股权再融资认购选择、政府控制与上市公司恶性增资行为研究
|
摘要
无论是对一个企业的成败还是对一国的经济增长,资本投资都是至关重要的,而近年来,我国企业的资本投资总额一直呈现出逐年增长的趋势,在这一背景下,研究如何提高投资效率,避免恶性增资行为的发生显得极为重要。
目前,对于恶性增资行为的研究主要有两方面的特点或者说不足:第一,多数研究是基于市场经济体制下的西方企业展开的,专门针对转轨经济体制下的企业恶性增资行为的研究还很少;第二,多数研究是从决策者心理、认知偏差和行为等非理性视角进行的,从决策者理性视角出发所作的研究还较少。这与最早提出并对恶性增资进行研究的是心理学家,目前国外从事该领域研究的仍有半数是心理学家或行为经济学家,并且他们主要来自于发达的市场经济体制国家有关。
无可否认,从非理性视角研究恶性增资有着重要的意义,但是对于中国,理性因素同样重要,原因在于,与发达的市场经济国家相比,中国上市公司的治理结构、内外部监管体制均不健全,决策者选择利己的投资行为的成本较低,空间更大。因此,在研究中国上市公司恶性增资行为时,仅从非理性视角出发而忽视理性视角的研究是不全面的,同时也会造成恶性增资理论研究的欠缺。
从决策者理性视角出发对恶性增资行为所作的研究主要是基于代理理论的理论基础进行的。但是,现有在代理理论框架下的研究多数还停留在管理者与股东、大股东与小股东的代理冲突这一泛化层面上。
作者认为,转轨经济时期的中国上市公司具有较特殊的地方:(1)由于国有产权的特殊性,导致国有上市公司具有双层委托代理关系,从最初委托人(全体公民)到政府是第一层代理,从政府到企业经理是第二层代理,政府是双层委托代理的纽带和核心。由于终极所有者缺位,同时政府官员具有强剩余控制权和弱剩余索取权,使得在经济中发挥实质性作用的是第二层代理关系,国有经济的腐败问题恰恰是第二层级的委托人与代理人共谋租金的结果,这些将影响企业的投资决策。另一方面,我国政府的行政分权、财政包干和政府官员晋升制度也使得地方政府为了追求GDP增长和晋升机会而推动企业过度增资;(2)我国上市公司具有极强的股权再融资偏好和上市公司大股东普遍放弃股权再融资认购权的特点,在中国制度背景下,这将大大降低大股东的融资成本和投资风险,激化大股东与中小股东的代理冲突,降低公司的投资效率。因此,转轨经济体制下的中国上市公司的恶性增资行为的产生原因及形成机理应该具有独特的地方。
本文着眼于转轨经济时期的中国制度背景,从决策者理性的视角出发,以上市公司的代理关系为主线,将股权再融资认购选择、政府控制和恶性增资放在一个研究框架内,提出了基于中国制度背景下的恶性增资行为理论分析框架,然后,从理论上分析了大股东的股权再融资认购选择、政府控制对上市公司恶性增资行为的影响效应,再选用2003-2006年间沪深两市的相关公司为样本,用实证方法检验了本文的研究结论。
研究结果表明:(1)无论是否存在政府控制,在大股东参加股权再融资认购时,上市公司都存在恶性增资的可能,其恶性增资的发生概率与大股东持股比例负相关;而在大股东放弃认购时,恶性增资的发生概率与大股东持股比例呈非线性关系;(2)与大股东参加认购相比,放弃认购将增加上市公司恶性增资的概率;(3)无论是大股东放弃认购还是参加认购,与不存在政府控制相比,政府控制将显著增加上市公司恶性增资的额度。并且,总体而言,上市公司恶性增资额度与大股东持股比例呈负相关关系。
在把政府控制进一步划分为国有资产管理机构控制、中央国企控制和地方国企控制三类后,我们发现:(1)与民营上市公司相比,无论是恶性增资发生概率还是恶性增资额度,国有上市公司均更大;(2)在恶性增资发生概率上,中央国企控制的上市公司最低,国有资产管理机构控制的上市公司次之,地方国企控制的上市公司最高;在恶性增资额度上,三类国有上市公司无显著差异。
本文的贡献在于:(1)从决策者理性的视角出发,以中国上市公司的代理关系为主线,构建了基于中国制度背景下的恶性增资行为理论分析框架;(2)研究了大股东的股权再融资认购选择对恶性增资的影响效应,为我们理解大股东的股权再融资认购选择的经济后果以有益的启示,为管理层监督和规范上市公司的投融资行为提供了理论依据;(3)深入研究了政府控制对企业恶性增资行为的影响,为政府控制研究提供了新视角,加深了我们对政府控制经济后果的理解;(4)首次将恶性增资和过度投资纳入一个研究框架内,丰富和推进了非效率投资以及恶性增资的研究。
Capital investment is critical whether to the success of an enterprise or to a country's economic growth. China's fixed assets investment has been increasing continuously in the past few years.In this context, it is very important to investigate how to improve the efficiency of fixed assets investment, and how to avoid the occurrence of escalation of commitment.
By far, there are two weak points on the study of escalation of commitment in investment. Firstly, most studies are based on the practice of enterprises in market economy, and few studies related to enterprises of transition economy have been made. Secondly, most studies are carried out from the perspective of decision-maker's judgment bias and irrationality, and only a few studies are made from the perspective of decision-maker rationality. This is because of that the earliest researchers of escalation of commitment are the psychologist. At present, studying abroad in this field there is still half of the psychologists or behavior economists, and they are mainly from countries in market economy.
It is undeniable that study on the escalation of commitment from the perspective of irrationality is very important. However, the rational perspective is equally important in China, because the governance structure and internal and external monitoring system of Chinese listed companies are not as effective as those in market economy of developed countries. Besides, the cost of selfish investment decision is lower and the there is more leeway in such behavior in China than in developed countries. Therefore, it is not complete for studying escalation of commitment in China only from the irrational perspective, and neglecting the rational perspective will cause theoretical research in escalation of commitment to be deficient.
Currently, the research conducted from the rational perspective is mainly based on agency theory, and most of it only deals with the conflict at the general level, for example: conflict between managers and shareholders, or between major shareholders and minority shareholders.
We believe that Chinese listed companies in transition economy are unique in two ways: (1) there is a two-tier principal-agent relationship in these companies characterized by state ownership. The first-tier principal-agent relationship is the one between the initial clients (all citizens) and the government, and the second-tier principal-agent relationship is the one between the government and managers, and the government represents the core connection of the two-tier principal-agent relationship. The second-tier principal-agent relationship is the one actually effective due to the problem of the final owner absence, government officials' strong residual right of control and weak residual right of claiming. The rent-seeking collusion by the principal and agent in the second-tier principal-agent relationship leads to the problem of corruption in state owned enterprises and affects enterprise investment decision. In addition, the decentralized administration, the financial contract system and the promotion system of government officials in China also cause local governments to encourage enterprises' over-investment in pursuit of GDP growth and promotion opportunities; (2) Chinese listed companies have a strong preference for seasoned equity offering, and the major shareholders generally give up the subscription right In the Chinese institutional system, these will greatly reduce the financing cost and investment risk of major shareholders, and reduce the enterprise investment efficiency. Therefore, the causes and formation mechanism of escalation of commitment in Chinese listed companies should have its own unique aspects.
This paper proposes an analytical framework of the escalation of commitment from decision maker's rationality perspective, based on China's institutional background in transition economy, focusing on the principal-agent relationship in listed companies, and elaborated to include the subscription selection of seasoned equity offering and government control in the framework. Subsequently, the paper analyzes theoretically the effect of major shareholder's subscription selection and government control on escalation of commitment, and conducts an empirical research based on data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2006.
The results show that: (1) Regardless of the existence of government control, there may be escalation of commitment in listed companies when the major shareholder takes part in the subscription, and the relationship between the probability of escalation of commitment and the major shareholder's shareholding proportion is negative. But the relationship becomes non-linear when the major shareholder gives up the subscription; (2) Compared with the case when the major shareholder takes part in the subscription, their giving up the subscription will increase the probability of escalation of commitment; (3) Regardless of the major shareholder's subscription choice, compared with the case when there is no government control, government control will increase the degree of escalation of commitment. Moreover, the relationship between government control and the degree of escalation of commitment is negative.
When we further divide the government-controlled enterprises into three categories: ultimately controlled by state asset-management bureaus(SAMBs)、state-owned enterprises affiliated to the central government(SOECGs)、state-owned enterprises affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), we find that: (1) both the probability and degree of escalation of commitment are higher in state-owned listed enterprises than private listed companies;(2) in terms of the probability of escalation of commitment, SOELG listed firms are highest, followed by SAMB-controlled listed firms, and SOECGs listed firms are the lowest. The three types of state-owned listed companies do not differ significantly in the degree of escalation of commitment.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) Tracing down the principal-agent relationship of Chinese listed companies, we propose an analytical framework based on China's institutional background and from the rational perspective; (2) We study the effect of major shareholder's subscription selection of seasoned equity offering on escalation of commitment. This helps us understand the economic consequences of the subscription selection by major shareholder, and sets up theoretical foundation for managing and supervising the investment and financing behavior of listed companies; (3) We study the effect of government control on escalation of commitment, which provides a new perspective for government control research, and improves our understanding of the economic consequences of government control; (4) We place the escalation of commitment and over-investment into the same research framework, which enriches and advances the study of inefficient investment and escalation of commitment
目前,对于恶性增资行为的研究主要有两方面的特点或者说不足:第一,多数研究是基于市场经济体制下的西方企业展开的,专门针对转轨经济体制下的企业恶性增资行为的研究还很少;第二,多数研究是从决策者心理、认知偏差和行为等非理性视角进行的,从决策者理性视角出发所作的研究还较少。这与最早提出并对恶性增资进行研究的是心理学家,目前国外从事该领域研究的仍有半数是心理学家或行为经济学家,并且他们主要来自于发达的市场经济体制国家有关。
无可否认,从非理性视角研究恶性增资有着重要的意义,但是对于中国,理性因素同样重要,原因在于,与发达的市场经济国家相比,中国上市公司的治理结构、内外部监管体制均不健全,决策者选择利己的投资行为的成本较低,空间更大。因此,在研究中国上市公司恶性增资行为时,仅从非理性视角出发而忽视理性视角的研究是不全面的,同时也会造成恶性增资理论研究的欠缺。
从决策者理性视角出发对恶性增资行为所作的研究主要是基于代理理论的理论基础进行的。但是,现有在代理理论框架下的研究多数还停留在管理者与股东、大股东与小股东的代理冲突这一泛化层面上。
作者认为,转轨经济时期的中国上市公司具有较特殊的地方:(1)由于国有产权的特殊性,导致国有上市公司具有双层委托代理关系,从最初委托人(全体公民)到政府是第一层代理,从政府到企业经理是第二层代理,政府是双层委托代理的纽带和核心。由于终极所有者缺位,同时政府官员具有强剩余控制权和弱剩余索取权,使得在经济中发挥实质性作用的是第二层代理关系,国有经济的腐败问题恰恰是第二层级的委托人与代理人共谋租金的结果,这些将影响企业的投资决策。另一方面,我国政府的行政分权、财政包干和政府官员晋升制度也使得地方政府为了追求GDP增长和晋升机会而推动企业过度增资;(2)我国上市公司具有极强的股权再融资偏好和上市公司大股东普遍放弃股权再融资认购权的特点,在中国制度背景下,这将大大降低大股东的融资成本和投资风险,激化大股东与中小股东的代理冲突,降低公司的投资效率。因此,转轨经济体制下的中国上市公司的恶性增资行为的产生原因及形成机理应该具有独特的地方。
本文着眼于转轨经济时期的中国制度背景,从决策者理性的视角出发,以上市公司的代理关系为主线,将股权再融资认购选择、政府控制和恶性增资放在一个研究框架内,提出了基于中国制度背景下的恶性增资行为理论分析框架,然后,从理论上分析了大股东的股权再融资认购选择、政府控制对上市公司恶性增资行为的影响效应,再选用2003-2006年间沪深两市的相关公司为样本,用实证方法检验了本文的研究结论。
研究结果表明:(1)无论是否存在政府控制,在大股东参加股权再融资认购时,上市公司都存在恶性增资的可能,其恶性增资的发生概率与大股东持股比例负相关;而在大股东放弃认购时,恶性增资的发生概率与大股东持股比例呈非线性关系;(2)与大股东参加认购相比,放弃认购将增加上市公司恶性增资的概率;(3)无论是大股东放弃认购还是参加认购,与不存在政府控制相比,政府控制将显著增加上市公司恶性增资的额度。并且,总体而言,上市公司恶性增资额度与大股东持股比例呈负相关关系。
在把政府控制进一步划分为国有资产管理机构控制、中央国企控制和地方国企控制三类后,我们发现:(1)与民营上市公司相比,无论是恶性增资发生概率还是恶性增资额度,国有上市公司均更大;(2)在恶性增资发生概率上,中央国企控制的上市公司最低,国有资产管理机构控制的上市公司次之,地方国企控制的上市公司最高;在恶性增资额度上,三类国有上市公司无显著差异。
本文的贡献在于:(1)从决策者理性的视角出发,以中国上市公司的代理关系为主线,构建了基于中国制度背景下的恶性增资行为理论分析框架;(2)研究了大股东的股权再融资认购选择对恶性增资的影响效应,为我们理解大股东的股权再融资认购选择的经济后果以有益的启示,为管理层监督和规范上市公司的投融资行为提供了理论依据;(3)深入研究了政府控制对企业恶性增资行为的影响,为政府控制研究提供了新视角,加深了我们对政府控制经济后果的理解;(4)首次将恶性增资和过度投资纳入一个研究框架内,丰富和推进了非效率投资以及恶性增资的研究。
Capital investment is critical whether to the success of an enterprise or to a country's economic growth. China's fixed assets investment has been increasing continuously in the past few years.In this context, it is very important to investigate how to improve the efficiency of fixed assets investment, and how to avoid the occurrence of escalation of commitment.
