国有企业中的在职消费与现金股利政策研究
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摘要
1.主要内容及观点
代理理论是否能够解释我国国有企业收益分配政策,是国有企业收益分配和公司治理领域需要深入研究的问题。本文以代理理论为指导,运用2003年—2006年A股上市公司的数据为研究样本,实证检验了我国国有上市公司现金分红政策与高管人员在职消费之间的关系及内部治理因素对这种关系的影响。我们发现相对非国有最终控制的公司,国有最终控制公司高管人员的在职消费程度与公司业绩显著负相关,并且支付现金股利可以显著降低高管人员的在职消费程度,减少代理成本,提升国有企业的公司业绩。我们认为,与国有最终控制的企业相比,非国有最终控制的企业的代理成本在在职消费问题上的表现可能更弱。因为,非国有最终控制的企业股东对经理在职消费方面的监督较强。因此,采取降低代理成本的手段(发放现金股利),可能造成其他形式的代理成本降低,而非在职消费降低。这为我们从优化公司治理、约束管理层代理动机角度思考国有企业收益分配政策提供了经验证据。
为了深入研究国有企业收入分配问题,探讨如何通过收益分配降低国家与管理层代理冲突,约束管理层代理动机,提升公司业绩,本文将研究分为两个主要的部分:第一部分,探讨现金股利是否能有效抑制高管人员的在职消费,减少代理成本;第二部分探讨在职消费作为代理成本的一部分,是否会给公司业绩带来显著的负面影响。这样一来,可以为我们的研究提供一个逻辑上的证明,并可以为国有企业的收益分配政策提供一个基于代理理论的视角。
本文共分为八章,各章主要内容如下:
第一章绪论
本章首先阐述了本文的研究背景。2005年10月,世界银行发表的一份题为《国有企业分红:分多少?分给谁?》的研究报告,引起了国内对国有企业收益分配问题的广泛讨论。2007年底,财政部、国资委发布了《中央企业国有资本收益收取管理办法》,国有资本经营预算制度正式实施,这标志着国有企业不向国家分红的历史一去不复返了。但是,我们在肯定国家作为国有企业投资主体回收资本收益的同时,应该看到收益分配政策作为公司财务决策的重要内容,应当遵循公司财务的基本规律和内在逻辑。本文认为,从代理理论视角,即基于约束管理层代理动机的立场来研究国有企业收益分配问题具有重要意义。
其次,阐述了本文的研究目的。将在职消费与国有企业的收益分配政策结合起来,探讨如何通过收益分配来抑制管理层的代理动机,提高公司治理效率,从而提升国有企业的公司业绩,并为国有企业正确的收益分配政策提供参考。
最后,对本文的研究意义、研究方法和研究思路、研究结构与流程也做了简要阐述。
第二章文献回顾与研究假说
这是全文的理论基础部分,本章首先对委托代理理论、股利代理理论以及在职消费相关的文献做了综述,并在此基础上提出假设:国有企业现金股利的发放抑制了高管人员的在职消费水平,即现金股利支付率与在职消费水平负相关。其次,为了使本文的逻辑性更强,本文提出了一个递进的假设:国有企业在职消费会给公司业绩造成显著负面影响,即在职消费水平与公司业绩负相关。这一假设将在第五章中加以证明。
第三章研究设计
本章是进行实证研究的前提部分,是对下面一章的研究所做的基础性工作,包括模型构建和变量说明、数据来源与样本选择两个小节。
需要说明的是本文的数据来源:本文选取2003—2006年所有在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所上市的A股公司为初始研究样本,除了在职消费数据为手工收集外,其余数据均来自中国证券市场会计研究数据库(CSMAR),并按以下标准对初始样本做了剔除:(1)由于金融类上市公司与一般上市公司的财务特征和会计制度存在差异,剔除了金融和保险行业的上市公司样本;(2)剔除了同时发行有B股或H股的样本;(3)剔除了所有数据缺失的样本,最后我们得到2008个观测值,用以研究上市公司分红政策、在职消费和公司业绩之间的关系。
第四章在职消费与现金股利政策实证研究
本章是本研究的主要部分,也是全文的创新之处,重点是对前面提出的假设1进行证明。
第一部分为变量描述性统计及主要变量差异性检验。该部分比较了国有最终控制与非国有最终控制的样本各主要变量之间的描述性统计及差异性检验结果。统计结果显示国有最终控制的企业,其主营业务收入要显著高于非国有最终控制的企业,然而,其业绩却与非国有最终控制的企业没有显著差异,说明国有企业代理问题较严重,在职消费绝对数额显著高于非国有最终控制的企业也许是其中的一个原因。
第二部分为相关性分析。该部分主要是对各主要变量之间的相关关系做出统计,也为后面的回归分析做铺垫,防止产生严重的多重共线性问题。统计发现企业在职消费程度(NPC)与公司业绩(EPS和ROA)之间存在显著的负相关关系,这一现象说明,在职消费给公司带来了显著的负面影响;股利支付率(DIVI1)和每股现金股利(DIVI2)与在职消费程度显著负相关,这说明,通过支付现金股利可以抑制高管人员的在职消费程度。
第三部分为回归结果及其分析。该部分承上启下,实证检验了股利代理理论在我国的适用性。研究结果表明:(1)在国有最终控制的样本和全样本中,股利的发放减少了管理人员可支配的自由现金流,抑制了其利用企业资金获取私人利益的行为,减少了代理成本,从而有利于公司业绩的提升。另外,与国有最终控制的企业相比,非国有最终控制的企业的代理成本在在职消费问题上的表现可能更弱。(2)随着企业资产负债率的增大,增加了企业经营者可以支配的自由现金流,为经营者谋取私人利益提供了方便,加重了在职消费程度,增加了代理成本。(3)无论是全样本、国有最终控制的样本还是非国有最终控制的样本,长期投资率都对在职消费程度产生了正向影响,这说明企业经理常常借助对外投资,将大量资金拿到体外循环,以便躲避监督,隐藏在职消费或通过过度投资谋取私人利益的行为。(4)在国有最终控股的样本中,管理层在职消费程度随着管理层持股比例的提高非但没有减少,反而加剧了。分析其原因,本文认为这和国有最终控制的企业管理层持股比例(MSH)显著低于非国有最终控制的企业样本,经营者没有得到有效的激励,在职消费成了其替代性选择有关。
第五章在职消费与公司业绩相关关系研究
该部分是对前面的论证所做的有益补充,使本研究在逻辑上更加合理。
(1)实证检验了在职消费对公司业绩确实带来了显著的负面影响,这验证了本文所提出的假设2的合理性。
(2)分红对企业业绩产生了显著的正面影响。结合前面的分析,我们认为股利的发放有利于降低国有企业高层管理者在职消费程度,减少代理成本,从而提升企业业绩。
(3)企业资产负债率(LEVER)对企业业绩产生了显著的负面影响,说明杠杆治理在我国是失效的。那么,是什么原因造成了这样一种与现代财务理论截然相反的现象呢?结合上面的实证分析,我们认为最根本的制度原因是预算软约束。债务融资为高层管理人员提供了可以支配的自由现金流,加剧了其在职消费程度,增加了代理成本,从而降低了企业业绩。
(4)长期投资率也对公司业绩产生了显著的负面影响。
第六章稳健性检验
考虑到本文在职消费数据可能存在选择性偏差,影响结论的稳健性,因此本文作了稳健性检验,以增强本文的可信度和说服力。
第七章结语
本章首先对实证分析的结果做了总结陈述,并从财务政策角度对国有企业的分红政策提出了建议。本文通过实证研究发现在职消费作为代理成本的一部分在我国确实存在,并对企业业绩造成了显著的负面影响。它不仅受高管薪酬的显著影响,还受到长期投资率和资本结构的显著影响。更为重要的是,我们证实了,国有企业通过支付现金股利可以显著降低高管人员的在职消费程度,从而减少代理成本,提升国有企业的公司业绩,这为正确认识国有企业的收益分配政策、优化国有企业的公司治理提供了一个有益的视角。一方面,要尊重国有企业自身的理财自主权,避免一刀切的国有企业收益分配模式;另一方面应该转换政府作为国有企业所有者的行为方式,避免国有资本预算制度的实施导致新的政企不分。
第八章研究局限与后续研究建议
针对本文研究存在的局限性,对后续研究做出了一些有价值的建议。
2.主要贡献
(1)针对我国国有企业存在的较为严重的在职消费和治理缺陷,从公司治理和代理关系角度对我国国有企业的收益分配问题进行科学解析,从而深化我国关于收益分配的研究;
