英美法善意原则研究
|
摘要
本文以英美法中的善意原则尤其是善意购买为研究对象，全文围绕英美法中关于善意的相关规定，就商法领域中有关善意的理论和实务问题进行了分析和论证，文章的每部分各有侧重，较为全面地介绍了美国法学界对善意的不同层面的认识和理解，同时对美国法学史上不同时期的必读权威作品亦进行了介绍和评述。全文共分九章。
第一章是“善意：U．C．C．中的内涵及外延”。法典中的善意是指“当事人的有关行为或者在有关交易中事实上的诚实”，它至少包含三重含义：1、事实上的诚实；2、商人应遵守合理的商业准则：3、克服某种障碍的适当注意或勤勉。在涉及不同的交易主体时，对善意的要求也就各不相同，一般说来，善意对商人要求的程度比非商人高。另外，实务中有将善意的主观判断标准向客观判断标准转变的趋势。
第二章是“善意：一般义务之认定及其不可定义性”。“善意”概念充分满足了各种相关标准，它可以保证对合意的忠实遵守，实现双方当事人的合理预期，并捍卫社会正义、公平和理性。但它不是一个包含正面内容的概念，相反它是一个“排除器”式的概念，它排除了一系列的“恶意”情形，而且对“恶意”情形进行详细列举也是不可能的。试图对“善意”下定义注定要失败。尽管“善意”存在被滥用的道德主义风险，但由于其自身的优越性和对社会的增益作用，因而冒险也值得。
第三章是“善意：标准化条款可执行性之前提”。标准化合同具有“抽象概括性”和“单方性”两个特点，因而易产生“出乎意料的契约”和“不平衡性”，破坏了传统合同法中的很多规则。为保护标准化合同非起草人的合理预期和利益，确保标准化条款的可执行性，本文提出了善意原则在标准化条款执行中的四条判断标准：1、非起草人是否因被讨论的标准条款而对合同客体享有具体的利益或预期；2、这种利益是否在法律上可以被认识；3、起草人是否认识到了该预期或利益；4、起草人是否不适当地忽视了该预期或利益。四个方面答案皆为肯定时，恶意便可确定，从而使标准化条款不具备可执行性，反之，则具备可执行性。
第四章是“善意履行：商业合理性之客观标准”。商业合理性经常和善意联系在一起来界定商人的善意，商业合理性作为客观标准对善意履行的判定非常重要，该标准是基于社会公众的正义、公平和合理性而不是基于单个人关于什么是正义、公平或合理的信念所形成的，因而，对商人而言，不仅要求事实上诚实，还应遵守有关公平交易的合
This article is about the obligations of good faith, esp. good faith purchase. Referring to the sections of good faith in U.C.C., the article analyzes the theoretical and practical questions of good faith in commercial fields. It introduces the varied recognition and understanding of good faith in American academic circles and gives a review of authoritative works of different periods in the American law history. It is consisted of nine chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 is about the meaning and extension of good faith in Uniform Commercial Code. Good faith is defined in U.C.C. as "honesty in the conduct or transaction concerned". It has at least three different meanings: (1) Honesty in fact; (2) Observance of reasonable commercial standards in the case of a merchant; (3) Due care or diligence to overcome an obstacle. The requirement of good faith is different to different parties. Generally, the code puts more duty on merchants than non-merchants. In addition, it has a tendency of using objective standards of good faith instead of subjective standards in the judicial practices.
Chapter 2 is "the recognition and conceptualization of good faith". The conceptualization of good faith, as an excluder in Uniform Commercial Code satisfies the relevant criteria of adequacy. It serves: (1) faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party, and (2) community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness of our society. Good faith does not have a general positive meaning, but it is conceptualized as an "excluder" which rules out a wide range of bad faith. Besides, It is also impossible to enumerate a complete catalogues of bad faith. Although, there will be a risk of overextension of good faith in the name of moral idealism, the gain that good faith bring to us is worth this risk.
The third chapter is about good faith and the enforcement of standardized terms. Standardized contracts constitute two commercial phenomena (1) "abstract generality" and (2) "unilateralness", so the use of standardized forms threatens two distinct abuses "surprise" and "imbalance" which bring damages to modern commerce. To protect the reasonable expectation of the non-drafting party and enforcement of standardized forms, this article proposes four tests for good faith. (1) Did the non-drafting party entertain a specific interest or
第一章是“善意：U．C．C．中的内涵及外延”。法典中的善意是指“当事人的有关行为或者在有关交易中事实上的诚实”，它至少包含三重含义：1、事实上的诚实；2、商人应遵守合理的商业准则：3、克服某种障碍的适当注意或勤勉。在涉及不同的交易主体时，对善意的要求也就各不相同，一般说来，善意对商人要求的程度比非商人高。另外，实务中有将善意的主观判断标准向客观判断标准转变的趋势。
第二章是“善意：一般义务之认定及其不可定义性”。“善意”概念充分满足了各种相关标准，它可以保证对合意的忠实遵守，实现双方当事人的合理预期，并捍卫社会正义、公平和理性。但它不是一个包含正面内容的概念，相反它是一个“排除器”式的概念，它排除了一系列的“恶意”情形，而且对“恶意”情形进行详细列举也是不可能的。试图对“善意”下定义注定要失败。尽管“善意”存在被滥用的道德主义风险，但由于其自身的优越性和对社会的增益作用，因而冒险也值得。
第三章是“善意：标准化条款可执行性之前提”。标准化合同具有“抽象概括性”和“单方性”两个特点，因而易产生“出乎意料的契约”和“不平衡性”，破坏了传统合同法中的很多规则。为保护标准化合同非起草人的合理预期和利益，确保标准化条款的可执行性，本文提出了善意原则在标准化条款执行中的四条判断标准：1、非起草人是否因被讨论的标准条款而对合同客体享有具体的利益或预期；2、这种利益是否在法律上可以被认识；3、起草人是否认识到了该预期或利益；4、起草人是否不适当地忽视了该预期或利益。四个方面答案皆为肯定时，恶意便可确定，从而使标准化条款不具备可执行性，反之，则具备可执行性。
第四章是“善意履行：商业合理性之客观标准”。商业合理性经常和善意联系在一起来界定商人的善意，商业合理性作为客观标准对善意履行的判定非常重要，该标准是基于社会公众的正义、公平和合理性而不是基于单个人关于什么是正义、公平或合理的信念所形成的，因而，对商人而言，不仅要求事实上诚实，还应遵守有关公平交易的合
This article is about the obligations of good faith, esp. good faith purchase. Referring to the sections of good faith in U.C.C., the article analyzes the theoretical and practical questions of good faith in commercial fields. It introduces the varied recognition and understanding of good faith in American academic circles and gives a review of authoritative works of different periods in the American law history. It is consisted of nine chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 is about the meaning and extension of good faith in Uniform Commercial Code. Good faith is defined in U.C.C. as "honesty in the conduct or transaction concerned". It has at least three different meanings: (1) Honesty in fact; (2) Observance of reasonable commercial standards in the case of a merchant; (3) Due care or diligence to overcome an obstacle. The requirement of good faith is different to different parties. Generally, the code puts more duty on merchants than non-merchants. In addition, it has a tendency of using objective standards of good faith instead of subjective standards in the judicial practices.
Chapter 2 is "the recognition and conceptualization of good faith". The conceptualization of good faith, as an excluder in Uniform Commercial Code satisfies the relevant criteria of adequacy. It serves: (1) faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party, and (2) community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness of our society. Good faith does not have a general positive meaning, but it is conceptualized as an "excluder" which rules out a wide range of bad faith. Besides, It is also impossible to enumerate a complete catalogues of bad faith. Although, there will be a risk of overextension of good faith in the name of moral idealism, the gain that good faith bring to us is worth this risk.
The third chapter is about good faith and the enforcement of standardized terms. Standardized contracts constitute two commercial phenomena (1) "abstract generality" and (2) "unilateralness", so the use of standardized forms threatens two distinct abuses "surprise" and "imbalance" which bring damages to modern commerce. To protect the reasonable expectation of the non-drafting party and enforcement of standardized forms, this article proposes four tests for good faith. (1) Did the non-drafting party entertain a specific interest or
引文
1 Malcolm The U niform Commercial Code as Enacted in Massachusetts, 13 Bus. LAW. 497(1958)
2 UCC§1-102(3)
3 UCC§1-102(3)(?)(1954)
4 UMIFORM Laws Annotated-Uniform Commercial Code 3.
5 UCC§1-201(19)
6 UCC§1-201(19)and comment
7 UNIFORM SALES ACT§76(2)
8 3 B. and C. 466, 107 Eng.Rep. 806(1824)
9 Cf. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U. S. 27(1935)
10 U. C. C.§1-201(19)(1950).
11 1951 A. B. A. Rep.126-28, 181.
12 U. C. C.§1-201(19).
13 U. C. C.§2-103(1)(b).
14 [1951] 1 N.Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 263.
15 U. C. C.§2-305(2).
16 U. C. C.§2-306(1).
17 U. C. C.§2-328(4).
18 U. C. C.§2-702(3).
19 U. C. C. §2-506(2).
20 U. C. C.§2-403(1).
21 U. C. C. §2-615(a).
22 U. C. C.§2-706(1).
23 U. C. C.§2-706(5).
24 U. C. C.§3-404(1), 3-406.
25 U. C. C.§3-410(3),and comment 6.
26 U. C. C.§3-417(1)(c)(2)(4).
27 U. C. C.§3-418.
28 U. C. C.§3-802(2).
29 U. C. C.§4-108(1).
30 U.C.C §4-2o7(b),4-4o1(2),4-4o4,4-406(1)(2)(b).
31 U. C. C. §5-114.
32 U.C.C. §5-114.
33 U. C. C.§6-110(2).
34 U. C. C.§7-203.
35 U. C. C. §7-206(2).
36 U. C. C.§7-210(5).
37 U. C. C.§7-304.
38 U. C. C.§7-308 (4).
39 U. C. C.§7-501(4).
40 U. C. C.§7-504 (2)(c).
41 U. C. C.§7-508.
42 U. C. C.§7-601.
43 U. C. C.§8-311.
44 U. C. C.§ 9-206.
45 U. C. C.§9-208(2).
46 U. C. C.§9-401 (2).
47 U. C. C.§2-103 (1) (b).
48 Uniform Sales Act § 76(2).
49 [1951] 1 N. Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 355, 357.
50 Ibid. Acorrd, Kovatch v. Hyde,47 Luz. L. ReG. 13(Pa. c. P. 1958).
51 U. C.C.§§2-402, 3-419(3), 3-506, 4-103, 5-109.
52 U.C.C.§2-306 (2).
53 U. C. C.§2-615(a).
54 U. C. C. §2-715(1).
55 U.C.C.§7-204(1).
56 U. C. C. §1-203.
57 Brocker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. Pitt. L. Bev. 541, 545(1954).
58 Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 so. zd 463(Fla. 1959).
59 U.C.C. §2-302.
60 U. C. C.§2-508.
61 [1955] 1 N. Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 311.
62 U. C. C. §§1-208, 2-603, 2-614, 2-615.
63 [1955] 1 N.Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 310, 311.
64 Id. at 315.
65 U. C. C.§2-103.
66 zb4 Pa. 304,107 Atl.711(1919).
67 U.C.C. §2-306(1).
68 See, e. g., Poland Coal Co. v. Rogers, z60 Pa. 118, 103 Atl. 559(1918).
69 U.C.C. §2-306 comment 2.
70 U. C. C.§2-306(1).
71 U. C. C.§2-306 comment 2.
72 [1955] 1 N. Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 355,379.
73 3B.& C,466,107 Eng. Rep. 806(1824).
74 U.C.C. §4-103.
75 U.C.C. §8-302.
76 286F.2d 775(5th cir 1961)
1 See Appendix (containing text of § 205, it's comment, and accompanying Reporter's Note).
2 See generally Restatement of Contracts (1932).
3 Summers, Good Faith in Ceneral Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 198.(1968).
4 See generally Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code,72 Nw. L.Rev.906(1978).
5 See Ellinghans In Defense of Unconsionability, 78 Yale L. J. 757, 779-80(1969).
6 See generally Lewellyn, Book Review, 52Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703(1959).
7 See Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith, 39 U. Ptte. L. Rev. 381, 388-89(1978).
8 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note(3), at 198-99.
9 See generally Gordley, European Code and American Pestatemant: Some Difficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140(1981).
10 Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3), at216-52.
11 47Ali Proceedings 490(1970).
12 Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205, Comments d-e, Reporter's Note(1979).
13 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3), at 195, 207-16.
14 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, comment a (1979).
15 Id. § 231(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
16 Id. § 231(Revised and Edited ed., Tent. Draft nos, 1-7, 1973).
17 一战后，德国经济恶性膨胀，合同的严肃性受到挑战．因为德国法一直追随罗马法的金融债务规则，称为“一马克主义”，即合同标的是一马克，无论经历多么久，给付的内容仍然是一马克，价金是不会变化的．但战后的恶性通货膨胀，使战前签订的许多合同变得一文不值．德国学者冯特曼提出“交易基础丧失理论”，虽然学者们对其理论有争议，但这一理论在矫正合同方面发挥着积极、重要的作用．这是问题的背景．
18 47ALI Poceedings 489-91(1970).
19 See Burton, Good Faith Purchase of a Contract Within Article 2 of the U. C. C., 67 Iowa L. Rev.1(1981).
20 See Summers,Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 Corneli. L. Rev. 707(1978).
21 1 Carrow, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found Theke ch. 6 (1871).
22 See, e. g., R. Robinson, Definition(1950).
23 3 Aristole Nicomachaen Ethecs (W. Ross. 1929).
24 J. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia 70-71 (GWarnock ed.1962).
25 Hart,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rrights, 49 Proceedings of the Ariotolelian Soliety 171,180(1949).
26 Woozley, Injustice, 7AM. Phil. Q. Mono. Ser. 109(1975).
27 Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3), at198-99.
28 See U. C. C.§1-201(19).
29 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a (1979).
30 Id.§ 205, Comments a, d, e.
31 See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev 384(1980).
32 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a.
33 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment d (1979).
34 See generally R. Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously Ch. 2(1978).
35 See Summers, Good Faith, Supra note(3),at 203, 215-216.
36 See Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement(Second) of Contracts, 67 Comill L. Rev.680(1962).
37 See, e. g.,Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 Duke. L. J. 619, 650.
38 See Weinberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 375, 422(1975).
39 See generally J. Dawson, The Oracles of Law 461-502(1968).
40 See Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3),at 196,207-16.
41 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,30 U. CHI. L. Rev.666,673-74(1963).
42 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment b(1979).
43 See, e. g., Button, Breach of Contract; Weinberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at on Old Problems, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 1(1971).
44 Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3), at 198.
45 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a(1979).
46 See, e. g., Blachly v. United States, 380F. zd 665, 671(5th cir. 1967).
47 See Holmes, supra note (7), at 385-87.
48 See Button, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 392-94(1980).
49 ld. at 393.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3),at 201-02.
53 Actually, only the latter is a law-philosopher.
54 See Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in Law, Morality and Society 26,43-56(P.Hacker and J. Raz eds.1977); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. Rev. 151, 237-38(1981).
55 See Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 Proceedings of the Ariototelian Society 171(1949).
56 Moore, supra note (54),at 237-42.
57 Id. at 239.
58 Button, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48),at 372-73 n. 17.
59 Id.at 373.
60 Holmes, Supra note (7), at 452.
61 Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48),at 378-94.
62 See also Burton, Article 2 Good Faith supra note (19).
63 Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48), at384.
64 See id. at 384-85.
65 Id. at 391.
66 See id. at 395.
67 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205,Comment d(1979).
68 See generally Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3),at 232-43.
69 See generally Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48), at 387-92.
70 See the article by Professor Hillman in note (36) supra.
71 See Holmes, supra note (7).
72 Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note (3), at 21 n. 136; Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48),at 232-43.
73 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment d (1979); Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3),at 232-43.
74 See Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note (19),at 21 n.136.
75 Burton, Breach of Contract,Supra note (48),at 370-71 &I n.8.
76 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3), at 232-43.
77 Burton, Breach of Contract,Supra note (48), at 384.
78 Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE. L. J.619.
79 Id. at 645.
80 See id. at 204 n.46.
1 See Majors v. kalo Laboratorie, Inc., 407 F Supp. 20(M. D. Ala. 1975).
2 See discussion in Fchroeder v. Fageol Fotors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P. 2d 20 (1975).
3 附带条款指合同起草人没有在合同文本中规定而是希望通过协商而确定的条款．See e.g.Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, inc. 419F Supp. 1133(N. D. 111.1976).
4 See Wichiam v. Walker-Thoma Furniture co. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
5 这一特点为标准化合同提供了经济和商业效用．See Schwartz, A Reexamination of nonsubstantive Unconsicionability,63 Va.L.Rev. 1053,1067-70(1977).
6 See Dugan,An Introduction, 24 Wagn~ L.Rev.1307(1978)
7 See Restatement(Second) of Torts §402A(1965)
8 See U.C.C. §§-201(3),1-205,2-208
9 本条与其说是普通法的重述，不如说是普通法的否认，但它还是逐渐为法庭所接受．See Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1321 n. 50.
10 See Leff, at 490.
11 See Dugan, Unconscionability, Supra note 6, at 730-35.
12 See id, at 743-45.
13 See id., at 740-45.
14 See e. g, Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp. 290 A.2d 648 (Del.1972).
15 See Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Fatith: Good Faith Discloure in Contract Formation, 39. U. Pitt. L.Rev.381 (1978).
16 See Dugan, Unconscionability, Supra note 6,at 730-40.
17 See Manufactures Trust Co. v. Becker, 388U.S.304.310-14(1949).
18 See U. C. C. §2-103(1)b.
19 这些交易包括附条件买卖合同和委托合同．See U．C．C．§§1-201(37)，2-102，2-326，2-401(1)，9-102(2)．
20 See Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1976).
21 See Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act § 56(withdrawn 1951)要构成票据的瑕疵或所有权瑕疵的通知，被通知方必须现实地知道该瑕疵或知道他取得票据的希望是恶意的．《美国统一商法典》第一编第201条第(25)款[一个人在下列情况下被视为已得到关于某一事实的“通知”：1、它实际上已知道该事实；2、收到有关该事实的通告；3、据他了解的各种事实和情况，他有理由知道该事实的存在．]中对通知的客观定义现正实现着通知的功能，并在善意概念如何为其提供合适地位方面留下了根多疑问．
22 See Universal C. I. T Credit Corp. v. Shepler,164 Ind.
23 See U.C.C. § 2-306,Comment 2.
24 See U.C.C. §2-311. Comment 1.
25 在第二编第311条第(1)款中，合理商业限制不会基于协商的口头表示来保护预期；第306条第(1)款中不合理的差距的限制不会基于供应商或购买者营业的连续性来保护预期。
26 U.C.C. §1-203, Comment.
27 See U.C.C. §1-205(2), (reference to "expectaion").
28 U.C.C. §2-306, Comment 2.
29 See U. C. C. §2-313, Comment 4.
30 See U. C. C. §2-314, Comment 3.
31 See U. C. C. §2-603, Comment 1.
32 See U. C. C. §2-609, Comment 4.
33 See U. C. C. §2-612, Comment 5..
34 与善意相关的84个评论中，很少有将善意与占主导地位一方的意志状态相联系的．
35 See Dugan, An Introduction, Supra note(6), at 1329-30
36 其他法律规则即使没有说明保护预期的目的，但也仔细界定了如何保护预期．See e.g.,Restatement(Second) of contracts § 90(Tent, Draft No. 2, 1965).
37 如果卖方的提示交付或交付因不符合合同而被拒收，且履约时间还未超过．卖方可将其进行补救的意图及时通知买方，然后可在合同规定的时间内做出符合合同的交付；即使卖方所作的提示交付不符合合同，只要卖方原有合理理由相信，经过或不经过调整价格，买方是可以接受的，如果买方拒收，卖方应获得额外的合理时间来重新做出符合合同的交付，但卖方必须把此种意图及时通知买方．
38 除非买方拥有担保权益，当卖方在拒收地无营业场所或代理人时，商人买方拒收其占有或控制的货物后，有义务遵从卖方有关货物处置的合理指示；如果无此种指示，且货物易腐或价值面临迅速下降的危险，买方有义务做出合理的努力代表卖方将货物出售．如果买方做出要求后，卖方不能很快对买方处置货物所需支出给予补偿，卖方的指示即为不合理．
39 See U. C.C．§ 2-603(2).
40 如果合同规定，一方或其权益继承人有权“任意”或“在他认为自己处境不安全时”或在类似词句所规定的情况下要求对方提前付款或履约，或要求提供担保物，或要求增加担保物，此种规定应被解释为，只有当他善意地相信对方付款或履约的前景已受到损害时，他才有权这样要求．缺乏此种善意的举证责任由接到要求的一方承担．
41 See W Baumol, Economic Theory and Operation Analysis 266-69(1961).
42 See e.g, U.C.C. §§2-103(1)(b),2-306(1),2-311(1).
43 See U.C.C.§§2-202, 2-209(2),2-316(2),2-219(3).
44 法庭已经开始参考这三个因素，并用善意标准限制标准化条款的可预见性．See Arnott v．American Oil Co, 609 f. 2d 873(8th Cir. 1979).
45 See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L. J. 757 (1969).
46 See e. g, Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act § 56(withdrawn 1951).
47 Z F Haper & F James, Law of Torts 785 (1956).
48 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402 A(1965)
49 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402 A(1965).
50 See Z F Haper & F James, Law of Torts 785 (1956).
51 (45)See F Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence §54(2d, ed. 1877).
52 除了以预期为指向的规则，侵权法和合同法一般只保护基本预期，这一点在合同签订、调整和补救的合同规范中体现尤为明显．
53 See Restatement (Second) of contracts §90(Tent, Draft No. 2, 1965).
54 使用“善意信任”原则时，主要解决事实的检验者如何能够知道他人意识的内容，而这只可以从感觉到的表达中获悉，比如，一个人的言行举止或由此得出的合理含义，这就要求检验者从证言和证据所表达的东西中慢慢搜集，以便推论在特定情况下他的想法以及行为是否诚实．可以预见，专家的意见对事实的检验者来说是必要的帮助。
55 W LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 203 (1972).
56 在侵权行为中，按照惯例应参照行为人的表达、行为和不行为的内容来证明“引诱的故意”这个因素。
57 《美国统一商法典》的正式评论中很多关于善意、恶意的说明，主要关注的就是占主导地位一方行为的性质。
58 Schwartz, supea note 11, at 1067-70 Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6. 36(1969).
59 该条款表明本合同代表合同各方完整的和最终的协议，合同效力将超过一切非正式和口头协议的效力。
60 Compare S. M. Wilson CO. V. Snith Int'1, Inc, 587 F. 2d 1363. See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818(Ala.Civ.App.1976).
