基于回购契约的供应链协调模型研究
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摘要
供应链的思想已经广泛被人们所接受。当今的企业竞争,已经从简单的单个企业之间的竞争演变为供应链之间的竞争,企业要想在竞争中脱颖而出,就必须使其所在的供应链得到有效整合。但是供应链是由若干个独立的主体组成的一张企业网络,各个主体在合作的过程中,由于存在着不同的目标、有着各自的资源条件、以及独有的信息资源,因此供应链企业之间不可避免地会发生利益冲突,这样供应链就出现了失调的状况。
供应链企业如何有效重新整合供应链,解决供应链失调达到供应链的协调,是当今理论和实务界研究的重点,供应链协调研究具有很强的学术和实践意义。经过理论界的大量理论研究和实务界的不断摸索,发现供应链协调契约机制是一种有效实现供应链协调的方式,常见的供应链协调方式包括批发价格契约、收益共享契约、数量折扣契约、回购契约等等,这些契约有各自的适应性,在企业中被广泛使用,人们也越来越意识到供应链协调的重要性了。
本文正是对供应链协调契约机制中的回购契约进行研究。首先考虑在需求不确定的情况下,供应链回购契约如何实现供应链的协调,证明了传统的回购契约策略能够实现供应链的协调。接下来本文研究了在需求受到促销努力的情况下供应链的回购契约策略,证明了传统的回购契约已经不能实现供应链的协调,这个时候,供应商采用成本共担下的回购契约可以实现了供应链的协调。最后在销售努力影响需求并且不允许缺货的情况下,对供应链的回购策略进行研究,研究结果显示:单纯的回购策略、成本共担下的回购契约策略均不能实现供应链的协调,这时供应商可以采取奖励与惩罚策略,奖励与惩罚策略在这种情况下能够有效激励零售商的订货和促销的积极性,最后证明了供应商通过惩罚与奖励策略下的回购策略能够实现供应链的协调,并且运用数值分析加以验证。
The view of Supply chain thinking has been widely accepted by people. Today, the Competition among enterprises has grown from a simple competition between individual enterprises turned into competition among the supply chain.enterprises can not succeed in the competition only if the supply chain ,where the enterprises belong to, is integrated effectively. But the supply chain is a corporate network which is composed of a number of independent subjects,and in the process of cooperatiing, because of their different objectives、limited resources and their unique information resources, the enterprises of tht supply chain have a conflict of interest inevitably.As a result, the situation of the discoordination of supply chain arises.
To achive the object of supply chain coordination,how to make the supply chain integrated effectively and how to solve the problem about the discoordination of supply chain , is the focus problem in the current theory and practice,so the study of supply chain coordination has a strong academic and practical significance. Though a large number of the theoretical study by the theorists and constant practical test by practitioners, they found that the contract mechanism of supply chain coordination is an effective way to achieve supply chain coordination.The common ways of supply chain coordination include wholesale price contracts、revenue sharing contracts、quantity discounts contract and buy-back contracts, etc.These contracts have their own adaptability, and they are used widely in the enterprises, people have realized the importance of supply chain coordination increasingly.
The object of study in this paper is the buy-back contract ,which is one of the contracts in the coordination mechanism of supply chain. First,in the case of demand uncertainty, how to achieve the supply coordinate by buy-back contracts ?The result of research is that the traditional buy-back contract strategy can achieve supply chain coordination. Then,in the case of demand effected by the promotional efforts, the paper studies the buy-back strategy and proves that the traditional buy-back contracts can not achieve supply chain coordination, but, in the same case, the buy back contract strategy under the cost-sharing can achieve the coordination of the supply chain.
Finally, in the case that the demand is effected by the promotional efforts and out of stock is not allowed, we find that buy back strategy research, the results show that: traditional buy-back contract strategy、the buy back contract strategy under the cost-sharing can not achieve the supply chain coordination, then suppliers can take reward and punishment strategy to make the supply chain coordination. in this case, reward and punishment strategy can stimulate the retailer’s enthusiasm of ordering and promotional efforts effectively. It is finally proved that suppliers can achieve supply chain coordination by the buy back contract strategy under punishment and reward strategy and the correctness is verified through the numerical analysis.