(2)了解我国国有企业公司治理特征与国有企业高管人员在职消费程度之间的关系,为正确处理我国国有企业收益分配中存在的问题奠定基础;
(3)将国有企业的在职消费、公司治理特征和收益分配政策纳入一个统一的分析框架,既保证收益分配在抑制管理层代理动机、发挥其公司治理效率方面的作用,又能为制定国有企业正确的收益分配政策提供参考;
(4)将国有企业的在职消费、公司业绩和收益分配政策纳入一个统一的分析框架,从而更全面地对在职消费、公司业绩和收益分配政策之间的关系进行科学合理的解释,为国有企业正确的收益分配政策提供更加科学的经验证据。
1. The main content and perspective:
If agency theory can explain China's income distribution policy of SOEs is very important in the field of SOEs’income distribution and corporate governance that should be studied in depth.
Based on agency theory, we use the data of the china’s listed companies of A over period 2003-2006 to investigate the relationship between cash dividend and non-pecuniary compensation of managers; we also investigate the effect of interior governance factor on this relationship. Our empirical result shows that compared to non-state-owned enterprises, there is a significant negative correlation between the non-pecuniary compensation in Chinese SOEs and performance, therefore the pay of cash dividend can reduce the non-pecuniary compensation in China’s SOEs which also reduce the agency cost and therefore upgrade the performance of SOEs. We believe that compared to state-owned enterprises, maybe the agency cost on non-pecuniary compensation in non-state-owned enterprises are less prominent. Because the supervision of shareholders over managers in non-state-owned enterprises is much stricter than that in SOEs, the way to reduce agency cost (pay of cash dividend) may reduce another form of agency cost but not non-pecuniary compensation. This provides us with the empirical evidence to think the SOEs’income distribution policy from the point of optimizing corporate governance and bounding agent motivation of managers.
In order to research the income distribution policy in SOEs, discuss on how to reduce the conflict between nation and manager, bound agent motivation of managers and enhance the performance of the company by income distribution policy, this paper will be divided into two main parts: The first part will discuss whether or not the cash dividend can restrain the non-pecuniary compensation effectively and reduce agency costs; The second part will discuss whether or not the non-pecuniary compensation as agency costs will bring significant negative impact on the performance of the company. As a result, our research can provide a logical test and provide a policy based on agency theory perspective for the income distribution of SOEs.
This paper is divided into eight chapters:
Chapter one is an Introduction.
This part covers the paper’s research background, research purpose, research significance, research methods, research thinking, research structure and research process.
Chapter two is a review of the literature and research hypothesis.
This part is the theoretical basis of whole paper. First of all, this chapter has done a summary on the principal-agent theory, dividend-agent theory, as well as the non-pecuniary compensation related literature, and then made two assumptions that cash dividend is negative correlation with the non-pecuniary compensation of managers and the non-pecuniary compensation is negative correlation with the performance of companies.
Chapter three is the research design.
This chapter is the premise of the empirical study, it includes two sections that are modeling and variables illustrating, data sources and sample selection. Chapter four is empirical study on the relationship between non-pecuniary compensation and cash dividend policy.