61 一些法庭要求提请买方注意一些特殊条款作为可预见性的前提条件．See Posttape Assoc v. Eastman Kodak Co.,537 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976)
62 See ones & Mcknight Corp. v. Birdsbore Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N. D. 11.1970)
63 See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ, App. 1976)
64 如果买方没有按照《美国统一商法典》第2-603条中善意的要求履行义务，则会承担赔偿卖方财产损失的责任。
65 See Larraburu Bros. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F. 2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1979)
66 See Franz Chen. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F. 2d 146 (9th Cir. 1979)
67 See O'Neil v. International Harvester Co.
68 一旦被接受为证据，该书面文件将产生最终协议的假定，但该假定并不是最终的，非起草方要证明假定不正确有责任举证．根据u．c．c．第2-313条第(1)款之规定，买方有责任证明：(1) 是卖方做出的法律要求的确认；(2) 事实是交易的基础；(3) 损害因质量担保范围内的事实而产生。
69 Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6. 36(1969).
70 See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
71 See Restatement of contracts §342(1932).
72 See Leff, supra note 10, at 522-25.
73 See U. C. C. §2-316(limited warranties), id.
74 这一标准隐含在实质显失公平的说明之中，比如“一方被剥夺了协议中的所有利益或对对方的违约没有任何补救措施”．See Bank of Indiana v．Holyfield，476 F Supp．104，110(S．D．Miss．1979)
75 See Tuner v. Department of Employment Security and Bd. of Review, 423 U. S. 44(1975).
76 “实际合同规则”是指交易惯例．交易习惯程序、履行习惯程序，或者是除双方协议和法律规定外，作为合同条款来源的对方希望．See U．C．C．§§1-201
77 See U.C.C.§§9-501to507.
78 根据《美国统一商法典》第1-208条判决的案件大多数有利于债权人，但找不到一个有利于债权人的案件包含了假定。
79 Compare Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler,164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N. E.2d 620(1975).
80 See Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc, 594 F. 2d 129(5th Cir.)善意义务不适用于推翻或损害明示的合同条款．
81 于是买方取得货物占有的行为与法典第2-206条关于发价接受和货物接受的规定具有相对性．错误表示和没有表示的事实与谨慎、实质性和信赖是相关的．See generally Blackie v．Barrack，524 F．2d 891(9th Cir．1975)．
82 第1—201条规定的“履行习惯”被“本法另有规定”所限制。
83 虽然正式评论仅提及贸易惯倒和交易的习惯程序是本部分的补充，但相同的推理证明了对第2-208条的相似解释．See U.C.C. §§1-203, Comment 1 ￡2.
84 See U. C. C. §§2-208, Comment 3.
85 Restatement(Second)of Torts §402 A(1965) and U. C. C. §§2-314(1),2-714(1).
86 See 3A A. Corbin, Contracts § 754 (1960).
87 Compare Jones & Mcknight Corp. v. B irdsbore Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N. D. Ill. 1970).
88 See S. M. Wilson & Co. v. smith Int'l Inc., 587 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1979).
89 该款规定的有限补救不能实现时对其他合同条款有无影响并不清楚，按本条规定，如果实质目的不能实现，则“按照本法规定提供补救”．正式评论认为如果补救仍不能实现其目的，则“应当根据本条规定提供一般补救的途径”．
90 See G. Fridman, The Law of Contract 286-310 (1976).
91 See Jones & Mcknight Corp. v. Birdsbore Corp, 320 F Supp. 39 (N. D.Ill. 1970).
92 See generally K. Liewellgn The Common Law Tradition 362-71(1960).
93 其他阻碍恢复补救请求权的因素包括卖方善意的实行派他的补救措施及机器的复杂性等．
94 Compare Jones & Mcknight Corp. v. Birdsbore Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N.D.Ill.1970).
95 See Eddy, on the "Essential" Purpose of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2),65 Calif. L. Rev. 28(1977).
1 Gutteridge. Comparative Law-An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research 94(2d ed. 1949).
2 U. C. C §1-203.
3 U. C. C §1-201(19).
4 U. C. C §2-103(1)(b).
5 Compare, e. g., U. C. C §2-306(1).
6 Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE CODE § 1493(1941).
7 §8(d), 61 Star. 142(1947), 29 U. S. C. §158(d) (1958).
8 § 2(b), 49 Star. 1526(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
9 § 141, 52 Star. 887(1938), 11 U. S. C. § 541(1958).
10 § 2, 70 Star. 1125(1956), 15 U. S. C. § 1222(1958).
11 See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L. J. 1057(1954).
12 U. C. C §§ 3-205, 3-302.
13 U.C. C § 1-203.
14 U. C. C § 7-404.
15 U.C.C §3-417(1) (c).
16 U.C. C § 1-203.
17 U.C.C §§2-305(2),2-311(1).
18 U.C.C §2-306(1).
19 U. C. C § 2-603 (3).
20 U.C.C §9-318(2).
21 Gerseta Corp. V. Wessex-Campbell Silk co., 3F. 2d 236, 238(2d Cir. 1924).
22 See Restatement Contracts § 504(1932).
23 Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Lay 124-25(1955).
24 5 Holdsworth, A Hiotory of English Law 79-81(2d ed. 1937).
25 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640(K. B. 1801).
26 3B. &I C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K. B. 1824).
27 Goodman v. Harvey, 4A. &I E. 87D, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011(K.B. 1836).
28 In Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How. ) 343(1857).
29 Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9Current Legal Prob. 16, 25(1956).
30 The Standard is explicit in U.C.C §§2-306(1), 2-311(1) and 9-318(2).
31 American Bar Association Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. Law. 119, 128(1951).
32 U. C. C §3-302(1)(b).
33 American Bar Association Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, supra note(31).
34 See, e.g., U.C. C § 1-201(9).
35 U.C.C §2-311(1).
36 U.C. C § 2-305 (2).
37 U.C. C § 1-203, comment.
38 U.C.C §2-209.
39 U. C C § 2-209, comment 2.
40 U.C.C § 1-102(1).
41 U.C.C §2-311(1).
42 Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. Rev. 457, 475(1949).
43 U.C. C § 1-102, comment 1.
44 U.C. C § 1-203, comment.
45 U. C. C § 1-205 (3).
46 U.C.C §2-508.
47 U. C. C § 1-102, comment 1.
1 See Dnorkin, Is Wealth a value?,9J. Legal Stud. 191,220-222(1980).用确定一个理论预见能力的方法来检验这个理论，而不管理论的预设，这样做在方法论的意义上可以是正确的．但是，即便是最坚定的经济解释方法的维护者都不得不承认，司法行为理论中的利益可以解释为什么普通法向重效率的方向发展。
2 See generally M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860(1977)[hereinafter cited as Transformation].
3 See e. g., Fawcett, Isham &I Co. V. osborm, Adams &i Co., 32 Ⅱ 11. 411 (1863).
4 See Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of goods, 9J. Legal Stud. 569(1980)[hereinafter cited as Sales Law].
5 See generally 5W. Holdsworth, AHistory of English Law 104-105(2ded.1937).
6 ZW. Blackstone, commentaries 449-55(Bell ed.1771).
7 See Pease, The Change of the Properth in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 378, 379(1908).
8 2E. Coke, The Institute of the Laws of England 713(1642).
9 Id.at 714.
10 Id. at 716-17.
11 See generally Williams, Book Review, 25 U.C.L.A.L.Rev.1187,1200-05(1978).其实，形成公开市场原则的英国法官可能也有分配正义和政治方面的动机。王室、市场的准入者或者公平经营权的批准者通过获得摊位费和服务费而从市场活动中获益。并且配备良好的市场可以为古老的庄园和城镇吸引充足的食物供应，从而有助于避免不良的社会现状。英国法庭将这个原则限制在16世纪的范围内，可能是因为孕育这个原则的市场和集市体系的衰落。
12 在美洲殖民地使用公开市场原则的可能性令人感兴趣．不幸的是，很多殖民地时期的法律都已经消失或难以找到，但是毫无疑问，殖民地有关于解决所有者与被盗货物的购买人之间永恒争议的法律方法，并且，如果所有权的问题在英国原则指导下解决也并不奇怪。贸易联系和英国传统保证了英国法律在美洲殖民地的影响，并且，殖民者渴望从英国和欧洲大陆进口货物，特别是制成品．但是值得怀疑的是吸引英国或欧洲商人是否是殖民地接受这个规则的重要动机．进出口大都集中通过大不列颠进行，并遵守《航海法案》，并且作为母国即使没有重商主义的政策，英国也是自然和主要的贸易来源，殖民地市场的法律也暗示将接受公开市场原则．(这里是国内法，前述为国际贸易法)早在1633年波士顿和其它城镇就拥有了常规市场或集市．殖民地法律按照英国模式建立市场和集市．例如，纽约制定法律，规定市场和集体应当包含市场法庭，而市场法庭处理案件要遵从正在适用、应当或可能适用英国集市习惯或惯例的集市的自由习惯，殖民地也有司法上参照公开市场买卖的案例。但是，以上材料并不代表殖民地已经接受了公开市场原则．在独立后的公开市场案例并没有涉及殖民地法律原则，也许是人们认为新成立的国家与此无关．
13 G. Gaines,1Lex Mertatoria Americana 374(1802).
14 Law of September 23, 1780, ch. 908, §7.《1780年9月23日法案》，该法案规范公众拍卖式买卖．在堆塞克诉维尔案中，一位丢失的或被盗的马匹的购买人，主张该法显示在本法案通过前宾西法尼亚州就已有公开市场．法庭和陪审团同意马匹所有者的观点，认为购买人所引用的法律规定所有者不丧失被盗马匹的所有权．但是，法律保护善意购买人，他们可以要求赔偿他们为马匹所支付的金钱，如果所有者在马匹被盗后六个月之内提出主张．这种处理方法与大陆法相似．
15 Editor's Notes to the Institute of Justinian 472-73, 617(T. cooper ed, 1812).
16 See note 12 supra. The operation ofthe Baltimore public market is described in Browning v. Magill, ZH. SJ. 169(Md. CT.App. 1808).
17 这个进程得到了公众的支持．托马斯·杰弗逊成为这一发展的宣扬者．尽管他个人倾向相反的观点，因为这个进程是国内大多数人的愿望．《1789年宪法》预示和促进这个市场的形成．See generally American Growth, supra 12, at 96-98, 113-23, 128-33,153-60.
18 R. Wade, The Urban Frontier 87-91, 122-24, 271, 289-90(1959).
19 See 2 Kent's Commentaries on American Law 324 n.a(4th ed.1840)
20 See, e. g., Kitchell v. Vanadar, 1 blat. k. 356(Ind. 1825).
21 See Browning v. Magili, 2H. 8c. J. 269(Md. Ct. App. 1808).
22 See Southwick v. Harndell, 2 Dane's Abridgement, at 286(1823).
23 1 Yeates 478(Pa.1795).
24 1 Yeates at 479, quoting J. Kelying, A report of Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown 48(1708).
25 See Davis v. Hampton, 4Mart. (n. s.)288, 291(La. 1826).
26 See generally Sales Law, supra note 4, at 574-79.
27 1 Yeats at 479.The authority was J. Kelying. A Report of Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown 48(1708).
28 I Tyl, 338(vt. 1802).
29 Id. at341.
30 See Sales Law, supra note 4, at581-84.
31 1 Tyl. at341.
32 See Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend.285,296-99,315(N.Y.1839)(opinion of Senator Furman).
33 1 Johns. 472 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1806).
34 Id. at 479.
35 2 Kent's Commentaries, supra note 19, at317.
36 1 Johns. supra note 33, at480.
37 Id. at480.
38 See Sales Law, supra note 4, at584-85.
39 See generally Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. Legal Stud. 65(1977).
40 See generally J. Benjamin., A Treatise on the Law of Personal Property § 433(4th ed.1884).
41 See, e.g.,Titcomb v. Wood.,38Me.561 (1854).
42 19 Mass.(2 Pick) 184(1824), at201.
43 See Sales Law, supra note 4, at583.
44 19 Mass.(2 Pick) at202.
45 19 Mass.(2 Pick) at203.
46 Johnson, Economic Analysis, The Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems, 15J. L. 8t Econ. 259. 260-68(1972).
47 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S (6 Cranch)87,133-34(1810).
48 See generally C. Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Polities in the New Republic(1966).
49 19 Mass.(2 Pick) at201.
50 8 Cow. 238 (N. Y.Sup.Ct.1828).
51 1 Johns. 472(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1806).
52 8 Cow. at242.
53 See generally Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 244(1892).
54 Rex v. Pears, 168 Fng Rep. 208, 209(K.B. 1779).
55 See F. Pollock 8i R. Wright, Possession in the Common Law 131-32,218-20(1888).
56 Parker v. Patrick, 101 Eng. Rep. 99(K. B. 1793).
57 21 Hen. 8, C. 11(1529).
58 3 Cai.R.182(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1805).
59 29 Mass.(12 Pick.)307(1832).
60 Id. at311.
61 Id. at312-13.
62 See generally L.Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales320-22(1st ed.1931).
63 See, e. g., Marston v. Baldwin, 17,Mass.606(1822).
64 See Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267, 283(N. Y. 1838).
65 Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 572(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
66 See generally S. Williston, Sales of Goods §§311-30(1909).
67 See American Growth, supra note 12, at50-52, 67.
68 See, e. g., Williams v. Merle, 11 Wend. 80(N. Y. Sup. Ct.1833).
69 20 Wend. at284-85.
70 Id, at269.
71 Id, at274.
72 Id, at283.
73 Id, at286.
74 See also Carmichael v．Buck, 4_4 S．C．L．(10 Rich．)322(1857)．在本案中，如果陪审团认为哈金斯有权销售那是不合适的，因为那样就没有任何木材所有者委托承运人而不面临受损失的风险．一个明显的答案是，让所有者雇佣诚实或负责任的承运人；另一个方法是让所有者以某种适当的方法表明承运人既不是所有者也不是买卖代理人．Id，at339．
75 20 Wend. at 276, 279-80.
76 In Parsons v. Webb, 8 Me. 38(1831).
77 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations xi (Cannan ed. 1976).
78 See G. Becker, Economic Theory 25-26,69(1971).
79 See Transformation, supra note 2, at100-01.
80 See generally, e. g., Jordan, An Economic Analysis of The Law of False Advertising, 8J. Legal Stud. 527(1979).
81 See Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commerciai Code, 30U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 475(1963).
1 See 2 Williston, Sales § 318,319(Rev.ed.1948).
2 Id. At 374.
3 Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N. Y. 212, 163 N. E. 737(1925).
4 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 150 Ore.172, 38 P. zd 48, rehearing, 150 Ore. 203,43 P.zd 1078(1935).
5 See Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24, 102 Pac. 799(1910).
6 如果可以证明卖方迟延，那么卖方就不能从善意购买人处取回货物。大多数的案件涉及以无效支票进行的支付．戚利斯顿教授长期以来就反对将支票案件作为现金买卖来对待．虽然此理论在威利斯顿教授《论买卖》第一版中被提出时并没有判例法的支持，但是现在的案例表明法庭正在开始利用这个理论．威利斯顿教授的《论买卖》收集了一些近来的案例，这些案例毫无例外的涉及了以下情节：欺诈人从商人A处购买了汽车，又立即转手卖给商人B，B在购买时没有要求对方签发所有权证书或作其它所有权标记．《统一商法典》试图抛弃现金买卖理论．第2-401条第(1)款(b)项：“如果一个协议改变了特定化的效果或损害了善意购买人的权利，那么这个买卖合同就不是现金买卖”。此外，第2-403条第(2)款规定：“如果将货
物委托给从事该种货物交易的商人占有，该商人即有权力将委托人的权利全部转让给正常交易中的买方．”第1-201条第(9)款对“正常交易中的买方”进行了界定，排除了当铺老板和从农民处购买产品的人．
7 NIL § 1.
8 NIL § 16. NIL § 30.
9 See NIL § 119, see the cases Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law 1114 ct seq.(7th ed., Beutel,1948).
10 这个命题明显是不言自明的，所以《流通票据法》和《统一商法典》都没有对其规定。但对于股权证书和所有权证书这一点就不那么明显了，所以有关法规规定了相关条款。
11 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 349(1934).
12 NIL § 24, NIL§ 16, NIL§ 14, NIL § 59, NIL §45.
13 NIL § 66.
14 See generally Britton, handbook of the law of bills and notes, §§ 100,101(1943).
15 Id. at112.
16 NIL § 25.
17 NIL § 58.
18 NIL § 57.
19 Cf. Restatement, Contracts § 151 (1932).
20 See Restatement, Contracts § 170(1932).
21 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 179 et seq. (1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 107 et seg. (1951).
22 See Goodrich, op cit. supra note Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 179 et seq. (1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 107 et seg. (1951).
23 See the discussion in 4 Corbin, Contracts § 902(1951).
24 See Restatement, Contracts § 175 (1932).
25 See Restetement, Contracts § 167 (1932).
26 NIL § 5.
27 NIL § 3.
28 Bullet v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29,1 Salk 130(K.B.1704).
29 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9(1704)
30 See such cases as Clark v. Young &i Co., 1 Cranch 181(U. S. 1803);Mandeville v. Riddle, l Cranch 290 (U. S. 1803); Harris v. Johnston 3 Cranch 311(U. S.1805).
31 NIL § 2 (2).
32 NIL § 2 (3).
33 NIL § 2 (5).
34 NIL § 5(3).
35 NIL § 5 (2).
36 NIL § 5(1).
37 NIL § 5 (4).
38 Compare UCC §§ 3-105,3-106,3-109,3-110,3-112 with NIL §§1-8.
39 See Scollans v. Rollins,179 Mass.346,60 N.E.983(1901).
40 Or of Course might not. See United States Fid.&i Guar.Co.v. Newburger,263 N.Y.16,188 N.E.141(1933).
41 See 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations §5109(1932).
42 Id. at5262.
43 USTA §7．
44 USTA §15．
45 USTA §13．
46 USTA §4．
47 USTA §7．
48 商业单据的发展并不仅仅是普通法的事情，涵盖提单、仓单或两者的法规早己出现．明显受到《代销商法》影响的《1858年纽约法》规定，“仓单……可以通过背书转让，经过如此转让的受让人应当被认为是货物的所有人……但是，所有仓单如果在票面简单记载或加盖了‘不可流通’的字样，应当被认为是本部分规定的例外。”康涅狄格州在1878年照搬了纽约法．1866年宾夕法尼亚州法规也有同样的效果，只有一点不同，它涵盖了提单和仓单并增添了这些单据“应当可以流通”．1878年马萨诸塞州规定“存放在公共仓库中的货物或动产的所有权可以以背书加交付仓单的方式转移给购买人或质权人……”．另外一种说法是1876年路易斯安娜州法规，规定这种单据可以在汇票和本票同样的范围内流通。法院并不认为这些法规赋予了它们所涉单据完全的可流通性。联邦最高法院在其首要判例士沃案中，有机会承认一张被盗提单的人的权利．法庭发现没有必要决定宾夕法尼亚州法规是否优先于密苏里州法规，因为根据两个法规提单“以背书加交付的方式转让，转让方式同汇票和本票，”其实说的都是一个意思．法庭判决认为法规的意图仅仅是描述流通的方式，而不是界定转让的效果．斯庄法官写道：“没有任何一个法规会被解释为……基于没有合理表达的普通法而作的革新．特别是如此重大的革新，它可以使提单制度的各个方面都建立在与汇票相同的基础之上，我们不能够从没有它也可以令人满意的语句中得出革新的结论．法律非常小心地保护着除了金钱之外的私人财产的所有权，使其免受他人的侵占，即使财产并不为其占有。”提单的“真正所有人”，即使没有委托的证据也被保护．所以即使早期法规有所规定，普通法的发展应该说还是比较顺利的。
49 See Llemellyn,Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales 77 ct.seg.(1931).
50 See., e.g., Quality Shingle Co.v. Old Oregon Lumber &i Shingle co.,110 Wash.60,187 Pac.705(1920).
51 Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited as USA) §27.
52 USA §§ 28,29.
53 USA §33．
54 USA §39．
55 USA §37．
56 USA §36．
57 《统一仓单法》第46条的规定以及《统一提单法》第37条的相似规定并没有立即为法庭接受。得克萨斯州有一个案例，它将卖方对质量的担保责任强加给了因担保而取得提单的持票人．一系列单据法的通过使得克萨斯州放弃了得克萨斯州原则，但有些司法区还在遵守．作为起草人之一，威利斯顿教授在后来对本评论的编辑的交流中坚持说该法的规定完全清楚(这一点曾为哥伦比亚州评论怀疑过)并且遵守得克萨斯州原则的判例毫无疑问已经被推翻。委员会记录收集了这些案例，评价得克萨斯州原则“与权威和理智相背”．从二十世纪二十年代以后真理似乎成为了主流。The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act §46．
58 1916年国会通过的《联邦提单法》适用于州际或国际提单，统一州法和联邦法的规定有些区别，但是关于可流通的部分是一样的．联邦法的通过无疑解释了为什么统一州法没有像《统一仓单法》一样为所有司法区所接受。
59 有十六个州通过了《统一仓单法》的修正案，此外，伊达荷州通过了第47条的修正案而没有通过相应的第40条．《统一买卖法》修正案为十三个州、哥伦比亚州和夏成夷特区通过．马里兰州和北达科他州通过第32条而没有通过相应的第38条．通过了一个修正案的州并不一定就通过另一个修正案．
60 For an attempt to sketch the background, see Gilmore &i Axelord, Chattel Security,57 Yale L.J.517,761(1948).
61 See 1 Hilliard, The Law of Mortgages 236(1872).
62 当然也有例外的判决．在斯庄案中，法庭评论说附有不动产抵押担保的本票“不是经常为商人称为商业票据的东西；并且……可以属于附属权利，而严格意义上的商业票据不可以……”所以这样的本票不可流通，或者在某种程度上作为被告的购买人知道由抵押产生的所有附属权利．在马萨诸塞州，由抵押担保的本票仍然不可流通。加里弗尼亚州认为抵押本票不可流通是基于以下原因，抵押权人在对本票提起诉讼之前要先对抵押财产行使求偿权．加里弗尼亚州的规则最终被《流通票据法》所改变．蒙大拿州遵从麦雅案的先例与加里弗尼亚州具有相同的抵押规则：要求在诉诸诉讼前用尽抵押担保．
63 See 1 Danill, Negotiable Instruments 170 ct seg.(4th ed. 1891).
64 See annotation in 127 A．L．R．190(1940)．大多数的早期案件似乎涉及到了因为没有对价而产生的抵押人的抗辩．早期案件中涉及的附加权利主要是留置的优先权．问题不是一个人欺诈性的转移一个抵押权，而是根据多个不同的抵押权产生的多个实际占有土地的权利，其中经常伴随着由最初抵押权人欺诈性的放弃一个抵押权的情况．当然，这里登记法规是使其更加复杂的一个因素．所以在路易斯案中法忘判决本票和抵押的善意购买人不得优先于财产的善意购买人，一旦抵押没有登记或即使登记却被抵押权人放弃．另一方面，在巴博格案中，法庭认为因为登记法规并没有要求抵押的转让需要登记，所以本票和抵押的善意购买人应当被保护，他可以对抗信赖错误登记的收款人的放弃权利记录的后续抵押权人．在文尼案中，法庭认为本票和抵押的正常业务中的持有人不受任何他不知晓的在先留置权的影响，纽约法院在古德案中同样在正常业务中的持有人的抵押权因转让人的欺诈而在先登记于先前抵押时，保护了正常持有人．但是，一些州开始反对这些结论，并拒绝赋予抵押可流通性．在伊利诺斯州反对这一规则的判例法为后来的《伊利诺斯州动产抵押法》所肯定，它规定所有被动产抵押担保的本票必须在票面上记载担保方式及在转让时承担一切抗辩，如果本票不记载，抵押将完全无效．
65 See, e.g., Story, Promissiory Notes §22 (1859).
66 See Britton Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes §§14,15(1943).
67 45 & 46 Vict.,c.61.