By far, there are two weak points on the study of escalation of commitment in investment. Firstly, most studies are based on the practice of enterprises in market economy, and few studies related to enterprises of transition economy have been made. Secondly, most studies are carried out from the perspective of decision-maker's judgment bias and irrationality, and only a few studies are made from the perspective of decision-maker rationality. This is because of that the earliest researchers of escalation of commitment are the psychologist. At present, studying abroad in this field there is still half of the psychologists or behavior economists, and they are mainly from countries in market economy.
It is undeniable that study on the escalation of commitment from the perspective of irrationality is very important. However, the rational perspective is equally important in China, because the governance structure and internal and external monitoring system of Chinese listed companies are not as effective as those in market economy of developed countries. Besides, the cost of selfish investment decision is lower and the there is more leeway in such behavior in China than in developed countries. Therefore, it is not complete for studying escalation of commitment in China only from the irrational perspective, and neglecting the rational perspective will cause theoretical research in escalation of commitment to be deficient.
Currently, the research conducted from the rational perspective is mainly based on agency theory, and most of it only deals with the conflict at the general level, for example: conflict between managers and shareholders, or between major shareholders and minority shareholders.
We believe that Chinese listed companies in transition economy are unique in two ways: (1) there is a two-tier principal-agent relationship in these companies characterized by state ownership. The first-tier principal-agent relationship is the one between the initial clients (all citizens) and the government, and the second-tier principal-agent relationship is the one between the government and managers, and the government represents the core connection of the two-tier principal-agent relationship. The second-tier principal-agent relationship is the one actually effective due to the problem of the final owner absence, government officials' strong residual right of control and weak residual right of claiming. The rent-seeking collusion by the principal and agent in the second-tier principal-agent relationship leads to the problem of corruption in state owned enterprises and affects enterprise investment decision. In addition, the decentralized administration, the financial contract system and the promotion system of government officials in China also cause local governments to encourage enterprises' over-investment in pursuit of GDP growth and promotion opportunities; (2) Chinese listed companies have a strong preference for seasoned equity offering, and the major shareholders generally give up the subscription right In the Chinese institutional system, these will greatly reduce the financing cost and investment risk of major shareholders, and reduce the enterprise investment efficiency. Therefore, the causes and formation mechanism of escalation of commitment in Chinese listed companies should have its own unique aspects.
This paper proposes an analytical framework of the escalation of commitment from decision maker's rationality perspective, based on China's institutional background in transition economy, focusing on the principal-agent relationship in listed companies, and elaborated to include the subscription selection of seasoned equity offering and government control in the framework. Subsequently, the paper analyzes theoretically the effect of major shareholder's subscription selection and government control on escalation of commitment, and conducts an empirical research based on data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2006.
The results show that: (1) Regardless of the existence of government control, there may be escalation of commitment in listed companies when the major shareholder takes part in the subscription, and the relationship between the probability of escalation of commitment and the major shareholder's shareholding proportion is negative. But the relationship becomes non-linear when the major shareholder gives up the subscription; (2) Compared with the case when the major shareholder takes part in the subscription, their giving up the subscription will increase the probability of escalation of commitment; (3) Regardless of the major shareholder's subscription choice, compared with the case when there is no government control, government control will increase the degree of escalation of commitment. Moreover, the relationship between government control and the degree of escalation of commitment is negative.
When we further divide the government-controlled enterprises into three categories: ultimately controlled by state asset-management bureaus(SAMBs)、state-owned enterprises affiliated to the central government(SOECGs)、state-owned enterprises affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), we find that: (1) both the probability and degree of escalation of commitment are higher in state-owned listed enterprises than private listed companies;(2) in terms of the probability of escalation of commitment, SOELG listed firms are highest, followed by SAMB-controlled listed firms, and SOECGs listed firms are the lowest. The three types of state-owned listed companies do not differ significantly in the degree of escalation of commitment.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) Tracing down the principal-agent relationship of Chinese listed companies, we propose an analytical framework based on China's institutional background and from the rational perspective; (2) We study the effect of major shareholder's subscription selection of seasoned equity offering on escalation of commitment. This helps us understand the economic consequences of the subscription selection by major shareholder, and sets up theoretical foundation for managing and supervising the investment and financing behavior of listed companies; (3) We study the effect of government control on escalation of commitment, which provides a new perspective for government control research, and improves our understanding of the economic consequences of government control; (4) We place the escalation of commitment and over-investment into the same research framework, which enriches and advances the study of inefficient investment and escalation of commitment
引文
[1]A·克鲁格.寻租社会的政治经济学.经济社会体制比较,1988,4:8-16.
[2]布坎南[美].自由、市场和国家.北京:北京经济学院出版社,1988.
[3]陈朝龙,史本山.上市公司再融资募集资金的盈利能力研究.软科学,2004,5(18):33-36.
[4]陈抗,Hillman,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化.经济学(季刊),2002,1(2):111-130.
[5]陈舒予.上市公司投资与现金流高敏感度的经济解释:融资约束还是投资过度?.厦门大学管理学院工作论文,2005.
[6]陈小悦,肖星,过晓燕.配股权与上市公司利润操纵.经济研究,2000,1:30-36.
[7]樊潇彦.经济增长与中国宏观投资效率研究.上海:上海人民出版社,2005.
[8]方晓霞.中国企业融资:制度变迁与行为分析.北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[9]戈登·塔洛克[美].关税、垄断和偷窃的福利成本.李政军译.经济社会体制比较,2001,1:47-51.
[10]戈登·塔洛克[美].寻租:对寻租活动的经济学分析.李政军译.成都:西南财经大学出版社,1999.
[11]耿建新,刘文鹏.上市公司再融资与股权结构优化问题.经济理论与经济管理,2001,(9):31-36.
[12]管征,卞志村,范从来.增发还是配股?上市公司股权再融资方式选择研究.管理世界.2008,1:136-144.
[13]郝颖.大股东控制下的中国上市公司投资行为特征研究:[重庆大学博士论文].重庆:重庆大学,2007.
[14]何金耿,丁加华.上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析.证券市场导报,2001,9:44-47.
[15]贺振华.寻租、过度投资与地方保护.南开经济研究,2006,2:64-72.
[16]胡鞍钢.中国:挑战腐败.北京:机械工业出版社,2001.
[17]胡鞍钢.腐败造成了多少经济损失.中国改革,2002,5:36-37.
[18]胡国柳,黄景贵,裘益政.股权结构与企业资本支出决策:理论与实证分析.管理世界,2006,1:142-149.
[19]胡继之.海外主要证券市场发行制度.北京:中国金融出版社,1999.
[20]黄凯,时巨涛.企业投资失误成因的实证分析.投资研究,1999,8:10-13.
[21]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析.经济研究,2001,11:12-20.
[22]江曙霞,罗杰,黄君慈.产权软约束、官商合谋与寻租性腐败:国有企业产权改革过程中的腐败机理分析.中国经济学年会论文,2005.
[23]蒋义宏.配股资格线的变迁与ROE分布的变化:中国上市公司“上有政策,下有对策”图解.经济管理,2003,2:61-67.
[24]李辰,张翼.股权结构、现金流与资本投资.经济学(季刊),2005,1(5):229-245.
[25]李礼.中国上市公司寻租行为研究:[博士学位论文].天津:南开大学,2008.
[26]李明芬.华人嵌陷行为未出现的责任效果之探讨.[硕士学位论文].台北:中原大学,2007.
[27]李涛.混合所有制公司中的国有股权—论国有股减持的理论基础.经济研究,2002,8:19-27.
[28]李心愉.中国上市公司配股资金使用效率的统计分析.财贸经济,2004,3:13-17.
[29]李翔.股权分置与上市公司配股行为:[博士学位论文].天津:南开大学,2005.
[30]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组:来自我国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究,2005,1:95-104.
[31]李志文,宋衍衡.影响中国上市公司配股决策的因素分析.经济科学,2003,3:59-69.
[32]李志文,宋衍衡.股权结构会影响筹资决策吗?.管理世界,2003b,6:128-138.
[33]连玉君,程建.投资—现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?.财经研究,2007,2(33):37-46.
[34]林家五,郑伯埙,蔡明宏.决策嵌陷的成因分析.管理学报,2000,17(3):515-546.
[35]林家五,郑伯埙,陈淑琪.组织决策嵌陷的陷溺与挽救历程:个案研究取向.人力资源管理学报,2003,3(3):27-56.
[36]林书仔.团体凝聚力对决策嵌陷的影响:[硕士学位论文].台北:中原大学,2003.
[37]林云,陈方正.我国上市公司股权融资偏好的寻租经济学分析.云南财贸学院学报(社会科学版),2003,2:37-39.