This chapter is the main part of this study and it’s also an innovation of the whole article, the focus is to prove whether or not the assumptions one is reasonable. It is divided into three parts. The first part is the descriptive statistics for the variables and the main differences of variables in test. The second part is correlation analysis. The third part is the results of regression and regression analysis.
Chapter five is the study on the correlation between the non-pecuniary compensation and the performance of the company.
This part is a useful supplement to the foregoing demonstration in order to make this study more logical and reasonable. It shows that:
The non-pecuniary compensation brings significant negative impact on the performance of the company, which proves that the assumptions two is reasonable;
Cash dividend has a significant positive impact on the performance of the company;
The rate of corporate assets and liabilities (LEVER) has a significant negative impact on the performance of enterprises.
The rate of long-term investment (CQTZR) has also a significant negative impact on the performance of the company.
Chapter six is robustness test.
To consider the non-pecuniary compensation data may be selective bias and influences the stability of the conclusions, so this paper makes a robustness test in order to enhance the credibility and persuasiveness of this article.
Chapter seven is the conclusion of this study.
First of all, this chapter makes summarized statements on the empirical analysis, and gives an advice from the financial point of view on the policy of SOEs’dividend policy. Our empirical result shows that non-pecuniary compensation as a part of agent cost does exist, and it brings significant negative impact on the performance of enterprise. It is not only affected significantly by the pay of executives, but also the CQTZR and LEVER. More importantly, we have confirmed that cash dividend can reduce the level of non-pecuniary compensation in SOEs, which also reduces agent cost and enhance the performance of SOEs. This provides us with a useful perspective to understand the SOEs’income distribution policy and optimize corporate governance correctly. On the one hand, the state-owned enterprises should respect the autonomy of their own financial management and avoid across-the-board income distribution patterns of them. On the other hand, the government should convert her role as owner of SOEs and avoid implementation of the state-owned capital budget system to lead to the new trouble.
Chapter eight is a study limitations and the follow-up advice.
For the limitations of this study, this paper gives some valuable proposals for the follow-up research.
2. The main contribution:
For the existence of the serious non-pecuniary compensation and management deficiencies,this paper gives a scientific analysis to study the income distribution policy of SOEs from a view of corporate governance and agency relationship.
Understand the relationship between the characteristics of the corporate governance and the non-pecuniary compensation in order to lay the foundation for dealing with the issue in the income distribution policy of SOEs correctly.
This paper lets non-pecuniary compensation, corporate governance and income distribution policy of SOEs into a unified framework, which not only guarantees the role of cash dividend policy in bounding agent motivation of managers and exerting its corporate governance efficiency, but also gives an advice on the income distribution policy of SOEs from a correct way.
Moreover this paper lets non-pecuniary compensation, the performance of company and income distribution policy of SOEs into a unified framework, which gives a reasonable explanation of the relationship among them and provides more scientific and empirical evidence to the income distribution policy of SOEs.