68 Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law,14 Harv.L.Rev.241,244(1900).
69 Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 Yale L.J.84,87(1900).布鲁斯特法官在《流通票据法的辩护》中说道，“这条规定(第3条第(2)款)的意图在于将‘动产本票’这样的交易包括进来，从而使原本对它区别对待的法律统一起来，这正如丹·艾米思在案件中表达的一样。”
70 《流通票据法》第一版中的案件综述是解释性的．衣阿华州法院在艾利逊案中认为如果本票由抵押担保 并且收款人同意以抵押担保寻求偿付，那么本票背面的协议就是本票的一部分，并且该本票是不可流通的．在做出这个判决的时候法庭引用了《流通票据法》的第1条第(2)款而不是第3条第(2)款．纽约法庭认为债券是可流通的，虽然关于信托的条款限制了债券持有人的权利．如同衣阿华州法庭一样，纽约法庭引用了第1条第(2)款而非第3条第(2)款．在索普案中，威斯康辛州法院从一个涉及本票的案件中得出一个结论，认为：“本票的支付由不动产抵押担保，期限如述．如果发生利益支付违约或不符合附加抵押中的任何条件或协议，那么所有的资金将由抵押权人处理……到期或无需通知支付或其它方式．”含有关于税收和保险的支付普通协议(有人认为已经引入了本票)的本票是不可流通的．这是一个精心设计的结论，法庭认为这种本票可以流通．法官和律师又一次认为与第3条第(2)款是无关的：被引用的条文是第1条(全文)，第2条第(3)款(关于定额)和第4条第(3)教(关于可确定的未来时间)．
71 See Steffen and Russell，The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 Yale L.J．799(1932)．纽约州霍布斯案似乎是《流通票据法》与投资证券的第一次讨论．上诉法庭认为债券是可流通的，所以此法的适用性或不可适用性问题就似乎有些重要了．后来案例中适用《流通票据法》判决债券不可流通的是王者畜牧公司案．《流通票据法》适用于证券的论证如下：(1) 正如英国《汇票法》序言中描述这部法规是“将有关汇票，支票和本票的法律法典化的法律”，同样《流通票据法》的序言证明了它是“与可流通票据相关的一般法律．”(2)《流通票据法》第1条以一种强制性的条款表达了：“票据如果可以流通，必须符合如下要求”；但是似乎没有一个论点对评论者来说有说服力．
72 Steffen, Cases on Commercial and Investment Papers 251-75(1939).
73 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,242 N.Y.38,43,150 N.E.594,595(1926).
74 Id.at 50,150 N.E.at 598.
75 Id.at 50,150 N.E.at 598.
76 N.Y.Laws 1926,c.704;N.Y.Pers.Prop.Law §§260-2.
77 N.Y.Pers.Prop.Law §262.
78 249 N.Y.263,164 N.E.45(1928).
79 Enoch v. Brandon,249 N.Y.263,266,164 N.E.45,46-7(1928).
80 Id．at 268, 164 N．E．at 47．《霍夫斯代德法》最初仅适用于“担保收据”(莫根案中所涉及的一种暂时证书)和“设备信托证书”．在尹诺赤案之后，立法承认了双重起诉，将公司债券增加到了法案的范围之中．
81 只有一个案例认为没有登记的公司债券是不可流通的．抵押因为可获得的支付资金而受到限制，这个案件因为此法律依据而不适用先例。认为包含了其它请求人的权利的债券是可流通的判例很多，但是，当债券依照非讼条款的可执行性问题进行解释的时候，有些判决结果就是不可流通。这些案件在这些条款的可执行性上平等地分成了两派。一派认为非讼条款禁止债券持券人提起诉讼．另一派认为不论在信托合同中是否有非讼条款，都应当允许债券持券人提起诉讼。
82 U．C．C．Art．8．而《统一商法典》第八编赋予“投资证券”完全的可流通性。“证券”在第八编第102条中的定义为“除上下文另有所指外，本编中“证券”指具有下列特征的票据：(a)以不记名或记名方式发行；并且(b)通常在证券交易所或证券交易市场买卖，或在其发行地或买卖地被公认为投资媒介；并且(c)系一类或一系列票据之一，或按其条款规定，可被分解为一类或一系列票据；并且(d)证明对某项财产或某个企业的分享、参与或享有其它权益，或证明发行人承担某项债务”。
83 高利贷法不适用的原因是，至少在该法的预期中，没有任何一种借贷可以包含一个单纯比现金买卖价格更高一些的信用买卖。
84 See,e.g.Hughbanks,Inc.v.Gourley,12 Wash.zd 44,120 P.zd 523(1941)．不管是《统一附条件买卖法》或非统一的附条件买卖立法对这一要求有严格规定．
85 Sloan v. McCarty,134 Mass.245(1883).
86 Worden Grocer Co. v. Blanding, 116 Mich.254,126 N.W.212(1910);Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Co.,145 N.C.120,58 S.E.909(1907).
87 See, e.g.,Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co.,316 Ill.App.79,43 N.E,.zd 857(1942).
88 191 Cal.364,216 Pac.376(1923).
89 对于这一点，索莫维里案的观点为买方适用“无法律手续的禁止反言”原则留下了可能性，法庭明显认为“无法律手续的禁止反言”是指如果买方在回应询问时直接向受让人表达他没有抗辩权，他将受此陈述的约束。在此法律根据上，有人提出索莫维里“远不是拒绝接受合同的可流通性，事实上是认可了它的使用。”这个意见显然不会为金融公司接受，因为大规模操作的昂贵和繁琐，同时也因为金融公司，像其他借贷人一样，希望无需询问就免于抗辩．
90 Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall,61 Utah 223,211 Pac.991(1922).
91 在1920年到1930年之间，尤他州的豪尔在给予切断抗辩条款效力的问题上非常孤立，而相反的索莫维里案却有其它的四个判决支持．在1930年到1940年之间这个均势被打破了．追随索莫维里案的只有三个案件，而在此期间有五个案件支持了切断抗辩条款．
92 See Britton,．Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes §14(1943)．尽管有些根据《流通票据法》判决的早期案例和两三个少数司法区在这一问题上顽固不化，但是附条件买卖的本票原则上会被判定为不可流通的恐慌并没有被证实．在上述近来的发展之外，附条件买卖本票和抵押本票应当同样对待，本票与附条件买卖合同相联系的单纯陈述在大多数司法区不会损害可流通性．
93 在1940年以前判决高利贷法适用于消费买卖金融的唯一几个案件就是库彻斯特城市法院中汤姆普金斯的两个判决．阿肯色州的最高法院也声称在将来它会在高利贷法的规定下考虑融资费用．我们认为即使融资费用应当被规范，适用已经过时的、粗劣起草的、充满了例外的高利贷法也不可能达到这个结果．
94 NIL §59．Id, §102-104．
95 See Britton,op.cit.Id. §105.
96 指令裁决是指直接依案件主审法官的命令而对案件作出判决，因为案件的证据非常具有说服力，法官取代陪审团作为事实认定者的角色．
97 See Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg.Co., 117 F.2d 442(6th Cir. 1941);Commer Cial Credit Corp. v. Organ County Machine Works,34 Cal.2d 766,214 P.2d 819(1950).但是，新奥尔良州白色系统公司案中，法庭拒绝遵从上述先例，它评论说“规范分期付款信用买卖的措施应当由立法来决定，而不是由本法庭根据《流通票据法》的规定来决定．”一个匿名作者在卡传尔案的注释中的“提议”体现了对概念能左右一切的影响力的信仰：让金融公司首先通过流通取得票据，然后再转让附条件的买卖合同．一个学识渊博的评论者总结说，“似乎正常业务中的持有人的权利，一旦仅以本票上的背书转让取得，就不会为后续的附条件买卖合同所损害．”
98 Id.
99 墨西哥法院审理的卡传尔案中这种方法被接受，“但是，不幸的是原告的地位不仅仅是不当业务中的被诉本票持有人，同时还是执行并作为同一交易一部分的附条件买卖合同的受让人．虽然在本诉讼中不能根据合同确定任何权利，然而，合同的受让人，也就是原告不仅取得了合同包含的权利，也要承担它所包含的义务．根据这些权威规定，原告．作为附条件买卖合同的受让人应承担所有存在的对抗转让人的抗辩．”前述引文中显示原告是根据本票起诉请求金钱判决而不是坚持合同中的担保权利．
100 所以在蒂通案中，法庭否定了原告简易判决的动议，并且评论审判事实的问题是，“交易人并卖方是否真的是信用公司的代理人，而非独立交易人……”在全国公共银行案中暗示了同样的观点．
101 See Thorp Finance Corp. v. Le Mire,264 Wis.220,58 N.W.zd 641(1953).在索普案中，买方签署合同承认“交付和接受”的抗辩需基于家具没有交付的事由，法院推翻了由原告提议的指令裁决并发回重审．在第一承诺公司案中，被告提出合同中有欺诈性引诱，并获得了审理法院的陪审团判决，但是判决在上诉中被推翻．纽约的初级法院有很多活动，但是还没有任何一个清晰的标准获得权威的肯定．现在在纽约案件中被告(经常由法律援助人代理)习惯性的以欺诈为答辩理由；然后，原告申请简易判决。
102 但这也不仅仅是判例法的趋势．比如，《宾夕法尼亚州机动车买卖金融法》禁止与分期付款买卖合同一起使用可流通本票．《马里兰州零售分期付款买卖法》规定作为分期付款交易一部分的本票与基础相联系，并承担抗辩．同样《伊利诺斯州动产抵押法》也有类似规定．《统一商法典》第九编第206条第(1)款也规定，“消费货物的买方所做的不向合同受让方主张基于买卖产生的任何请求权或抗辩的协议不可为任何人执行。”该编明晰了“协议”同时包含了本票和切断抗辩条款，但是如果持票人不试图在票据诉讼中执行担保协议或特定货物上的保险责任和税收义务，那么他表面上并不受到禁止，这一事实在某种程度上冲淡了法规的效力。
103 合理使用技术的例子是商业信用公司案，该案中出卖的财产是冲床，价值5500美元，协议书上的题目是“工业附条件买卖合同”．另一方面，上诉法院推翻在第一承诺公司案中做出的对被告的判定是完全合适的：案件中涉及的是一桩价值8000美元的空调买卖，买方是批量生产洋葱的种植人．《统一商法典》第九编第206条第(2)款在除了消费者领域之外的一切案件中都承认买方通过切断抗辩条款或者通过使用可流通票据放弃抗辩．
104 See Note,Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance,60 Yale L.J.1218.1223 n.17(1951).
105 信托收据法通常有一个特点，信托人的担保利益自动从最初的抵押物转移到由买卖产和的诉讼中去．这一点规定在《统一信托收据法》第10条．
106 UTRA §9(2)(a).
107 UTRA §1.
108 对此，有两个原因可以解释：(1) 自从二十世纪三十年代后期，也就是本法为大多数司法区接受时，商业情况运转良好；(2) 1943年以后，由于在《破产法》第60条无效条款面前所有信托收据都不堪一击，所以那些从事信托收据金融业务的人有意的从诉讼中退出，直到1950年，对第60条作出了有利于他们的修改．自从第60条修改以后，僵局似乎被打破了；在过去的两三年里就发生了和此前十五年里同样多的案件。
109 Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman,58 Cal.App.zd 729,137 P.zd 729(1943).
110 The term is defined in U.C.C. §9-105.
111 U.C.C. §9-308.
112 U.C.C. §3-104,Comment 2.
113 U.C.C. § 3-104,Comment 5.
114 U.C.C. §8-102.
115 U.C.C. §9-105.
116 Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Nat.Park Bank of N.Y.,239 N.Y.386,146 N.E.636(1925).
117 See Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel,196 F.2d 950(1st Cir.1952).
118 See Ward and Harfield,Bank Credits and Acceptances c.9(3rd ed. 1948).这是因为银行设计了一种程序，卖方 即受益人可以以此融资，这种“二级融资”需要第二次支付银行费用，并与第一张信用证“背靠背”地签发第二张信用证(两张信用证要求同样的运输单据)．
119 这个关于银行集团观念的陈述缺乏科学研究，但即使是有科学研究的支持也不尽合理．尽管美国银行业的观点忠实地反映在《跟单信用证统一惯例》的转让规定和《统一商法典》第五编中．但由杰出的银行顾问撰写的美国信用证的首要文件在转让问题上的立场与大多数银行的观点不同．
120 Id. at 131-2.
121 该论点明显得到了《沃德和哈菲尔德》一书的支持：在“收益的转让”这个标题下，作者写道：“从银行的角度看，对这种转让不应当有任何反对．如果受让人适当地通知了银行，银行应当给予承认，并根据转让协议的副本支付任何本应向最初受益人支付的金额．”之后，在“汇票的准支付借贷人或供货人的代理人”标题下，作者虚构了一个案例，信用证的受益人签发了一张指示信用证，并转让给供货人，之后，他评论说：“如果信用证是可流通的信用证，并经过持有人和背书人转移．如果这些汇票向银行提示，并各有适当单据，那么银行不但应当安全的支付，而且它还有义务这样做．”
122 比如国际商业会议第82号手册中记录的《跟单信用证统一惯例》第49条关于转让有如下规定：“信用证只有在原则的明确授权下才可转让．在这种情况下，信用证只能转让一次，并不能改变原始信用证的条款和条件，这里有两个例外，信用证的数额和有效期限，这两项都可能会被减少．”“如果商业跟单信用证被按部分转让，那么这种按部分的转让应被认为是构成一个单独的转让．”“授权转让信用证包括了将信用证转让到其它地方的授权．这种转让所导致的银行费用由最初受益人支付，另有规定的除外．在最初信用证的有效期间，信用证被转让到的地方为支付地．”
123 修改后的第49条规定：“所谓可转让或可流通信用证是指支付行或议付行有权向第三方或第一受益人指示的任何方支付的信用证．”“一个信用证要想转让必须得到开证行的明确授权，并且明确设计成‘可转让’的形式．在这种情况下，信用证只能转让一次并不能改变原始信用证的条款和条件．这里有几个例外，信用证的数额或载明的统一价款、有效期限或运输期限可能会部分或全部的减少或缩短．如果减少了信用证 的数额或统一价款，转让人可以被允许用他自己的发票来代替受让人的发票，因为比起受让人的发票来，转让人的发票中记载的数额或统一价款更大，但此数额不得超过信用证最初的规定，通过这种发票的替代，转让人可以根据信用证请求支付其发票与受让人发票之间的差价．”“可转让信用证的部分(其总和不得超过整个信用证的数额)可以分别转让，如果不按部分运输的话，这种转让的整体应被认为是构成一个整体信用证的单独转让。”“授权转让信用证包括了将信用证转让给其他地方受益人(不管他是否在同一个国家)的授权，另有规定的除外。在被转让信用证的有效期间，支付或流通可以在信用证转让地进行．”“转让所导致的银行费用由最初受益人支付，另有规定的除外．”“转让不应当约束据此行为的银行，除非转让的范围和方式得到了该银行的明示同意，并支付了转让的银行费用。”
124 新斯科舍省银行案中，柴斯国家银行签发的信用证记载：“如果信用证由你……转让给……第三方，提示的所有汇票必须附加有转让协议，并且在实现转让时你必须支付0.125％的代理费用．”这就被认为是“可转让”的信用证。
125 这个理解是由伊瑞克森案产生的，这个案例是无可争议的首要判例。伊瑞克森案中的事实陈述足以说明前面讨论的这一类型的问题．纽约信托公司为瑞典海洋委员会服务，向精练出口公司签发了一张特殊信用证(记名信用证)涉及的是精炼厂向瑞典以240，000美元的价格提供汽油的买卖．精炼厂是从城市服务石油公司购买的汽油．银行根据海洋委员会的指示拒绝修改信用证，因此信用证不能转让给城市服务．精炼厂还是“转让信用证”给了城市服务然后通知信托公司。“信用证……和它的收益”已经被转让了．精炼厂根据信用证签发了汇票并背书给了城市服务．城市服务通知信托公司精炼厂履行信用证后赊欠汇票收益。经过所有这些，汇票和运输单据由精炼厂提示给信托公司．同时，海洋委员会在纽约起诉了精炼厂，诉称精炼厂在一桩甲苯买卖的合同中违约．在向银行提示了汇票和单据之后、支付之前，县治安官因甲苯信用证诉讼扣押了汽油信用证的收益。汽油信用证参照《统一惯例》．判决认为向城市服务的转让是无效的，这笔资金仍然是精炼厂的财产并且理应属于在海洋委员会诉糟炼厂案中非居住地扣押的范围．虽然这个观点涉及的是“信用证”的转让，但是应当注意的是汇票已经由精炼厂—最初受益人—请求支付并提示，并且显 然只有收益的转让被涉及．法庭十分重视《惯例》的第49条，虽然当时此条款在1951年的修改之前．我们尊重伊瑞克森案作为判例的价值，但是我们也应当记住1933年版的第49条不包括“转让人支票”的规定，所以，正如前文提出的一样，它不能像修改后的条款一样支持仅适用于根据信用证请求支付权利的转让，而不适用收益转让的解释．
126 因为在不记名信用证中，银行同意“签发人、背书人及普意持有人”适当签发的汇票会得到承兑，所以任何在汇票流通生效之前必须得到银行同意的建议都会使流通条款变得毫无意义．
127 U.C.C. §5-115.
128 U.C.C. §5-115(1).
129 U.C.C. §5-115(2).
130 See the 1950 and 1949 drafts of U.C.C.
131 This was the holding in Ericksson v. Refiners Export Co.,264 App.Div.525,35 N.Y.S.zd 829(1st Dep't 1942).
132 See the forms developd by the First National Bank of Boston reproduced in Brauc, her, Sutherland & Willcox, Commercial Transactions 204-207(1953).
133 Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat.Bank,144 F.zd 759(zd Cir.1944),ccrt.denied,324 U.S.850(1945).
134 See, e.g.,Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co.,111 Wash.576,191 Pac.869(1920).
135 Restatement,Contracts §151(1932).
136 See the excellent discussion in 4 Corbin, Contracts §§872-3(1951).
137 303 N.Y.446,103 N.E.zd 891(1952);Notes,21 Ford L.Rev.178(1952),27 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.361 (1952),[1952]Wis.L.Rev.740.
138 Allhussen v. Caristo Constr.Corp.303 N.Y.446,449,103 N.E.zd 891(1952).
139 Allhussen v. Caristo Constr.Corp.,278 App.Div.817,104 N.Y.S.zd 565,566(1951).
140 Id, at 447.
141 Id.at 450,103 N.E.zd at 892.
142 U.C.C. §9-206(2).
143 U.C.C. §9-318(1).
144 Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The Real Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable Financing,64 Harv.L.Rev.62(1950).
145 See 4 Corbin,Contracts §902(1951).
146 Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,318 U.S.434(1943).
147 See, e.g.,Conn.Gen.Stats. §6721(Rev.1949);N.C.Gen.Stats §§44-80(1950).
148 Fuller,American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century,6 J.LEG.ED.457,472-3(1954).
1 See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13Creighton L.Rev.441,445-46 n.8(1979).
2 See,e.&,Coogan,Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade,87 YALE L.T. I012,1013-14(1978).
3 See Dolan,Good Faith Purchase and Warchouse Receipts:Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles Z7,and 9 of the U.C.C.,30 Hastings L.J.1(1975)[hereinafter cited Good Frith Purchurse].
4 In Yorke v. Grenaugh,9z Eng.Rep.790(K.B.1703).
5 Green v. Farmer,98 Eng.Rep. 154,158(K.B.1768)(Mansfield,J.).
6 U.C.C §7-403(1),(4).
7 See 3 N.Y.L.Revision Commission Rep.,Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 1800, 1817(1955).
8 See, e.g.,Services Co.v. O'dell,-Pa.zd-,417A.zd 604(1980).
9 Miller v. Race,97/Eng.Rep.398,401(K.B.1758).
10 See, e.g.,Silver v. Robert's Garage,Inc.,240 Mass.571,574,134N.E.610,611-12(1922).
11 White v. Garden,138 Eng.Rep.364,367(C.P.1851).
12 See, e.g.,Mowrey v.Walsh,8 Cow.238(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1828).
13 See,e.g.,Cundy v.Lindsay,3 App.Cas.459,465-66(H.L. 1878).
14 U.C.C §7-209(3)(b).
15 92 Eng.Rep.79(K.B.1703).
16 See, e.g.,Peacock v. Rhodes,99 Eng.Rep.402,403(K.B. 1781).
17 Accord,Johnson v. Hill,171 Eng.Rep.812(K.B.1822).
18 See also Grinnell v. Cood,3 Hill 485(N.Y. 1842).
19 Yorke v. Grenaugh,92 Eng.Rep.79,80(K.B.1703).
20 6 Whart. 418(Pa.1841).
21 Id. at 422-23(dictum).
22 Sunbolf v. Alford, 150 Eng.Rep. 1135,1136,1138(Ex. 1838).
23 106 Eng.Rep. 1219(K.B. 1822).
24 Collman v. Collins,z Hall 569(N.Y.super. 1829);Van Buskirt v.Puriton,z Hall 561(N.Y.super.1829).
25 1 Doug. 1(Mich. 1843).
