经营者集中的法律标准问题研究
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摘要
现代反垄断法始于美国颁布的《谢尔曼法》,迄今已有一百多年的历史。经营者集中作为反垄断法主要规制的对象之一,历来为各国反垄断法所关注。美国、德国、欧盟、日本以及加拿大等国家和地区都建立了相对完善的反垄断制度,并将经营者集中控制制度作为本国反垄断法的核心内容。本文采用经济、历史、对比分析等研究方法,在研究了美国、德国、欧盟等发达国家和地区经营者集中判断标准的基础上,结合我国新颁布的《反垄断法》,对我国经营者集中的法律标准进行了分析,指出了我国经营者集中法律标准的不足及立法完善。全文由前言、正文和结论三部分组成。
前言:简要说明本文选题的背景及内容概括。
正文:共分为四部分,主要内容有:
第一部分:对经营者集中进行反垄断法的界定,并指出我国经营者集中的立法概况。反垄断法意义上的经营者集中是一种主体宽泛、表现形态多样的法律行为,各国一般将经营者集中分为横向集中、垂直集中和混合集中三种类型。其中横向集中对竞争的影响最大,所以,本文主要探讨横向集中的反垄断法标准。经营者集中对经济的发展有着促进和阻碍两方面的作用。一方面,集中有利于促进经营者间人力、财力、设备及技术的合作,从而有利于提高企业的生产效率和企业竞争力。另一方面,过度的集中可能会使经营者为谋求垄断利润,而滥用其市场支配地位,从而危害市场竞争。
第二部分:主要研究了发达国家经营者集中标准的立法及司法实践,进而提出对我国的启示。在对经营者集中的反垄断法判断标准上,大致有“市场支配地位标准”和“严重损害有效竞争标准”两种。为了适应全球经济一体化的需要,各国都在不断调整本国经营者集中控制政策,对经营者集中的态度也由严厉变得趋于宽松。在审查一项集中是否应予禁止时,各国大都采取了市场份额、市场集中度及赫尔芬达指数(HHI)的方法来测定市场的集中程度,并考虑了诸如经营者的财力、市场进入障碍、潜在的竞争者等因素。各国还确立了经营者集中豁免制度。
第三部分:在本章,笔者对经营者集中的两类实体标准加以对比,从而得出严重损害有效竞争标准更加科学的结论。笔者进而对严重损害有效竞争标准的理论进行分析,认为有效竞争模式一直以来被认为是理想的从而也是国家应当努力追求的市场模式。
反垄断主管机关在适用“严重损害有效竞争标准”决定一项集中是否应当予以批准时,往往主要从四个方面来分析:一是界定相关市场,以确定具有竞争可能性的商品或服务的范围;二是衡量相关市场上的市场集中度和集中企业的市场份额;三是分析可能的反竞争效果;四是对其他因素的分析。
另外,笔者提出了经营者集中控制的豁免制度。一般来说,禁止经营者集中主要有以下几种抗辩事由:一是改善市场竞争条件,二是有助于提高经营者的效益,三是维护整体经济和社会公共利益。豁免条款的适用使一国的反垄断法具有灵活性,给执法机关留下自由裁量的空间,使一国在其竞争政策和产业政策发生冲突时可以灵活处理。
第四部分:对我国经营者集中法律标准提出立法上的不足及完善的建议。最近几年,中国企业并购活动迅猛发展,经营者集中的浪潮一浪高过一浪。但直到2007年,中国才有了自己的《反垄断法》来规制经营者集中。在该部法律中,确立了经营者集中申报制度,对经营者集中的控制采用了“严重损害有效竞争标准”。最后笔者提出我国经营者集中法律判断标准的不足,并提出立法建议,以期望对我国经营者集中控制制度有所借鉴。
结论:对全文内容的总结。
From the beginning of the United States enacted "the Sherman Act", the modern Anti-monopoly law has gone through the course of one hundred years. As one of the main anti-monopoly regulations, concentrations have always been emphasized by countries who laid down the anti-monopoly law. The United States, Germany, the European Union, Japan, Canada and other countries and regions have set up a relatively perfect system of anti-monopoly. And set the system of controlling the concentrations as the core of their anti-monopoly law. In this paper, the author adopt a lot of research methods, such as the economy, history research methods, comparative analysis, and so on. On the basis of researching the judging criterion of the United States, Germany, the EU and other developed countries. Combined with the China's new "anti-monopoly law" ,the author analyzed China's anti-monopoly law, proposed the defect of China's operator concentration's judging criterion, and put forward a sound. The full text is composed of the preface, body and conclusion.