供应链企业如何有效重新整合供应链,解决供应链失调达到供应链的协调,是当今理论和实务界研究的重点,供应链协调研究具有很强的学术和实践意义。经过理论界的大量理论研究和实务界的不断摸索,发现供应链协调契约机制是一种有效实现供应链协调的方式,常见的供应链协调方式包括批发价格契约、收益共享契约、数量折扣契约、回购契约等等,这些契约有各自的适应性,在企业中被广泛使用,人们也越来越意识到供应链协调的重要性了。
本文正是对供应链协调契约机制中的回购契约进行研究。首先考虑在需求不确定的情况下,供应链回购契约如何实现供应链的协调,证明了传统的回购契约策略能够实现供应链的协调。接下来本文研究了在需求受到促销努力的情况下供应链的回购契约策略,证明了传统的回购契约已经不能实现供应链的协调,这个时候,供应商采用成本共担下的回购契约可以实现了供应链的协调。最后在销售努力影响需求并且不允许缺货的情况下,对供应链的回购策略进行研究,研究结果显示:单纯的回购策略、成本共担下的回购契约策略均不能实现供应链的协调,这时供应商可以采取奖励与惩罚策略,奖励与惩罚策略在这种情况下能够有效激励零售商的订货和促销的积极性,最后证明了供应商通过惩罚与奖励策略下的回购策略能够实现供应链的协调,并且运用数值分析加以验证。
The view of Supply chain thinking has been widely accepted by people. Today, the Competition among enterprises has grown from a simple competition between individual enterprises turned into competition among the supply chain.enterprises can not succeed in the competition only if the supply chain ,where the enterprises belong to, is integrated effectively. But the supply chain is a corporate network which is composed of a number of independent subjects,and in the process of cooperatiing, because of their different objectives、limited resources and their unique information resources, the enterprises of tht supply chain have a conflict of interest inevitably.As a result, the situation of the discoordination of supply chain arises.
To achive the object of supply chain coordination,how to make the supply chain integrated effectively and how to solve the problem about the discoordination of supply chain , is the focus problem in the current theory and practice,so the study of supply chain coordination has a strong academic and practical significance. Though a large number of the theoretical study by the theorists and constant practical test by practitioners, they found that the contract mechanism of supply chain coordination is an effective way to achieve supply chain coordination.The common ways of supply chain coordination include wholesale price contracts、revenue sharing contracts、quantity discounts contract and buy-back contracts, etc.These contracts have their own adaptability, and they are used widely in the enterprises, people have realized the importance of supply chain coordination increasingly.
The object of study in this paper is the buy-back contract ,which is one of the contracts in the coordination mechanism of supply chain. First,in the case of demand uncertainty, how to achieve the supply coordinate by buy-back contracts ?The result of research is that the traditional buy-back contract strategy can achieve supply chain coordination. Then,in the case of demand effected by the promotional efforts, the paper studies the buy-back strategy and proves that the traditional buy-back contracts can not achieve supply chain coordination, but, in the same case, the buy back contract strategy under the cost-sharing can achieve the coordination of the supply chain.
Finally, in the case that the demand is effected by the promotional efforts and out of stock is not allowed, we find that buy back strategy research, the results show that: traditional buy-back contract strategy、the buy back contract strategy under the cost-sharing can not achieve the supply chain coordination, then suppliers can take reward and punishment strategy to make the supply chain coordination. in this case, reward and punishment strategy can stimulate the retailer’s enthusiasm of ordering and promotional efforts effectively. It is finally proved that suppliers can achieve supply chain coordination by the buy back contract strategy under punishment and reward strategy and the correctness is verified through the numerical analysis.
引文
[1] Taylor T A.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects[J]. Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007.
[2] Wang Y,Jiang 1.Shen Z.J..Channel Performance under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing[J].Management Science,2004,50(1):34-47.
[3] Wang Y Gerchak Y. Supply chain coordination when demand is shelf space dependent [J] Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,2001,3(1) :82-87.
[4] Moorthy K. Managing channel profits:Comments[J].Marketing Science , 1987 , 6(4):375-379.
[5] Ingene C A , Parry M E. Channel coordination when retailers compete [J]. Marketing Science , 1995 , 14(4): 360 -377.