[38]刘兵军,欧阳令南.企业“恶性增资”现象的期权分析.财经研究,2002,28(7):75-80.
[39]刘超.资本预算项目恶性增资研究—理论框架与预警模型:[博士学位论文].天津:南开大学,2004.
[40]刘超.企业恶性增资:委托代理视角及中国的实证.河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,3:66-68.
[41]刘志远,刘超.基于实验研究的恶性增资行为解释:自辩理论还是前景理论?.中国会计评论,2004,2:249-258.
[42]刘志远,刘青.集体决策能抑制恶性增资吗?:一个基于前景理论的实验研究.中国工业经济,2007,4:13-20.
[43]刘志远,唐洋.决策责任、项目认知和资本预算项目恶性增资:基于自辩理论的模型.财经理论与实践,2007a,5:69-73.
[44]刘志远,唐洋.资本预算项目恶性增资的控制研究.经济与管理研究,2007b,6:17-23.
[45]陆铭,陈钊,严冀.收益递增、发展战略与区域经济的分割.经济研究,2004,1:54-62.
[46]卢现祥.寻租经济学导论.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2000.
[47]陆正飞,叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析:偏好股权融资就是源于融资成本低吗?.经济研究,2004,4:50-58.
[48]罗兰著.张帆,潘佐红译.转型与经济学.北京:北京大学出版社,2002.
[49]梅丹.我国上市公司固定资产投资规模财务影响因素研究.管理科学,2005,5(18):80-85.
[50]孟猛.我国转轨时期恶性增资形成机理研究.南开大学博士后出站报告,2007,5.
[51]莫衍.政府参与的理论探索.[博士学位论文].长春:吉林大学,2005.
[52]欧阳凌.企业非效率投资行为理论与实证研究.[博士学位论文].上海:上海交通大学, 2005.
[53]潘敏、金岩.信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资.金融研究,2003,1:36-45.
[54]裴红卫.国有企业外部人控制:一个寻租视角.财经问题研究,2004,7:59-64.
[55]饶育蕾,汪玉英.中国上市公司大股东对投资影响的实证研究.南开管理评论,2006,5:67-73.
[56]沈洪涛,沈艺峰,杨熠.新股增发:自由现金流量假说还是优序融资假说.世界经济,2003,8:53-61.
[57]沈立人,戴园晨.我国“诸侯经济”的形成及其弊端和根源.经济研究,1990,3:12-19.
[58]孙丽君,徐建蓉.决策者人格特征对承诺升级的影响研究.商业研究,2006,23:47-50.
[59]孙铮,王跃堂.资源配置与盈余操纵之实证研究.财经研究,1999,4:3-9.
[60]坦尼夫,张春霖,白瑞福特著.张军括译.中国的公司治理与企业改革:建立现代企业制度.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[61]唐洋,刘志远.决策责任、原生性认知、资本预算项目恶性增资—基于模拟试验的证据.南开管理评论,2008,1:78-84.
[62]唐洋.投资者恶性增资行为的控制机制探讨—基于原生性认知和负反馈信息明确化的考察.经济经纬,2007,4:67-70.
[63]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论.经济研究,2005a,10:48-58.
[64]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理.管理世界,2005b,7:123-147.
[65]田利辉.制度变迁、银企关系和扭曲的杠杆治理.经济学(季刊),2005c,4(增刊):119-134.
[66]王妍.中国国有企业制度性寻租行为研究:[博士学位论文].长春:吉林大学,2005.
[67]魏锋,刘星.融资约束、不确定性对公司投资行为的影响.经济科学,2004,2:37-45.
[68]文宏.融资偏好与融资效率.当代经济科学,1999,6:65-71.
[69]吴敬琏.中国腐败的治理.战略与管理,2003,2:1-8.
[70]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵:上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究:[博士学位论文].上海:上海财经大学,2005.
[71]谢百三,陈霆.我国上市公司增发新股现象剖析.当代财经,2001,10:47-50.
[72]谢平,陆磊.中国金融腐败的经济学分析.北京:中信出版社,2005.
[73]辛清泉.政府控制、资本投资与治理:[博士学位论文].广州:中山大学,2007.
[74]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资.经济研究.2007,8:110-121.
[75]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响.经济研究,2006a,1:90-100.
[76]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.控股股东的性质及公司经营绩效.世界经济.2006b,10:78-89.
[77]阎达五,耿建新,刘文鹏.我国上市公司配股融资行为的实证研究.会计研究,2001,9:21-27.
[78]杨华军,胡奕明.制度背景与自由现金流的过度投资.管理世界,2007,9:99-106.
[79]杨瑞龙.我国制度变迁方转换的三阶段论.经济研究,1998,1:3-10.
[80]银温泉,才婉如.我国地方市场分割的成因和治理.经济研究,2001,6:3-12.
[81]张仁德,韩晶.国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析.当代经济科学,2003,25(2):28-32.
[82]章卫东,夏新平.论我国上市公司治理对股权再融资绩效的影响.当代财经,2005,8:121-124.
[83]张维迎,栗树和.地区间竞争与中国国有企业的民营化.经济研究,1998,12:13-22.
[84]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[85]张维迎.是什么推动了中国经济的高增长.山东经济战略研究,2005,1-2:22-23.
[86]张五常.经济解释.北京:商务印书馆,2000.
[87]中国改革基金会.现实的选择:国有中小企业改革实践的初步总结.上海:上海远东出版社,1997.
[88]钟笑寒.私有企业,投资控制与过度投资.清华大学工作论文,2005.
[89]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作.经济研究,2004,6:33-40.
[90]周齐武,维达.中国企业中“恶性增资”现象的广泛性、影响、原因及对策探讨.中国会计与财务研究,2000,1(2):1-20.
[91]朱恒鹏.分权化改革、财政激励和公有制企业改制.世界经济,2004,12:14-24.
[92]Abel,B.,and Eberly,C..Investment and q with Fixed Costs:An Empirical Analysis.University of Pennsylvania Working Paper,2001.
[93]Adam Smith.The Wealth of Nations.Glasgow Edition of the Works of Adam Smith,Oxford University Press,1976.
[94]Aggarwal,R.,and A.Samwick.Empire Builders and Shirkers:Investment,Firm Performance,and Managerial Incentives.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12:489-515.
[95]A.I.Teger,Too Much Invested to Quit,Pergamon,New York,1980.
[96]Amihud,Y and B,Ley.Risk Reduction as A Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers.Bell Journal of Economics.1981,12:605-617.
[97]Arkes,H.R.,Blumer,C..The Psychology of Sunk Cost.Organizational Bechavior and Human Decision Processes,I985,35:124-140.
[98]Arkes,H.R.,and Ayton,P..The sunk cost and concorde effects:Are humans less rational than lower animals? Psychological Bulletin,1999,125:591-600.
[99]Baker,K.,Nofsinger,J.,Weaver,D..International Cross-Listing and Visibility.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2002,(37):495-521.
[100]Baker,M..Career Concerns and Staged Investment:Evidence from the Venture Capital Industry.Working Paper.Harvard University,2000.
[101]Bandura.Social Learning Theory.Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall,1977.
[102]Bateman,T..The Escalation of Commitment in Sequential Decision-making.Decision Sciences,1986,17:33-49.
[103]Baxter,N..Leverage,Risk of Ruin and Cost of Capital.Journal of Finance,1967,22:395-403.
[104]Bazerman,M.H.,Giuliano,T.,and Appelman,A..Escalation in Individual and Group Decision Making.Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,1984,33:141-152.
[105]Bebchuk,UA.and LA.Stole.Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects.Journal of Finance.1993,48:719-729.
[106]Bebchuk,L.A.,R.H.Kraakman and G.Triantis.Stock Pyramids,Cross-Ownership,and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights.In Concentrated Corporate Ownership,edited by R.Morck.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1983,295-315.
[107]Beeler,J.D.,and Hunton,J.E..The Influence of Compensation Method and Disclosure Level on Information Search Strategy and Escalation of Commitment.Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,1997,10:77-91.
[108]Berkovitch,E.and H.Kim.Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over-investnent and Under-investment Incentives.Journal of Finance,1990,ⅩLⅤ(3):765-794.
[109]Berliner,J..The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm.Quarterly Journal of Economics.1952,66:342-365.
[110]Berle,A.,and Means,G..The Modern Corporation and Private Propert.New York:Commerce Clearing House,1932.
[111]Bertrand,Marianne,Francis K.,Antoinette S.,and David T..Politically Connected CEOs and Corporate Outcomes:Evidence from France.Working Paper from www.ssrn.com,2004.
[112]Bertrand,M.and S.Mullainatban.Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences.Working Paper,MIT,2000.
[113]Bhagwati,Jagdish.Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking(DUP) Activities.Journal of Political Economy.1982,90(10):988-1002.
[114]Blanchard,O.,and A.Shleifer.Federalism with and with out Political Centralization:China versus Russia.NBER Working Paper,2000.
[115]Boardman,A.,and A.Vining.Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments:A Comparison of the Performance of Private,Mixed,and State-Owned Enterprises.Journal of Law and Economics.1989,32:1-33.
[116]Bobocel,D.R.and Meyer,J.P..Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of Action:Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification.Journal of Applied Psychology,1994,79(3):60-33.
[117]Bowen,M.G..The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered:Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors? Academy of Management Review,1987,12(1):52-66.
[118]Bragger,J.L.,Bragger D.H.,and Hantula,D.A.,et al.Hysteresis and uncertainty:The effect of information on delays to exit decisions.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1998,74:229-253.
[119]Brockner,J.,and Rubin,J.Z..Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts:a Social Psychological Analysis.New York:Springer-Verlag,1985.
[120]Brockner,J.,Nathanson,S.,and Friend,A.,et al.The Role of Modeling Processes in the "Knee Deep in the Big Muddy" Phenomenon.Organizational Behavior and Human Performmance,1984,33:77-99.
[121]Brockner,J.,Rubin,J.Z.,and Fine,J.,et al.Factors Affecting Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts:the Importance of Timing.Journal of Research in Personality,1982,16:247-266.
[122]Brockner,J.,Rubin,J.Z.and Lang,E..Face-Saving and Entrapment.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,1981,17(1):68-79.
[123]Brockner,J.,Staw,M.C.,and Rubin,J.Z..Factors Affecting Withdrawal from an Escalating Conflict:Quitting before It's too Late.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,1979,15:492-503.
[124]Brockner,J..The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action:Toward Theoretical Progress.Academy of Management Review,1992,17:39-61.
[125]Caldwell,D.F.,and O'Reilly,C.A.Response to Failure:The Effects of Choice and Responsibility on Impression Management.Academy of Management Journal,1982,25:121-136.
[126]Cao,Y.,Y.Qian,and B.Weingast.Form Federalism,Chinese Style,to Privatization,Chinese Style.Economics of Transition,1999,7:103-131.
[127]Chen,K.,and H.Yuan.Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation:Evidence from China's Accounting-Based Regulation of Rights Issues.The Accounting Review,2004,79:645-665.
[128]Cheng,M.,Sclaluz,K.D.,and Luckett,P.,et al.The Effects of Hurdle Rate on the Level Escalation of Commitment in Capital Budgeting.Behavioral Research in Accounting,2003,15:63-85.
[129]Chow,C.W.,Vidya,N.A.,and Fleenor,C.P..Exploring the Extensiveness,Effects and Causes of Remedies for Escalation in Chinese Business Enterprises.China Accounting and Finance Review,2000,2(1):21-33.