Preface Part One : A brief description of the background and content summary.
Body parts: It is divided into four chapters. The main contents contain:
Chapter One: Define the concentrations and analyze the two sides of the concentrations. In the view of the Anti-monopoly law, concentrations are a broad and diverse manifestations of legal acts. All countries generally divide the concentrations into three parts: Horizontal concentration, vertical and mixed concentrations. During these three types, horizontal focus have the greatest impact on competition. Therefore, this article focused on the horizontal concentration of anti-monopoly law criterion. Concentrations have both the role of promoter to economy. On one hand, Concentrations can assist the cooperation of human, financial, equipment and technology, which will help to improve productivity and competitiveness. On the other hand, the excessive concentrations may make operators seek monopoly profits, and abuse their dominant market position, which will harm competition in the market.
Chapter Two: It focuses on the criterion of the legislation and judicial practice in developed countries. Then put forward to China. On the criterion of the anti-monopoly law, there are two standards: "Market dominant standard " and "seriously harm effective competition standard". In order to adapt to the impact of the global economic integration, countries are constantly adjusting their policy of controlling concentrations. Their attitude towards concentrations tends to loosen from becoming severe. In reviewing whether a concentration should be prohibited, States are to take the market share, market concentration and HHI Index approach to determine the degree of the market concentration. And taking into account the financial resources, the market entry barriers, potential competitors and other factors. States also established a forgiveness system of operator concentration.
Chapter Three: In this part, the author compares the two standards, then comes to the conclusion that "seriously harm effective competition standard" are more scientific. The author turned to analyze the theory of "seriously harm effective competition standard". And claims that the model of effective competition has been considered an harm ideal market model and thus the country should strive for it.
Anti-monopoly authorities in the application of "seriously harm effective competition standard" decide whether a concentration should be approved mainly from four aspects to analyze: First, defining the relevant market to determine the possibility of a competitive range of goods or services; Second, measuring the market concentration and the share of enterprises; Third, analyzing the possibility of anti-competitive effects; And then analyzing other factors.
In addition, the author proposed the forgiveness system of operator concentration controlling. Generally speaking, the prohibition of the concentrations have the following defense: First, to improve the conditions of market competition; Second, to help improving the effectiveness of the operators; Third, to maintain the overall economic and social benefits. Application of the forgiveness system makes a country's anti-monopoly law flexible, and keeps back space of freely judging for executors. A country can be flexible and deal with conflict when its competition policy and industrial policy conflicts.
Chapter Four: Focus on our country's anti-monopoly law criterion for judging research. In recent years, China has rapid development of the acquisition and merger. But it was not until 2007, the Chinese have its own "anti-monopoly law". In this law, it establishes the reporting system, using the "seriously harm effective competition standard" for the controlling of operator concentrations.Finally the author proposes the inadequacy of China's legal judging criterion of operator concentration and put forward legislative proposals. Hope some references for centralized control.
The conclusion: A summary of the contents.
