阶段的时间成本和相应均衡策略问题。单物品两阶段采购机制的主要研究结论是:在单物品多因素两阶段机制的拍卖阶段中,存在最佳近视反应意义下的招投标策略;单物品多因素两阶段机制的议价阶段在均衡路径上的分配结果,与买卖双方的真实价值具有重要的确定性关系;议价阶段实现了对拍卖阶段分配效率的改进,且买卖双方都存在关于质量和价格的贝叶斯纳什均衡议价策略与相关信念。
和单物品采购相对应,本文还研究了多物品的两阶段采购机制,多物品两阶段采购机制的设计充分考虑到,采购组合拍卖中同时存在的价格竞争和质量竞争,以及供应商与采购商的私有信息披露问题。证明了多因素多物品两阶段机制中拍卖阶段的激励相容和个体理性;给出了多因素多物品两阶段机制中的谈判阶段需要满足的三个条件,并分别为企业采购和政府采购设计了满足上述条件的垄断谈判和纳什谈判机制。分析发现,多因素多物品两阶段机制在拍卖阶段实现了激励相容和个体理性的预分配方案,在满足谈判各方个体理性的前提下,在谈判阶段实现了分配效率的改进。
Bargaining is very important; it is an inevitable stage in practical operations. Bargaining can improve the previous "contract" pre-allocation efficiency. Under the framework of game theory, two-stage (or more) mechanism can improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of decision-making in the following stage by selecting few (potential) winners from many competitors in the first stage. So it has important practical significance and theoretical value. In practical complex procurement operations, the buyer often selects suppliers by auction and then conduct negotiation with the winner in its quality and price. Considering the existence of multi-attributes and multi-stage in practical complex procurement operations, we design a two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical procurement operations in one-item and multi-item procurement situation, which implements first multi-attributes auction then bargaining.
Main novelty of the one-item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism is that we focus on three characteristics of practical procurement: both bidding and bargaining for price and qualities, both buyer and seller’s information revelation problem, and time cost problem with corresponding strategies construction. We show that, in the one- item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism the auction stage holds MBR (Myopic Best Response) incentive compatible for buyer and sellers. Also, allocation outcome on equilibrium path and its relationship with buyer and seller’s real valuation is presented. Bargaining stage improves the efficiency of auction stage, especially, we show there exist Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategies and corresponding beliefs for both players in the one- item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism.
A two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical combinatorial procurement operations is designed in multi-item procurement situation, which implements first combinatorial auction then renegotiation. The multi-attributes two-stage mechanism in multi-item procurement situation, deals with price-quality competition and suppliers’(buyer’s) information revelation problem severely. The paper shows that the multi-item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism holds incentive compatible and individual rationality in the auction stage; three criteria for the renegotiation function are presented, and monopolistic-bargaining and Nash-bargaining functions satisfied these criteria are designed for enterprise procurement and government procurement respectively. Especially, under all parties’individual rationality, the renegotiation allocation improves the efficiency of pre-allocation from auction.
考虑多因素的单物品两阶段机制的特色在于充分考虑到:采购业务中同时存在关于价格和质量的投标竞争与议价谈判,供应商与采购商在采购的不同阶段的私有信息披露问题,以及谈判阶段的时间成本和相应均衡策略问题。单物品两阶段采购机制的主要研究结论是:在单物品多因素两阶段机制的拍卖阶段中,存在最佳近视反应意义下的招投标策略;单物品多因素两阶段机制的议价阶段在均衡路径上的分配结果,与买卖双方的真实价值具有重要的确定性关系;议价阶段实现了对拍卖阶段分配效率的改进,且买卖双方都存在关于质量和价格的贝叶斯纳什均衡议价策略与相关信念。
和单物品采购相对应,本文还研究了多物品的两阶段采购机制,多物品两阶段采购机制的设计充分考虑到,采购组合拍卖中同时存在的价格竞争和质量竞争,以及供应商与采购商的私有信息披露问题。证明了多因素多物品两阶段机制中拍卖阶段的激励相容和个体理性;给出了多因素多物品两阶段机制中的谈判阶段需要满足的三个条件,并分别为企业采购和政府采购设计了满足上述条件的垄断谈判和纳什谈判机制。分析发现,多因素多物品两阶段机制在拍卖阶段实现了激励相容和个体理性的预分配方案,在满足谈判各方个体理性的前提下,在谈判阶段实现了分配效率的改进。
Bargaining is very important; it is an inevitable stage in practical operations. Bargaining can improve the previous "contract" pre-allocation efficiency. Under the framework of game theory, two-stage (or more) mechanism can improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of decision-making in the following stage by selecting few (potential) winners from many competitors in the first stage. So it has important practical significance and theoretical value. In practical complex procurement operations, the buyer often selects suppliers by auction and then conduct negotiation with the winner in its quality and price. Considering the existence of multi-attributes and multi-stage in practical complex procurement operations, we design a two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical procurement operations in one-item and multi-item procurement situation, which implements first multi-attributes auction then bargaining.