代理理论是否能够解释我国国有企业收益分配政策,是国有企业收益分配和公司治理领域需要深入研究的问题。本文以代理理论为指导,运用2003年—2006年A股上市公司的数据为研究样本,实证检验了我国国有上市公司现金分红政策与高管人员在职消费之间的关系及内部治理因素对这种关系的影响。我们发现相对非国有最终控制的公司,国有最终控制公司高管人员的在职消费程度与公司业绩显著负相关,并且支付现金股利可以显著降低高管人员的在职消费程度,减少代理成本,提升国有企业的公司业绩。我们认为,与国有最终控制的企业相比,非国有最终控制的企业的代理成本在在职消费问题上的表现可能更弱。因为,非国有最终控制的企业股东对经理在职消费方面的监督较强。因此,采取降低代理成本的手段(发放现金股利),可能造成其他形式的代理成本降低,而非在职消费降低。这为我们从优化公司治理、约束管理层代理动机角度思考国有企业收益分配政策提供了经验证据。
为了深入研究国有企业收入分配问题,探讨如何通过收益分配降低国家与管理层代理冲突,约束管理层代理动机,提升公司业绩,本文将研究分为两个主要的部分:第一部分,探讨现金股利是否能有效抑制高管人员的在职消费,减少代理成本;第二部分探讨在职消费作为代理成本的一部分,是否会给公司业绩带来显著的负面影响。这样一来,可以为我们的研究提供一个逻辑上的证明,并可以为国有企业的收益分配政策提供一个基于代理理论的视角。
本文共分为八章,各章主要内容如下:
第一章绪论
本章首先阐述了本文的研究背景。2005年10月,世界银行发表的一份题为《国有企业分红:分多少?分给谁?》的研究报告,引起了国内对国有企业收益分配问题的广泛讨论。2007年底,财政部、国资委发布了《中央企业国有资本收益收取管理办法》,国有资本经营预算制度正式实施,这标志着国有企业不向国家分红的历史一去不复返了。但是,我们在肯定国家作为国有企业投资主体回收资本收益的同时,应该看到收益分配政策作为公司财务决策的重要内容,应当遵循公司财务的基本规律和内在逻辑。本文认为,从代理理论视角,即基于约束管理层代理动机的立场来研究国有企业收益分配问题具有重要意义。
其次,阐述了本文的研究目的。将在职消费与国有企业的收益分配政策结合起来,探讨如何通过收益分配来抑制管理层的代理动机,提高公司治理效率,从而提升国有企业的公司业绩,并为国有企业正确的收益分配政策提供参考。
最后,对本文的研究意义、研究方法和研究思路、研究结构与流程也做了简要阐述。
第二章文献回顾与研究假说
这是全文的理论基础部分,本章首先对委托代理理论、股利代理理论以及在职消费相关的文献做了综述,并在此基础上提出假设:国有企业现金股利的发放抑制了高管人员的在职消费水平,即现金股利支付率与在职消费水平负相关。其次,为了使本文的逻辑性更强,本文提出了一个递进的假设:国有企业在职消费会给公司业绩造成显著负面影响,即在职消费水平与公司业绩负相关。这一假设将在第五章中加以证明。
第三章研究设计
本章是进行实证研究的前提部分,是对下面一章的研究所做的基础性工作,包括模型构建和变量说明、数据来源与样本选择两个小节。
需要说明的是本文的数据来源:本文选取2003—2006年所有在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所上市的A股公司为初始研究样本,除了在职消费数据为手工收集外,其余数据均来自中国证券市场会计研究数据库(CSMAR),并按以下标准对初始样本做了剔除:(1)由于金融类上市公司与一般上市公司的财务特征和会计制度存在差异,剔除了金融和保险行业的上市公司样本;(2)剔除了同时发行有B股或H股的样本;(3)剔除了所有数据缺失的样本,最后我们得到2008个观测值,用以研究上市公司分红政策、在职消费和公司业绩之间的关系。
第四章在职消费与现金股利政策实证研究
本章是本研究的主要部分,也是全文的创新之处,重点是对前面提出的假设1进行证明。
第一部分为变量描述性统计及主要变量差异性检验。该部分比较了国有最终控制与非国有最终控制的样本各主要变量之间的描述性统计及差异性检验结果。统计结果显示国有最终控制的企业,其主营业务收入要显著高于非国有最终控制的企业,然而,其业绩却与非国有最终控制的企业没有显著差异,说明国有企业代理问题较严重,在职消费绝对数额显著高于非国有最终控制的企业也许是其中的一个原因。
第二部分为相关性分析。该部分主要是对各主要变量之间的相关关系做出统计,也为后面的回归分析做铺垫,防止产生严重的多重共线性问题。统计发现企业在职消费程度(NPC)与公司业绩(EPS和ROA)之间存在显著的负相关关系,这一现象说明,在职消费给公司带来了显著的负面影响;股利支付率(DIVI1)和每股现金股利(DIVI2)与在职消费程度显著负相关,这说明,通过支付现金股利可以抑制高管人员的在职消费程度。
第三部分为回归结果及其分析。该部分承上启下,实证检验了股利代理理论在我国的适用性。研究结果表明:(1)在国有最终控制的样本和全样本中,股利的发放减少了管理人员可支配的自由现金流,抑制了其利用企业资金获取私人利益的行为,减少了代理成本,从而有利于公司业绩的提升。另外,与国有最终控制的企业相比,非国有最终控制的企业的代理成本在在职消费问题上的表现可能更弱。(2)随着企业资产负债率的增大,增加了企业经营者可以支配的自由现金流,为经营者谋取私人利益提供了方便,加重了在职消费程度,增加了代理成本。(3)无论是全样本、国有最终控制的样本还是非国有最终控制的样本,长期投资率都对在职消费程度产生了正向影响,这说明企业经理常常借助对外投资,将大量资金拿到体外循环,以便躲避监督,隐藏在职消费或通过过度投资谋取私人利益的行为。(4)在国有最终控股的样本中,管理层在职消费程度随着管理层持股比例的提高非但没有减少,反而加剧了。分析其原因,本文认为这和国有最终控制的企业管理层持股比例(MSH)显著低于非国有最终控制的企业样本,经营者没有得到有效的激励,在职消费成了其替代性选择有关。
第五章在职消费与公司业绩相关关系研究
该部分是对前面的论证所做的有益补充,使本研究在逻辑上更加合理。
(1)实证检验了在职消费对公司业绩确实带来了显著的负面影响,这验证了本文所提出的假设2的合理性。
(2)分红对企业业绩产生了显著的正面影响。结合前面的分析,我们认为股利的发放有利于降低国有企业高层管理者在职消费程度,减少代理成本,从而提升企业业绩。
(3)企业资产负债率(LEVER)对企业业绩产生了显著的负面影响,说明杠杆治理在我国是失效的。那么,是什么原因造成了这样一种与现代财务理论截然相反的现象呢?结合上面的实证分析,我们认为最根本的制度原因是预算软约束。债务融资为高层管理人员提供了可以支配的自由现金流,加剧了其在职消费程度,增加了代理成本,从而降低了企业业绩。
(4)长期投资率也对公司业绩产生了显著的负面影响。
第六章稳健性检验
考虑到本文在职消费数据可能存在选择性偏差,影响结论的稳健性,因此本文作了稳健性检验,以增强本文的可信度和说服力。
第七章结语
本章首先对实证分析的结果做了总结陈述,并从财务政策角度对国有企业的分红政策提出了建议。本文通过实证研究发现在职消费作为代理成本的一部分在我国确实存在,并对企业业绩造成了显著的负面影响。它不仅受高管薪酬的显著影响,还受到长期投资率和资本结构的显著影响。更为重要的是,我们证实了,国有企业通过支付现金股利可以显著降低高管人员的在职消费程度,从而减少代理成本,提升国有企业的公司业绩,这为正确认识国有企业的收益分配政策、优化国有企业的公司治理提供了一个有益的视角。一方面,要尊重国有企业自身的理财自主权,避免一刀切的国有企业收益分配模式;另一方面应该转换政府作为国有企业所有者的行为方式,避免国有资本预算制度的实施导致新的政企不分。
第八章研究局限与后续研究建议
针对本文研究存在的局限性,对后续研究做出了一些有价值的建议。
2.主要贡献
(1)针对我国国有企业存在的较为严重的在职消费和治理缺陷,从公司治理和代理关系角度对我国国有企业的收益分配问题进行科学解析,从而深化我国关于收益分配的研究;
(2)了解我国国有企业公司治理特征与国有企业高管人员在职消费程度之间的关系,为正确处理我国国有企业收益分配中存在的问题奠定基础;
(3)将国有企业的在职消费、公司治理特征和收益分配政策纳入一个统一的分析框架,既保证收益分配在抑制管理层代理动机、发挥其公司治理效率方面的作用,又能为制定国有企业正确的收益分配政策提供参考;
(4)将国有企业的在职消费、公司业绩和收益分配政策纳入一个统一的分析框架,从而更全面地对在职消费、公司业绩和收益分配政策之间的关系进行科学合理的解释,为国有企业正确的收益分配政策提供更加科学的经验证据。
1. The main content and perspective:
If agency theory can explain China's income distribution policy of SOEs is very important in the field of SOEs’income distribution and corporate governance that should be studied in depth.