[130]Chow,C.W.,Wright,P.and Haddad,K..Increasing the Effectiveness of Hotels Management:How to Avoid Throwing Good Money after Bad.Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly,2000,12:49-55.
[131]Chow,C.W.,Harrison,P.,and Lindquist,T.et al.Escalating Commitment to Unprofitable Projects:Replication and Cross-Cultural Extension.Management Accounting Research,1997,8(3):347-361.
[132]Coffee,J..Racing Toward the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listing and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance.Columbia Law Review,2002,102(7):1757-1832.
[133]Conlon,E.J.,Parks,J.M..Information Requests in the Context of Escalation.Journal of Applied Psychology,1987,72:344-350.
[134]Davis,M.,and Bobko,P..Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public Sector Decision Making.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1986,37:121-138.
[135]Demesetz,H.and Lehn,K.The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes Consequencies.Journal of Political Economics.1985,93:1155-1177.
[136]Demesetz,H.The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm.Journal of Law and Economics.1983,26:379-390.
[137]Djankov,S.,E.Glaeser,R.La Porta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.The New Comparative Economics.Journal of Comparative Economics.2003,31:595-615.
[138]Doidge,C.,Karolyi,G.,Stulz,R..Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S.Worth More?Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(2):205-238.
[139]Donaldson,G.Corporate Debt Capacity:A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity.Working Paper,Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration,1961.
[140]Drummond,H..Are We Any Closer to the End? Escalation and the Case of Taurus.International Journal of project Management,1999,17(1):11-16.
[141]Errunza,V.,Miller,D.Market Segmentation and the Cost of Capital in International Equity Markets.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2000,35(4):577-600.
[142]Faccio,M..Politically Connected Firms.American Economic Review,2006,96(1):369-386.
[143]Faccio,M.,R.W.Masulis and J.J.McConnell.Politically Connections and Corporate Bailouts.Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[144]Fan,J.,Timan,S.,Twite,G..An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choice.Working Paper from www.ssm.com,2004.
[145]Fazzari,S.M.,Hubbard,R.G.,Petersen,B.C.,et al.Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,1:141-206.
[146]Festinger,L.A..Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,1957.
[147]Fox,F.V.,and Staw,B.M.The Frapped Administrator:Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance upon Commitment to a Course of Action.Administrative Science Quarterly,1979,24:449-471.
[148]Fred S.McChesney.Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation.Journal of Legal Studies,1987,(ⅩⅥ):101-118.
[149]Garland,H.,and Conlon,D.E..Too Close Too Quite:The Role of Project Completion in Maintaining Commitment.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,1998,28(22):2025-2048.
[150]Garland,H.,and Newport,S..Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on the Decision to Persist with a Course of Action.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1991,48(1):55-69.
[151]Garland,H.,C.A.Sandefur,and A.C.Rogers.De-escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration:When Sunk Costs and Negative Feedback Coincide.Journal of Applied Psychology,1990,75(6):721-727.
[152]Garland,H..Throwing Good Money After Bad:The Effect of Sunk Cost on the Decision to Escalate Commitment to an Ongoing Project.Journal of Applied Psychology,1990,75(6):728-731.
[153]Gervais and Odean.Learning to be overconfident.Review of Financial Studies,2001,14(1): 1-27.
[154]Ghosh,D..De-Escalation Strategies:Some Experimental Evidence.Behavioral Research in Accounting,1997,9:88-112.
[155]Goel,Anand M.and Anjan Thakor,Do overconfident managers make better leaders?.Working Paper,University of Michigan.,2002.
[156]Greer,C.R.,and Stephens,G.K..Escalation of Commitment:A Comparison of Differences Between Mexico and U.S.Decision-makers.Journal of Management,2001,27(1):51-78.
[157]Hail,L.,Leuz,C..Cost of Capital and Cash Flow Effects of U.S.Cross Listing.Working Paper from University of Pennsylvania,2004.
[158]Hall,Brian J.,and Kevin J.Murphy.Stock options for undiversified executives.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(1):3-42.
[159]Hantula,D.A.,and Bragger,J.L..The Effect of Feedback Equivocality on Escalation of Commitment:An Empirical Investigation of Decision dilemma Theory.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,1999,29(2):424-444.
[160]Harrison,P.D.,and Harrel,A..Impact of "Adverse Selection" on Managers Project Evaluation Decisions.Academy of Management Journal,1993,36(3):635-643.
[161]Haunschild,P.R.,Davis-Blake,A.,and Fichman,M..Managerial Overcommitment in Corporate Acquisition Processes.Organization Science,1994,5(4):528-540.
[162]Heaton,J.B.Managerial optimism and corporate finance.Financial Management,2002,31(2):33-45.
[163]Hirshleifer,D.and A.V.Thakor.Managerial Conservatism,Project Choice and Debt.Review of Financial Studies.1992,5(3):437-470.
[164]Hogarth,R.M.,and Einhorn,R.J.Order Effects in Belief Updating:Belief-Adjustment Model.Cognitive Psychology,1992,24(1):1-55.
[165]Holderness,C.G.,and Shechan,D.P..The Pole of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):317-346.
[166]Holmstrom,B.,and J.R.Costa.Managerial Incentives And Capital Management.Quarterly Journal of Economics.1986,11(5):835-860.
[167]Hovakimian,G.and Titman,S.Corporate Investment with Financial Constraints:Sensitivity of Investment to Funds from Voluntary Asset Sales.Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2006,2(38):357-374.
[168]James,C.Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans[J].Journal of Financial Economics.1987,19(2):217-235.
[169]Jensen,M.C..Agency Costs of Free-Cash-Flow.Corporate Finance,and Takeovers,1986,76(2):323-329.
[170]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[171]Jensen,M..The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems.Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[172]J.N.Bhagwati.Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking(DUP) Activities.JPE,1982,90(5):241-248.
[173]Kahneman,A.Tversky.The Psychology of Preferences.Scientific American,1982,246(1):160-173.
[174]Kahneman,D.and A.Tversky.Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk.Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-291.
[175]Kanodia,Chandra,Bushman,R.,Dickhaut,J..Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect:an Explanation Based on Reputation and Information Asymmetries.Journal of Accounting Research,1989,27(1):59-77.
[176]Kaplan,Steven N.,and Luigi Zingales.Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are Not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints.Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,115(2):707-712.
[177]Keil,M.,and Flatto,J..Information Systems Project Escalation:A Reinterpretation Based on Options Theory.Accounting Management and Information Technologies,1999,9(2):115-139.
[178]Keil,M..Identifying and Preventing Runaway Systems Project.American Programmer,1995(a),8(3):16-22.
[179]Keil,M..Pulling the Plug:Software Project Management and the Problem of Project Escalation.MIS Quarterly,1995,19(4):421-447.
[180]Keil,M.,R.Mixon,et al.Understanding Runaway Information Technology Projects:Results from an International Research Program Based on Escalation Theory.Journal of Management Information Systems,1995,11(3):65-85.
[181]Keil,M.,Rai,A.,and Mann,J..Why Software Projects Escalate:An Empirical Analysis and Test of Four Theoretical Models.MIS Quarterly,2000,24(4):631-664.
[182]Kiesler,C.A..The Psychology of Commitment:Experiments Linking Behavior to Belief.New York:Academic Press,1971.
[183]Kornai,J..Economics of Shortage.Amsterdam:North Holland,1980.
[184]Kornai,J.,E.Maskin and G.Roland.Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint.Journal of Economic Literature.2003,41(4):1095-1136.
[185]Kornai,J..The Soft Budget Constraint.Kyklos,1986,39(1):3-10.
[186]Kraus,A.,and R.Litzenberger.A State Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage.Journal of Finance.1973,28(4):911-922.
[187]Krueger,A..The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.American Economic Review,1974,64(3),291-303.
[188]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanes and A.Shleifer.Corporrate Owenership around the World.The Journal of Finance.1999,54(2):471-517.
[189]Lang,L.,and Litzenberger,R.Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signaling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypothesis.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24(1):181-191.
[190]Lang,M.,Lins,K.,Miller,D..ADRs,Analysts,and Accuracy:Does Cross Listing in the U.S.Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value? Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2):317-362.
[191]Leatherwood,M.,and Conlon,E..The Impact of Prospectively Relevant Information on Persistence in a Project Following Setbacks.Advances in Information Processing in Organizations,1988,3:207-219.
[192]Leatherwood,M.L.,and Conlon,E.J.Difinsibility of Blame:Effects on Persistence in a Project.Academy of Management Review,1987,30:836-847.
[193]Lehn,K.,S.Patro and Zhao.Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards:1935-2000.Working Paper,University of Pittsburgh,2004.
[194]Leuza,Christian and Felix Oberholzer-Geeb.Political relationships,global financing,and corporate transparency:Evidence from Indonesia.Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(2):411-439.
[195]Li,H.,and L.Zhou.Political Turn ove And Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of China's Personnel Control.Memo,2004.
[196]Majumdar,S..Asseasing Comparative Efficiency of the State-Owned,Mixed,and Private Sectors in Indian Industry.Public Choice,1996,96(1-2):1-24.
[197]Malmendier U.and G.Tate.CEO overconfidence and corporate investment.Journal of Finance.2005,60(6):2661-2700.
[198]Maug.Large Shareholders as Monitors:Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?Journal of Finance,1998,53(1):65-98.
[199]McCain,B.E.Continuing Investment Under Conditions of Failure:A Laboratory Study of the Limits to Escalation.Journal of Applied Psychology,1986,71(2):280-284.
[200]McCarthy,A.M.,Schoorman,F.D.,and Cooper,A.C..Reinvestment Decisions by Entrepreneurs:Rational Decision Making or Escalation of Commitment?.Journal of Business Venturing,1993,8(1):9-24.
[201]McConnell,J.and Servaes,H.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.Journal of Financial Economics.1990,27(2):595-612.
[202]McKinnon,R..Spontaneous Order on the Road Back from Socialism:An Asian Perspective.American Economic Review,1992,80(2):31-36.
[203]McNamara,G.,H.Moon,and P.Bromiley.Banking on Commitment:Intended and Unintended Consequences of an Organization's Attempt to Attenuate Escalation of Commitment.Academy of Management Journal,2002,45(2):443-52.
[204]Megginson,W.,and J.Netter.From State to Market:A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization.Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(2):321-389.
[205]Modigliani,F.,and M.Miller.The Cost of Capital,Corporation Finance,and the Theory Investment.American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297.
[206]Modigliani,F.,and M.Miller.Corporate Income Taxes and Cost of Capital:A Correction.American Economic Review,1963,53(3):433-443.
[207]Montealegre,R.,and M.Keil.De-escalating Information Technology Projects:Lessons from the Denver international Airport. MIS Quarterly 2000, 24(3): 417-447.
[208] Montinola, G, Yingyi Qian and B. Weigast. Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China. World Politics, 1995,48 (1): 50-81.
[209] Myeong- Hyeon Cho. Ownership Structure, Investment and the Corporate Value:An Empirical Analysis . Journal of Financial Economics. 1998,47(1): 103-121.
[210] Myers, D. G, and Lamm, H.. The group polarization phenomenon. Psychologist Bulletin, 1976,83(4): 602-627.
[211] Myers, S. C, and Majluf. Corporate Financing and Invest Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Don't Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13(2): 187-221.
[212] 212] Myers, S. C. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 1977,5(1): 147-175.