Main novelty of the one-item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism is that we focus on three characteristics of practical procurement: both bidding and bargaining for price and qualities, both buyer and seller’s information revelation problem, and time cost problem with corresponding strategies construction. We show that, in the one- item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism the auction stage holds MBR (Myopic Best Response) incentive compatible for buyer and sellers. Also, allocation outcome on equilibrium path and its relationship with buyer and seller’s real valuation is presented. Bargaining stage improves the efficiency of auction stage, especially, we show there exist Nash-Bayesian equilibrium strategies and corresponding beliefs for both players in the one- item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism.
A two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical combinatorial procurement operations is designed in multi-item procurement situation, which implements first combinatorial auction then renegotiation. The multi-attributes two-stage mechanism in multi-item procurement situation, deals with price-quality competition and suppliers’(buyer’s) information revelation problem severely. The paper shows that the multi-item multi-attributes two-stage mechanism holds incentive compatible and individual rationality in the auction stage; three criteria for the renegotiation function are presented, and monopolistic-bargaining and Nash-bargaining functions satisfied these criteria are designed for enterprise procurement and government procurement respectively. Especially, under all parties’individual rationality, the renegotiation allocation improves the efficiency of pre-allocation from auction.
引文
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[5] Mishra D, Veeraman D. A multi-attribute reverse auction for outsourcing [C]// Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications. [s.n.] , 2002:77-86.
[6] BiehlerM. An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions[J]. Decision Support Systems,2000,29(3):249-268.
[7] M.Biehler,J.Kalagnanam. Bidding languages and winner determination in mu1ti-attribute auction[J]. European Journal of Operational Researeh.2005,160(2):380-394.
[8]张醒洲,廉莲.多属性反向拍卖机制与模型研究[D].硕士学位论文, 2007:5-20.
[9]于红岩,刘仲英,基于拍卖方偏好揭示的多属性网上拍卖模型[J].系统工程,2008,26(3):53-58
[10]张李义,段凌,邓汉华,面向电子采购的多属性拍卖模型[J].武汉大学学报(工学版),2004,37(4):97-100
[11]于红岩,葛禄青,刘仲英,有时间约束的多属性网上顺序拍卖研究[J].武汉大学学报(工学版),2007,46(4):470-475
[12]陈湘,胡可立,石曼银,一种安全的多属性拍卖模型[J].计算机研究与发展, 2007,44(4):680-685
[13]李怀德,多维拍卖在电子采购中的应用研究[D].硕士学位论文,2008
[14]金滓,石纯一,一种暗标叫价的多属性拍卖方法[J].计算机学报,2006,29(l):145-152.
[15]谢安石,李一军,尚维,李燕.拍卖理论的最新进展一多属性网上拍卖研究[J].管理工程学报,2006,20(3):17-22.
[16]王先甲等人·区域配电服务特许经营权竞标机制设计[J].中国电机工程学报,2006, 26(20):39-44·
[17]黄河,等·多因素采购组合拍卖动态机制设计研究[J].中国管理科学, 2008,16(1):104-110
[18] Clarke, E·H·. Multipart Pricing of Public Goods[J]. Public Choice,1971,11(1):17-33.
[19] Groves, T·Incentives in Teams[J] Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,1973,41(4):617-631.
[20] Jackson, C·,Technology for Spectrum Markets, PhD thesis[J]. Department of Electrical Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, MA,1976.
[21] Wilson, R·.Auction of Shares[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,1979(93):4.675-689
[22] Palfrey T.R. Bundling Decisions by a Multi-Product Monopolist with Incomplete Information[J] Econometrica,1983(51):2.463-484
[23] Avery, C·and Hendershott, T·Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Goods[J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2000(67):3.483-497
[24] Chakraborty, I·Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Objects[J] Economic Theory, 1999(13):3.
[25] Armstrong, M. Optimal Multi-Object Auctions[J] Review of Economic Studies,2000 (67): 3.455-481
[26] Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E. Efficient Auctions[J] Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):2.341-388
[27] Perry M., Reny P.J. An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction[J].Review of economic studies,2005,72(2):567-592.
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