Based on agency theory, we use the data of the china’s listed companies of A over period 2003-2006 to investigate the relationship between cash dividend and non-pecuniary compensation of managers; we also investigate the effect of interior governance factor on this relationship. Our empirical result shows that compared to non-state-owned enterprises, there is a significant negative correlation between the non-pecuniary compensation in Chinese SOEs and performance, therefore the pay of cash dividend can reduce the non-pecuniary compensation in China’s SOEs which also reduce the agency cost and therefore upgrade the performance of SOEs. We believe that compared to state-owned enterprises, maybe the agency cost on non-pecuniary compensation in non-state-owned enterprises are less prominent. Because the supervision of shareholders over managers in non-state-owned enterprises is much stricter than that in SOEs, the way to reduce agency cost (pay of cash dividend) may reduce another form of agency cost but not non-pecuniary compensation. This provides us with the empirical evidence to think the SOEs’income distribution policy from the point of optimizing corporate governance and bounding agent motivation of managers.
In order to research the income distribution policy in SOEs, discuss on how to reduce the conflict between nation and manager, bound agent motivation of managers and enhance the performance of the company by income distribution policy, this paper will be divided into two main parts: The first part will discuss whether or not the cash dividend can restrain the non-pecuniary compensation effectively and reduce agency costs; The second part will discuss whether or not the non-pecuniary compensation as agency costs will bring significant negative impact on the performance of the company. As a result, our research can provide a logical test and provide a policy based on agency theory perspective for the income distribution of SOEs.
This paper is divided into eight chapters:
Chapter one is an Introduction.
This part covers the paper’s research background, research purpose, research significance, research methods, research thinking, research structure and research process.
Chapter two is a review of the literature and research hypothesis.
This part is the theoretical basis of whole paper. First of all, this chapter has done a summary on the principal-agent theory, dividend-agent theory, as well as the non-pecuniary compensation related literature, and then made two assumptions that cash dividend is negative correlation with the non-pecuniary compensation of managers and the non-pecuniary compensation is negative correlation with the performance of companies.
Chapter three is the research design.
This chapter is the premise of the empirical study, it includes two sections that are modeling and variables illustrating, data sources and sample selection. Chapter four is empirical study on the relationship between non-pecuniary compensation and cash dividend policy.
This chapter is the main part of this study and it’s also an innovation of the whole article, the focus is to prove whether or not the assumptions one is reasonable. It is divided into three parts. The first part is the descriptive statistics for the variables and the main differences of variables in test. The second part is correlation analysis. The third part is the results of regression and regression analysis.
Chapter five is the study on the correlation between the non-pecuniary compensation and the performance of the company.
This part is a useful supplement to the foregoing demonstration in order to make this study more logical and reasonable. It shows that:
The non-pecuniary compensation brings significant negative impact on the performance of the company, which proves that the assumptions two is reasonable;
Cash dividend has a significant positive impact on the performance of the company;
The rate of corporate assets and liabilities (LEVER) has a significant negative impact on the performance of enterprises.
The rate of long-term investment (CQTZR) has also a significant negative impact on the performance of the company.
Chapter six is robustness test.
To consider the non-pecuniary compensation data may be selective bias and influences the stability of the conclusions, so this paper makes a robustness test in order to enhance the credibility and persuasiveness of this article.
Chapter seven is the conclusion of this study.
First of all, this chapter makes summarized statements on the empirical analysis, and gives an advice from the financial point of view on the policy of SOEs’dividend policy. Our empirical result shows that non-pecuniary compensation as a part of agent cost does exist, and it brings significant negative impact on the performance of enterprise. It is not only affected significantly by the pay of executives, but also the CQTZR and LEVER. More importantly, we have confirmed that cash dividend can reduce the level of non-pecuniary compensation in SOEs, which also reduces agent cost and enhance the performance of SOEs. This provides us with a useful perspective to understand the SOEs’income distribution policy and optimize corporate governance correctly. On the one hand, the state-owned enterprises should respect the autonomy of their own financial management and avoid across-the-board income distribution patterns of them. On the other hand, the government should convert her role as owner of SOEs and avoid implementation of the state-owned capital budget system to lead to the new trouble.
Chapter eight is a study limitations and the follow-up advice.
For the limitations of this study, this paper gives some valuable proposals for the follow-up research.
2. The main contribution:
For the existence of the serious non-pecuniary compensation and management deficiencies,this paper gives a scientific analysis to study the income distribution policy of SOEs from a view of corporate governance and agency relationship.
Understand the relationship between the characteristics of the corporate governance and the non-pecuniary compensation in order to lay the foundation for dealing with the issue in the income distribution policy of SOEs correctly.
This paper lets non-pecuniary compensation, corporate governance and income distribution policy of SOEs into a unified framework, which not only guarantees the role of cash dividend policy in bounding agent motivation of managers and exerting its corporate governance efficiency, but also gives an advice on the income distribution policy of SOEs from a correct way.
Moreover this paper lets non-pecuniary compensation, the performance of company and income distribution policy of SOEs into a unified framework, which gives a reasonable explanation of the relationship among them and provides more scientific and empirical evidence to the income distribution policy of SOEs.