[6] Balachander S , Srinivasan K. Quantity discounts , manufacturer and channel profit maximization:Impact of retailer heterogeneity [J]. Marketing Letters,1998 ,9:169 -179.
[7] Qi X.,Bard J.F.and Yu G..Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004,32:301-312.
[8] Xiao T.,Yu G.,Sheng Z.and Xia Y..Coordination of a Supply Chain with One-Nanufacturer and Two-Retailers Under Demand Promotion and Disruption Management Decisions[J] Annals of Operations Research 2005,135: 87-109.
[9] Munson C.L.,Rosenlatt M.J..Coordinating a three-level supply chain with quantity discounts[J].IIE Transactions,2001,33: 371-384.
[10] pashingianB.P.Demand Uncertaintyand Sales[J].American Economic Review 1988,78:939-953
[11] Baner,R.D.and Hansen S.C.The Adequacy of Full cost Based Pricing Heuristies[J].working Paper.UT Dallas and UCLA,2000.
[12] Boyaer,Gallego.coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment polieies for one Wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailers[J].International Journal of Production economics,2002,77(2):95-111.
[13] HarishKishnan,Roman Kuseinski and David A Butz. Coordination contraets For decentralized supply chain with retailer Promotional effort[J].Management Seienee,2004,50(l):48一63
[14] Nicholas.C.Petruzzi and Maqbool.Data Pricing and the newsvendor problem:a review with extensions[J]. Operations Researeh,1999,47(2):183-194.
[15] Hojung,shin,Benton.Aquantity discount approach to supply chain coordination.[J].European Journal of Operational Researeh,2007,180(2):60-616.
[16] Scott Webster.Ordering and pricing policing policies in a manufacturing and distribution Supplychain for fashion Produets[J].International Journal of Produetion Economies,2008,114:476-486
[17] Sijie Li.supply chain Coordination and decision making under consignment contract with Revenue sharing[J]. International Journal of Produetion Economies,July2008.
[18] Emmons H.and S.M.Gilbert.Note:the role of returns Policies in Pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods[J]. Management Seienee,1998,44(2):276-283.
[19] Tsay A.Managing retailchannel overstock: Markdown money and return policies[J].Journal of Retailing,2001,77(4):457-492.
[20] Li S X,Huang Z M Zhu J Chau P Y K Cooperative advertising game theory and manufacturer retailer supply chains [J] Omega,2002,30:347-357.
[21] Pasternack B A.Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities J.MarketingSci.,1985,4(2):166-176.
[22] Cachon G P. Supply chain coordination with contracts [R] University of Pennsylvania Working Paper Philadelphia,2002.
[23] Cachon G.P.,Lariviere M.A..Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:
[24] strengths and limitations[J]. Management Science, 2005,51(1): 30-44.
[25] Li Suan , Huang Zhinmin , Zhu Joe , et al Cooperative advertising,game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains[J].Omega , 2002 , 30(5):347-357.
[26] Corsten D and Gruen T.DesPerately seeking shelf availability:An examination of the extent,out-of-stocks[J]. The causes,and the efforts to address retail International Joumal of Retail And Distribution Management,2003,31(12):605-617.
[27] Lee W.Space Management in Retail Stores and Implications to Agriculture[A].In:Dolva WK.Marketing keys to Profits in the 1960’s[C]. Chicago:American Marking Association. 1961:523-533.
[28] Brown W and Tucker WT.The marketing center:Vanishing shelf space[Jl. Atlacnta Economic Review,1961,11(4):9-13.
[29] Dreze X,Hoch SJ and Purk ME.Shelf management and space elasticity[J].Journal of Retailing,1994,70(4):301-326.
[30] Amy Hing-LingLau,Hon-Shiang Lau.Decision models for single-period products with two ordering opportunities J.International Journal of Production Economics,1998,55:57-70.
[31] Hon-shiangLau,Amy Hing-LingLau.Reordering strategies for a Newsboy-type product J.European Journal of Operational Research1997, 103: 557-572.
[32] Stenvens G.Integrating the supply chain.Interational Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management.1989,19:3~8.
[33] Evens P,Shulman L E.Competing on capabilities-the new rules of corporate strategy.HarvardBusiness Review.1992,March-April:57~69.