[213] Myers, S. C. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance, 1984, 39(3): 575-592.
[214] Narayanan, M. P.. Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1996, 31(4): 467-491.
[215] Narayanan, M. P.. Managerial Incentives for Shout-Term Results. Journal of Finance, 1985, 40(6): 1469-1484.
[216] Northcraft, G. B., and M. A. Neale. Opportunity Costs and the Framing of Resource Allocation Decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1986, 37(3): 348-356.
[217] Nulden, U.. Escalation in IT Projects: Can We Afford to Quit or Do We Have to Continue. Information System Conference of New Zealand. Palmerston North. New Zealand: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1996.
[218] Pawlina,G. and L.Renneboog. Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK. European Financial Management, 2005,11(4): 483-513.
[219] Pinto, B., M. Belka,and S.Krajewski. Transforming State Enterprises in Poland:Evidence on Adjustment by Manufacturing Firms. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1993, 23(1): 213-261.
[220] Pistor,K.,and Chenggang Xu. Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China. American Law and Economics Review, 2005,7(1): 184-210.
[221] Poncet, S.. A Fragmented China: Measure and Determinants of China's Domestic Market Disintegration. Eview of International Economics, 2005,13(3): 409-430 .
[222] Posner, R. The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 1975,83(4): 807-827.
[223] P. R. Haunschild, A. Davis-Blake, M. Fichman, Managerial overcommitment in corporate acquisition processes, Organization Science, 1994, 5 (4):528-540.
[224] Qian,Y., and B.Weigast. China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style. Journal of Policy Reform, 1996, 1: 148-185.
[225]Qian,Y..Government Control in Corporate Governmance as a Transitional Institute:Lesson from China.Working Paper,University of Maryland,2000.
[226]Reese,W.and Weisbach,M..Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests,Cross-Listings in the United States,and Subsequent Equity Offerings.Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):65-104.
[227]Richardson,S..Over Investment of Free Cash Flow.Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[228]Ross,J.,and B.M.Staw.Expo 86:An Escalation Prototype.Administrative Science Quarterly,1986,31(2):274-97.
[229]Ross,J.,Staw,B.J..Organizational Escalation and Exit:Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.Academy of Management Journal,1993,36(4):701-732.
[230]Ross,S.A..Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive Signaling Approaeh.Journal of Economics,1977,8(1):23-40
[231]Rowley,C.K and Tollison,R.D.Rent Seeking and Trade Protection,in:Hauser,H.(eds).Protection and Structure Adjustment,Gruesch:Ruegger,1986.
[232]Rubin,J.Z.and Brockner,J..Factors Affecting Entrapment in Waiting Situations:The Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Effect.Journal of Personality and Social Psychiatry,1975,31:1054-1063.
[233]Rubin,J.Z.,Brockner,J.,and Small-Weil.S.,et al.Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps.Journal of Conflict Resolution,1980,24(3):405-426.
[234]Rutledge,R.and Harrel,A..Responsibility and Framing of Accounting Information.International Journal of Management,1993,10(3):300-313.
[235]Ryan,H.,and R.Wiggins.The Interactions between R&D Investment Decisions and Compensation Policy.Financial Management,2002,31(1):5-29.
[236]Salter,S.,and Sharp,D..Agency Theory and Escalation of Commitment:Do Small National Culture Difference Matter?.The International Journal of Accounting,2001,36(1):33-45.
[237]Sappington,D.,and J.Stiglitz.Privatization,Information and Incentive.Journal of Political Analysis and Management,1987,6:567-579.
[238]Sapienza,P..The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending.Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72(2):357-384.
[239]Schoorman,F.D.,Mayer,R.C.,and Douglas,C.A.,et al.Escalation of Commitment and the Framing Effect:An empirical Investigation.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,1994,24(6):509-528.
[240]Scott,F.Evidence on the Importance of Financial Structure.Financial Management.1972,1(3):45-50.
[241]Seibert,S.E.,and Goltz,S.M..Comparison of Allocations by Individuals and Interacting Groups in An Escalation of Commitment Situation.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,2001,31(1):134-156.
[242]Sharp,D.J.,and Salter,S.B..Project Escalation and Sunk Costs:A Test of the International Generalizability of Agency and Prospect Theories.Journal of International Business Studies,1997,28(1):101-122.
[243]Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.The Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[244]Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[245]Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny.Politicians and Firms.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4):995-1025.
[246]Shleifer,A.,Wolfenzon.D..Investor Protection and Equity Markets.Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):3-27.
[247]Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny.Managerial Entrenchment:The Case of Manager-Specific Investment.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,25(1):123-140.
[248]Siegel,J..Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S.Securities Laws? Journal of Financial Economics,2005,75(2):319-359.
[249]Staw,B.M.,and J.Ross.Behavior in Escalation Situations:Antecedents,Prototypes,and Solutions.Research in Organizational Behavior,1987(a),9:39-78.
[250]Staw,B.M.,and J.Ross."Knowing when to pull the plug." Harvard Business Review,1987(b),65(2):68-74.
[251]Staw,B.M.,and Ross,J..Commitment to a Policy Decision:A multi-Theoretical Perspective.Administrative Science Quarterly,1978,23(1):40-64.
[252]Staw,B.M..Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy:A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action.Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,1976,16(4):27-44.
[253]Staw,B.M..The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action.Academy of Management Review,1981,6(4):577-587.
[254]Stiglitz,J.E..Some Aspect of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance:Bankruptcies and Takeovers.Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1972,23:60-67.
[255]Stigliz,J..The Private Uses of Public Interests:Incentives and Institutions.Journal of Economic Perspective,1998,12(2):3-22.
[256]Sun,Q,W.Tong,and J.Tong.How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance?Evidence from China's Privatization Process.Journal of Business,Finance & Accounting,2002,29(1-2):1-27.
[257]Sun,Q.,and W.Tong.China Share Issue Privatization:The Extent of Its Success.Journal of Financial Economics,2003,70:182-222.
[258]Tan,H.,and Yates,J.F..Sunk Cost Effects:The Influences of Instruction and Future Return Estimates.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1995,63(3):311-319.
[259]Tegar,A..Too Much Invested to Quit.New York:Perfamon Press,1980.
[260]T.S.Bateman,C.P.Zeithaml,The psychological context of strategic decisions:a model and convergent experimental findings,Strategic Management Journal,1989,10(1):59-74.
[261]Tullock,G.Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game.In Buchanan,J.M.,Tollison,R.D.and Tullock,G.Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society.Texas:A& M University Press,1980.
[262]Tullock,G..The Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopolies and Theft.Western Economics Journal,1967,5(3):224-232.
[263]Tollison,R.D.,1982.Rent Seeking:A Survey.Kyklos,1982,35(4):575-602.
[254]Verdi,R..Financial Reporting Quality and Investment Efficiency.Working Paper,University of Pennsylvania,2006.
[265]Vining,A.,and A.Boardman.Ownership Versus Competition:Efficiency in Public Enterprise.Public Choice,1992,73(2):205-239.
[266]Vogt,S.C..The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship:Eidence from U.S.Manufacturing Firms.Financial Management,1994,23(2):3-20.
[267]V.Vroom.Work and Motivation.New York:Wiley,1964.
[268]Wei,Z.,F.Xie,and S.Zhang.Ownership structure and firm value in China's privatized firms:1991-2001.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2005,40(1):87-108.
[269]Whyte,G..Diffusion of Responsibility:Effects on the Escalation Tendency.Journal of Applied Psychology,1991,76(3):408-415.
[270]Whyte,G..Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making:A Prospect Theory Approach.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process,1993,54(3):430-455.
[271]Whyte,G..Escalation Commitment to a Course of Action:a Reinterpretation.Academy of Management Review,1986,11(2):311-321.
[272]Williamson,O..Economics of Discretionary Behavior:Managerial Objectives in A Theory of Fiem.Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall,1964.
[273]Wilson,R.,and Zhang,Q..Entrapment and Escalation Commitment in Investment Decision Making:A Review.British Accounting Review,1997,29(3):277-305.
[274]Wortman,C.B.and Brehm,J.W..Responses to Uncontrollable Outcomes:An Integration of Reactance of Reactance Theory and Learned Helplessness.In L.Berkowitz(ed.),Advances in Psychology.New York:Academic Press,1975.
[275]Wruck,K.Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value:Evidence from Private Equity Financials.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,23(1):3-28.
[276]Xu,U Types of Large Shareholders,Corporate Governance,and Firm Performance,PHD Dissertation,The Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2004.
[277]Xu,X.,and Wang,Y.Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies.China Economic Review,1999,10(1):75-98.
[278]Young,A..The Razor's Edge:Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,115(4):1091-1135.
[279]Yu,Q.,B.Du and Q.Sun.Earnings Management at Rights Issues Thresholds-Evidence from China.Journal of Banking & Finance,2006,30(12):3453-3468.
[280]Zhang,J..China's State Assets Management System:How the State Exercises Its Ownership.World Bank,Washington,D.C.,2001.
[281] Zhang, W.. China's SOE Reform: A Corporate Governance Perspective. Working paper. Peking University. 1998.
[282] Zwiebel, J. Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation. Journal of Political Economy. 1995,103(1):1-25.
[2]布坎南[美].自由、市场和国家.北京:北京经济学院出版社,1988.
[3]陈朝龙,史本山.上市公司再融资募集资金的盈利能力研究.软科学,2004,5(18):33-36.
[4]陈抗,Hillman,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化.经济学(季刊),2002,1(2):111-130.
[5]陈舒予.上市公司投资与现金流高敏感度的经济解释:融资约束还是投资过度?.厦门大学管理学院工作论文,2005.
[6]陈小悦,肖星,过晓燕.配股权与上市公司利润操纵.经济研究,2000,1:30-36.
[7]樊潇彦.经济增长与中国宏观投资效率研究.上海:上海人民出版社,2005.
[8]方晓霞.中国企业融资:制度变迁与行为分析.北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[9]戈登·塔洛克[美].关税、垄断和偷窃的福利成本.李政军译.经济社会体制比较,2001,1:47-51.
[10]戈登·塔洛克[美].寻租:对寻租活动的经济学分析.李政军译.成都:西南财经大学出版社,1999.
[11]耿建新,刘文鹏.上市公司再融资与股权结构优化问题.经济理论与经济管理,2001,(9):31-36.
[12]管征,卞志村,范从来.增发还是配股?上市公司股权再融资方式选择研究.管理世界.2008,1:136-144.
[13]郝颖.大股东控制下的中国上市公司投资行为特征研究:[重庆大学博士论文].重庆:重庆大学,2007.
[14]何金耿,丁加华.上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析.证券市场导报,2001,9:44-47.
[15]贺振华.寻租、过度投资与地方保护.南开经济研究,2006,2:64-72.
[16]胡鞍钢.中国:挑战腐败.北京:机械工业出版社,2001.
[17]胡鞍钢.腐败造成了多少经济损失.中国改革,2002,5:36-37.
[18]胡国柳,黄景贵,裘益政.股权结构与企业资本支出决策:理论与实证分析.管理世界,2006,1:142-149.
[19]胡继之.海外主要证券市场发行制度.北京:中国金融出版社,1999.
[20]黄凯,时巨涛.企业投资失误成因的实证分析.投资研究,1999,8:10-13.
[21]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析.经济研究,2001,11:12-20.