26 Id. at 10-11.
27 Id. at 18.
28 Id. at 8-9.
29 136 Mich.611,99 N.W.867(1904).
30 Id. at 614,99 N.W.at 868.
31 See generally 2 S.Williston,The Law Governing the Sales of Goods §317(Rev.ed.1948).
32 92 Eng.Rep.at 80.
33 1 Doug.at 18.
34 92 Eng.Rep.at 80.
35 Id.
36 See generally R.Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 17981 (zd ed. 1977).
37 See Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Strorage Warehouse Co.,70 Misc.565,127 N.Y.S.306(App.Term. 1911).
38 See U.C.C. §7-209(3)(b), §7-307(2).
39 2 W.Blackstone, Commentaries 452.
40 Id. at 396.
41 see Digest 5.20.2.3.
42 58 F.zd 511(D.C.Cir.1932).
43 Fidelity Storage Co.v. Reliable Store Corp.,69 F.zd 569(D.C.Cir.1934).
44 Id. At 569-70.
45 See Famous Furuiture Co.v.J.Fishman &i Son,22 N.J.Misc.368,370,29 A.zd 235,236(Clifton County Ct. 1944).
46 Buckley-Newhall co.v. Bangs,130 Misc.293,224 N.Y.S.71(Mun.Ct. 1927).
47 Dade Nat's I Bank v. University Transfer &I Storage, Inc.,151 So.zd 868(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1963).
48 279 Pa. 160,123 A.658(1924).
49 Id. At 162,123 A. at 659.
50 81 P.Super.Ct. 140(1923).
51 Id. At 144.
52 See Ludwig Baumann &I co.v. Roth,67 Misc.458,460,123 N.Y.S.191,192(Sup.Ct.1910).
53 U.C.C. §2-403(2).
54 U.C.C. §9-306(2).
55 See, e.g.,Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§600.5744(West Supp.1980).
56 E.g.,Mass.Ann.Laws ch.239, §4(Michie/Law.Co-op 1974).
57 Finigan v. Hadley,286 Mass.345,347-48,190 N.E.528,529(1934_.
58 Holloway v. Merchant's Transfer Co., 294 S.W.989,990(Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1927,no writ).
59 236 Mo.App.921,163 S.W. zd 128(1942).
60 296 Mass.531,6 N.E.zd 838(1937).
61 236 Mo.App. at 929,163 S.W.zd at 131-32.
62 294 S.W.989(Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1927,no writ).
63 Id. at 990.
64 286 Mass.345,190 N.E.528(1934).
65 Id. at 348,190 N.E. at 529.
66 See Nikolas v. Patrick,51 Mich.App.561,215 N.W.zd 715(1974).
67 See Flagg Bros.v. Brooks,436 U.S.149(1978).
68 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§3-202 (1), 7-501 (1), 8-302 (1).
69 See N.Y.L Revision Commission Rep.,Report and Appondices Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code 708,731(1956).
70 Young v. Colyear,54 Cal.App.232,201 P.623(1921).
71 E.g.,Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Storase Warehouse Co.,70 Mioc.565,127N.Y.S.306(App.Term 1911).
72 See Nikolas v. Patrick,51 Mich.App.561,215 N.W.zd 715(1974).
73 See generally J.Kent, Commentaries 634.
74 203 A.D.108,196 N.Y.S.414(1922).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 112,196 N.Y.S. at 418.
77 203 A.D. at 112,196 N.Y.S. at 418.
78 7F.zd 447(zd Cir. 1925).
79 Id. at 451.
80 Lord Mansfield would agree. See Green v. Farmer, 98 Eng.Rep.154(K.B.1768).
81 U.C.C. §7-307(1).
82 U.C.C. §7-209(3) (a).
83 See,e.g.,Hollis v. Chanberlin,243 Ark.201,419 S.W.zd116(1967).
84 Barthelmess v. Cavalier,z Cal.App.zd 477,478,38 P.zd 484,490(1934).
85 U.C.C. §7-209(3) (a).
86 U.C.C. §7-502(1).
87 U.C.C. §7-503. Comment 1.
88 U.C.C. §7-209, Comment 3.
89 U.C.C. §7-508(1) (a), (b).
90 See Mohun, The Effect of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,13 Colum.L.Rev.202(1913).
91 See T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 7-29(1978).
92 See. U.C.C. §7-209, Comment 2 (1952 version).
93 See R. Riegert &I R. Braucher,Documents of Title §4.2(1978),at 64-65.
94 See generally R. Brown,The Law of Personal Property 202-06(Raushenbush ed. 1978);L.Vold,Handbook of the Law of Sales 393-96(zd ed.1959).
95 See,e.g., U.C.C. §7-503(1), Comment 1.
96 See, U.C.C. §7-503(1), Comment 1.
97 U.C.C. §7-209(3), (1952 version).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See, U.C.C. §7-209, Comment 2 (1952 version).
101 See, U.C.C. §7-209(3) (1958 version).
102 Refer to notes (85)-67 supra and accompanying text.
103 Refer to notes (39)-113 supra and accompanying text.
104 U.C.C. §9-305.
105 For a discussion of field warehouse, see J.White &I R.Summers,Handbook on the Uniform Commercial Code 823-27(zd ed.1980).
106 See, e.g.cChrysler Corp.v. Adamatic,Inc.,59 Wis.zd 219,240,208 N.W.zd 97,107(1973).
107 See generally Dolan, Good Faith Purchase, supra note(3).
108 7 U.C.C.Rep. Serv. 535(N. Y. County Sup. Ct. 1970).
109 Id. at 536.
110 51 Mich.App.561,215 N.W.zd 715(1974).
111 Id. at 565-66,215 N.W.zd at 718.
112 Id. at 565-66,215 N.W.zd at 718.
113 Id. at 565-66,215 N.W.zd at 718.
114 Zuber v. Allen,396 U.S. 168,185(1969).
115 17 Wash.App.73,561 P.zd 1097(1977).
116 Id. at 76,561 P.zd at 1099.
117 532 S.W.zd 910(Tenn.1975).
118 U.C.C. §7-209, Comment3.
119 19 U.C.C.Rep. SerV. 1204 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 1976).
120 19 U.C.C.Rep. SerV. at 1205.
121 See,e.g.,Flagg Bros.v.Brooks,436 U.S.149,166(1978).
122 U.C.C. §7-209(3)(a).
123 Id.
1 K.Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales ⅹⅶ(1930).
2 Gilmore,The Commericial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase 63 Yale LJ.1057(1954).
3 See, e.g.,Emmanuel College v.Evans, 1Ch.Rep.18(1625).
4 G.Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 3-67(1977).
5 See,e.g.,Clarke v. Martin,92 Eng, Rep.6,6-7(K.B.1704).
6 See,e.g.,Gill v. Cubitt,107 Eng.Rep.806,806(K.B.1824).
7 See,e.g.,Kimball v. Cunningham,4Mass.502(1808).
8 R.Pothier, A Treatige of the Law of Obligations,or Contracts(2d ed.D.Evans trans. 1839).
9 Cf.Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor,36 Colum.L.Rev.745(1936).
10 See generally Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1057-58.
11 See generally Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1057-58.
12 Gilmore,supra note(2),at 1058-59.
13 See,e.g.,Hickey v. McDonald Bros.,151 Ala.497,44 So.201(1907);Uaion Stock-Yard & Transit Co. v. Mallory,son & Zimmerman Co.,157 Ill.554,41 N.E.888(1895).
14 See,e.g.,Junction Ry.v.Cleneay,13 Ind.161(1859);Carr v. LeFevre,27 Pa.413(1856)
15 See,e.g.,Hibbs v. Brown,190 N.Y.167,82N.E.1108(1907).
16 See generally 1 G.Gilmore,supra note(5).
17 For the historical beckground,see 1 G.Gilmore,supra note(5) §§7.3-7.4.
18 See id. §§7.6-7.9.
19 Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1063-68.
20 Id.at 1063.
21 See id.at 118-22.
22 Gilmore,Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments,13 Creighton L.Rev.447(1979).
23 Id.at 448.
24 Gilmore, supra note(23),at 452.
25 Id.at 452-56.
26 Negotiable Instruments Law(1896).
27 Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1058.
28 See,e.g.,Fawcett,Isham & Co.v.Osburn,Adams & Co.,32 Ill.411,425(1863).
29 For the text of Uniform Sales Act §24(1906).
30 See,e.g.,Henderson Baker Lumber Co. v. Headly,247 Ala,681,20 So.zd 81(1946);Drain v. LaGranse State Bank,303 Ill.330,135 N.E.780(1922).
31 See,e.g.,Hart v. Carpenter,24 Conn.427(1856);Levi v. Booth,58 Md.305,42Am.Rep.332(1882).
32 See Ballantine,Purchase for Vahue and Estoppel,6 Minn.L.Rev.87(1922).
33 See, e.g.,Beutel,The Negotiable Instruments Act should not be Amended,80 U.PA.L.Rev.368(1932).
34 For one example of this,see 14 Minn.L.Rev.696(1930).
35 The Case was Gazzola v. Lacy Bros.& Kimball,156 Tenn.229,229 S.W.1039(1927).
36 Some have attempted to draw that line.See Dolan.Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts:Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2,7,and 9 of the U.C.C.,30 Hastings L.J.1(1978).
37 Gilmore,supra note(23),at 461.
38 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,199 Ark. 1073,137 S.W.zd 260(1940),was one of the first "leading cases" in this area.
39 E.g.,Truth-In-Lending Act, IS U.S.C §1601(1976);Uniform Consumer Credit Code(1974).
40 See Rohner, Holder in Due Courses in Consumer Transaction:Requiem,Revival,or Reformation?60 Cornell L.Rev.503(1975).
41 Gilmore, Article 9:What It Dose For the Past,26 La.L.Rev.285(1966).
42 U.C.C. §9-105,Official Comment.
43 See Coogan,Article 9——An Agenda for the Next Decade,87YALe L.J.1012(1978).
44 See z G.Gilmore,Security Interests in Personal Property §8.1.
45 Id. §9.2.
46 268U.S.353(1925).
47 The Courts opinion in Benedict was noted in 39 Harv.L.Rev.253(1925) with qualified approval.
48 282 F.at 17.
49 Benedict v. Rather,268 U.S.353(1925).
50 Id.at 360.
51 See, e.g.,Russell v. Winne,37 N.Y.591(1868);Edgell v. Hart,9 N.Y.213(1853);Griswold v. Sheldoa,4 N.Y.580(1851).
52 Gilmore, supra note(23), §8.5.
53 See Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co.,38 F.2d 45(2d Cir.1930);second aqppeal,54 F.2d 318(2d Cir.1931);Brown v. Leo,12 F.2d 350(2d Cir. 1926).
54 See N.Y.U.C.C.(Mckinney 1964).
55 See generally Z G.Gilmore, Supra note(23),at 250-86.
56 See,e.g.,Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey,142 N.Y. 570,37 N.E.632(1894).
57 128 F.2d 564(2d Cir.),rev'd on rehearing,129 F.2d 892(2d Cir.1942).
58 128 F.2d at 566.
59 128 F.2d 892(2d Cir.1942).
60 See,e.g.,In re City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill,Z N.Y.2d 429,141 N.E.2d 575,161 N.Y.S.2d 67(1957);In re Gruner,295 N.Y.510,68 N.E.2d514(1946).
61 Allhusen v. Caristo Constr.Corp.,303 N.Y.446,103 N.E.2d 891(1952).But see Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,3 N.Y.2d 395,144 N.E.2d 387,165 N.Y.S.2d 498(1957).
62 U.C.C. §9-205.
63 U.C.C. §9-204.
64 U.C.C. §9-318(4).
65 U.C.C. §9-206.
66 U.C.C. §9-312(7).
67 U.C.C. §9-306.
68 318 U.S.434(1943).
69 See,e.g.,Dearle v. Hall,3 Russ.1,38 Eng.Rep.475(1828).
70 See 2 G.Gilmore, Supra note(23), §8.7.
71 Cf.id. §8.8.
72 128 F.2d 564(2d Cir.),rev'd on rehearing,129 F.2d 892(2d Cir. 1942).
73 11 U.S.C. §§101-151326(Supp.Ⅲ1979).
74 11 U.S.C. §547(Supp.Ⅲ1979).
75 See Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty:A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,87 YALe L.J.907(1978).
76 See,e.g.,In re Sanuels,526 F.2d 1238(5th Cir.1976).
77 See Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion:The German Version,89 Harv.L.Rev.1041(1976).
78 See,e.g.,Macaulay v. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.,[1974]1 W.L.R.1308(H.L.);Clifford Davis v.WEA Records,[1975] 1 All E.R.237(C.A.);Lloyds Bank v. Bundy,[1974] 3 All E.R.757(C.A.).
79 See G.Gilmore,Supra note(4),at 95-98;Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act:A Comment,4 Vt.L.Rev.247(1979);Davies,A Response to Slatutory Obsolescence:The Nonprimacy of Statute Act,4 Vt.L.Rev.203(1979);Gilmore,Putting Senator Davies in Context,4 Vt.L.Rev.233(1979).
1 U.C.C. §2—302.
2 See James v. Morgan, 1 Lev.111,83 Eng.Rep.323(1664).
3 Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code,45 Iowa L.Rev.843,863—65(1960).
4 Turner, Equity of Redemption 24—26(1931).
5 See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 Harv.L.Rev.198(1919).
6 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum.L.Rev. 629,635(1943).
7 Vance, Insurance §4(3d ed.1951).
8 Patterson, Supra note 5.
9 E.g., Bekkevold v. Ports, 173 Minn.87,216 N.W.790(1927).
10 Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P. zd 1272(1937).
11 New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417,189 N.W.815(1922).
12 Auction Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co.,104 Ore.541,209 Pac. 131(1922).
13 Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St 328, 140 N.E.118(1922).
14 Robert A.Munroe & Co.v. Meyer,[1930]2 K.B. 312.
15 U.C.C. §2—302(1), Comment 2.
16 U.C.C. §2—302, Comment 1.
17 U.C.C. §1—203.
18 See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666(1963).
19 Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 A.2d69(1955); Eastern Woodworks v. Vance, 206 Md. 419, 112 A. 2d 231(1955).
20 J. R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich.82, 235 N. W. 845(1931).
21 1 A Corbin, contracts §231; See, e.g., Webb v. Mc Gowin, 27 Ala. App.
22 U.C.C. §1—205.
23 U.C.C. §1—203, Comment.
24 U.C.C. §1—201(19).
25 U.C.C. §2—103.
26 U.C.C. §2—209, comment 1.
27 U.C.C. §2—305(2).
28 U.C.C. §1—208.
29 U.C.C. §2—508.
30 U.C.C. §1—203.
31 See, e.g., Scoutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant and Burclict; Contributions of the Law Merchant to the Common Law, in Ⅲ Selected Essays In Anglo-American Legal History, AALS(1909).
32 I bid.
33 U.C.C. §2—201(2).
34 U.C.C. §2—207(2).
35 U.C.C. §2—207(2)(c).
36 U.C.C. §2—316(2).
37 U.C.C. §2—315,comment 5.
38 U.C.C. §2—509(3).
39 U.C.C. §2—509(3).
40 U.C.C. §2—503, comment 3.
41 U.C.C. §2—603(1).
42 U.C.C. §2—104(1), and comment 2.
43 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§2—201(2), 2—207(2).
44 U.C.C. §2—104(3), and comment 1.
45 U.C.C. §2—207(2).
46 U.S.A. §63(1).
47 U.S.A. §66.
48 See Latty, asles aad Title and the Proposed Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3(1951).
49 U.S.A. §19.
50 U.S.A. §19 (2), (3), (4), (5).
51 Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales 79(1955).
52 Lewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond,15 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 166,167(1938).
53 I bid.
54 Comment to U.C.C. §2—101.
55 I bid.
56 U.C.C. §2—401, Comment 1.
57 National Dairy Products Crop. v. Gleeson, 72 Dauph. 112, 16 pa. D.& C. 2d 390(1958).
58 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Harv.L.Rev.561.568(1950).
59 I bid.
60 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J.821,825(1950).
61 Id, at 827.
62 U.C.C. §2—709,Comment 1.
63 U.C.C. §2—509,Comment 1.
64 U.C.C. §2—510.
65 U.C.C. §2—403.
66 See U.C.C. §§2—101, comment 1; 2—401, comment 1.
67 See 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 449; Murray, Sale in the Market Overt, 9 Int'l & Comp.L.Q. 24(1960).
68 Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441(1917).
69 Newberry v. Norfolk & So. R. R, 135 N. C. 45, 45 S.E.356(1903).
70 Warren, Cutting off claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L.Rev.476—77(1963).
71 See Whitney, The Law of Modern Commercial Practices §4(1958).
72 U.S.A. §23—25.
73 U.S.A. §24.
74 U.C.C. §2—403(1).
75 Ibid.
76 U.C.C. §2—403(1)(a).
77 U.C.C. §2—403(1)(b).
78 U.C.C. §2—403(1)(c).
79 U.C.C. §1—201(9).
80 U.C.C. §2—403(2).
81 UTRA §9(2)(a).
82 See examples given in 1 N. Y. L. Rev. Comm. Rep., U.C.C. §101(1954).
83 U.C.C. §2—403, comment 2.
1. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in Massachusetts, 13 Bus. Law.497 (1958).
2. Brocker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 541,545(1954).
3. Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 445-46 n. 8(1979).
4. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 Yale L. J. 1012(1978).
5. Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2,7, and 9 of the U.C.C., 30 Hastings L. J. 1(1978).
6. N.Y.L. Revision Commission Rep. Study of the U.C.C. 1800, 1817(1955).
7. R.Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 179-81 (2d ed. 1977).
8. N.Y.L. Revision Commission Rep., Report and Appendices Relating to the U.C.C.708, 731(1956).
9. Mohun, The Effect of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 202(1913).
10. T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 7-29(1978).
11. R. Brown, The Law le Personal Property 202-06 (Raushenbush ed. 1978).
12. L. Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales 393-96 (2d ed. 1959).
13. White, For a discussion of field Warehouse 823-26(2d ed. 1980).
14. R. Summers, Handbook on the U.C.C. 823-27(2d ed.1980).
15. Williston, The "cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrine and Policy Anomaly 62 Yale L. J. 101(1952).
16. Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 1114 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
17. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes (1943).
18. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 179 et seq. (1949).
19. Stumberge, Principles of Conflict of Laws 107 et seq.(9151).
20. Llewellyn, Cases an Materials on the Law of Sales 77 et seq. (1931).
21. Axelord, Chattel Security, 57 Yale L.J. 517,761(1948).
22. Billiard, The Law of Mortgages 236(1872).
23. Danill, Negotiable Instruments 170 ct seq. (4th ed.1891).
24. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, Harv. L. Rev. 241,244 (1900).
25. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Lawl0 Yale L.J.84, 87(1900).
26. Steffen and Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 Yale L.J. 799(1932).
27. Note, Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance, 60 Yale L.J.1218, 1223 n. 17(1951).
28. Ward and Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances c. 9(3rd ed.1948).
29. Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The Read Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable financing, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 62(1950).
30. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 j.Leg.Ed.457, 472(1954).
31. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sale Provisions of the U.C.C., 54 Va. L. Rev.198 (1968).
32. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under section 1-103 of the U.C.C., 72 Nw. L. Rev. 906(1978).
33. Ellinghans, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L.J.757, 779-80(1969).
34. Lewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harw.L.Rev.700, 703(1959).
35. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith, 39 U.Ptte.L.Rev.381 (1978).
36. Gordley, European Code and American Restatement: Some Difficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140(1981).
37. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 Corneli. L. Rev. 707(1978).
38. Carrow, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found Theke Ch. 6(1871).
39. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights 49 Proceedings of the Aristolelian Society 171,180(1949).
40. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously Ch. 2(1978).
41. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 Cornill L. Rev. 680(1962).
42. Gillitte, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 duke.L.J.619.
43. Weinberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif.L.Rev.375 (1975).
44. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the U.C.C., 30 U.Chi.L.Rev.666 (1963).
45. Weinberg, Good Faith Under the U.C.C.-A New Look at on Old Problems, 54 Marg.L.Rev.191971).
46. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Outy to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 392(1980).
47. Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in Law, Morality and Society 26(P. Hacker and J. Ra zeds.1977).
48. Moore, The Semanties of Judging, 54 S. Cal.L.Rev.151 (1981).
49. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L. J. Rev. 1057(1954).
50. K. Llewellyn, Case and Materials on the Law of Sale ⅹⅶ (1930).
51. R.Pothier, A Treaties of the Law of Obligations, Or Contracts (zd ed.D.Evans.1839).
52. Danziger, the Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 745(1936).
53. Ballantine, Purchase for Value and Estoppel, 6 Minn. L. Rev. 87(1936).
54. Beutel, The Negotiable Instruments Act Should not be Amended, 80 U. Pa.L.Rev.368 (1932).
55. Rohner, Holder in Due Courses in Consumer Transaction: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation? 60 Cornell L. Rev.503 (1975).
56. Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does For the Past, 26 La. L.Rev.285 (1966).
57. Jackson, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the U.C.C., Yale L.J.907 (1978).
58. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 Harv. L.Rev.1041 (1976).
59. Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 247(1979).
60. Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescene: The Nonprimacy of Statute Act,4 Vt.L.Rev.203(1979).
61. Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context, 4 Vt. L.Rev.233 (1979).
62. Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Pitt.L.Rev.1 (1969).
63. Dugan, Standardized Form contracts-An Introduction, 24 Wayne L. Rev.1307 (1978).
64. Dugan, Standardized Forms: Unconscionability and Good Faith, 14 New England L. Rev.711 (1979).
65. Alpa, Protection of Consumers against Unfair contract Term: Legislation Patterns of Controlling Adhesion Contracts in Europe, 15 Willamette L. Rev. 267(1979).
66. Dewey, Freedom of Contract: Is it Still Relevant?, 31 Ohio St. L.J 724(1970).
67. Epstein, Unconscionability:. A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L 293(1975).
68. Gluck, Standardized Form Contracts-The Contract Theory Reconsidered, 28 Int'l.L.Q. 72(1979).
69. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L.Rev.529 (1971).
70. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum.L.Rev.629 (1943).
71. Leff, Unconsionability and the Code-The Emperor's New clause, 115 U. Ra.L.Rev. 485(1967).
72. Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconsionability,63 Va.L.Rev. 1053(1977).
73. Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 Colum.L.Rev.679 (1973).
74. Green, Strict Liability Under Section 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex.L.Rev. 1185(1976).
75. Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 465 (1968).
76. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 Calif. L.Rev.28 (1977).
77. Gordon & Tenenbaum, Conclusive Presumption Analysis: The Principle of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw.u.L.Rev.579 (1976).
78. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 Ⅲ. L.Rev.205(1933).