引文
1中国财政年鉴,2004;中国统计年鉴,2004。转引自:世界银行,2005年10月17日,《国有企业分红:分多少?分给谁?》。
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10 Fluck,Z.,1999,,“The dynamics of the management-shareholder conflict”,Review of Financial Studies,12,pp.347~377.
11 Gomes,A.,2000,,“Going public without governance”,The Journal of Finance,55(2),pp. 615~646.
1 La Porta,R.,2000,“Agency problems and dividend policies around the world”, The Journal of Finance,55(1),pp.1~33.
2 Lang,L.& R.Litzenberger,1989,“Dividend announcements:cash flow signalling vs.free cash flow hypotheses?”,Journal of Financial Economics,24(1),pp.181~191.
3 Agrawal,A.& N.Jayaraman,1994,“The dividend policies of all-equity firms: a direct test of free cash flow theory”,Managerial Decision Economics,15,pp.139~148.
4 Lie,E.,2000,“Excess funds and agency problems”,The Review of Financial Studies,13(1), pp.219~249.
5 S.Ghose,2005,“Corporate Governance and Over-investment by the U.S.oil Industry”,Working paper,www.ssrn.com.
6吕长江,王克敏.1999.上市公司股利政策的实证分析.经济研究,12:31~39.
7原红旗.2004.大股东配股行为及其经济后果.中国会计与财务研究,6(2):1~26.
8余明桂,夏新平,吴少凡.2004.公司治理研究新趋势——控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题.外国经济与管理,2(2):28~32.
9王信.2002.从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为.金融研究,9:44~52.
10周立.2002.自由现金流代理问题的验证.中国软科学,8:43~47.
11王满四.2004.上市公司自由现金流效应实证分析.证券市场导报,8.
12杨熠,沈艺峰.2004.现金股利:传递盈利信息还是起监督治理作用.中国会计评论,6(1):61~76.
13李增泉,孙铮,任强.2004.所有权安排与现金股利政策——来自我国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,4:48~75.
14廖理,方芳.2005.股利政策代理理论的实证检验.南开管理评论,8(5):55~62.
15李寿喜.2007.产权、代理成本和代理效率.经济研究,1:102~113.
1 Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.(1986),“Large shareholders and corporate control”,The Journal of Political Economy,94(3),pp.461-488.
2 Megginson,William L and Jeffery M Netter,2001,“From Stata to Market:A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privation”,Journal of Economic Literature,39(2),pp.321~389.
3 Djankov,Simeon and Peter Murrell,2002,“Enterprise Restructuring in Transition:A Quantitative Survey”,Journal of Economic Literature,40(3),pp.739~792.
4徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.2006.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响.经济研究,1:90~100.
5平新乔,范瑛,郝朝艳.2003.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析.经济研究,3:42~53.
1魏明海,柳建华.2007.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资.管理世界,4:88~95.
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4 Jensen M.,1986,“Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeover”, American Economic Review,76,pp.323~329.
5 Lang H.P.and Robert H.Litzenberger,1989,“Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signalling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypotheses”,Journal of Financial Economics,24,pp.181-191.
6 Lamont,Owen,1997,“Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets”, The Journal of Finance,52,pp.83~109.
7 S.Ghose.2005.“Corporate Governance and Over-investment by the U.S.oil Industry”.Working paper,www.ssrn.com.
8魏明海,柳建华.2007.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资.管理世界,4:88~95.
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2 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
3 Fama,Eugene F,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”,Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
4 Hart,Oliver D,2001,“Financial contracting”.Journal of Economic Literatrue,39(4).pp. 1079~1100.
5 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”.working paper, www.ssrn.com.
6 David,Yermack,2005,“Flights of fancy:Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and Inferior shareholder returns”.working paper,www.ssrn.com.
7 Hongbin Cai,Hanming Fang,and Lixin Colin Xu,2005,“Eat,drink,firms and government:An investigation of corruption from entertainment expenditures of Chinese firms”.working paper,www.ssrn.com.
8陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
1 Aghion,Philippe and Patrick Bolton,1992,“An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”.Review of Economics Studies,59(3),pp.473~494.
2 Jensen,M.C,1986,“Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers”.American Economic Review,76(2),pp.323~329.
3 Diamond,Douglas W,1984,“Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”.Review of Economics Studies,51,pp.1027~1054.
4 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”.Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
5田利辉.2004.杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效.经济学季刊,10:15~26.
6 Fama,Eugene F,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”.Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
7陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
1 Fama,Eugene F,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”.Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
2 Hart,Oliver D,2001,“Financial contracting”.Journal of Economic Literatrue,39(4),pp. 1079~1100.
3 Hirsch,Fred,1976,“Social limits to growth”.Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
4 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”.working paper, www.ssrn.com.
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2中国统计年鉴,2004,第291页。
1世界银行,2005年10月17日,《国有企业分红:分多少?分给谁?》。
1世界银行,2005,中国:深化事业单位改革,改善公共服务提供,中信出版社,第142页。
2世界银行,2005年10月17日,《国有企业分红:分多少?分给谁?》。
1 Black,Fischer,1976,“Dividend Puzzle”,Journal of Portfolio Management,2,pp.5~8.
2李增泉,孙铮,任强.2004.所有权安排与现金股利政策——来自我国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,4:48~75.
3 Rozeff,M.S.,1982,“Growth,beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios”,Journal of Financial Research,5,pp.249~259.
4 LLSV由四位经济学家姓氏的第一个字母组成,代表哈佛大学的Rafael La Porta、Andrei Shleifer,耶鲁大学的Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes和芝加哥大学的Robert Vishny.
5 Lang,Larry H.P. and Litzenberger,R.H.,1989,“Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signaling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?”,Journal of Financial Economics,24,pp.181~191.