[22]江曙霞,罗杰,黄君慈.产权软约束、官商合谋与寻租性腐败:国有企业产权改革过程中的腐败机理分析.中国经济学年会论文,2005.
[23]蒋义宏.配股资格线的变迁与ROE分布的变化:中国上市公司“上有政策,下有对策”图解.经济管理,2003,2:61-67.
[24]李辰,张翼.股权结构、现金流与资本投资.经济学(季刊),2005,1(5):229-245.
[25]李礼.中国上市公司寻租行为研究:[博士学位论文].天津:南开大学,2008.
[26]李明芬.华人嵌陷行为未出现的责任效果之探讨.[硕士学位论文].台北:中原大学,2007.
[27]李涛.混合所有制公司中的国有股权—论国有股减持的理论基础.经济研究,2002,8:19-27.
[28]李心愉.中国上市公司配股资金使用效率的统计分析.财贸经济,2004,3:13-17.
[29]李翔.股权分置与上市公司配股行为:[博士学位论文].天津:南开大学,2005.
[30]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组:来自我国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究,2005,1:95-104.
[31]李志文,宋衍衡.影响中国上市公司配股决策的因素分析.经济科学,2003,3:59-69.
[32]李志文,宋衍衡.股权结构会影响筹资决策吗?.管理世界,2003b,6:128-138.
[33]连玉君,程建.投资—现金流敏感性:融资约束还是代理成本?.财经研究,2007,2(33):37-46.
[34]林家五,郑伯埙,蔡明宏.决策嵌陷的成因分析.管理学报,2000,17(3):515-546.
[35]林家五,郑伯埙,陈淑琪.组织决策嵌陷的陷溺与挽救历程:个案研究取向.人力资源管理学报,2003,3(3):27-56.
[36]林书仔.团体凝聚力对决策嵌陷的影响:[硕士学位论文].台北:中原大学,2003.
[37]林云,陈方正.我国上市公司股权融资偏好的寻租经济学分析.云南财贸学院学报(社会科学版),2003,2:37-39.
[38]刘兵军,欧阳令南.企业“恶性增资”现象的期权分析.财经研究,2002,28(7):75-80.
[39]刘超.资本预算项目恶性增资研究—理论框架与预警模型:[博士学位论文].天津:南开大学,2004.
[40]刘超.企业恶性增资:委托代理视角及中国的实证.河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,3:66-68.
[41]刘志远,刘超.基于实验研究的恶性增资行为解释:自辩理论还是前景理论?.中国会计评论,2004,2:249-258.
[42]刘志远,刘青.集体决策能抑制恶性增资吗?:一个基于前景理论的实验研究.中国工业经济,2007,4:13-20.
[43]刘志远,唐洋.决策责任、项目认知和资本预算项目恶性增资:基于自辩理论的模型.财经理论与实践,2007a,5:69-73.
[44]刘志远,唐洋.资本预算项目恶性增资的控制研究.经济与管理研究,2007b,6:17-23.
[45]陆铭,陈钊,严冀.收益递增、发展战略与区域经济的分割.经济研究,2004,1:54-62.
[46]卢现祥.寻租经济学导论.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2000.
[47]陆正飞,叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析:偏好股权融资就是源于融资成本低吗?.经济研究,2004,4:50-58.
[48]罗兰著.张帆,潘佐红译.转型与经济学.北京:北京大学出版社,2002.
[49]梅丹.我国上市公司固定资产投资规模财务影响因素研究.管理科学,2005,5(18):80-85.
[50]孟猛.我国转轨时期恶性增资形成机理研究.南开大学博士后出站报告,2007,5.
[51]莫衍.政府参与的理论探索.[博士学位论文].长春:吉林大学,2005.
[52]欧阳凌.企业非效率投资行为理论与实证研究.[博士学位论文].上海:上海交通大学, 2005.
[53]潘敏、金岩.信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资.金融研究,2003,1:36-45.
[54]裴红卫.国有企业外部人控制:一个寻租视角.财经问题研究,2004,7:59-64.
[55]饶育蕾,汪玉英.中国上市公司大股东对投资影响的实证研究.南开管理评论,2006,5:67-73.
[56]沈洪涛,沈艺峰,杨熠.新股增发:自由现金流量假说还是优序融资假说.世界经济,2003,8:53-61.
[57]沈立人,戴园晨.我国“诸侯经济”的形成及其弊端和根源.经济研究,1990,3:12-19.
[58]孙丽君,徐建蓉.决策者人格特征对承诺升级的影响研究.商业研究,2006,23:47-50.
[59]孙铮,王跃堂.资源配置与盈余操纵之实证研究.财经研究,1999,4:3-9.
[60]坦尼夫,张春霖,白瑞福特著.张军括译.中国的公司治理与企业改革:建立现代企业制度.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[61]唐洋,刘志远.决策责任、原生性认知、资本预算项目恶性增资—基于模拟试验的证据.南开管理评论,2008,1:78-84.
[62]唐洋.投资者恶性增资行为的控制机制探讨—基于原生性认知和负反馈信息明确化的考察.经济经纬,2007,4:67-70.
[63]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论.经济研究,2005a,10:48-58.
[64]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理.管理世界,2005b,7:123-147.
[65]田利辉.制度变迁、银企关系和扭曲的杠杆治理.经济学(季刊),2005c,4(增刊):119-134.
[66]王妍.中国国有企业制度性寻租行为研究:[博士学位论文].长春:吉林大学,2005.
[67]魏锋,刘星.融资约束、不确定性对公司投资行为的影响.经济科学,2004,2:37-45.
[68]文宏.融资偏好与融资效率.当代经济科学,1999,6:65-71.
[69]吴敬琏.中国腐败的治理.战略与管理,2003,2:1-8.
[70]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵:上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究:[博士学位论文].上海:上海财经大学,2005.
[71]谢百三,陈霆.我国上市公司增发新股现象剖析.当代财经,2001,10:47-50.
[72]谢平,陆磊.中国金融腐败的经济学分析.北京:中信出版社,2005.
[73]辛清泉.政府控制、资本投资与治理:[博士学位论文].广州:中山大学,2007.
[74]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资.经济研究.2007,8:110-121.
[75]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响.经济研究,2006a,1:90-100.
[76]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.控股股东的性质及公司经营绩效.世界经济.2006b,10:78-89.
[77]阎达五,耿建新,刘文鹏.我国上市公司配股融资行为的实证研究.会计研究,2001,9:21-27.
[78]杨华军,胡奕明.制度背景与自由现金流的过度投资.管理世界,2007,9:99-106.
[79]杨瑞龙.我国制度变迁方转换的三阶段论.经济研究,1998,1:3-10.
[80]银温泉,才婉如.我国地方市场分割的成因和治理.经济研究,2001,6:3-12.
[81]张仁德,韩晶.国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析.当代经济科学,2003,25(2):28-32.
[82]章卫东,夏新平.论我国上市公司治理对股权再融资绩效的影响.当代财经,2005,8:121-124.
[83]张维迎,栗树和.地区间竞争与中国国有企业的民营化.经济研究,1998,12:13-22.
[84]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京:北京大学出版社,1999.
[85]张维迎.是什么推动了中国经济的高增长.山东经济战略研究,2005,1-2:22-23.
[86]张五常.经济解释.北京:商务印书馆,2000.
[87]中国改革基金会.现实的选择:国有中小企业改革实践的初步总结.上海:上海远东出版社,1997.
[88]钟笑寒.私有企业,投资控制与过度投资.清华大学工作论文,2005.
[89]周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作.经济研究,2004,6:33-40.
[90]周齐武,维达.中国企业中“恶性增资”现象的广泛性、影响、原因及对策探讨.中国会计与财务研究,2000,1(2):1-20.
[91]朱恒鹏.分权化改革、财政激励和公有制企业改制.世界经济,2004,12:14-24.
[92]Abel,B.,and Eberly,C..Investment and q with Fixed Costs:An Empirical Analysis.University of Pennsylvania Working Paper,2001.
[93]Adam Smith.The Wealth of Nations.Glasgow Edition of the Works of Adam Smith,Oxford University Press,1976.
[94]Aggarwal,R.,and A.Samwick.Empire Builders and Shirkers:Investment,Firm Performance,and Managerial Incentives.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12:489-515.
[95]A.I.Teger,Too Much Invested to Quit,Pergamon,New York,1980.
[96]Amihud,Y and B,Ley.Risk Reduction as A Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers.Bell Journal of Economics.1981,12:605-617.
[97]Arkes,H.R.,Blumer,C..The Psychology of Sunk Cost.Organizational Bechavior and Human Decision Processes,I985,35:124-140.
[98]Arkes,H.R.,and Ayton,P..The sunk cost and concorde effects:Are humans less rational than lower animals? Psychological Bulletin,1999,125:591-600.
[99]Baker,K.,Nofsinger,J.,Weaver,D..International Cross-Listing and Visibility.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2002,(37):495-521.
[100]Baker,M..Career Concerns and Staged Investment:Evidence from the Venture Capital Industry.Working Paper.Harvard University,2000.
[101]Bandura.Social Learning Theory.Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall,1977.
[102]Bateman,T..The Escalation of Commitment in Sequential Decision-making.Decision Sciences,1986,17:33-49.
[103]Baxter,N..Leverage,Risk of Ruin and Cost of Capital.Journal of Finance,1967,22:395-403.
[104]Bazerman,M.H.,Giuliano,T.,and Appelman,A..Escalation in Individual and Group Decision Making.Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,1984,33:141-152.
[105]Bebchuk,UA.and LA.Stole.Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects.Journal of Finance.1993,48:719-729.
[106]Bebchuk,L.A.,R.H.Kraakman and G.Triantis.Stock Pyramids,Cross-Ownership,and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights.In Concentrated Corporate Ownership,edited by R.Morck.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1983,295-315.
[107]Beeler,J.D.,and Hunton,J.E..The Influence of Compensation Method and Disclosure Level on Information Search Strategy and Escalation of Commitment.Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,1997,10:77-91.
[108]Berkovitch,E.and H.Kim.Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over-investnent and Under-investment Incentives.Journal of Finance,1990,ⅩLⅤ(3):765-794.
[109]Berliner,J..The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm.Quarterly Journal of Economics.1952,66:342-365.
[110]Berle,A.,and Means,G..The Modern Corporation and Private Propert.New York:Commerce Clearing House,1932.
[111]Bertrand,Marianne,Francis K.,Antoinette S.,and David T..Politically Connected CEOs and Corporate Outcomes:Evidence from France.Working Paper from www.ssrn.com,2004.
[112]Bertrand,M.and S.Mullainatban.Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences.Working Paper,MIT,2000.
[113]Bhagwati,Jagdish.Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking(DUP) Activities.Journal of Political Economy.1982,90(10):988-1002.
[114]Blanchard,O.,and A.Shleifer.Federalism with and with out Political Centralization:China versus Russia.NBER Working Paper,2000.
[115]Boardman,A.,and A.Vining.Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments:A Comparison of the Performance of Private,Mixed,and State-Owned Enterprises.Journal of Law and Economics.1989,32:1-33.
[116]Bobocel,D.R.and Meyer,J.P..Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of Action:Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification.Journal of Applied Psychology,1994,79(3):60-33.
[117]Bowen,M.G..The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered:Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors? Academy of Management Review,1987,12(1):52-66.
[118]Bragger,J.L.,Bragger D.H.,and Hantula,D.A.,et al.Hysteresis and uncertainty:The effect of information on delays to exit decisions.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1998,74:229-253.