79. Harfield, Secondary Uses of commercial Credits, 44 Col. L.Rev. 899(1944).
80. Backus and Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credits: The Dixon, Lrmaos Case, 52 Col.L.Rev. 589(1952).
81. Honnold, Letters of Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon Case: A Reply to Backus and Harfield, 53 Col.L.Rev. 504(1953).
82. Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Commercial Paper: The Faith of the Subjective Test, 39 S. Cal. L.Rev.48(1966).
83. Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of Commercial favor,36 Colum.L.Rev. 744(1936).
84. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law-Necessary Amendments, 16 Harv.L.Rev.255(1903).
85. Mckeehan, The Negotiable Instrument Law: A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy, 41 Am.L.Rev.437(1902).
86. McDonnell, The Floating Lienor As Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. Cal.L.Rev.429 (1977).
87. Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the: U.C.C. Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus.Law.153(1977).
88. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 Colum.L.Rev.375 (1971).
89. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filling Under Article 9(pts. Ⅰ and Ⅱ), 59 B.U.L.Rev. 1,209(1979).
90. Wiseman, Cash Sellers, Secured Financers and the Meat Industry of Articles 2 and 9 of the U.C.C., 19B.C.L.Rev.101 (1977).
91. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the U.C.C., 92 Harv.L.Rev.1013 (1979).
92. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13Ga.L.Rev.1221 (1979).
93. Dolan, The U.C.C. and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 Texas L.Rev.1147 (1978).
94. Warren, Cutting off Claim of Ownership Under the U.C.C., 30U.Chi.L.Rev. 469(1963).
95. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L.Rev.811 (1979).
96. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Iustruments in Early English Law, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 813(1938).
97. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 wis.L.Rev.513-26.
98. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45MichL.Rev.252(1947).
99. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 Yale L.J. 1135(1957).
100. Llewellyn, What Price Contract-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704(1931).
101. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Harv.L.Rev, 561(1950).
102. Corbin, The U.C.C.-Sale; Should It Be Enacted? 59Yale L.J.821(1950).
103. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 281(1979).
104. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic theory of Law 62 Minn.L.Rev. 1051 (1978).
105. Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner and the Economic Analysis of Law, 39 Ohio St.L.J 439(1978).
106. Rubin, Predictability and the Economic Approach to Law, 9 J. Legal Stud. 319(1980).
107. Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. Legal Stud. 319(1980).
108. Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt,8 Colum.L.Rev. 375(1908).
109. Pease, Market Overt in the City of London, 31L.Q.Rev. 270(1915).
110. Brickey, The Jurisprudence of Larceny: An Historical Interest Analysis, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 1101(1980).
111. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1138(1931).
112. Calabresi, Property Rules, Liability. Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv.L.Rev.1089 (1972).
113. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65(1977).
114. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 18 (1977).
115. Johnson, Economic Analysis, The Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems, 15 J.L.& Econ. 259(1972).
116. Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6 Harv.L.Rev. 24(1892).
117. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 367(1980).
118. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and The Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. Legal Stud. 367(1980).
119. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century American, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 513 (1974).
120. Mcclain, Legal Change and Class Interests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwitz' The Transformation of American Law, 68 Calif.L.Rev. 382(1980).
1. Daniel Keating, Sales-A System Approach, Aspen Law & Business, 1998.
2. Douglas Whaley, Problems And Materias On Commercial Law, zd ed., Aspen Law & Business, 1998.
3. James Brook, Sales and Leases, 3d ed, Aspen Publishers, Inc., 2003.
4. Luis E Del Duca, Egon Guttman & Alphonse M. Squilante, Problems and Materials On Negotiable Instruments, Anderson Publishing Company, 1993.
5. Lawrence P. King & Michael L. Cook, Creditors 'Rights, Debtor' Protection and Bankruptcy, Matthew Bender & Company Inc., 1989.
6. Robert N Leavell, Jean C. Love, Grant S. Nelson & Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Equitable Remedies, Restitution and Damages, West Publishing Company, 1996.
2 UCC§1-102(3)
3 UCC§1-102(3)(?)(1954)
4 UMIFORM Laws Annotated-Uniform Commercial Code 3.
5 UCC§1-201(19)
6 UCC§1-201(19)and comment
7 UNIFORM SALES ACT§76(2)
8 3 B. and C. 466, 107 Eng.Rep. 806(1824)
9 Cf. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U. S. 27(1935)
10 U. C. C.§1-201(19)(1950).
11 1951 A. B. A. Rep.126-28, 181.
12 U. C. C.§1-201(19).
13 U. C. C.§2-103(1)(b).
14 [1951] 1 N.Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 263.
15 U. C. C.§2-305(2).
16 U. C. C.§2-306(1).
17 U. C. C.§2-328(4).
18 U. C. C.§2-702(3).
19 U. C. C. §2-506(2).
20 U. C. C.§2-403(1).
21 U. C. C. §2-615(a).
22 U. C. C.§2-706(1).
23 U. C. C.§2-706(5).
24 U. C. C.§3-404(1), 3-406.
25 U. C. C.§3-410(3),and comment 6.
26 U. C. C.§3-417(1)(c)(2)(4).
27 U. C. C.§3-418.
28 U. C. C.§3-802(2).
29 U. C. C.§4-108(1).
30 U.C.C §4-2o7(b),4-4o1(2),4-4o4,4-406(1)(2)(b).
31 U. C. C. §5-114.
32 U.C.C. §5-114.
33 U. C. C.§6-110(2).
34 U. C. C.§7-203.
35 U. C. C. §7-206(2).
36 U. C. C.§7-210(5).
37 U. C. C.§7-304.
38 U. C. C.§7-308 (4).
39 U. C. C.§7-501(4).
40 U. C. C.§7-504 (2)(c).
41 U. C. C.§7-508.
42 U. C. C.§7-601.
43 U. C. C.§8-311.
44 U. C. C.§ 9-206.
45 U. C. C.§9-208(2).
46 U. C. C.§9-401 (2).
47 U. C. C.§2-103 (1) (b).
48 Uniform Sales Act § 76(2).
49 [1951] 1 N. Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 355, 357.
50 Ibid. Acorrd, Kovatch v. Hyde,47 Luz. L. ReG. 13(Pa. c. P. 1958).
51 U. C.C.§§2-402, 3-419(3), 3-506, 4-103, 5-109.
52 U.C.C.§2-306 (2).
53 U. C. C.§2-615(a).
54 U. C. C. §2-715(1).
55 U.C.C.§7-204(1).
56 U. C. C. §1-203.
57 Brocker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. Pitt. L. Bev. 541, 545(1954).
58 Jacksonville Tractor Co. v. Nasworthy, 114 so. zd 463(Fla. 1959).
59 U.C.C. §2-302.
60 U. C. C.§2-508.
61 [1955] 1 N. Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 311.
62 U. C. C. §§1-208, 2-603, 2-614, 2-615.
63 [1955] 1 N.Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 310, 311.
64 Id. at 315.
65 U. C. C.§2-103.
66 zb4 Pa. 304,107 Atl.711(1919).
67 U.C.C. §2-306(1).
68 See, e. g., Poland Coal Co. v. Rogers, z60 Pa. 118, 103 Atl. 559(1918).
69 U.C.C. §2-306 comment 2.
70 U. C. C.§2-306(1).
71 U. C. C.§2-306 comment 2.
72 [1955] 1 N. Y. Report of the Law Revision Commission 355,379.
73 3B.& C,466,107 Eng. Rep. 806(1824).
74 U.C.C. §4-103.
75 U.C.C. §8-302.
76 286F.2d 775(5th cir 1961)
1 See Appendix (containing text of § 205, it's comment, and accompanying Reporter's Note).
2 See generally Restatement of Contracts (1932).
3 Summers, Good Faith in Ceneral Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 198.(1968).
4 See generally Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code,72 Nw. L.Rev.906(1978).
5 See Ellinghans In Defense of Unconsionability, 78 Yale L. J. 757, 779-80(1969).
6 See generally Lewellyn, Book Review, 52Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703(1959).
7 See Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith, 39 U. Ptte. L. Rev. 381, 388-89(1978).
8 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note(3), at 198-99.
9 See generally Gordley, European Code and American Pestatemant: Some Difficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140(1981).
10 Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3), at216-52.
11 47Ali Proceedings 490(1970).
12 Compare Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205, Comments d-e, Reporter's Note(1979).
13 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3), at 195, 207-16.
14 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, comment a (1979).
15 Id. § 231(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
16 Id. § 231(Revised and Edited ed., Tent. Draft nos, 1-7, 1973).
17 一战后，德国经济恶性膨胀，合同的严肃性受到挑战．因为德国法一直追随罗马法的金融债务规则，称为“一马克主义”，即合同标的是一马克，无论经历多么久，给付的内容仍然是一马克，价金是不会变化的．但战后的恶性通货膨胀，使战前签订的许多合同变得一文不值．德国学者冯特曼提出“交易基础丧失理论”，虽然学者们对其理论有争议，但这一理论在矫正合同方面发挥着积极、重要的作用．这是问题的背景．
18 47ALI Poceedings 489-91(1970).
19 See Burton, Good Faith Purchase of a Contract Within Article 2 of the U. C. C., 67 Iowa L. Rev.1(1981).
20 See Summers,Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 Corneli. L. Rev. 707(1978).
21 1 Carrow, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found Theke ch. 6 (1871).
22 See, e. g., R. Robinson, Definition(1950).
23 3 Aristole Nicomachaen Ethecs (W. Ross. 1929).
24 J. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia 70-71 (GWarnock ed.1962).
25 Hart,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rrights, 49 Proceedings of the Ariotolelian Soliety 171,180(1949).
26 Woozley, Injustice, 7AM. Phil. Q. Mono. Ser. 109(1975).
27 Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3), at198-99.
28 See U. C. C.§1-201(19).
29 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a (1979).
30 Id.§ 205, Comments a, d, e.
31 See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev 384(1980).
32 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a.
33 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment d (1979).
34 See generally R. Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously Ch. 2(1978).
35 See Summers, Good Faith, Supra note(3),at 203, 215-216.
36 See Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement(Second) of Contracts, 67 Comill L. Rev.680(1962).
37 See, e. g.,Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 Duke. L. J. 619, 650.
38 See Weinberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 375, 422(1975).
39 See generally J. Dawson, The Oracles of Law 461-502(1968).
40 See Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3),at 196,207-16.
41 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,30 U. CHI. L. Rev.666,673-74(1963).
42 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment b(1979).
43 See, e. g., Button, Breach of Contract; Weinberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at on Old Problems, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 1(1971).
44 Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3), at 198.
45 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a(1979).
46 See, e. g., Blachly v. United States, 380F. zd 665, 671(5th cir. 1967).
47 See Holmes, supra note (7), at 385-87.
48 See Button, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 392-94(1980).
49 ld. at 393.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3),at 201-02.
53 Actually, only the latter is a law-philosopher.
54 See Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in Law, Morality and Society 26,43-56(P.Hacker and J. Raz eds.1977); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. Rev. 151, 237-38(1981).
55 See Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 Proceedings of the Ariototelian Society 171(1949).
56 Moore, supra note (54),at 237-42.
57 Id. at 239.
58 Button, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48),at 372-73 n. 17.
59 Id.at 373.
60 Holmes, Supra note (7), at 452.
61 Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48),at 378-94.
62 See also Burton, Article 2 Good Faith supra note (19).
63 Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48), at384.
64 See id. at 384-85.
65 Id. at 391.
66 See id. at 395.
67 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205,Comment d(1979).
68 See generally Summers, Good Faith, Supra note (3),at 232-43.
69 See generally Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48), at 387-92.
70 See the article by Professor Hillman in note (36) supra.
71 See Holmes, supra note (7).
72 Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note (3), at 21 n. 136; Burton, Breach of Contract, Supra note (48),at 232-43.
73 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment d (1979); Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3),at 232-43.
74 See Burton, Article 2 Good Faith, supra note (19),at 21 n.136.
75 Burton, Breach of Contract,Supra note (48),at 370-71 &I n.8.
76 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note (3), at 232-43.
77 Burton, Breach of Contract,Supra note (48), at 384.
78 Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE. L. J.619.
79 Id. at 645.
80 See id. at 204 n.46.
1 See Majors v. kalo Laboratorie, Inc., 407 F Supp. 20(M. D. Ala. 1975).
2 See discussion in Fchroeder v. Fageol Fotors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P. 2d 20 (1975).
3 附带条款指合同起草人没有在合同文本中规定而是希望通过协商而确定的条款．See e.g.Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, inc. 419F Supp. 1133(N. D. 111.1976).
4 See Wichiam v. Walker-Thoma Furniture co. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
5 这一特点为标准化合同提供了经济和商业效用．See Schwartz, A Reexamination of nonsubstantive Unconsicionability,63 Va.L.Rev. 1053,1067-70(1977).
6 See Dugan,An Introduction, 24 Wagn~ L.Rev.1307(1978)
7 See Restatement(Second) of Torts §402A(1965)
8 See U.C.C. §§-201(3),1-205,2-208
9 本条与其说是普通法的重述，不如说是普通法的否认，但它还是逐渐为法庭所接受．See Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1321 n. 50.
10 See Leff, at 490.
11 See Dugan, Unconscionability, Supra note 6, at 730-35.
12 See id, at 743-45.
13 See id., at 740-45.
14 See e. g, Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp. 290 A.2d 648 (Del.1972).
15 See Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Fatith: Good Faith Discloure in Contract Formation, 39. U. Pitt. L.Rev.381 (1978).
16 See Dugan, Unconscionability, Supra note 6,at 730-40.
17 See Manufactures Trust Co. v. Becker, 388U.S.304.310-14(1949).
18 See U. C. C. §2-103(1)b.
19 这些交易包括附条件买卖合同和委托合同．See U．C．C．§§1-201(37)，2-102，2-326，2-401(1)，9-102(2)．
20 See Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1976).
21 See Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act § 56(withdrawn 1951)要构成票据的瑕疵或所有权瑕疵的通知，被通知方必须现实地知道该瑕疵或知道他取得票据的希望是恶意的．《美国统一商法典》第一编第201条第(25)款[一个人在下列情况下被视为已得到关于某一事实的“通知”：1、它实际上已知道该事实；2、收到有关该事实的通告；3、据他了解的各种事实和情况，他有理由知道该事实的存在．]中对通知的客观定义现正实现着通知的功能，并在善意概念如何为其提供合适地位方面留下了根多疑问．
22 See Universal C. I. T Credit Corp. v. Shepler,164 Ind.
23 See U.C.C. § 2-306,Comment 2.
24 See U.C.C. §2-311. Comment 1.
25 在第二编第311条第(1)款中，合理商业限制不会基于协商的口头表示来保护预期；第306条第(1)款中不合理的差距的限制不会基于供应商或购买者营业的连续性来保护预期。
26 U.C.C. §1-203, Comment.
27 See U.C.C. §1-205(2), (reference to "expectaion").
28 U.C.C. §2-306, Comment 2.
29 See U. C. C. §2-313, Comment 4.
30 See U. C. C. §2-314, Comment 3.
31 See U. C. C. §2-603, Comment 1.
32 See U. C. C. §2-609, Comment 4.
33 See U. C. C. §2-612, Comment 5..
34 与善意相关的84个评论中，很少有将善意与占主导地位一方的意志状态相联系的．
35 See Dugan, An Introduction, Supra note(6), at 1329-30
36 其他法律规则即使没有说明保护预期的目的，但也仔细界定了如何保护预期．See e.g.,Restatement(Second) of contracts § 90(Tent, Draft No. 2, 1965).
37 如果卖方的提示交付或交付因不符合合同而被拒收，且履约时间还未超过．卖方可将其进行补救的意图及时通知买方，然后可在合同规定的时间内做出符合合同的交付；即使卖方所作的提示交付不符合合同，只要卖方原有合理理由相信，经过或不经过调整价格，买方是可以接受的，如果买方拒收，卖方应获得额外的合理时间来重新做出符合合同的交付，但卖方必须把此种意图及时通知买方．
38 除非买方拥有担保权益，当卖方在拒收地无营业场所或代理人时，商人买方拒收其占有或控制的货物后，有义务遵从卖方有关货物处置的合理指示；如果无此种指示，且货物易腐或价值面临迅速下降的危险，买方有义务做出合理的努力代表卖方将货物出售．如果买方做出要求后，卖方不能很快对买方处置货物所需支出给予补偿，卖方的指示即为不合理．
39 See U. C.C．§ 2-603(2).
40 如果合同规定，一方或其权益继承人有权“任意”或“在他认为自己处境不安全时”或在类似词句所规定的情况下要求对方提前付款或履约，或要求提供担保物，或要求增加担保物，此种规定应被解释为，只有当他善意地相信对方付款或履约的前景已受到损害时，他才有权这样要求．缺乏此种善意的举证责任由接到要求的一方承担．
41 See W Baumol, Economic Theory and Operation Analysis 266-69(1961).
42 See e.g, U.C.C. §§2-103(1)(b),2-306(1),2-311(1).
43 See U.C.C.§§2-202, 2-209(2),2-316(2),2-219(3).
44 法庭已经开始参考这三个因素，并用善意标准限制标准化条款的可预见性．See Arnott v．American Oil Co, 609 f. 2d 873(8th Cir. 1979).
45 See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L. J. 757 (1969).
46 See e. g, Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act § 56(withdrawn 1951).
47 Z F Haper & F James, Law of Torts 785 (1956).
48 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402 A(1965)
49 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402 A(1965).
50 See Z F Haper & F James, Law of Torts 785 (1956).
51 (45)See F Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence §54(2d, ed. 1877).
52 除了以预期为指向的规则，侵权法和合同法一般只保护基本预期，这一点在合同签订、调整和补救的合同规范中体现尤为明显．
53 See Restatement (Second) of contracts §90(Tent, Draft No. 2, 1965).
54 使用“善意信任”原则时，主要解决事实的检验者如何能够知道他人意识的内容，而这只可以从感觉到的表达中获悉，比如，一个人的言行举止或由此得出的合理含义，这就要求检验者从证言和证据所表达的东西中慢慢搜集，以便推论在特定情况下他的想法以及行为是否诚实．可以预见，专家的意见对事实的检验者来说是必要的帮助。
55 W LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 203 (1972).
56 在侵权行为中，按照惯例应参照行为人的表达、行为和不行为的内容来证明“引诱的故意”这个因素。
57 《美国统一商法典》的正式评论中很多关于善意、恶意的说明，主要关注的就是占主导地位一方行为的性质。
58 Schwartz, supea note 11, at 1067-70 Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6. 36(1969).
59 该条款表明本合同代表合同各方完整的和最终的协议，合同效力将超过一切非正式和口头协议的效力。
60 Compare S. M. Wilson CO. V. Snith Int'1, Inc, 587 F. 2d 1363. See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818(Ala.Civ.App.1976).
61 一些法庭要求提请买方注意一些特殊条款作为可预见性的前提条件．See Posttape Assoc v. Eastman Kodak Co.,537 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976)
62 See ones & Mcknight Corp. v. Birdsbore Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N. D. 11.1970)
63 See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ, App. 1976)
64 如果买方没有按照《美国统一商法典》第2-603条中善意的要求履行义务，则会承担赔偿卖方财产损失的责任。
65 See Larraburu Bros. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F. 2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1979)
66 See Franz Chen. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F. 2d 146 (9th Cir. 1979)
67 See O'Neil v. International Harvester Co.
68 一旦被接受为证据，该书面文件将产生最终协议的假定，但该假定并不是最终的，非起草方要证明假定不正确有责任举证．根据u．c．c．第2-313条第(1)款之规定，买方有责任证明：(1) 是卖方做出的法律要求的确认；(2) 事实是交易的基础；(3) 损害因质量担保范围内的事实而产生。
69 Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6. 36(1969).
70 See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
71 See Restatement of contracts §342(1932).
72 See Leff, supra note 10, at 522-25.
73 See U. C. C. §2-316(limited warranties), id.
74 这一标准隐含在实质显失公平的说明之中，比如“一方被剥夺了协议中的所有利益或对对方的违约没有任何补救措施”．See Bank of Indiana v．Holyfield，476 F Supp．104，110(S．D．Miss．1979)
75 See Tuner v. Department of Employment Security and Bd. of Review, 423 U. S. 44(1975).
76 “实际合同规则”是指交易惯例．交易习惯程序、履行习惯程序，或者是除双方协议和法律规定外，作为合同条款来源的对方希望．See U．C．C．§§1-201
77 See U.C.C.§§9-501to507.
78 根据《美国统一商法典》第1-208条判决的案件大多数有利于债权人，但找不到一个有利于债权人的案件包含了假定。
79 Compare Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler,164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N. E.2d 620(1975).
80 See Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc, 594 F. 2d 129(5th Cir.)善意义务不适用于推翻或损害明示的合同条款．
81 于是买方取得货物占有的行为与法典第2-206条关于发价接受和货物接受的规定具有相对性．错误表示和没有表示的事实与谨慎、实质性和信赖是相关的．See generally Blackie v．Barrack，524 F．2d 891(9th Cir．1975)．
82 第1—201条规定的“履行习惯”被“本法另有规定”所限制。
83 虽然正式评论仅提及贸易惯倒和交易的习惯程序是本部分的补充，但相同的推理证明了对第2-208条的相似解释．See U.C.C. §§1-203, Comment 1 ￡2.
84 See U. C. C. §§2-208, Comment 3.
85 Restatement(Second)of Torts §402 A(1965) and U. C. C. §§2-314(1),2-714(1).
86 See 3A A. Corbin, Contracts § 754 (1960).
87 Compare Jones & Mcknight Corp. v. B irdsbore Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N. D. Ill. 1970).
88 See S. M. Wilson & Co. v. smith Int'l Inc., 587 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1979).
89 该款规定的有限补救不能实现时对其他合同条款有无影响并不清楚，按本条规定，如果实质目的不能实现，则“按照本法规定提供补救”．正式评论认为如果补救仍不能实现其目的，则“应当根据本条规定提供一般补救的途径”．
90 See G. Fridman, The Law of Contract 286-310 (1976).
91 See Jones & Mcknight Corp. v. Birdsbore Corp, 320 F Supp. 39 (N. D.Ill. 1970).
92 See generally K. Liewellgn The Common Law Tradition 362-71(1960).
93 其他阻碍恢复补救请求权的因素包括卖方善意的实行派他的补救措施及机器的复杂性等．
94 Compare Jones & Mcknight Corp. v. Birdsbore Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N.D.Ill.1970).
95 See Eddy, on the "Essential" Purpose of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2),65 Calif. L. Rev. 28(1977).
1 Gutteridge. Comparative Law-An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research 94(2d ed. 1949).
2 U. C. C §1-203.
3 U. C. C §1-201(19).
4 U. C. C §2-103(1)(b).
5 Compare, e. g., U. C. C §2-306(1).
6 Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE CODE § 1493(1941).