6 Faccio,Mar,Larry Lang H.P. and Leslie Young,2001,“Dividends and Expropriation”,American Economic Review,91,pp.54~78.
7王信.2002.从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为.金融研究,9:44~52.
8周立.2002.自由现金流代理问题的验证.中国软科学,8:43~47.
1廖理,方芳.2005.股利政策代理理论的实证检验.南开管理评论,8(5):55~62.
2李增泉,孙铮,任强.2004.所有权安排与现金股利政策——来自我国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,4:48~75.
3廖理,方芳.2004.管理层持股、股利政策与上市公司代理成本.统计研究,12:27~30.
4魏明海,柳建华.2007.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资.管理世界,4:88~94.
1 Coase, Ronald, 1937,“The Nature of the Firm”, Economics,4,pp.386~405.
2 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
3 Fame, Eugence, and Michael Jensen,1983a,“Separation of Ownership and Control”,Journal of Law and Economics,26,pp.301~325. Fame, Eugence, and Michael Jensen,1983b,“Agency Problems and Residuals Claims”,Journal of Law and Economics,26,pp.327~349.
4 Shleifer,A.,& Vishy,R.W.,1997,“A Survey of Corporate Governance”,Journal of Finance,52,pp.737~783.
5郑红亮.1998.公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革.经济研究,10:20~27.
6冯根福.2004.双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架.经济研究,12:16~25.
1 Berle,A.,and Means,G.C.,1932,“The Modern Corporatin and Private Property”,Harvourt,Brace and World Inc.,New York,Revised Edition 1967.
2 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”.Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
3 Berle,A.,and Means,G.C.,1932,”The Modern Corporatin and Private Property”,Harvourt,Brace and World Inc.,New York,Revised Edition 1967.
1参见http://dictionary.reference.com/
2 Hart,Oliver D.,2001,“Financial contracting”,Journal of Economic Literatrue,39(4),pp.1079~1100.
3 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”,working paper, www.ssrn.com.
4国务院国有资产监督管理委员会关于规范中央企业负责人职务消费的指导意见,2006.6.8
5万华林.2007.国外在职消费研究述评.外国经济与管理,9:39~42.
6 Fama,Eugene F.,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”,Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
7 Hart,Oliver D.,2001,“Financial contracting”,Journal of Economic Literatrue,39(4),pp. 1079~1100.
1 Hirsch,Fred,1976,“Social limits to growth”.Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
2 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”,working paper, www.ssrn.com.
3 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”,working paper, www.ssrn.com.
4 David,Yermack,2005,“Flights of fancy:Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and Inferior shareholder returns”,working paper, www.ssrn.com.
5在其研究样本中,77.7%的公司拥有或租用了专机,但只有15.9%的公司披露了CEO私用公司专机的情况。
6 Hongbin Cai,Hanming Fang,and Lixin Colin Xu.,2005,“Eat,drink,firms and government:An investigation of corruption from entertainment expenditures of Chinese firms”,workingpaper,www.ssrn.com.
1费方域.1996.控制内部人控制:国企改革中的治理机制研究.经济研究,6:31~39.
2何浚.1998.上市公司治理结构的实证分析.经济研究,5:50~57.
3赵文红,李垣.1998.中国国企经营者“在职消费”行为探讨.经济体制改革,5:82~84.
4周其仁.1997.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”:“公有制经济”中企业家人力资本产权的案例研究.经济研究,5:31~42.
5张维迎.1998.控制权丧失的不可弥补性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍.经济研究,7:3~14.
6黄群慧.2000.控制权作为企业家的激励约束因素:理论分析及现实解释意义.经济研究,1:41~47.
7徐宁,谭安杰.2003.控制权收益及其资本化趋势.会计研究,9:39~42.
8张仁德,韩晶.2003.国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析.当代经济科学,3(2):28~32.
9童卫华.2005.我国国有企业高管人员报酬:控制权激励观.经济学家,6:53~57.
10陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
11黄凤岗,周海晨,王绛.2005.国有企业经营者职务消费问题分析.中国经贸导刊,10:25~26.
1夏冬林,李晓强.2004.在职消费与公司治理机制.中国会计学会第六届理事会第二次会议暨2004年学术年会论文集,7:361~369.
2陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
3王满四.2006.上市公司负债融资的激励效应实证研究——针对经理人员工资和在职消费的分析.南方经济,7:65~74.
4吕长江,金超,韩慧博.2007.上市公司资本结构、管理者利益侵占与公司业绩.财经研究,5:50~61.
5李寿喜.2007.产权、代理成本和代理效率.经济研究,1:102~113.
6 James S.Ang and Rebel A.Cole and James Wuh Lin,2000,“Agency Cost and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Finance,February,55(1),pp.81~106.
1夏冬林,李晓强.2004.在职消费与公司治理机制.中国会计学会第六届理事会第二次会议暨2004年学术年会论文集,7:361~369.
2陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
3王满四.2006.上市公司负债融资的激励效应实证研究——针对经理人员工资和在职消费的分析.南方经济,7:65~74.
4吕长江,金超,韩慧博.2007.上市公司资本结构、管理者利益侵占与公司业绩.财经研究,5:50~61.
5 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
6 Alchian,A.,and Demsetz,H.,1972,“Production,Information Costs and Economic Organization”,American Economic Review,12,pp.780~781.
1 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
2 Easterbrook,F.,1984,“Two agency cost explanations of dividends”,American Economic Review,74,pp.650~659.
3 Jensen,M.C.,1986,“Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers”,American Economic Review,76(2),pp.323~329.
4 Rozeff,M.S.,1982,“Growth,beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios”,Journal of Financial Research,5,pp.249~259.
5 Easterbrook,F.,1984,“Two agency cost explanations of dividends”,American Economic Review,74,pp.650~659.
6 Jensen,M.C.,1986,“Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers”,American Economic Review,76(2),pp.323~329.
7 Easterbrook,F.,1984,“Two agency cost explanations of dividends”,American Economic Review,74,pp.650~659.
8 Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.(1986),“Large shareholders and corporate control”,The Journal of Political Economy,94(3),pp.461~488.