[119]Brockner,J.,and Rubin,J.Z..Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts:a Social Psychological Analysis.New York:Springer-Verlag,1985.
[120]Brockner,J.,Nathanson,S.,and Friend,A.,et al.The Role of Modeling Processes in the "Knee Deep in the Big Muddy" Phenomenon.Organizational Behavior and Human Performmance,1984,33:77-99.
[121]Brockner,J.,Rubin,J.Z.,and Fine,J.,et al.Factors Affecting Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts:the Importance of Timing.Journal of Research in Personality,1982,16:247-266.
[122]Brockner,J.,Rubin,J.Z.and Lang,E..Face-Saving and Entrapment.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,1981,17(1):68-79.
[123]Brockner,J.,Staw,M.C.,and Rubin,J.Z..Factors Affecting Withdrawal from an Escalating Conflict:Quitting before It's too Late.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,1979,15:492-503.
[124]Brockner,J..The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action:Toward Theoretical Progress.Academy of Management Review,1992,17:39-61.
[125]Caldwell,D.F.,and O'Reilly,C.A.Response to Failure:The Effects of Choice and Responsibility on Impression Management.Academy of Management Journal,1982,25:121-136.
[126]Cao,Y.,Y.Qian,and B.Weingast.Form Federalism,Chinese Style,to Privatization,Chinese Style.Economics of Transition,1999,7:103-131.
[127]Chen,K.,and H.Yuan.Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation:Evidence from China's Accounting-Based Regulation of Rights Issues.The Accounting Review,2004,79:645-665.
[128]Cheng,M.,Sclaluz,K.D.,and Luckett,P.,et al.The Effects of Hurdle Rate on the Level Escalation of Commitment in Capital Budgeting.Behavioral Research in Accounting,2003,15:63-85.
[129]Chow,C.W.,Vidya,N.A.,and Fleenor,C.P..Exploring the Extensiveness,Effects and Causes of Remedies for Escalation in Chinese Business Enterprises.China Accounting and Finance Review,2000,2(1):21-33.
[130]Chow,C.W.,Wright,P.and Haddad,K..Increasing the Effectiveness of Hotels Management:How to Avoid Throwing Good Money after Bad.Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly,2000,12:49-55.
[131]Chow,C.W.,Harrison,P.,and Lindquist,T.et al.Escalating Commitment to Unprofitable Projects:Replication and Cross-Cultural Extension.Management Accounting Research,1997,8(3):347-361.
[132]Coffee,J..Racing Toward the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listing and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance.Columbia Law Review,2002,102(7):1757-1832.
[133]Conlon,E.J.,Parks,J.M..Information Requests in the Context of Escalation.Journal of Applied Psychology,1987,72:344-350.
[134]Davis,M.,and Bobko,P..Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public Sector Decision Making.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1986,37:121-138.
[135]Demesetz,H.and Lehn,K.The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes Consequencies.Journal of Political Economics.1985,93:1155-1177.
[136]Demesetz,H.The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm.Journal of Law and Economics.1983,26:379-390.
[137]Djankov,S.,E.Glaeser,R.La Porta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.The New Comparative Economics.Journal of Comparative Economics.2003,31:595-615.
[138]Doidge,C.,Karolyi,G.,Stulz,R..Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S.Worth More?Journal of Financial Economics,2004,71(2):205-238.
[139]Donaldson,G.Corporate Debt Capacity:A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity.Working Paper,Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration,1961.
[140]Drummond,H..Are We Any Closer to the End? Escalation and the Case of Taurus.International Journal of project Management,1999,17(1):11-16.
[141]Errunza,V.,Miller,D.Market Segmentation and the Cost of Capital in International Equity Markets.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2000,35(4):577-600.
[142]Faccio,M..Politically Connected Firms.American Economic Review,2006,96(1):369-386.
[143]Faccio,M.,R.W.Masulis and J.J.McConnell.Politically Connections and Corporate Bailouts.Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2597-2635.
[144]Fan,J.,Timan,S.,Twite,G..An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choice.Working Paper from www.ssm.com,2004.
[145]Fazzari,S.M.,Hubbard,R.G.,Petersen,B.C.,et al.Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,1:141-206.
[146]Festinger,L.A..Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,1957.
[147]Fox,F.V.,and Staw,B.M.The Frapped Administrator:Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance upon Commitment to a Course of Action.Administrative Science Quarterly,1979,24:449-471.
[148]Fred S.McChesney.Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation.Journal of Legal Studies,1987,(ⅩⅥ):101-118.
[149]Garland,H.,and Conlon,D.E..Too Close Too Quite:The Role of Project Completion in Maintaining Commitment.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,1998,28(22):2025-2048.
[150]Garland,H.,and Newport,S..Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on the Decision to Persist with a Course of Action.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1991,48(1):55-69.
[151]Garland,H.,C.A.Sandefur,and A.C.Rogers.De-escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration:When Sunk Costs and Negative Feedback Coincide.Journal of Applied Psychology,1990,75(6):721-727.
[152]Garland,H..Throwing Good Money After Bad:The Effect of Sunk Cost on the Decision to Escalate Commitment to an Ongoing Project.Journal of Applied Psychology,1990,75(6):728-731.
[153]Gervais and Odean.Learning to be overconfident.Review of Financial Studies,2001,14(1): 1-27.
[154]Ghosh,D..De-Escalation Strategies:Some Experimental Evidence.Behavioral Research in Accounting,1997,9:88-112.
[155]Goel,Anand M.and Anjan Thakor,Do overconfident managers make better leaders?.Working Paper,University of Michigan.,2002.
[156]Greer,C.R.,and Stephens,G.K..Escalation of Commitment:A Comparison of Differences Between Mexico and U.S.Decision-makers.Journal of Management,2001,27(1):51-78.
[157]Hail,L.,Leuz,C..Cost of Capital and Cash Flow Effects of U.S.Cross Listing.Working Paper from University of Pennsylvania,2004.
[158]Hall,Brian J.,and Kevin J.Murphy.Stock options for undiversified executives.Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(1):3-42.
[159]Hantula,D.A.,and Bragger,J.L..The Effect of Feedback Equivocality on Escalation of Commitment:An Empirical Investigation of Decision dilemma Theory.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,1999,29(2):424-444.
[160]Harrison,P.D.,and Harrel,A..Impact of "Adverse Selection" on Managers Project Evaluation Decisions.Academy of Management Journal,1993,36(3):635-643.
[161]Haunschild,P.R.,Davis-Blake,A.,and Fichman,M..Managerial Overcommitment in Corporate Acquisition Processes.Organization Science,1994,5(4):528-540.
[162]Heaton,J.B.Managerial optimism and corporate finance.Financial Management,2002,31(2):33-45.
[163]Hirshleifer,D.and A.V.Thakor.Managerial Conservatism,Project Choice and Debt.Review of Financial Studies.1992,5(3):437-470.
[164]Hogarth,R.M.,and Einhorn,R.J.Order Effects in Belief Updating:Belief-Adjustment Model.Cognitive Psychology,1992,24(1):1-55.
[165]Holderness,C.G.,and Shechan,D.P..The Pole of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):317-346.
[166]Holmstrom,B.,and J.R.Costa.Managerial Incentives And Capital Management.Quarterly Journal of Economics.1986,11(5):835-860.
[167]Hovakimian,G.and Titman,S.Corporate Investment with Financial Constraints:Sensitivity of Investment to Funds from Voluntary Asset Sales.Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2006,2(38):357-374.
[168]James,C.Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans[J].Journal of Financial Economics.1987,19(2):217-235.
[169]Jensen,M.C..Agency Costs of Free-Cash-Flow.Corporate Finance,and Takeovers,1986,76(2):323-329.
[170]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[171]Jensen,M..The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems.Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[172]J.N.Bhagwati.Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking(DUP) Activities.JPE,1982,90(5):241-248.
[173]Kahneman,A.Tversky.The Psychology of Preferences.Scientific American,1982,246(1):160-173.
[174]Kahneman,D.and A.Tversky.Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk.Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-291.
[175]Kanodia,Chandra,Bushman,R.,Dickhaut,J..Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect:an Explanation Based on Reputation and Information Asymmetries.Journal of Accounting Research,1989,27(1):59-77.
[176]Kaplan,Steven N.,and Luigi Zingales.Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are Not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints.Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,115(2):707-712.
[177]Keil,M.,and Flatto,J..Information Systems Project Escalation:A Reinterpretation Based on Options Theory.Accounting Management and Information Technologies,1999,9(2):115-139.
[178]Keil,M..Identifying and Preventing Runaway Systems Project.American Programmer,1995(a),8(3):16-22.
[179]Keil,M..Pulling the Plug:Software Project Management and the Problem of Project Escalation.MIS Quarterly,1995,19(4):421-447.
[180]Keil,M.,R.Mixon,et al.Understanding Runaway Information Technology Projects:Results from an International Research Program Based on Escalation Theory.Journal of Management Information Systems,1995,11(3):65-85.
[181]Keil,M.,Rai,A.,and Mann,J..Why Software Projects Escalate:An Empirical Analysis and Test of Four Theoretical Models.MIS Quarterly,2000,24(4):631-664.
[182]Kiesler,C.A..The Psychology of Commitment:Experiments Linking Behavior to Belief.New York:Academic Press,1971.
[183]Kornai,J..Economics of Shortage.Amsterdam:North Holland,1980.
[184]Kornai,J.,E.Maskin and G.Roland.Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint.Journal of Economic Literature.2003,41(4):1095-1136.
[185]Kornai,J..The Soft Budget Constraint.Kyklos,1986,39(1):3-10.
[186]Kraus,A.,and R.Litzenberger.A State Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage.Journal of Finance.1973,28(4):911-922.
[187]Krueger,A..The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.American Economic Review,1974,64(3),291-303.
[188]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanes and A.Shleifer.Corporrate Owenership around the World.The Journal of Finance.1999,54(2):471-517.
[189]Lang,L.,and Litzenberger,R.Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signaling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypothesis.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24(1):181-191.
[190]Lang,M.,Lins,K.,Miller,D..ADRs,Analysts,and Accuracy:Does Cross Listing in the U.S.Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value? Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2):317-362.
[191]Leatherwood,M.,and Conlon,E..The Impact of Prospectively Relevant Information on Persistence in a Project Following Setbacks.Advances in Information Processing in Organizations,1988,3:207-219.
[192]Leatherwood,M.L.,and Conlon,E.J.Difinsibility of Blame:Effects on Persistence in a Project.Academy of Management Review,1987,30:836-847.
[193]Lehn,K.,S.Patro and Zhao.Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards:1935-2000.Working Paper,University of Pittsburgh,2004.
[194]Leuza,Christian and Felix Oberholzer-Geeb.Political relationships,global financing,and corporate transparency:Evidence from Indonesia.Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(2):411-439.
[195]Li,H.,and L.Zhou.Political Turn ove And Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of China's Personnel Control.Memo,2004.
[196]Majumdar,S..Asseasing Comparative Efficiency of the State-Owned,Mixed,and Private Sectors in Indian Industry.Public Choice,1996,96(1-2):1-24.
[197]Malmendier U.and G.Tate.CEO overconfidence and corporate investment.Journal of Finance.2005,60(6):2661-2700.
[198]Maug.Large Shareholders as Monitors:Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?Journal of Finance,1998,53(1):65-98.