[34] R.Ganeshan,T.P.Harrison.An Introduction to Supply Chain Management.Working Paper, 1997:21~24.
[35] Malone T W,Crowston K G.The interdisciplinary study of coordination[J].ACM Computing Surveys,1994:26(1):87-119.
[36] Togar M Simatupang,Alan C Wright,Ramaswami Sridharan.The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration.Business Process Management Journal.2002,8(3):289-308.
[37]顾培亮.系统分析与协调.天津大学出版社, 1998:195.
[38]马士华,王福寿.时间价格敏感型需求下的供应链决策模式研究[J].中国管理科学, 2006,14(3):13-19.
[39]胡劲松,王虹.三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学, 2007.15(3):103-107.
[40]于辉,陈剑,于刚.回购契约下供应链对突发事件的协调应对[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2005. 25(8):38-43.
[41]于辉,陈剑,于刚.协调供应链如何应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2005.25(7):9-16.
[42]邱若臻,黄小原.供应链收益共享契约协调的随机期望值模型[J].中国管理科学, 2006.14(4):30-34.
[43]艾兴政,唐小我,倪得兵.价格上涨环境下供应链的渠道协调机制研究[J].管理科学学报, 2004.7(5):24-30.
[44]张钦红,赵泉午,熊中楷.不对称信息下的易逝品退货物流协调运作研究[J].中国管理科学.2006,14(2):107-111.
[45]易学辉,唐小我.需求价格相关的非中心化三级供应链的协调研究[J].中国科技论文在线, http://www.paper.edu.cn-chinawu liu com.cn.
[46]曹武军,李成刚,王学林,胡于进. VMI环境下收入共享契约分析[J].管理工程学报, 2007.21(1):51-55.
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[54]宋俊.零售商占主导地位的两级供应链企业间的博弈分析[J].经济问题, 2006(9):32-33.
[55]何勇,杨德礼,吴清烈等.基于努力因素的供应链利益共享契约模型研究[J].计算机集成制造系统, 2006, 12(11):1865-1868
[56]姬小利.伴随销售商促销努力的供应链契约设计[J].中国管理科学,2006(4):46-49.
[2] Wang Y,Jiang 1.Shen Z.J..Channel Performance under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing[J].Management Science,2004,50(1):34-47.
[3] Wang Y Gerchak Y. Supply chain coordination when demand is shelf space dependent [J] Manufacturing and Service Operations Management,2001,3(1) :82-87.
[4] Moorthy K. Managing channel profits:Comments[J].Marketing Science , 1987 , 6(4):375-379.
[5] Ingene C A , Parry M E. Channel coordination when retailers compete [J]. Marketing Science , 1995 , 14(4): 360 -377.
[6] Balachander S , Srinivasan K. Quantity discounts , manufacturer and channel profit maximization:Impact of retailer heterogeneity [J]. Marketing Letters,1998 ,9:169 -179.
[7] Qi X.,Bard J.F.and Yu G..Supply chain coordination with demand disruptions[J].Omega,2004,32:301-312.
[8] Xiao T.,Yu G.,Sheng Z.and Xia Y..Coordination of a Supply Chain with One-Nanufacturer and Two-Retailers Under Demand Promotion and Disruption Management Decisions[J] Annals of Operations Research 2005,135: 87-109.
[9] Munson C.L.,Rosenlatt M.J..Coordinating a three-level supply chain with quantity discounts[J].IIE Transactions,2001,33: 371-384.
[10] pashingianB.P.Demand Uncertaintyand Sales[J].American Economic Review 1988,78:939-953
[11] Baner,R.D.and Hansen S.C.The Adequacy of Full cost Based Pricing Heuristies[J].working Paper.UT Dallas and UCLA,2000.
[12] Boyaer,Gallego.coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment polieies for one Wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailers[J].International Journal of Production economics,2002,77(2):95-111.
[13] HarishKishnan,Roman Kuseinski and David A Butz. Coordination contraets For decentralized supply chain with retailer Promotional effort[J].Management Seienee,2004,50(l):48一63
[14] Nicholas.C.Petruzzi and Maqbool.Data Pricing and the newsvendor problem:a review with extensions[J]. Operations Researeh,1999,47(2):183-194.