前言:简要说明本文选题的背景及内容概括。
正文:共分为四部分,主要内容有:
第一部分:对经营者集中进行反垄断法的界定,并指出我国经营者集中的立法概况。反垄断法意义上的经营者集中是一种主体宽泛、表现形态多样的法律行为,各国一般将经营者集中分为横向集中、垂直集中和混合集中三种类型。其中横向集中对竞争的影响最大,所以,本文主要探讨横向集中的反垄断法标准。经营者集中对经济的发展有着促进和阻碍两方面的作用。一方面,集中有利于促进经营者间人力、财力、设备及技术的合作,从而有利于提高企业的生产效率和企业竞争力。另一方面,过度的集中可能会使经营者为谋求垄断利润,而滥用其市场支配地位,从而危害市场竞争。
第二部分:主要研究了发达国家经营者集中标准的立法及司法实践,进而提出对我国的启示。在对经营者集中的反垄断法判断标准上,大致有“市场支配地位标准”和“严重损害有效竞争标准”两种。为了适应全球经济一体化的需要,各国都在不断调整本国经营者集中控制政策,对经营者集中的态度也由严厉变得趋于宽松。在审查一项集中是否应予禁止时,各国大都采取了市场份额、市场集中度及赫尔芬达指数(HHI)的方法来测定市场的集中程度,并考虑了诸如经营者的财力、市场进入障碍、潜在的竞争者等因素。各国还确立了经营者集中豁免制度。
第三部分:在本章,笔者对经营者集中的两类实体标准加以对比,从而得出严重损害有效竞争标准更加科学的结论。笔者进而对严重损害有效竞争标准的理论进行分析,认为有效竞争模式一直以来被认为是理想的从而也是国家应当努力追求的市场模式。
反垄断主管机关在适用“严重损害有效竞争标准”决定一项集中是否应当予以批准时,往往主要从四个方面来分析:一是界定相关市场,以确定具有竞争可能性的商品或服务的范围;二是衡量相关市场上的市场集中度和集中企业的市场份额;三是分析可能的反竞争效果;四是对其他因素的分析。
另外,笔者提出了经营者集中控制的豁免制度。一般来说,禁止经营者集中主要有以下几种抗辩事由:一是改善市场竞争条件,二是有助于提高经营者的效益,三是维护整体经济和社会公共利益。豁免条款的适用使一国的反垄断法具有灵活性,给执法机关留下自由裁量的空间,使一国在其竞争政策和产业政策发生冲突时可以灵活处理。
第四部分:对我国经营者集中法律标准提出立法上的不足及完善的建议。最近几年,中国企业并购活动迅猛发展,经营者集中的浪潮一浪高过一浪。但直到2007年,中国才有了自己的《反垄断法》来规制经营者集中。在该部法律中,确立了经营者集中申报制度,对经营者集中的控制采用了“严重损害有效竞争标准”。最后笔者提出我国经营者集中法律判断标准的不足,并提出立法建议,以期望对我国经营者集中控制制度有所借鉴。
结论:对全文内容的总结。
From the beginning of the United States enacted "the Sherman Act", the modern Anti-monopoly law has gone through the course of one hundred years. As one of the main anti-monopoly regulations, concentrations have always been emphasized by countries who laid down the anti-monopoly law. The United States, Germany, the European Union, Japan, Canada and other countries and regions have set up a relatively perfect system of anti-monopoly. And set the system of controlling the concentrations as the core of their anti-monopoly law. In this paper, the author adopt a lot of research methods, such as the economy, history research methods, comparative analysis, and so on. On the basis of researching the judging criterion of the United States, Germany, the EU and other developed countries. Combined with the China's new "anti-monopoly law" ,the author analyzed China's anti-monopoly law, proposed the defect of China's operator concentration's judging criterion, and put forward a sound. The full text is composed of the preface, body and conclusion.
Preface Part One : A brief description of the background and content summary.