7 §8(d), 61 Star. 142(1947), 29 U. S. C. §158(d) (1958).
8 § 2(b), 49 Star. 1526(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
9 § 141, 52 Star. 887(1938), 11 U. S. C. § 541(1958).
10 § 2, 70 Star. 1125(1956), 15 U. S. C. § 1222(1958).
11 See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L. J. 1057(1954).
12 U. C. C §§ 3-205, 3-302.
13 U.C. C § 1-203.
14 U. C. C § 7-404.
15 U.C.C §3-417(1) (c).
16 U.C. C § 1-203.
17 U.C.C §§2-305(2),2-311(1).
18 U.C.C §2-306(1).
19 U. C. C § 2-603 (3).
20 U.C.C §9-318(2).
21 Gerseta Corp. V. Wessex-Campbell Silk co., 3F. 2d 236, 238(2d Cir. 1924).
22 See Restatement Contracts § 504(1932).
23 Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Lay 124-25(1955).
24 5 Holdsworth, A Hiotory of English Law 79-81(2d ed. 1937).
25 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640(K. B. 1801).
26 3B. &I C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K. B. 1824).
27 Goodman v. Harvey, 4A. &I E. 87D, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011(K.B. 1836).
28 In Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How. ) 343(1857).
29 Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9Current Legal Prob. 16, 25(1956).
30 The Standard is explicit in U.C.C §§2-306(1), 2-311(1) and 9-318(2).
31 American Bar Association Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. Law. 119, 128(1951).
32 U. C. C §3-302(1)(b).
33 American Bar Association Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, supra note(31).
34 See, e.g., U.C. C § 1-201(9).
35 U.C.C §2-311(1).
36 U.C. C § 2-305 (2).
37 U.C. C § 1-203, comment.
38 U.C.C §2-209.
39 U. C C § 2-209, comment 2.
40 U.C.C § 1-102(1).
41 U.C.C §2-311(1).
42 Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. Rev. 457, 475(1949).
43 U.C. C § 1-102, comment 1.
44 U.C. C § 1-203, comment.
45 U. C. C § 1-205 (3).
46 U.C.C §2-508.
47 U. C. C § 1-102, comment 1.
1 See Dnorkin, Is Wealth a value?,9J. Legal Stud. 191,220-222(1980).用确定一个理论预见能力的方法来检验这个理论，而不管理论的预设，这样做在方法论的意义上可以是正确的．但是，即便是最坚定的经济解释方法的维护者都不得不承认，司法行为理论中的利益可以解释为什么普通法向重效率的方向发展。
2 See generally M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860(1977)[hereinafter cited as Transformation].
3 See e. g., Fawcett, Isham &I Co. V. osborm, Adams &i Co., 32 Ⅱ 11. 411 (1863).
4 See Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of goods, 9J. Legal Stud. 569(1980)[hereinafter cited as Sales Law].
5 See generally 5W. Holdsworth, AHistory of English Law 104-105(2ded.1937).
6 ZW. Blackstone, commentaries 449-55(Bell ed.1771).
7 See Pease, The Change of the Properth in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 378, 379(1908).
8 2E. Coke, The Institute of the Laws of England 713(1642).
9 Id.at 714.
10 Id. at 716-17.
11 See generally Williams, Book Review, 25 U.C.L.A.L.Rev.1187,1200-05(1978).其实，形成公开市场原则的英国法官可能也有分配正义和政治方面的动机。王室、市场的准入者或者公平经营权的批准者通过获得摊位费和服务费而从市场活动中获益。并且配备良好的市场可以为古老的庄园和城镇吸引充足的食物供应，从而有助于避免不良的社会现状。英国法庭将这个原则限制在16世纪的范围内，可能是因为孕育这个原则的市场和集市体系的衰落。
12 在美洲殖民地使用公开市场原则的可能性令人感兴趣．不幸的是，很多殖民地时期的法律都已经消失或难以找到，但是毫无疑问，殖民地有关于解决所有者与被盗货物的购买人之间永恒争议的法律方法，并且，如果所有权的问题在英国原则指导下解决也并不奇怪。贸易联系和英国传统保证了英国法律在美洲殖民地的影响，并且，殖民者渴望从英国和欧洲大陆进口货物，特别是制成品．但是值得怀疑的是吸引英国或欧洲商人是否是殖民地接受这个规则的重要动机．进出口大都集中通过大不列颠进行，并遵守《航海法案》，并且作为母国即使没有重商主义的政策，英国也是自然和主要的贸易来源，殖民地市场的法律也暗示将接受公开市场原则．(这里是国内法，前述为国际贸易法)早在1633年波士顿和其它城镇就拥有了常规市场或集市．殖民地法律按照英国模式建立市场和集市．例如，纽约制定法律，规定市场和集体应当包含市场法庭，而市场法庭处理案件要遵从正在适用、应当或可能适用英国集市习惯或惯例的集市的自由习惯，殖民地也有司法上参照公开市场买卖的案例。但是，以上材料并不代表殖民地已经接受了公开市场原则．在独立后的公开市场案例并没有涉及殖民地法律原则，也许是人们认为新成立的国家与此无关．
13 G. Gaines,1Lex Mertatoria Americana 374(1802).
14 Law of September 23, 1780, ch. 908, §7.《1780年9月23日法案》，该法案规范公众拍卖式买卖．在堆塞克诉维尔案中，一位丢失的或被盗的马匹的购买人，主张该法显示在本法案通过前宾西法尼亚州就已有公开市场．法庭和陪审团同意马匹所有者的观点，认为购买人所引用的法律规定所有者不丧失被盗马匹的所有权．但是，法律保护善意购买人，他们可以要求赔偿他们为马匹所支付的金钱，如果所有者在马匹被盗后六个月之内提出主张．这种处理方法与大陆法相似．
15 Editor's Notes to the Institute of Justinian 472-73, 617(T. cooper ed, 1812).
16 See note 12 supra. The operation ofthe Baltimore public market is described in Browning v. Magill, ZH. SJ. 169(Md. CT.App. 1808).
17 这个进程得到了公众的支持．托马斯·杰弗逊成为这一发展的宣扬者．尽管他个人倾向相反的观点，因为这个进程是国内大多数人的愿望．《1789年宪法》预示和促进这个市场的形成．See generally American Growth, supra 12, at 96-98, 113-23, 128-33,153-60.
18 R. Wade, The Urban Frontier 87-91, 122-24, 271, 289-90(1959).
19 See 2 Kent's Commentaries on American Law 324 n.a(4th ed.1840)
20 See, e. g., Kitchell v. Vanadar, 1 blat. k. 356(Ind. 1825).
21 See Browning v. Magili, 2H. 8c. J. 269(Md. Ct. App. 1808).
22 See Southwick v. Harndell, 2 Dane's Abridgement, at 286(1823).
23 1 Yeates 478(Pa.1795).
24 1 Yeates at 479, quoting J. Kelying, A report of Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown 48(1708).
25 See Davis v. Hampton, 4Mart. (n. s.)288, 291(La. 1826).
26 See generally Sales Law, supra note 4, at 574-79.
27 1 Yeats at 479.The authority was J. Kelying. A Report of Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown 48(1708).
28 I Tyl, 338(vt. 1802).
29 Id. at341.
30 See Sales Law, supra note 4, at581-84.
31 1 Tyl. at341.
32 See Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend.285,296-99,315(N.Y.1839)(opinion of Senator Furman).
33 1 Johns. 472 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1806).
34 Id. at 479.
35 2 Kent's Commentaries, supra note 19, at317.
36 1 Johns. supra note 33, at480.
37 Id. at480.
38 See Sales Law, supra note 4, at584-85.
39 See generally Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. Legal Stud. 65(1977).
40 See generally J. Benjamin., A Treatise on the Law of Personal Property § 433(4th ed.1884).
41 See, e.g.,Titcomb v. Wood.,38Me.561 (1854).
42 19 Mass.(2 Pick) 184(1824), at201.
43 See Sales Law, supra note 4, at583.
44 19 Mass.(2 Pick) at202.
45 19 Mass.(2 Pick) at203.
46 Johnson, Economic Analysis, The Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems, 15J. L. 8t Econ. 259. 260-68(1972).
47 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S (6 Cranch)87,133-34(1810).
48 See generally C. Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Polities in the New Republic(1966).
49 19 Mass.(2 Pick) at201.
50 8 Cow. 238 (N. Y.Sup.Ct.1828).
51 1 Johns. 472(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1806).
52 8 Cow. at242.
53 See generally Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 244(1892).
54 Rex v. Pears, 168 Fng Rep. 208, 209(K.B. 1779).
55 See F. Pollock 8i R. Wright, Possession in the Common Law 131-32,218-20(1888).
56 Parker v. Patrick, 101 Eng. Rep. 99(K. B. 1793).
57 21 Hen. 8, C. 11(1529).
58 3 Cai.R.182(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1805).
59 29 Mass.(12 Pick.)307(1832).
60 Id. at311.
61 Id. at312-13.
62 See generally L.Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales320-22(1st ed.1931).
63 See, e. g., Marston v. Baldwin, 17,Mass.606(1822).
64 See Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267, 283(N. Y. 1838).
65 Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 572(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
66 See generally S. Williston, Sales of Goods §§311-30(1909).
67 See American Growth, supra note 12, at50-52, 67.
68 See, e. g., Williams v. Merle, 11 Wend. 80(N. Y. Sup. Ct.1833).
69 20 Wend. at284-85.
70 Id, at269.
71 Id, at274.
72 Id, at283.
73 Id, at286.
74 See also Carmichael v．Buck, 4_4 S．C．L．(10 Rich．)322(1857)．在本案中，如果陪审团认为哈金斯有权销售那是不合适的，因为那样就没有任何木材所有者委托承运人而不面临受损失的风险．一个明显的答案是，让所有者雇佣诚实或负责任的承运人；另一个方法是让所有者以某种适当的方法表明承运人既不是所有者也不是买卖代理人．Id，at339．
75 20 Wend. at 276, 279-80.
76 In Parsons v. Webb, 8 Me. 38(1831).
77 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations xi (Cannan ed. 1976).
78 See G. Becker, Economic Theory 25-26,69(1971).
79 See Transformation, supra note 2, at100-01.
80 See generally, e. g., Jordan, An Economic Analysis of The Law of False Advertising, 8J. Legal Stud. 527(1979).
81 See Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commerciai Code, 30U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 475(1963).
1 See 2 Williston, Sales § 318,319(Rev.ed.1948).
2 Id. At 374.
3 Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N. Y. 212, 163 N. E. 737(1925).
4 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 150 Ore.172, 38 P. zd 48, rehearing, 150 Ore. 203,43 P.zd 1078(1935).
5 See Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24, 102 Pac. 799(1910).
6 如果可以证明卖方迟延，那么卖方就不能从善意购买人处取回货物。大多数的案件涉及以无效支票进行的支付．戚利斯顿教授长期以来就反对将支票案件作为现金买卖来对待．虽然此理论在威利斯顿教授《论买卖》第一版中被提出时并没有判例法的支持，但是现在的案例表明法庭正在开始利用这个理论．威利斯顿教授的《论买卖》收集了一些近来的案例，这些案例毫无例外的涉及了以下情节：欺诈人从商人A处购买了汽车，又立即转手卖给商人B，B在购买时没有要求对方签发所有权证书或作其它所有权标记．《统一商法典》试图抛弃现金买卖理论．第2-401条第(1)款(b)项：“如果一个协议改变了特定化的效果或损害了善意购买人的权利，那么这个买卖合同就不是现金买卖”。此外，第2-403条第(2)款规定：“如果将货
物委托给从事该种货物交易的商人占有，该商人即有权力将委托人的权利全部转让给正常交易中的买方．”第1-201条第(9)款对“正常交易中的买方”进行了界定，排除了当铺老板和从农民处购买产品的人．
7 NIL § 1.
8 NIL § 16. NIL § 30.
9 See NIL § 119, see the cases Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law 1114 ct seq.(7th ed., Beutel,1948).
10 这个命题明显是不言自明的，所以《流通票据法》和《统一商法典》都没有对其规定。但对于股权证书和所有权证书这一点就不那么明显了，所以有关法规规定了相关条款。
11 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 349(1934).
12 NIL § 24, NIL§ 16, NIL§ 14, NIL § 59, NIL §45.
13 NIL § 66.
14 See generally Britton, handbook of the law of bills and notes, §§ 100,101(1943).
15 Id. at112.
16 NIL § 25.
17 NIL § 58.
18 NIL § 57.
19 Cf. Restatement, Contracts § 151 (1932).
20 See Restatement, Contracts § 170(1932).
21 See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 179 et seq. (1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 107 et seg. (1951).
22 See Goodrich, op cit. supra note Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 179 et seq. (1949); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 107 et seg. (1951).
23 See the discussion in 4 Corbin, Contracts § 902(1951).
24 See Restatement, Contracts § 175 (1932).
25 See Restetement, Contracts § 167 (1932).
26 NIL § 5.
27 NIL § 3.
28 Bullet v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29,1 Salk 130(K.B.1704).
29 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9(1704)
30 See such cases as Clark v. Young &i Co., 1 Cranch 181(U. S. 1803);Mandeville v. Riddle, l Cranch 290 (U. S. 1803); Harris v. Johnston 3 Cranch 311(U. S.1805).
31 NIL § 2 (2).
32 NIL § 2 (3).
33 NIL § 2 (5).
34 NIL § 5(3).
35 NIL § 5 (2).
36 NIL § 5(1).
37 NIL § 5 (4).
38 Compare UCC §§ 3-105,3-106,3-109,3-110,3-112 with NIL §§1-8.
39 See Scollans v. Rollins,179 Mass.346,60 N.E.983(1901).
40 Or of Course might not. See United States Fid.&i Guar.Co.v. Newburger,263 N.Y.16,188 N.E.141(1933).
41 See 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations §5109(1932).
42 Id. at5262.
43 USTA §7．
44 USTA §15．
45 USTA §13．
46 USTA §4．
47 USTA §7．
48 商业单据的发展并不仅仅是普通法的事情，涵盖提单、仓单或两者的法规早己出现．明显受到《代销商法》影响的《1858年纽约法》规定，“仓单……可以通过背书转让，经过如此转让的受让人应当被认为是货物的所有人……但是，所有仓单如果在票面简单记载或加盖了‘不可流通’的字样，应当被认为是本部分规定的例外。”康涅狄格州在1878年照搬了纽约法．1866年宾夕法尼亚州法规也有同样的效果，只有一点不同，它涵盖了提单和仓单并增添了这些单据“应当可以流通”．1878年马萨诸塞州规定“存放在公共仓库中的货物或动产的所有权可以以背书加交付仓单的方式转移给购买人或质权人……”．另外一种说法是1876年路易斯安娜州法规，规定这种单据可以在汇票和本票同样的范围内流通。法院并不认为这些法规赋予了它们所涉单据完全的可流通性。联邦最高法院在其首要判例士沃案中，有机会承认一张被盗提单的人的权利．法庭发现没有必要决定宾夕法尼亚州法规是否优先于密苏里州法规，因为根据两个法规提单“以背书加交付的方式转让，转让方式同汇票和本票，”其实说的都是一个意思．法庭判决认为法规的意图仅仅是描述流通的方式，而不是界定转让的效果．斯庄法官写道：“没有任何一个法规会被解释为……基于没有合理表达的普通法而作的革新．特别是如此重大的革新，它可以使提单制度的各个方面都建立在与汇票相同的基础之上，我们不能够从没有它也可以令人满意的语句中得出革新的结论．法律非常小心地保护着除了金钱之外的私人财产的所有权，使其免受他人的侵占，即使财产并不为其占有。”提单的“真正所有人”，即使没有委托的证据也被保护．所以即使早期法规有所规定，普通法的发展应该说还是比较顺利的。
49 See Llemellyn,Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales 77 ct.seg.(1931).
50 See., e.g., Quality Shingle Co.v. Old Oregon Lumber &i Shingle co.,110 Wash.60,187 Pac.705(1920).
51 Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited as USA) §27.
52 USA §§ 28,29.
53 USA §33．
54 USA §39．
55 USA §37．
56 USA §36．
57 《统一仓单法》第46条的规定以及《统一提单法》第37条的相似规定并没有立即为法庭接受。得克萨斯州有一个案例，它将卖方对质量的担保责任强加给了因担保而取得提单的持票人．一系列单据法的通过使得克萨斯州放弃了得克萨斯州原则，但有些司法区还在遵守．作为起草人之一，威利斯顿教授在后来对本评论的编辑的交流中坚持说该法的规定完全清楚(这一点曾为哥伦比亚州评论怀疑过)并且遵守得克萨斯州原则的判例毫无疑问已经被推翻。委员会记录收集了这些案例，评价得克萨斯州原则“与权威和理智相背”．从二十世纪二十年代以后真理似乎成为了主流。The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act §46．
58 1916年国会通过的《联邦提单法》适用于州际或国际提单，统一州法和联邦法的规定有些区别，但是关于可流通的部分是一样的．联邦法的通过无疑解释了为什么统一州法没有像《统一仓单法》一样为所有司法区所接受。
59 有十六个州通过了《统一仓单法》的修正案，此外，伊达荷州通过了第47条的修正案而没有通过相应的第40条．《统一买卖法》修正案为十三个州、哥伦比亚州和夏成夷特区通过．马里兰州和北达科他州通过第32条而没有通过相应的第38条．通过了一个修正案的州并不一定就通过另一个修正案．
60 For an attempt to sketch the background, see Gilmore &i Axelord, Chattel Security,57 Yale L.J.517,761(1948).
61 See 1 Hilliard, The Law of Mortgages 236(1872).
62 当然也有例外的判决．在斯庄案中，法庭评论说附有不动产抵押担保的本票“不是经常为商人称为商业票据的东西；并且……可以属于附属权利，而严格意义上的商业票据不可以……”所以这样的本票不可流通，或者在某种程度上作为被告的购买人知道由抵押产生的所有附属权利．在马萨诸塞州，由抵押担保的本票仍然不可流通。加里弗尼亚州认为抵押本票不可流通是基于以下原因，抵押权人在对本票提起诉讼之前要先对抵押财产行使求偿权．加里弗尼亚州的规则最终被《流通票据法》所改变．蒙大拿州遵从麦雅案的先例与加里弗尼亚州具有相同的抵押规则：要求在诉诸诉讼前用尽抵押担保．
63 See 1 Danill, Negotiable Instruments 170 ct seg.(4th ed. 1891).
64 See annotation in 127 A．L．R．190(1940)．大多数的早期案件似乎涉及到了因为没有对价而产生的抵押人的抗辩．早期案件中涉及的附加权利主要是留置的优先权．问题不是一个人欺诈性的转移一个抵押权，而是根据多个不同的抵押权产生的多个实际占有土地的权利，其中经常伴随着由最初抵押权人欺诈性的放弃一个抵押权的情况．当然，这里登记法规是使其更加复杂的一个因素．所以在路易斯案中法忘判决本票和抵押的善意购买人不得优先于财产的善意购买人，一旦抵押没有登记或即使登记却被抵押权人放弃．另一方面，在巴博格案中，法庭认为因为登记法规并没有要求抵押的转让需要登记，所以本票和抵押的善意购买人应当被保护，他可以对抗信赖错误登记的收款人的放弃权利记录的后续抵押权人．在文尼案中，法庭认为本票和抵押的正常业务中的持有人不受任何他不知晓的在先留置权的影响，纽约法院在古德案中同样在正常业务中的持有人的抵押权因转让人的欺诈而在先登记于先前抵押时，保护了正常持有人．但是，一些州开始反对这些结论，并拒绝赋予抵押可流通性．在伊利诺斯州反对这一规则的判例法为后来的《伊利诺斯州动产抵押法》所肯定，它规定所有被动产抵押担保的本票必须在票面上记载担保方式及在转让时承担一切抗辩，如果本票不记载，抵押将完全无效．
65 See, e.g., Story, Promissiory Notes §22 (1859).
66 See Britton Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes §§14,15(1943).
67 45 & 46 Vict.,c.61.
68 Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law,14 Harv.L.Rev.241,244(1900).
69 Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 Yale L.J.84,87(1900).布鲁斯特法官在《流通票据法的辩护》中说道，“这条规定(第3条第(2)款)的意图在于将‘动产本票’这样的交易包括进来，从而使原本对它区别对待的法律统一起来，这正如丹·艾米思在案件中表达的一样。”
70 《流通票据法》第一版中的案件综述是解释性的．衣阿华州法院在艾利逊案中认为如果本票由抵押担保 并且收款人同意以抵押担保寻求偿付，那么本票背面的协议就是本票的一部分，并且该本票是不可流通的．在做出这个判决的时候法庭引用了《流通票据法》的第1条第(2)款而不是第3条第(2)款．纽约法庭认为债券是可流通的，虽然关于信托的条款限制了债券持有人的权利．如同衣阿华州法庭一样，纽约法庭引用了第1条第(2)款而非第3条第(2)款．在索普案中，威斯康辛州法院从一个涉及本票的案件中得出一个结论，认为：“本票的支付由不动产抵押担保，期限如述．如果发生利益支付违约或不符合附加抵押中的任何条件或协议，那么所有的资金将由抵押权人处理……到期或无需通知支付或其它方式．”含有关于税收和保险的支付普通协议(有人认为已经引入了本票)的本票是不可流通的．这是一个精心设计的结论，法庭认为这种本票可以流通．法官和律师又一次认为与第3条第(2)款是无关的：被引用的条文是第1条(全文)，第2条第(3)款(关于定额)和第4条第(3)教(关于可确定的未来时间)．
71 See Steffen and Russell，The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 Yale L.J．799(1932)．纽约州霍布斯案似乎是《流通票据法》与投资证券的第一次讨论．上诉法庭认为债券是可流通的，所以此法的适用性或不可适用性问题就似乎有些重要了．后来案例中适用《流通票据法》判决债券不可流通的是王者畜牧公司案．《流通票据法》适用于证券的论证如下：(1) 正如英国《汇票法》序言中描述这部法规是“将有关汇票，支票和本票的法律法典化的法律”，同样《流通票据法》的序言证明了它是“与可流通票据相关的一般法律．”(2)《流通票据法》第1条以一种强制性的条款表达了：“票据如果可以流通，必须符合如下要求”；但是似乎没有一个论点对评论者来说有说服力．
72 Steffen, Cases on Commercial and Investment Papers 251-75(1939).
73 President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,242 N.Y.38,43,150 N.E.594,595(1926).
74 Id.at 50,150 N.E.at 598.
75 Id.at 50,150 N.E.at 598.
76 N.Y.Laws 1926,c.704;N.Y.Pers.Prop.Law §§260-2.
77 N.Y.Pers.Prop.Law §262.
78 249 N.Y.263,164 N.E.45(1928).