[15] Hojung,shin,Benton.Aquantity discount approach to supply chain coordination.[J].European Journal of Operational Researeh,2007,180(2):60-616.
[16] Scott Webster.Ordering and pricing policing policies in a manufacturing and distribution Supplychain for fashion Produets[J].International Journal of Produetion Economies,2008,114:476-486
[17] Sijie Li.supply chain Coordination and decision making under consignment contract with Revenue sharing[J]. International Journal of Produetion Economies,July2008.
[18] Emmons H.and S.M.Gilbert.Note:the role of returns Policies in Pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods[J]. Management Seienee,1998,44(2):276-283.
[19] Tsay A.Managing retailchannel overstock: Markdown money and return policies[J].Journal of Retailing,2001,77(4):457-492.
[20] Li S X,Huang Z M Zhu J Chau P Y K Cooperative advertising game theory and manufacturer retailer supply chains [J] Omega,2002,30:347-357.
[21] Pasternack B A.Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities J.MarketingSci.,1985,4(2):166-176.
[22] Cachon G P. Supply chain coordination with contracts [R] University of Pennsylvania Working Paper Philadelphia,2002.
[23] Cachon G.P.,Lariviere M.A..Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:
[24] strengths and limitations[J]. Management Science, 2005,51(1): 30-44.
[25] Li Suan , Huang Zhinmin , Zhu Joe , et al Cooperative advertising,game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains[J].Omega , 2002 , 30(5):347-357.
[26] Corsten D and Gruen T.DesPerately seeking shelf availability:An examination of the extent,out-of-stocks[J]. The causes,and the efforts to address retail International Joumal of Retail And Distribution Management,2003,31(12):605-617.
[27] Lee W.Space Management in Retail Stores and Implications to Agriculture[A].In:Dolva WK.Marketing keys to Profits in the 1960’s[C]. Chicago:American Marking Association. 1961:523-533.
[28] Brown W and Tucker WT.The marketing center:Vanishing shelf space[Jl. Atlacnta Economic Review,1961,11(4):9-13.
[29] Dreze X,Hoch SJ and Purk ME.Shelf management and space elasticity[J].Journal of Retailing,1994,70(4):301-326.
[30] Amy Hing-LingLau,Hon-Shiang Lau.Decision models for single-period products with two ordering opportunities J.International Journal of Production Economics,1998,55:57-70.
[31] Hon-shiangLau,Amy Hing-LingLau.Reordering strategies for a Newsboy-type product J.European Journal of Operational Research1997, 103: 557-572.
[32] Stenvens G.Integrating the supply chain.Interational Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management.1989,19:3~8.
[33] Evens P,Shulman L E.Competing on capabilities-the new rules of corporate strategy.HarvardBusiness Review.1992,March-April:57~69.
[34] R.Ganeshan,T.P.Harrison.An Introduction to Supply Chain Management.Working Paper, 1997:21~24.
[35] Malone T W,Crowston K G.The interdisciplinary study of coordination[J].ACM Computing Surveys,1994:26(1):87-119.
[36] Togar M Simatupang,Alan C Wright,Ramaswami Sridharan.The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration.Business Process Management Journal.2002,8(3):289-308.
[37]顾培亮.系统分析与协调.天津大学出版社, 1998:195.
[38]马士华,王福寿.时间价格敏感型需求下的供应链决策模式研究[J].中国管理科学, 2006,14(3):13-19.
[39]胡劲松,王虹.三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究[J].中国管理科学, 2007.15(3):103-107.
[40]于辉,陈剑,于刚.回购契约下供应链对突发事件的协调应对[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2005. 25(8):38-43.
[41]于辉,陈剑,于刚.协调供应链如何应对突发事件[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2005.25(7):9-16.
[42]邱若臻,黄小原.供应链收益共享契约协调的随机期望值模型[J].中国管理科学, 2006.14(4):30-34.
[43]艾兴政,唐小我,倪得兵.价格上涨环境下供应链的渠道协调机制研究[J].管理科学学报, 2004.7(5):24-30.
[44]张钦红,赵泉午,熊中楷.不对称信息下的易逝品退货物流协调运作研究[J].中国管理科学.2006,14(2):107-111.
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