Body parts: It is divided into four chapters. The main contents contain:
Chapter One: Define the concentrations and analyze the two sides of the concentrations. In the view of the Anti-monopoly law, concentrations are a broad and diverse manifestations of legal acts. All countries generally divide the concentrations into three parts: Horizontal concentration, vertical and mixed concentrations. During these three types, horizontal focus have the greatest impact on competition. Therefore, this article focused on the horizontal concentration of anti-monopoly law criterion. Concentrations have both the role of promoter to economy. On one hand, Concentrations can assist the cooperation of human, financial, equipment and technology, which will help to improve productivity and competitiveness. On the other hand, the excessive concentrations may make operators seek monopoly profits, and abuse their dominant market position, which will harm competition in the market.
Chapter Two: It focuses on the criterion of the legislation and judicial practice in developed countries. Then put forward to China. On the criterion of the anti-monopoly law, there are two standards: "Market dominant standard " and "seriously harm effective competition standard". In order to adapt to the impact of the global economic integration, countries are constantly adjusting their policy of controlling concentrations. Their attitude towards concentrations tends to loosen from becoming severe. In reviewing whether a concentration should be prohibited, States are to take the market share, market concentration and HHI Index approach to determine the degree of the market concentration. And taking into account the financial resources, the market entry barriers, potential competitors and other factors. States also established a forgiveness system of operator concentration.
Chapter Three: In this part, the author compares the two standards, then comes to the conclusion that "seriously harm effective competition standard" are more scientific. The author turned to analyze the theory of "seriously harm effective competition standard". And claims that the model of effective competition has been considered an harm ideal market model and thus the country should strive for it.
Anti-monopoly authorities in the application of "seriously harm effective competition standard" decide whether a concentration should be approved mainly from four aspects to analyze: First, defining the relevant market to determine the possibility of a competitive range of goods or services; Second, measuring the market concentration and the share of enterprises; Third, analyzing the possibility of anti-competitive effects; And then analyzing other factors.
In addition, the author proposed the forgiveness system of operator concentration controlling. Generally speaking, the prohibition of the concentrations have the following defense: First, to improve the conditions of market competition; Second, to help improving the effectiveness of the operators; Third, to maintain the overall economic and social benefits. Application of the forgiveness system makes a country's anti-monopoly law flexible, and keeps back space of freely judging for executors. A country can be flexible and deal with conflict when its competition policy and industrial policy conflicts.
Chapter Four: Focus on our country's anti-monopoly law criterion for judging research. In recent years, China has rapid development of the acquisition and merger. But it was not until 2007, the Chinese have its own "anti-monopoly law". In this law, it establishes the reporting system, using the "seriously harm effective competition standard" for the controlling of operator concentrations.Finally the author proposes the inadequacy of China's legal judging criterion of operator concentration and put forward legislative proposals. Hope some references for centralized control.
The conclusion: A summary of the contents.
引文
[1][3][4][22][39]史际春.反垄断法理解与适用.北京:中国法制出版社,2007年.201-206,237,246-249.
[2][5][23][32][34][36][38]王晓晔.企业合并中的反垄断问题.北京:法律出版社,1996年,9,15,65-68,97-99,252-254.
[6][11]黄勇、董灵.反垄断法经典判例解析.北京:人民法院出版社,2002年.21,476,487.
[7]马歇尔·C·霍华德.美国反垄断法与贸易规则.孙南申译.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1991年.39.
[8]汪渊智,王继军.市场经济条件下的民商法与经济法.北京:人民法院出版社,2003年.127-128.、
[9][40]王晓晔.竞争法研究.北京:中国法制出版社,1999年.381.
[10]American Bar Association,Scetion of Antitrust Law,op.cit,P46.
[12]1968年美国司法部合并指南12条.
[13][25][31]王为农.企业集中规制基本法理——美国、日本及欧盟的反垄断法比较研究.北京:法律出版社,2001年.19,68.
[14]王晓晔.美国控制企业合并的立法与实践.载于王晓晔主编的《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版.19.
[15]戴奎生.竞争法研究.北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1993年.35.
[16]参见《德国反对限制竞争法》第19条.
[17][26]王晓晔.欧共体竞争法.北京:中国法制出版社,2001年.303.
[18]尚明.主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编.北京:法律出版社,2004年.684.