79 Enoch v. Brandon,249 N.Y.263,266,164 N.E.45,46-7(1928).
80 Id．at 268, 164 N．E．at 47．《霍夫斯代德法》最初仅适用于“担保收据”(莫根案中所涉及的一种暂时证书)和“设备信托证书”．在尹诺赤案之后，立法承认了双重起诉，将公司债券增加到了法案的范围之中．
81 只有一个案例认为没有登记的公司债券是不可流通的．抵押因为可获得的支付资金而受到限制，这个案件因为此法律依据而不适用先例。认为包含了其它请求人的权利的债券是可流通的判例很多，但是，当债券依照非讼条款的可执行性问题进行解释的时候，有些判决结果就是不可流通。这些案件在这些条款的可执行性上平等地分成了两派。一派认为非讼条款禁止债券持券人提起诉讼．另一派认为不论在信托合同中是否有非讼条款，都应当允许债券持券人提起诉讼。
82 U．C．C．Art．8．而《统一商法典》第八编赋予“投资证券”完全的可流通性。“证券”在第八编第102条中的定义为“除上下文另有所指外，本编中“证券”指具有下列特征的票据：(a)以不记名或记名方式发行；并且(b)通常在证券交易所或证券交易市场买卖，或在其发行地或买卖地被公认为投资媒介；并且(c)系一类或一系列票据之一，或按其条款规定，可被分解为一类或一系列票据；并且(d)证明对某项财产或某个企业的分享、参与或享有其它权益，或证明发行人承担某项债务”。
83 高利贷法不适用的原因是，至少在该法的预期中，没有任何一种借贷可以包含一个单纯比现金买卖价格更高一些的信用买卖。
84 See,e.g.Hughbanks,Inc.v.Gourley,12 Wash.zd 44,120 P.zd 523(1941)．不管是《统一附条件买卖法》或非统一的附条件买卖立法对这一要求有严格规定．
85 Sloan v. McCarty,134 Mass.245(1883).
86 Worden Grocer Co. v. Blanding, 116 Mich.254,126 N.W.212(1910);Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Co.,145 N.C.120,58 S.E.909(1907).
87 See, e.g.,Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co.,316 Ill.App.79,43 N.E,.zd 857(1942).
88 191 Cal.364,216 Pac.376(1923).
89 对于这一点，索莫维里案的观点为买方适用“无法律手续的禁止反言”原则留下了可能性，法庭明显认为“无法律手续的禁止反言”是指如果买方在回应询问时直接向受让人表达他没有抗辩权，他将受此陈述的约束。在此法律根据上，有人提出索莫维里“远不是拒绝接受合同的可流通性，事实上是认可了它的使用。”这个意见显然不会为金融公司接受，因为大规模操作的昂贵和繁琐，同时也因为金融公司，像其他借贷人一样，希望无需询问就免于抗辩．
90 Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall,61 Utah 223,211 Pac.991(1922).
91 在1920年到1930年之间，尤他州的豪尔在给予切断抗辩条款效力的问题上非常孤立，而相反的索莫维里案却有其它的四个判决支持．在1930年到1940年之间这个均势被打破了．追随索莫维里案的只有三个案件，而在此期间有五个案件支持了切断抗辩条款．
92 See Britton,．Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes §14(1943)．尽管有些根据《流通票据法》判决的早期案例和两三个少数司法区在这一问题上顽固不化，但是附条件买卖的本票原则上会被判定为不可流通的恐慌并没有被证实．在上述近来的发展之外，附条件买卖本票和抵押本票应当同样对待，本票与附条件买卖合同相联系的单纯陈述在大多数司法区不会损害可流通性．
93 在1940年以前判决高利贷法适用于消费买卖金融的唯一几个案件就是库彻斯特城市法院中汤姆普金斯的两个判决．阿肯色州的最高法院也声称在将来它会在高利贷法的规定下考虑融资费用．我们认为即使融资费用应当被规范，适用已经过时的、粗劣起草的、充满了例外的高利贷法也不可能达到这个结果．
94 NIL §59．Id, §102-104．
95 See Britton,op.cit.Id. §105.
96 指令裁决是指直接依案件主审法官的命令而对案件作出判决，因为案件的证据非常具有说服力，法官取代陪审团作为事实认定者的角色．
97 See Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg.Co., 117 F.2d 442(6th Cir. 1941);Commer Cial Credit Corp. v. Organ County Machine Works,34 Cal.2d 766,214 P.2d 819(1950).但是，新奥尔良州白色系统公司案中，法庭拒绝遵从上述先例，它评论说“规范分期付款信用买卖的措施应当由立法来决定，而不是由本法庭根据《流通票据法》的规定来决定．”一个匿名作者在卡传尔案的注释中的“提议”体现了对概念能左右一切的影响力的信仰：让金融公司首先通过流通取得票据，然后再转让附条件的买卖合同．一个学识渊博的评论者总结说，“似乎正常业务中的持有人的权利，一旦仅以本票上的背书转让取得，就不会为后续的附条件买卖合同所损害．”
98 Id.
99 墨西哥法院审理的卡传尔案中这种方法被接受，“但是，不幸的是原告的地位不仅仅是不当业务中的被诉本票持有人，同时还是执行并作为同一交易一部分的附条件买卖合同的受让人．虽然在本诉讼中不能根据合同确定任何权利，然而，合同的受让人，也就是原告不仅取得了合同包含的权利，也要承担它所包含的义务．根据这些权威规定，原告．作为附条件买卖合同的受让人应承担所有存在的对抗转让人的抗辩．”前述引文中显示原告是根据本票起诉请求金钱判决而不是坚持合同中的担保权利．
100 所以在蒂通案中，法庭否定了原告简易判决的动议，并且评论审判事实的问题是，“交易人并卖方是否真的是信用公司的代理人，而非独立交易人……”在全国公共银行案中暗示了同样的观点．
101 See Thorp Finance Corp. v. Le Mire,264 Wis.220,58 N.W.zd 641(1953).在索普案中，买方签署合同承认“交付和接受”的抗辩需基于家具没有交付的事由，法院推翻了由原告提议的指令裁决并发回重审．在第一承诺公司案中，被告提出合同中有欺诈性引诱，并获得了审理法院的陪审团判决，但是判决在上诉中被推翻．纽约的初级法院有很多活动，但是还没有任何一个清晰的标准获得权威的肯定．现在在纽约案件中被告(经常由法律援助人代理)习惯性的以欺诈为答辩理由；然后，原告申请简易判决。
102 但这也不仅仅是判例法的趋势．比如，《宾夕法尼亚州机动车买卖金融法》禁止与分期付款买卖合同一起使用可流通本票．《马里兰州零售分期付款买卖法》规定作为分期付款交易一部分的本票与基础相联系，并承担抗辩．同样《伊利诺斯州动产抵押法》也有类似规定．《统一商法典》第九编第206条第(1)款也规定，“消费货物的买方所做的不向合同受让方主张基于买卖产生的任何请求权或抗辩的协议不可为任何人执行。”该编明晰了“协议”同时包含了本票和切断抗辩条款，但是如果持票人不试图在票据诉讼中执行担保协议或特定货物上的保险责任和税收义务，那么他表面上并不受到禁止，这一事实在某种程度上冲淡了法规的效力。
103 合理使用技术的例子是商业信用公司案，该案中出卖的财产是冲床，价值5500美元，协议书上的题目是“工业附条件买卖合同”．另一方面，上诉法院推翻在第一承诺公司案中做出的对被告的判定是完全合适的：案件中涉及的是一桩价值8000美元的空调买卖，买方是批量生产洋葱的种植人．《统一商法典》第九编第206条第(2)款在除了消费者领域之外的一切案件中都承认买方通过切断抗辩条款或者通过使用可流通票据放弃抗辩．
104 See Note,Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance,60 Yale L.J.1218.1223 n.17(1951).
105 信托收据法通常有一个特点，信托人的担保利益自动从最初的抵押物转移到由买卖产和的诉讼中去．这一点规定在《统一信托收据法》第10条．
106 UTRA §9(2)(a).
107 UTRA §1.
108 对此，有两个原因可以解释：(1) 自从二十世纪三十年代后期，也就是本法为大多数司法区接受时，商业情况运转良好；(2) 1943年以后，由于在《破产法》第60条无效条款面前所有信托收据都不堪一击，所以那些从事信托收据金融业务的人有意的从诉讼中退出，直到1950年，对第60条作出了有利于他们的修改．自从第60条修改以后，僵局似乎被打破了；在过去的两三年里就发生了和此前十五年里同样多的案件。
109 Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman,58 Cal.App.zd 729,137 P.zd 729(1943).
110 The term is defined in U.C.C. §9-105.
111 U.C.C. §9-308.
112 U.C.C. §3-104,Comment 2.
113 U.C.C. § 3-104,Comment 5.
114 U.C.C. §8-102.
115 U.C.C. §9-105.
116 Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Nat.Park Bank of N.Y.,239 N.Y.386,146 N.E.636(1925).
117 See Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel,196 F.2d 950(1st Cir.1952).
118 See Ward and Harfield,Bank Credits and Acceptances c.9(3rd ed. 1948).这是因为银行设计了一种程序，卖方 即受益人可以以此融资，这种“二级融资”需要第二次支付银行费用，并与第一张信用证“背靠背”地签发第二张信用证(两张信用证要求同样的运输单据)．
119 这个关于银行集团观念的陈述缺乏科学研究，但即使是有科学研究的支持也不尽合理．尽管美国银行业的观点忠实地反映在《跟单信用证统一惯例》的转让规定和《统一商法典》第五编中．但由杰出的银行顾问撰写的美国信用证的首要文件在转让问题上的立场与大多数银行的观点不同．
120 Id. at 131-2.
121 该论点明显得到了《沃德和哈菲尔德》一书的支持：在“收益的转让”这个标题下，作者写道：“从银行的角度看，对这种转让不应当有任何反对．如果受让人适当地通知了银行，银行应当给予承认，并根据转让协议的副本支付任何本应向最初受益人支付的金额．”之后，在“汇票的准支付借贷人或供货人的代理人”标题下，作者虚构了一个案例，信用证的受益人签发了一张指示信用证，并转让给供货人，之后，他评论说：“如果信用证是可流通的信用证，并经过持有人和背书人转移．如果这些汇票向银行提示，并各有适当单据，那么银行不但应当安全的支付，而且它还有义务这样做．”
122 比如国际商业会议第82号手册中记录的《跟单信用证统一惯例》第49条关于转让有如下规定：“信用证只有在原则的明确授权下才可转让．在这种情况下，信用证只能转让一次，并不能改变原始信用证的条款和条件，这里有两个例外，信用证的数额和有效期限，这两项都可能会被减少．”“如果商业跟单信用证被按部分转让，那么这种按部分的转让应被认为是构成一个单独的转让．”“授权转让信用证包括了将信用证转让到其它地方的授权．这种转让所导致的银行费用由最初受益人支付，另有规定的除外．在最初信用证的有效期间，信用证被转让到的地方为支付地．”
123 修改后的第49条规定：“所谓可转让或可流通信用证是指支付行或议付行有权向第三方或第一受益人指示的任何方支付的信用证．”“一个信用证要想转让必须得到开证行的明确授权，并且明确设计成‘可转让’的形式．在这种情况下，信用证只能转让一次并不能改变原始信用证的条款和条件．这里有几个例外，信用证的数额或载明的统一价款、有效期限或运输期限可能会部分或全部的减少或缩短．如果减少了信用证 的数额或统一价款，转让人可以被允许用他自己的发票来代替受让人的发票，因为比起受让人的发票来，转让人的发票中记载的数额或统一价款更大，但此数额不得超过信用证最初的规定，通过这种发票的替代，转让人可以根据信用证请求支付其发票与受让人发票之间的差价．”“可转让信用证的部分(其总和不得超过整个信用证的数额)可以分别转让，如果不按部分运输的话，这种转让的整体应被认为是构成一个整体信用证的单独转让。”“授权转让信用证包括了将信用证转让给其他地方受益人(不管他是否在同一个国家)的授权，另有规定的除外。在被转让信用证的有效期间，支付或流通可以在信用证转让地进行．”“转让所导致的银行费用由最初受益人支付，另有规定的除外．”“转让不应当约束据此行为的银行，除非转让的范围和方式得到了该银行的明示同意，并支付了转让的银行费用。”
124 新斯科舍省银行案中，柴斯国家银行签发的信用证记载：“如果信用证由你……转让给……第三方，提示的所有汇票必须附加有转让协议，并且在实现转让时你必须支付0.125％的代理费用．”这就被认为是“可转让”的信用证。
125 这个理解是由伊瑞克森案产生的，这个案例是无可争议的首要判例。伊瑞克森案中的事实陈述足以说明前面讨论的这一类型的问题．纽约信托公司为瑞典海洋委员会服务，向精练出口公司签发了一张特殊信用证(记名信用证)涉及的是精炼厂向瑞典以240，000美元的价格提供汽油的买卖．精炼厂是从城市服务石油公司购买的汽油．银行根据海洋委员会的指示拒绝修改信用证，因此信用证不能转让给城市服务．精炼厂还是“转让信用证”给了城市服务然后通知信托公司。“信用证……和它的收益”已经被转让了．精炼厂根据信用证签发了汇票并背书给了城市服务．城市服务通知信托公司精炼厂履行信用证后赊欠汇票收益。经过所有这些，汇票和运输单据由精炼厂提示给信托公司．同时，海洋委员会在纽约起诉了精炼厂，诉称精炼厂在一桩甲苯买卖的合同中违约．在向银行提示了汇票和单据之后、支付之前，县治安官因甲苯信用证诉讼扣押了汽油信用证的收益。汽油信用证参照《统一惯例》．判决认为向城市服务的转让是无效的，这笔资金仍然是精炼厂的财产并且理应属于在海洋委员会诉糟炼厂案中非居住地扣押的范围．虽然这个观点涉及的是“信用证”的转让，但是应当注意的是汇票已经由精炼厂—最初受益人—请求支付并提示，并且显 然只有收益的转让被涉及．法庭十分重视《惯例》的第49条，虽然当时此条款在1951年的修改之前．我们尊重伊瑞克森案作为判例的价值，但是我们也应当记住1933年版的第49条不包括“转让人支票”的规定，所以，正如前文提出的一样，它不能像修改后的条款一样支持仅适用于根据信用证请求支付权利的转让，而不适用收益转让的解释．
126 因为在不记名信用证中，银行同意“签发人、背书人及普意持有人”适当签发的汇票会得到承兑，所以任何在汇票流通生效之前必须得到银行同意的建议都会使流通条款变得毫无意义．
127 U.C.C. §5-115.
128 U.C.C. §5-115(1).
129 U.C.C. §5-115(2).
130 See the 1950 and 1949 drafts of U.C.C.
131 This was the holding in Ericksson v. Refiners Export Co.,264 App.Div.525,35 N.Y.S.zd 829(1st Dep't 1942).
132 See the forms developd by the First National Bank of Boston reproduced in Brauc, her, Sutherland & Willcox, Commercial Transactions 204-207(1953).
133 Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. v. Chase Nat.Bank,144 F.zd 759(zd Cir.1944),ccrt.denied,324 U.S.850(1945).
134 See, e.g.,Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse & Sales Co.,111 Wash.576,191 Pac.869(1920).
135 Restatement,Contracts §151(1932).
136 See the excellent discussion in 4 Corbin, Contracts §§872-3(1951).
137 303 N.Y.446,103 N.E.zd 891(1952);Notes,21 Ford L.Rev.178(1952),27 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.361 (1952),[1952]Wis.L.Rev.740.
138 Allhussen v. Caristo Constr.Corp.303 N.Y.446,449,103 N.E.zd 891(1952).
139 Allhussen v. Caristo Constr.Corp.,278 App.Div.817,104 N.Y.S.zd 565,566(1951).
140 Id, at 447.
141 Id.at 450,103 N.E.zd at 892.
142 U.C.C. §9-206(2).
143 U.C.C. §9-318(1).
144 Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The Real Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable Financing,64 Harv.L.Rev.62(1950).
145 See 4 Corbin,Contracts §902(1951).
146 Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,318 U.S.434(1943).
147 See, e.g.,Conn.Gen.Stats. §6721(Rev.1949);N.C.Gen.Stats §§44-80(1950).
148 Fuller,American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century,6 J.LEG.ED.457,472-3(1954).
1 See Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13Creighton L.Rev.441,445-46 n.8(1979).
2 See,e.&,Coogan,Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade,87 YALE L.T. I012,1013-14(1978).
3 See Dolan,Good Faith Purchase and Warchouse Receipts:Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles Z7,and 9 of the U.C.C.,30 Hastings L.J.1(1975)[hereinafter cited Good Frith Purchurse].
4 In Yorke v. Grenaugh,9z Eng.Rep.790(K.B.1703).
5 Green v. Farmer,98 Eng.Rep. 154,158(K.B.1768)(Mansfield,J.).
6 U.C.C §7-403(1),(4).
7 See 3 N.Y.L.Revision Commission Rep.,Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 1800, 1817(1955).
8 See, e.g.,Services Co.v. O'dell,-Pa.zd-,417A.zd 604(1980).
9 Miller v. Race,97/Eng.Rep.398,401(K.B.1758).
10 See, e.g.,Silver v. Robert's Garage,Inc.,240 Mass.571,574,134N.E.610,611-12(1922).
11 White v. Garden,138 Eng.Rep.364,367(C.P.1851).
12 See, e.g.,Mowrey v.Walsh,8 Cow.238(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1828).
13 See,e.g.,Cundy v.Lindsay,3 App.Cas.459,465-66(H.L. 1878).
14 U.C.C §7-209(3)(b).
15 92 Eng.Rep.79(K.B.1703).
16 See, e.g.,Peacock v. Rhodes,99 Eng.Rep.402,403(K.B. 1781).
17 Accord,Johnson v. Hill,171 Eng.Rep.812(K.B.1822).
18 See also Grinnell v. Cood,3 Hill 485(N.Y. 1842).
19 Yorke v. Grenaugh,92 Eng.Rep.79,80(K.B.1703).
20 6 Whart. 418(Pa.1841).
21 Id. at 422-23(dictum).
22 Sunbolf v. Alford, 150 Eng.Rep. 1135,1136,1138(Ex. 1838).
23 106 Eng.Rep. 1219(K.B. 1822).
24 Collman v. Collins,z Hall 569(N.Y.super. 1829);Van Buskirt v.Puriton,z Hall 561(N.Y.super.1829).
25 1 Doug. 1(Mich. 1843).
26 Id. at 10-11.
27 Id. at 18.
28 Id. at 8-9.
29 136 Mich.611,99 N.W.867(1904).
30 Id. at 614,99 N.W.at 868.
31 See generally 2 S.Williston,The Law Governing the Sales of Goods §317(Rev.ed.1948).
32 92 Eng.Rep.at 80.
33 1 Doug.at 18.
34 92 Eng.Rep.at 80.
35 Id.
36 See generally R.Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 17981 (zd ed. 1977).
37 See Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Strorage Warehouse Co.,70 Misc.565,127 N.Y.S.306(App.Term. 1911).
38 See U.C.C. §7-209(3)(b), §7-307(2).
39 2 W.Blackstone, Commentaries 452.
40 Id. at 396.
41 see Digest 5.20.2.3.
42 58 F.zd 511(D.C.Cir.1932).
43 Fidelity Storage Co.v. Reliable Store Corp.,69 F.zd 569(D.C.Cir.1934).
44 Id. At 569-70.
45 See Famous Furuiture Co.v.J.Fishman &i Son,22 N.J.Misc.368,370,29 A.zd 235,236(Clifton County Ct. 1944).
46 Buckley-Newhall co.v. Bangs,130 Misc.293,224 N.Y.S.71(Mun.Ct. 1927).
47 Dade Nat's I Bank v. University Transfer &I Storage, Inc.,151 So.zd 868(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1963).
48 279 Pa. 160,123 A.658(1924).
49 Id. At 162,123 A. at 659.
50 81 P.Super.Ct. 140(1923).
51 Id. At 144.
52 See Ludwig Baumann &I co.v. Roth,67 Misc.458,460,123 N.Y.S.191,192(Sup.Ct.1910).
53 U.C.C. §2-403(2).
54 U.C.C. §9-306(2).
55 See, e.g.,Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§600.5744(West Supp.1980).
56 E.g.,Mass.Ann.Laws ch.239, §4(Michie/Law.Co-op 1974).
57 Finigan v. Hadley,286 Mass.345,347-48,190 N.E.528,529(1934_.
58 Holloway v. Merchant's Transfer Co., 294 S.W.989,990(Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1927,no writ).
59 236 Mo.App.921,163 S.W. zd 128(1942).
60 296 Mass.531,6 N.E.zd 838(1937).
61 236 Mo.App. at 929,163 S.W.zd at 131-32.
62 294 S.W.989(Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1927,no writ).
63 Id. at 990.
64 286 Mass.345,190 N.E.528(1934).
65 Id. at 348,190 N.E. at 529.
66 See Nikolas v. Patrick,51 Mich.App.561,215 N.W.zd 715(1974).
67 See Flagg Bros.v. Brooks,436 U.S.149(1978).
68 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§3-202 (1), 7-501 (1), 8-302 (1).
69 See N.Y.L Revision Commission Rep.,Report and Appondices Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code 708,731(1956).
70 Young v. Colyear,54 Cal.App.232,201 P.623(1921).
71 E.g.,Farrell v. Harlem Terminal Storase Warehouse Co.,70 Mioc.565,127N.Y.S.306(App.Term 1911).
72 See Nikolas v. Patrick,51 Mich.App.561,215 N.W.zd 715(1974).
73 See generally J.Kent, Commentaries 634.
74 203 A.D.108,196 N.Y.S.414(1922).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 112,196 N.Y.S. at 418.
77 203 A.D. at 112,196 N.Y.S. at 418.
78 7F.zd 447(zd Cir. 1925).
79 Id. at 451.
80 Lord Mansfield would agree. See Green v. Farmer, 98 Eng.Rep.154(K.B.1768).
81 U.C.C. §7-307(1).
82 U.C.C. §7-209(3) (a).
83 See,e.g.,Hollis v. Chanberlin,243 Ark.201,419 S.W.zd116(1967).
84 Barthelmess v. Cavalier,z Cal.App.zd 477,478,38 P.zd 484,490(1934).
85 U.C.C. §7-209(3) (a).
86 U.C.C. §7-502(1).
87 U.C.C. §7-503. Comment 1.
88 U.C.C. §7-209, Comment 3.
89 U.C.C. §7-508(1) (a), (b).
90 See Mohun, The Effect of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,13 Colum.L.Rev.202(1913).
91 See T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 7-29(1978).
92 See. U.C.C. §7-209, Comment 2 (1952 version).
93 See R. Riegert &I R. Braucher,Documents of Title §4.2(1978),at 64-65.
94 See generally R. Brown,The Law of Personal Property 202-06(Raushenbush ed. 1978);L.Vold,Handbook of the Law of Sales 393-96(zd ed.1959).