9 Zwiebel,J.,1996,“Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment”, American Economic Review,86,pp.1197~1215.
10 Fluck,Z.,1999,,“The dynamics of the management-shareholder conflict”,Review of Financial Studies,12,pp.347~377.
11 Gomes,A.,2000,,“Going public without governance”,The Journal of Finance,55(2),pp. 615~646.
1 La Porta,R.,2000,“Agency problems and dividend policies around the world”, The Journal of Finance,55(1),pp.1~33.
2 Lang,L.& R.Litzenberger,1989,“Dividend announcements:cash flow signalling vs.free cash flow hypotheses?”,Journal of Financial Economics,24(1),pp.181~191.
3 Agrawal,A.& N.Jayaraman,1994,“The dividend policies of all-equity firms: a direct test of free cash flow theory”,Managerial Decision Economics,15,pp.139~148.
4 Lie,E.,2000,“Excess funds and agency problems”,The Review of Financial Studies,13(1), pp.219~249.
5 S.Ghose,2005,“Corporate Governance and Over-investment by the U.S.oil Industry”,Working paper,www.ssrn.com.
6吕长江,王克敏.1999.上市公司股利政策的实证分析.经济研究,12:31~39.
7原红旗.2004.大股东配股行为及其经济后果.中国会计与财务研究,6(2):1~26.
8余明桂,夏新平,吴少凡.2004.公司治理研究新趋势——控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题.外国经济与管理,2(2):28~32.
9王信.2002.从代理理论看上市公司的派现行为.金融研究,9:44~52.
10周立.2002.自由现金流代理问题的验证.中国软科学,8:43~47.
11王满四.2004.上市公司自由现金流效应实证分析.证券市场导报,8.
12杨熠,沈艺峰.2004.现金股利:传递盈利信息还是起监督治理作用.中国会计评论,6(1):61~76.
13李增泉,孙铮,任强.2004.所有权安排与现金股利政策——来自我国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,4:48~75.
14廖理,方芳.2005.股利政策代理理论的实证检验.南开管理评论,8(5):55~62.
15李寿喜.2007.产权、代理成本和代理效率.经济研究,1:102~113.
1 Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.(1986),“Large shareholders and corporate control”,The Journal of Political Economy,94(3),pp.461-488.
2 Megginson,William L and Jeffery M Netter,2001,“From Stata to Market:A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privation”,Journal of Economic Literature,39(2),pp.321~389.
3 Djankov,Simeon and Peter Murrell,2002,“Enterprise Restructuring in Transition:A Quantitative Survey”,Journal of Economic Literature,40(3),pp.739~792.
4徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.2006.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响.经济研究,1:90~100.
5平新乔,范瑛,郝朝艳.2003.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析.经济研究,3:42~53.
1魏明海,柳建华.2007.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资.管理世界,4:88~95.
2田利辉.2005.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理.管理世界,7:123~128.
3 Easterbrook Frank H.,“Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review, 1984(74),pp.650~658.
4 Jensen M.,1986,“Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeover”, American Economic Review,76,pp.323~329.
5 Lang H.P.and Robert H.Litzenberger,1989,“Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signalling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypotheses”,Journal of Financial Economics,24,pp.181-191.
6 Lamont,Owen,1997,“Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets”, The Journal of Finance,52,pp.83~109.
7 S.Ghose.2005.“Corporate Governance and Over-investment by the U.S.oil Industry”.Working paper,www.ssrn.com.
8魏明海,柳建华.2007.国企分红、治理因素与过度投资.管理世界,4:88~95.
1陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
2钱颖一.1995.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革.经济研究,1:20~29.
3杨瑞龙,周业安.1998.相机治理与国有企业监控.中国社会科学,3:4~17.
1李旭红.2003.国企老总要拿年薪了.市场报,9月12日。
2 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
3 Fama,Eugene F,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”,Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
4 Hart,Oliver D,2001,“Financial contracting”.Journal of Economic Literatrue,39(4).pp. 1079~1100.
5 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”.working paper, www.ssrn.com.
6 David,Yermack,2005,“Flights of fancy:Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and Inferior shareholder returns”.working paper,www.ssrn.com.
7 Hongbin Cai,Hanming Fang,and Lixin Colin Xu,2005,“Eat,drink,firms and government:An investigation of corruption from entertainment expenditures of Chinese firms”.working paper,www.ssrn.com.
8陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
1 Aghion,Philippe and Patrick Bolton,1992,“An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”.Review of Economics Studies,59(3),pp.473~494.
2 Jensen,M.C,1986,“Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers”.American Economic Review,76(2),pp.323~329.
3 Diamond,Douglas W,1984,“Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”.Review of Economics Studies,51,pp.1027~1054.
4 Jensen,M.C.,and Meckling,W.H.,1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”.Journal of Financial Economics,3,pp.305~360.
5田利辉.2004.杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效.经济学季刊,10:15~26.
6 Fama,Eugene F,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”.Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
7陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101.
1 Fama,Eugene F,1980,“Agency problem and the theory of the firm”.Journal of Political Economics,88(4),pp.288~307.
2 Hart,Oliver D,2001,“Financial contracting”.Journal of Economic Literatrue,39(4),pp. 1079~1100.
3 Hirsch,Fred,1976,“Social limits to growth”.Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
4 Raghuram G.Rajan,and Julie Wulf,2004,“Are perks purely managerial excess”.working paper, www.ssrn.com.
1 James S.Ang and Rebel A.Cole and James Wuh Lin,2000,“Agency Cost and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Finance,February,55(1),pp.81~106.
1平新乔,范瑛,郝朝艳.2003.中国国有企业代理成本的实证分析.经济研究,3:42~53.
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