[199]McCain,B.E.Continuing Investment Under Conditions of Failure:A Laboratory Study of the Limits to Escalation.Journal of Applied Psychology,1986,71(2):280-284.
[200]McCarthy,A.M.,Schoorman,F.D.,and Cooper,A.C..Reinvestment Decisions by Entrepreneurs:Rational Decision Making or Escalation of Commitment?.Journal of Business Venturing,1993,8(1):9-24.
[201]McConnell,J.and Servaes,H.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.Journal of Financial Economics.1990,27(2):595-612.
[202]McKinnon,R..Spontaneous Order on the Road Back from Socialism:An Asian Perspective.American Economic Review,1992,80(2):31-36.
[203]McNamara,G.,H.Moon,and P.Bromiley.Banking on Commitment:Intended and Unintended Consequences of an Organization's Attempt to Attenuate Escalation of Commitment.Academy of Management Journal,2002,45(2):443-52.
[204]Megginson,W.,and J.Netter.From State to Market:A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization.Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(2):321-389.
[205]Modigliani,F.,and M.Miller.The Cost of Capital,Corporation Finance,and the Theory Investment.American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297.
[206]Modigliani,F.,and M.Miller.Corporate Income Taxes and Cost of Capital:A Correction.American Economic Review,1963,53(3):433-443.
[207]Montealegre,R.,and M.Keil.De-escalating Information Technology Projects:Lessons from the Denver international Airport. MIS Quarterly 2000, 24(3): 417-447.
[208] Montinola, G, Yingyi Qian and B. Weigast. Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China. World Politics, 1995,48 (1): 50-81.
[209] Myeong- Hyeon Cho. Ownership Structure, Investment and the Corporate Value:An Empirical Analysis . Journal of Financial Economics. 1998,47(1): 103-121.
[210] Myers, D. G, and Lamm, H.. The group polarization phenomenon. Psychologist Bulletin, 1976,83(4): 602-627.
[211] Myers, S. C, and Majluf. Corporate Financing and Invest Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Don't Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984, 13(2): 187-221.
[212] 212] Myers, S. C. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 1977,5(1): 147-175.
[213] Myers, S. C. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance, 1984, 39(3): 575-592.
[214] Narayanan, M. P.. Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1996, 31(4): 467-491.
[215] Narayanan, M. P.. Managerial Incentives for Shout-Term Results. Journal of Finance, 1985, 40(6): 1469-1484.
[216] Northcraft, G. B., and M. A. Neale. Opportunity Costs and the Framing of Resource Allocation Decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1986, 37(3): 348-356.
[217] Nulden, U.. Escalation in IT Projects: Can We Afford to Quit or Do We Have to Continue. Information System Conference of New Zealand. Palmerston North. New Zealand: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1996.
[218] Pawlina,G. and L.Renneboog. Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK. European Financial Management, 2005,11(4): 483-513.
[219] Pinto, B., M. Belka,and S.Krajewski. Transforming State Enterprises in Poland:Evidence on Adjustment by Manufacturing Firms. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1993, 23(1): 213-261.
[220] Pistor,K.,and Chenggang Xu. Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China. American Law and Economics Review, 2005,7(1): 184-210.
[221] Poncet, S.. A Fragmented China: Measure and Determinants of China's Domestic Market Disintegration. Eview of International Economics, 2005,13(3): 409-430 .
[222] Posner, R. The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 1975,83(4): 807-827.
[223] P. R. Haunschild, A. Davis-Blake, M. Fichman, Managerial overcommitment in corporate acquisition processes, Organization Science, 1994, 5 (4):528-540.
[224] Qian,Y., and B.Weigast. China's Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style. Journal of Policy Reform, 1996, 1: 148-185.
[225]Qian,Y..Government Control in Corporate Governmance as a Transitional Institute:Lesson from China.Working Paper,University of Maryland,2000.
[226]Reese,W.and Weisbach,M..Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests,Cross-Listings in the United States,and Subsequent Equity Offerings.Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):65-104.
[227]Richardson,S..Over Investment of Free Cash Flow.Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[228]Ross,J.,and B.M.Staw.Expo 86:An Escalation Prototype.Administrative Science Quarterly,1986,31(2):274-97.
[229]Ross,J.,Staw,B.J..Organizational Escalation and Exit:Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.Academy of Management Journal,1993,36(4):701-732.
[230]Ross,S.A..Determination of Financial Structure:The Incentive Signaling Approaeh.Journal of Economics,1977,8(1):23-40
[231]Rowley,C.K and Tollison,R.D.Rent Seeking and Trade Protection,in:Hauser,H.(eds).Protection and Structure Adjustment,Gruesch:Ruegger,1986.
[232]Rubin,J.Z.and Brockner,J..Factors Affecting Entrapment in Waiting Situations:The Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Effect.Journal of Personality and Social Psychiatry,1975,31:1054-1063.
[233]Rubin,J.Z.,Brockner,J.,and Small-Weil.S.,et al.Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps.Journal of Conflict Resolution,1980,24(3):405-426.
[234]Rutledge,R.and Harrel,A..Responsibility and Framing of Accounting Information.International Journal of Management,1993,10(3):300-313.
[235]Ryan,H.,and R.Wiggins.The Interactions between R&D Investment Decisions and Compensation Policy.Financial Management,2002,31(1):5-29.
[236]Salter,S.,and Sharp,D..Agency Theory and Escalation of Commitment:Do Small National Culture Difference Matter?.The International Journal of Accounting,2001,36(1):33-45.
[237]Sappington,D.,and J.Stiglitz.Privatization,Information and Incentive.Journal of Political Analysis and Management,1987,6:567-579.
[238]Sapienza,P..The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending.Journal of Financial Economics,2004,72(2):357-384.
[239]Schoorman,F.D.,Mayer,R.C.,and Douglas,C.A.,et al.Escalation of Commitment and the Framing Effect:An empirical Investigation.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,1994,24(6):509-528.
[240]Scott,F.Evidence on the Importance of Financial Structure.Financial Management.1972,1(3):45-50.
[241]Seibert,S.E.,and Goltz,S.M..Comparison of Allocations by Individuals and Interacting Groups in An Escalation of Commitment Situation.Journal of Applied Social Psychology,2001,31(1):134-156.
[242]Sharp,D.J.,and Salter,S.B..Project Escalation and Sunk Costs:A Test of the International Generalizability of Agency and Prospect Theories.Journal of International Business Studies,1997,28(1):101-122.
[243]Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.The Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[244]Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance.Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[245]Shleifer,A.,and R.Vishny.Politicians and Firms.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4):995-1025.
[246]Shleifer,A.,Wolfenzon.D..Investor Protection and Equity Markets.Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66(1):3-27.
[247]Shleifer,A.and R.W.Vishny.Managerial Entrenchment:The Case of Manager-Specific Investment.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,25(1):123-140.
[248]Siegel,J..Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S.Securities Laws? Journal of Financial Economics,2005,75(2):319-359.
[249]Staw,B.M.,and J.Ross.Behavior in Escalation Situations:Antecedents,Prototypes,and Solutions.Research in Organizational Behavior,1987(a),9:39-78.
[250]Staw,B.M.,and J.Ross."Knowing when to pull the plug." Harvard Business Review,1987(b),65(2):68-74.
[251]Staw,B.M.,and Ross,J..Commitment to a Policy Decision:A multi-Theoretical Perspective.Administrative Science Quarterly,1978,23(1):40-64.
[252]Staw,B.M..Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy:A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action.Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,1976,16(4):27-44.
[253]Staw,B.M..The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action.Academy of Management Review,1981,6(4):577-587.
[254]Stiglitz,J.E..Some Aspect of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance:Bankruptcies and Takeovers.Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1972,23:60-67.
[255]Stigliz,J..The Private Uses of Public Interests:Incentives and Institutions.Journal of Economic Perspective,1998,12(2):3-22.
[256]Sun,Q,W.Tong,and J.Tong.How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance?Evidence from China's Privatization Process.Journal of Business,Finance & Accounting,2002,29(1-2):1-27.
[257]Sun,Q.,and W.Tong.China Share Issue Privatization:The Extent of Its Success.Journal of Financial Economics,2003,70:182-222.
[258]Tan,H.,and Yates,J.F..Sunk Cost Effects:The Influences of Instruction and Future Return Estimates.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,1995,63(3):311-319.
[259]Tegar,A..Too Much Invested to Quit.New York:Perfamon Press,1980.
[260]T.S.Bateman,C.P.Zeithaml,The psychological context of strategic decisions:a model and convergent experimental findings,Strategic Management Journal,1989,10(1):59-74.
[261]Tullock,G.Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game.In Buchanan,J.M.,Tollison,R.D.and Tullock,G.Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society.Texas:A& M University Press,1980.
[262]Tullock,G..The Welfare Cost of Tariffs Monopolies and Theft.Western Economics Journal,1967,5(3):224-232.
[263]Tollison,R.D.,1982.Rent Seeking:A Survey.Kyklos,1982,35(4):575-602.
[254]Verdi,R..Financial Reporting Quality and Investment Efficiency.Working Paper,University of Pennsylvania,2006.
[265]Vining,A.,and A.Boardman.Ownership Versus Competition:Efficiency in Public Enterprise.Public Choice,1992,73(2):205-239.
[266]Vogt,S.C..The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship:Eidence from U.S.Manufacturing Firms.Financial Management,1994,23(2):3-20.
[267]V.Vroom.Work and Motivation.New York:Wiley,1964.
[268]Wei,Z.,F.Xie,and S.Zhang.Ownership structure and firm value in China's privatized firms:1991-2001.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2005,40(1):87-108.
[269]Whyte,G..Diffusion of Responsibility:Effects on the Escalation Tendency.Journal of Applied Psychology,1991,76(3):408-415.
[270]Whyte,G..Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making:A Prospect Theory Approach.Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process,1993,54(3):430-455.
[271]Whyte,G..Escalation Commitment to a Course of Action:a Reinterpretation.Academy of Management Review,1986,11(2):311-321.
[272]Williamson,O..Economics of Discretionary Behavior:Managerial Objectives in A Theory of Fiem.Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice Hall,1964.
[273]Wilson,R.,and Zhang,Q..Entrapment and Escalation Commitment in Investment Decision Making:A Review.British Accounting Review,1997,29(3):277-305.
[274]Wortman,C.B.and Brehm,J.W..Responses to Uncontrollable Outcomes:An Integration of Reactance of Reactance Theory and Learned Helplessness.In L.Berkowitz(ed.),Advances in Psychology.New York:Academic Press,1975.
[275]Wruck,K.Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value:Evidence from Private Equity Financials.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,23(1):3-28.
[276]Xu,U Types of Large Shareholders,Corporate Governance,and Firm Performance,PHD Dissertation,The Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2004.
[277]Xu,X.,and Wang,Y.Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies.China Economic Review,1999,10(1):75-98.
[278]Young,A..The Razor's Edge:Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000,115(4):1091-1135.
[279]Yu,Q.,B.Du and Q.Sun.Earnings Management at Rights Issues Thresholds-Evidence from China.Journal of Banking & Finance,2006,30(12):3453-3468.
[280]Zhang,J..China's State Assets Management System:How the State Exercises Its Ownership.World Bank,Washington,D.C.,2001.
[281] Zhang, W.. China's SOE Reform: A Corporate Governance Perspective. Working paper. Peking University. 1998.
[282] Zwiebel, J. Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation. Journal of Political Economy. 1995,103(1):1-25.