[19]许光耀.欧共体竞争立法.武汉:武汉大学出版社,2006年.396.
[20]包锡妹.反垄断法的经济分析.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003年,244-247
[21]郑鹏程.论对我国自然垄断行业的法律调整.出自《中国软科学》,2001年第8期
[24]王军、解琳.欧盟法对企业合并的规制http//www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp(中国民商法律网),2007年9月访问.
[27][29]王士亨.反垄断法中的相关市场问题研究.山西大学2005界硕士毕业论 文.
[28]王传辉.反垄断法的经济分析.北京:中国人民大学出版社,91.
[30][41]阮方民.欧盟竞争法.北京:中国政法大学出版社,1998年版,122.
[33]孔祥俊.反垄断法原理.北京:中国法制出版社,2001年,592-594,605-607.
[35]王晓晔.美国控制企业合并的立法与实践.载王晓晔的《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版.
[37]尚明.主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编.北京:法律出版社,2004年.236-242.
[42]周昀.反垄断法新论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2006年.111.
[43]吕明瑜,《关于企业合并的立法思考》,中国竞争法网,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/,2009年2月9日访问。
[44]焦海涛,《论反垄断法中经营者的认定标准》,北大法律信息网,http//www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=4488&cid=17.
[45]王晓晔,尚明,时建中.反垄断立法的热点和难点问题http//www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=1960&cid=17.2009年2月7日访问.
[2][5][23][32][34][36][38]王晓晔.企业合并中的反垄断问题.北京:法律出版社,1996年,9,15,65-68,97-99,252-254.
[6][11]黄勇、董灵.反垄断法经典判例解析.北京:人民法院出版社,2002年.21,476,487.
[7]马歇尔·C·霍华德.美国反垄断法与贸易规则.孙南申译.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1991年.39.
[8]汪渊智,王继军.市场经济条件下的民商法与经济法.北京:人民法院出版社,2003年.127-128.、
[9][40]王晓晔.竞争法研究.北京:中国法制出版社,1999年.381.
[10]American Bar Association,Scetion of Antitrust Law,op.cit,P46.
[12]1968年美国司法部合并指南12条.
[13][25][31]王为农.企业集中规制基本法理——美国、日本及欧盟的反垄断法比较研究.北京:法律出版社,2001年.19,68.
[14]王晓晔.美国控制企业合并的立法与实践.载于王晓晔主编的《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版.19.
[15]戴奎生.竞争法研究.北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1993年.35.
[16]参见《德国反对限制竞争法》第19条.
[17][26]王晓晔.欧共体竞争法.北京:中国法制出版社,2001年.303.
[18]尚明.主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编.北京:法律出版社,2004年.684.
[19]许光耀.欧共体竞争立法.武汉:武汉大学出版社,2006年.396.
[20]包锡妹.反垄断法的经济分析.北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003年,244-247
[21]郑鹏程.论对我国自然垄断行业的法律调整.出自《中国软科学》,2001年第8期
[24]王军、解琳.欧盟法对企业合并的规制http//www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp(中国民商法律网),2007年9月访问.
[27][29]王士亨.反垄断法中的相关市场问题研究.山西大学2005界硕士毕业论 文.
[28]王传辉.反垄断法的经济分析.北京:中国人民大学出版社,91.
[30][41]阮方民.欧盟竞争法.北京:中国政法大学出版社,1998年版,122.
[33]孔祥俊.反垄断法原理.北京:中国法制出版社,2001年,592-594,605-607.
[35]王晓晔.美国控制企业合并的立法与实践.载王晓晔的《竞争法研究》,中国法制出版社,1999年版.
[37]尚明.主要国家(地区)反垄断法律汇编.北京:法律出版社,2004年.236-242.
[42]周昀.反垄断法新论.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2006年.111.
[43]吕明瑜,《关于企业合并的立法思考》,中国竞争法网,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/,2009年2月9日访问。
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