95 See,e.g., U.C.C. §7-503(1), Comment 1.
96 See, U.C.C. §7-503(1), Comment 1.
97 U.C.C. §7-209(3), (1952 version).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See, U.C.C. §7-209, Comment 2 (1952 version).
101 See, U.C.C. §7-209(3) (1958 version).
102 Refer to notes (85)-67 supra and accompanying text.
103 Refer to notes (39)-113 supra and accompanying text.
104 U.C.C. §9-305.
105 For a discussion of field warehouse, see J.White &I R.Summers,Handbook on the Uniform Commercial Code 823-27(zd ed.1980).
106 See, e.g.cChrysler Corp.v. Adamatic,Inc.,59 Wis.zd 219,240,208 N.W.zd 97,107(1973).
107 See generally Dolan, Good Faith Purchase, supra note(3).
108 7 U.C.C.Rep. Serv. 535(N. Y. County Sup. Ct. 1970).
109 Id. at 536.
110 51 Mich.App.561,215 N.W.zd 715(1974).
111 Id. at 565-66,215 N.W.zd at 718.
112 Id. at 565-66,215 N.W.zd at 718.
113 Id. at 565-66,215 N.W.zd at 718.
114 Zuber v. Allen,396 U.S. 168,185(1969).
115 17 Wash.App.73,561 P.zd 1097(1977).
116 Id. at 76,561 P.zd at 1099.
117 532 S.W.zd 910(Tenn.1975).
118 U.C.C. §7-209, Comment3.
119 19 U.C.C.Rep. SerV. 1204 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 1976).
120 19 U.C.C.Rep. SerV. at 1205.
121 See,e.g.,Flagg Bros.v.Brooks,436 U.S.149,166(1978).
122 U.C.C. §7-209(3)(a).
123 Id.
1 K.Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales ⅹⅶ(1930).
2 Gilmore,The Commericial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase 63 Yale LJ.1057(1954).
3 See, e.g.,Emmanuel College v.Evans, 1Ch.Rep.18(1625).
4 G.Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 3-67(1977).
5 See,e.g.,Clarke v. Martin,92 Eng, Rep.6,6-7(K.B.1704).
6 See,e.g.,Gill v. Cubitt,107 Eng.Rep.806,806(K.B.1824).
7 See,e.g.,Kimball v. Cunningham,4Mass.502(1808).
8 R.Pothier, A Treatige of the Law of Obligations,or Contracts(2d ed.D.Evans trans. 1839).
9 Cf.Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor,36 Colum.L.Rev.745(1936).
10 See generally Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1057-58.
11 See generally Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1057-58.
12 Gilmore,supra note(2),at 1058-59.
13 See,e.g.,Hickey v. McDonald Bros.,151 Ala.497,44 So.201(1907);Uaion Stock-Yard & Transit Co. v. Mallory,son & Zimmerman Co.,157 Ill.554,41 N.E.888(1895).
14 See,e.g.,Junction Ry.v.Cleneay,13 Ind.161(1859);Carr v. LeFevre,27 Pa.413(1856)
15 See,e.g.,Hibbs v. Brown,190 N.Y.167,82N.E.1108(1907).
16 See generally 1 G.Gilmore,supra note(5).
17 For the historical beckground,see 1 G.Gilmore,supra note(5) §§7.3-7.4.
18 See id. §§7.6-7.9.
19 Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1063-68.
20 Id.at 1063.
21 See id.at 118-22.
22 Gilmore,Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments,13 Creighton L.Rev.447(1979).
23 Id.at 448.
24 Gilmore, supra note(23),at 452.
25 Id.at 452-56.
26 Negotiable Instruments Law(1896).
27 Gilmore,supra note(3),at 1058.
28 See,e.g.,Fawcett,Isham & Co.v.Osburn,Adams & Co.,32 Ill.411,425(1863).
29 For the text of Uniform Sales Act §24(1906).
30 See,e.g.,Henderson Baker Lumber Co. v. Headly,247 Ala,681,20 So.zd 81(1946);Drain v. LaGranse State Bank,303 Ill.330,135 N.E.780(1922).
31 See,e.g.,Hart v. Carpenter,24 Conn.427(1856);Levi v. Booth,58 Md.305,42Am.Rep.332(1882).
32 See Ballantine,Purchase for Vahue and Estoppel,6 Minn.L.Rev.87(1922).
33 See, e.g.,Beutel,The Negotiable Instruments Act should not be Amended,80 U.PA.L.Rev.368(1932).
34 For one example of this,see 14 Minn.L.Rev.696(1930).
35 The Case was Gazzola v. Lacy Bros.& Kimball,156 Tenn.229,229 S.W.1039(1927).
36 Some have attempted to draw that line.See Dolan.Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts:Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2,7,and 9 of the U.C.C.,30 Hastings L.J.1(1978).
37 Gilmore,supra note(23),at 461.
38 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,199 Ark. 1073,137 S.W.zd 260(1940),was one of the first "leading cases" in this area.
39 E.g.,Truth-In-Lending Act, IS U.S.C §1601(1976);Uniform Consumer Credit Code(1974).
40 See Rohner, Holder in Due Courses in Consumer Transaction:Requiem,Revival,or Reformation?60 Cornell L.Rev.503(1975).
41 Gilmore, Article 9:What It Dose For the Past,26 La.L.Rev.285(1966).
42 U.C.C. §9-105,Official Comment.
43 See Coogan,Article 9——An Agenda for the Next Decade,87YALe L.J.1012(1978).
44 See z G.Gilmore,Security Interests in Personal Property §8.1.
45 Id. §9.2.
46 268U.S.353(1925).
47 The Courts opinion in Benedict was noted in 39 Harv.L.Rev.253(1925) with qualified approval.
48 282 F.at 17.
49 Benedict v. Rather,268 U.S.353(1925).
50 Id.at 360.
51 See, e.g.,Russell v. Winne,37 N.Y.591(1868);Edgell v. Hart,9 N.Y.213(1853);Griswold v. Sheldoa,4 N.Y.580(1851).
52 Gilmore, supra note(23), §8.5.
53 See Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co.,38 F.2d 45(2d Cir.1930);second aqppeal,54 F.2d 318(2d Cir.1931);Brown v. Leo,12 F.2d 350(2d Cir. 1926).
54 See N.Y.U.C.C.(Mckinney 1964).
55 See generally Z G.Gilmore, Supra note(23),at 250-86.
56 See,e.g.,Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey,142 N.Y. 570,37 N.E.632(1894).
57 128 F.2d 564(2d Cir.),rev'd on rehearing,129 F.2d 892(2d Cir.1942).
58 128 F.2d at 566.
59 128 F.2d 892(2d Cir.1942).
60 See,e.g.,In re City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill,Z N.Y.2d 429,141 N.E.2d 575,161 N.Y.S.2d 67(1957);In re Gruner,295 N.Y.510,68 N.E.2d514(1946).
61 Allhusen v. Caristo Constr.Corp.,303 N.Y.446,103 N.E.2d 891(1952).But see Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,3 N.Y.2d 395,144 N.E.2d 387,165 N.Y.S.2d 498(1957).
62 U.C.C. §9-205.
63 U.C.C. §9-204.
64 U.C.C. §9-318(4).
65 U.C.C. §9-206.
66 U.C.C. §9-312(7).
67 U.C.C. §9-306.
68 318 U.S.434(1943).
69 See,e.g.,Dearle v. Hall,3 Russ.1,38 Eng.Rep.475(1828).
70 See 2 G.Gilmore, Supra note(23), §8.7.
71 Cf.id. §8.8.
72 128 F.2d 564(2d Cir.),rev'd on rehearing,129 F.2d 892(2d Cir. 1942).
73 11 U.S.C. §§101-151326(Supp.Ⅲ1979).
74 11 U.S.C. §547(Supp.Ⅲ1979).
75 See Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty:A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,87 YALe L.J.907(1978).
76 See,e.g.,In re Sanuels,526 F.2d 1238(5th Cir.1976).
77 See Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion:The German Version,89 Harv.L.Rev.1041(1976).
78 See,e.g.,Macaulay v. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.,[1974]1 W.L.R.1308(H.L.);Clifford Davis v.WEA Records,[1975] 1 All E.R.237(C.A.);Lloyds Bank v. Bundy,[1974] 3 All E.R.757(C.A.).
79 See G.Gilmore,Supra note(4),at 95-98;Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act:A Comment,4 Vt.L.Rev.247(1979);Davies,A Response to Slatutory Obsolescence:The Nonprimacy of Statute Act,4 Vt.L.Rev.203(1979);Gilmore,Putting Senator Davies in Context,4 Vt.L.Rev.233(1979).
1 U.C.C. §2—302.
2 See James v. Morgan, 1 Lev.111,83 Eng.Rep.323(1664).
3 Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code,45 Iowa L.Rev.843,863—65(1960).
4 Turner, Equity of Redemption 24—26(1931).
5 See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 Harv.L.Rev.198(1919).
6 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum.L.Rev. 629,635(1943).
7 Vance, Insurance §4(3d ed.1951).
8 Patterson, Supra note 5.
9 E.g., Bekkevold v. Ports, 173 Minn.87,216 N.W.790(1927).
10 Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P. zd 1272(1937).
11 New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417,189 N.W.815(1922).
12 Auction Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co.,104 Ore.541,209 Pac. 131(1922).
13 Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St 328, 140 N.E.118(1922).
14 Robert A.Munroe & Co.v. Meyer,[1930]2 K.B. 312.
15 U.C.C. §2—302(1), Comment 2.
16 U.C.C. §2—302, Comment 1.
17 U.C.C. §1—203.
18 See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666(1963).
19 Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 A.2d69(1955); Eastern Woodworks v. Vance, 206 Md. 419, 112 A. 2d 231(1955).
20 J. R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich.82, 235 N. W. 845(1931).
21 1 A Corbin, contracts §231; See, e.g., Webb v. Mc Gowin, 27 Ala. App.
22 U.C.C. §1—205.
23 U.C.C. §1—203, Comment.
24 U.C.C. §1—201(19).
25 U.C.C. §2—103.
26 U.C.C. §2—209, comment 1.
27 U.C.C. §2—305(2).
28 U.C.C. §1—208.
29 U.C.C. §2—508.
30 U.C.C. §1—203.
31 See, e.g., Scoutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant and Burclict; Contributions of the Law Merchant to the Common Law, in Ⅲ Selected Essays In Anglo-American Legal History, AALS(1909).
32 I bid.
33 U.C.C. §2—201(2).
34 U.C.C. §2—207(2).
35 U.C.C. §2—207(2)(c).
36 U.C.C. §2—316(2).
37 U.C.C. §2—315,comment 5.
38 U.C.C. §2—509(3).
39 U.C.C. §2—509(3).
40 U.C.C. §2—503, comment 3.
41 U.C.C. §2—603(1).
42 U.C.C. §2—104(1), and comment 2.
43 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§2—201(2), 2—207(2).
44 U.C.C. §2—104(3), and comment 1.
45 U.C.C. §2—207(2).
46 U.S.A. §63(1).
47 U.S.A. §66.
48 See Latty, asles aad Title and the Proposed Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3(1951).
49 U.S.A. §19.
50 U.S.A. §19 (2), (3), (4), (5).
51 Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales 79(1955).
52 Lewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond,15 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 166,167(1938).
53 I bid.
54 Comment to U.C.C. §2—101.
55 I bid.
56 U.C.C. §2—401, Comment 1.
57 National Dairy Products Crop. v. Gleeson, 72 Dauph. 112, 16 pa. D.& C. 2d 390(1958).
58 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Harv.L.Rev.561.568(1950).
59 I bid.
60 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J.821,825(1950).
61 Id, at 827.
62 U.C.C. §2—709,Comment 1.
63 U.C.C. §2—509,Comment 1.
64 U.C.C. §2—510.
65 U.C.C. §2—403.
66 See U.C.C. §§2—101, comment 1; 2—401, comment 1.
67 See 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 449; Murray, Sale in the Market Overt, 9 Int'l & Comp.L.Q. 24(1960).
68 Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441(1917).
69 Newberry v. Norfolk & So. R. R, 135 N. C. 45, 45 S.E.356(1903).
70 Warren, Cutting off claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L.Rev.476—77(1963).
71 See Whitney, The Law of Modern Commercial Practices §4(1958).
72 U.S.A. §23—25.
73 U.S.A. §24.
74 U.C.C. §2—403(1).
75 Ibid.
76 U.C.C. §2—403(1)(a).
77 U.C.C. §2—403(1)(b).
78 U.C.C. §2—403(1)(c).
79 U.C.C. §1—201(9).
80 U.C.C. §2—403(2).
81 UTRA §9(2)(a).
82 See examples given in 1 N. Y. L. Rev. Comm. Rep., U.C.C. §101(1954).
83 U.C.C. §2—403, comment 2.
1. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in Massachusetts, 13 Bus. Law.497 (1958).
2. Brocker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 541,545(1954).
3. Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 445-46 n. 8(1979).
4. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 Yale L. J. 1012(1978).
5. Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2,7, and 9 of the U.C.C., 30 Hastings L. J. 1(1978).
6. N.Y.L. Revision Commission Rep. Study of the U.C.C. 1800, 1817(1955).
7. R.Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 179-81 (2d ed. 1977).
8. N.Y.L. Revision Commission Rep., Report and Appendices Relating to the U.C.C.708, 731(1956).
9. Mohun, The Effect of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 202(1913).
10. T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest 7-29(1978).
11. R. Brown, The Law le Personal Property 202-06 (Raushenbush ed. 1978).
12. L. Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales 393-96 (2d ed. 1959).
13. White, For a discussion of field Warehouse 823-26(2d ed. 1980).
14. R. Summers, Handbook on the U.C.C. 823-27(2d ed.1980).
15. Williston, The "cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrine and Policy Anomaly 62 Yale L. J. 101(1952).
16. Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 1114 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
17. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes (1943).
18. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 179 et seq. (1949).
19. Stumberge, Principles of Conflict of Laws 107 et seq.(9151).
20. Llewellyn, Cases an Materials on the Law of Sales 77 et seq. (1931).
21. Axelord, Chattel Security, 57 Yale L.J. 517,761(1948).
22. Billiard, The Law of Mortgages 236(1872).
23. Danill, Negotiable Instruments 170 ct seq. (4th ed.1891).
24. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, Harv. L. Rev. 241,244 (1900).
25. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Lawl0 Yale L.J.84, 87(1900).
26. Steffen and Russell, The Negotiability of Corporate Bonds, 41 Yale L.J. 799(1932).
27. Note, Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance, 60 Yale L.J.1218, 1223 n. 17(1951).
28. Ward and Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances c. 9(3rd ed.1948).
29. Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The Read Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable financing, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 62(1950).
30. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 j.Leg.Ed.457, 472(1954).
31. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sale Provisions of the U.C.C., 54 Va. L. Rev.198 (1968).
32. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under section 1-103 of the U.C.C., 72 Nw. L. Rev. 906(1978).
33. Ellinghans, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L.J.757, 779-80(1969).
34. Lewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harw.L.Rev.700, 703(1959).
35. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith, 39 U.Ptte.L.Rev.381 (1978).
36. Gordley, European Code and American Restatement: Some Difficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140(1981).
37. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 Corneli. L. Rev. 707(1978).
38. Carrow, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found Theke Ch. 6(1871).
39. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights 49 Proceedings of the Aristolelian Society 171,180(1949).
40. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously Ch. 2(1978).
41. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 Cornill L. Rev. 680(1962).
42. Gillitte, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 duke.L.J.619.
43. Weinberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif.L.Rev.375 (1975).
44. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the U.C.C., 30 U.Chi.L.Rev.666 (1963).
45. Weinberg, Good Faith Under the U.C.C.-A New Look at on Old Problems, 54 Marg.L.Rev.191971).
46. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Outy to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 392(1980).
47. Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in Law, Morality and Society 26(P. Hacker and J. Ra zeds.1977).
48. Moore, The Semanties of Judging, 54 S. Cal.L.Rev.151 (1981).
49. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L. J. Rev. 1057(1954).
50. K. Llewellyn, Case and Materials on the Law of Sale ⅹⅶ (1930).
51. R.Pothier, A Treaties of the Law of Obligations, Or Contracts (zd ed.D.Evans.1839).
52. Danziger, the Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 745(1936).
53. Ballantine, Purchase for Value and Estoppel, 6 Minn. L. Rev. 87(1936).
54. Beutel, The Negotiable Instruments Act Should not be Amended, 80 U. Pa.L.Rev.368 (1932).
55. Rohner, Holder in Due Courses in Consumer Transaction: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation? 60 Cornell L. Rev.503 (1975).
56. Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does For the Past, 26 La. L.Rev.285 (1966).
57. Jackson, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the U.C.C., Yale L.J.907 (1978).
58. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 Harv. L.Rev.1041 (1976).
59. Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 247(1979).
60. Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescene: The Nonprimacy of Statute Act,4 Vt.L.Rev.203(1979).
61. Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context, 4 Vt. L.Rev.233 (1979).
62. Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Pitt.L.Rev.1 (1969).
63. Dugan, Standardized Form contracts-An Introduction, 24 Wayne L. Rev.1307 (1978).
64. Dugan, Standardized Forms: Unconscionability and Good Faith, 14 New England L. Rev.711 (1979).
65. Alpa, Protection of Consumers against Unfair contract Term: Legislation Patterns of Controlling Adhesion Contracts in Europe, 15 Willamette L. Rev. 267(1979).
66. Dewey, Freedom of Contract: Is it Still Relevant?, 31 Ohio St. L.J 724(1970).
67. Epstein, Unconscionability:. A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L 293(1975).
68. Gluck, Standardized Form Contracts-The Contract Theory Reconsidered, 28 Int'l.L.Q. 72(1979).
69. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L.Rev.529 (1971).
70. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum.L.Rev.629 (1943).
71. Leff, Unconsionability and the Code-The Emperor's New clause, 115 U. Ra.L.Rev. 485(1967).
72. Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconsionability,63 Va.L.Rev. 1053(1977).
73. Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 Colum.L.Rev.679 (1973).
74. Green, Strict Liability Under Section 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex.L.Rev. 1185(1976).
75. Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 465 (1968).
76. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 Calif. L.Rev.28 (1977).
77. Gordon & Tenenbaum, Conclusive Presumption Analysis: The Principle of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw.u.L.Rev.579 (1976).
78. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 Ⅲ. L.Rev.205(1933).
79. Harfield, Secondary Uses of commercial Credits, 44 Col. L.Rev. 899(1944).
80. Backus and Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credits: The Dixon, Lrmaos Case, 52 Col.L.Rev. 589(1952).
81. Honnold, Letters of Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon Case: A Reply to Backus and Harfield, 53 Col.L.Rev. 504(1953).
82. Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Commercial Paper: The Faith of the Subjective Test, 39 S. Cal. L.Rev.48(1966).
83. Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of Commercial favor,36 Colum.L.Rev. 744(1936).
84. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law-Necessary Amendments, 16 Harv.L.Rev.255(1903).
85. Mckeehan, The Negotiable Instrument Law: A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy, 41 Am.L.Rev.437(1902).
86. McDonnell, The Floating Lienor As Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. Cal.L.Rev.429 (1977).
87. Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the: U.C.C. Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus.Law.153(1977).
88. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 Colum.L.Rev.375 (1971).
89. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filling Under Article 9(pts. Ⅰ and Ⅱ), 59 B.U.L.Rev. 1,209(1979).
90. Wiseman, Cash Sellers, Secured Financers and the Meat Industry of Articles 2 and 9 of the U.C.C., 19B.C.L.Rev.101 (1977).
91. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the U.C.C., 92 Harv.L.Rev.1013 (1979).
92. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13Ga.L.Rev.1221 (1979).
93. Dolan, The U.C.C. and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 Texas L.Rev.1147 (1978).
94. Warren, Cutting off Claim of Ownership Under the U.C.C., 30U.Chi.L.Rev. 469(1963).
95. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L.Rev.811 (1979).
96. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Iustruments in Early English Law, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 813(1938).
97. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 wis.L.Rev.513-26.
98. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45MichL.Rev.252(1947).
99. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 Yale L.J. 1135(1957).
100. Llewellyn, What Price Contract-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704(1931).
101. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Harv.L.Rev, 561(1950).
102. Corbin, The U.C.C.-Sale; Should It Be Enacted? 59Yale L.J.821(1950).
103. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 281(1979).
104. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic theory of Law 62 Minn.L.Rev. 1051 (1978).
105. Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner and the Economic Analysis of Law, 39 Ohio St.L.J 439(1978).
106. Rubin, Predictability and the Economic Approach to Law, 9 J. Legal Stud. 319(1980).
107. Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. Legal Stud. 319(1980).
108. Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt,8 Colum.L.Rev. 375(1908).
109. Pease, Market Overt in the City of London, 31L.Q.Rev. 270(1915).
110. Brickey, The Jurisprudence of Larceny: An Historical Interest Analysis, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 1101(1980).
111. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1138(1931).
112. Calabresi, Property Rules, Liability. Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv.L.Rev.1089 (1972).
113. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient rules, 6 J. Legal Stud. 65(1977).
114. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 18 (1977).
115. Johnson, Economic Analysis, The Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems, 15 J.L.& Econ. 259(1972).
116. Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6 Harv.L.Rev. 24(1892).
117. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 367(1980).
118. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and The Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. Legal Stud. 367(1980).
119. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century American, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 513 (1974).
120. Mcclain, Legal Change and Class Interests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwitz' The Transformation of American Law, 68 Calif.L.Rev. 382(1980).
1. Daniel Keating, Sales-A System Approach, Aspen Law & Business, 1998.
2. Douglas Whaley, Problems And Materias On Commercial Law, zd ed., Aspen Law & Business, 1998.
3. James Brook, Sales and Leases, 3d ed, Aspen Publishers, Inc., 2003.
4. Luis E Del Duca, Egon Guttman & Alphonse M. Squilante, Problems and Materials On Negotiable Instruments, Anderson Publishing Company, 1993.
5. Lawrence P. King & Michael L. Cook, Creditors 'Rights, Debtor' Protection and Bankruptcy, Matthew Bender & Company Inc., 1989.
6. Robert N Leavell, Jean C. Love, Grant S. Nelson & Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Equitable Remedies, Restitution and Damages, West Publishing Company, 1996.