地方保护主义的利益成因与对策
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摘要
我国持续的分权化和市场化改革,使得经济迅猛发展。其中在80年代实行的行政性分权强化了地方政府的自主权,大大激发地方政府发展经济的积极性,从而有力支撑了中国持续多年的高速经济增长。但是,随着市场化改革的不断深入,在中国经济发展的同时,地区经济差距拉大,产生了利益主体的多元化和市场分化现象,地方政府不可能独立于这个利益格局之外。由于各地方政府自身的利益需求与利益倾向,引发了多种利益冲突,导致最为明显的结果就是各地区间的地方保护主义。地方保护主义就是在改革进程中,地方政府为了保护自身辖区利益的思量,所采取的一种地方保护性措施。
因此,本文带着“是什么因素、什么机制阻碍了地区间的经济合作协调发展,而取而代之的是最终会陷入‘囚徒困境’的地方保护主义?”的疑问,从利益驱动的视角对地方政府实施地方保护主义的行为进行研究,找出其动因并逐步加以解决,对促进我国经济健康平稳的发展具有重要的意义。本文的研究目的是通过系统阐明地方保护主义的发展现状、影响、理论界的各种研究现状,然后从利益的视角来解析地方保护主义的成因,最后提出以利益协调,制度改革和促进合作来遏制地方保护主义的对策。
本文主要包括了以下几个方面的内容:
第一,介绍本文的选题依据和研究意义,综述了国内外学者对地方保护主义问题的理论研究现状,通过系统阐明和分析研究地方保护主义的发展现状后,对照以有的各学科对地方保护主义的研究方法与角度,提出了一个新的研究地方保护主义的方法——利益视角。
第二,由公共利益悖论提出地方政府行为的自利性的前提下,接着对地方政府的利益格局进行分析,对地方保护主义的利益主体和利益需求进行分析,提出了利益主体的多重性以及利益需求的多元化,把地方政府的地方保护主义行为贯穿为利益驱动的行为。
第三,对我国地方保护主义利益成因进行系统分析:从导致地方利益凸显的行政性分权的制度原因开始,到后来的地方政府官员的政治晋升制度以及地方政府之间因为政策倾斜导致利益非均衡发展的历史原因。因为这三类原因相互作用,相互影响,共同促使了地方保护主义的出现及恶化,根本还是表现为利益冲突的行为过程,其中部分的引用博弈论方法分析各利益行为的形成原因和机制。
第四,提出对策:根据成因提出地方保护主义问题的解决在于建立一个有效的利益制度与规范体系,继续推进行政改革,完善财政分权制度,改革地方官员的政绩考核制度,同时促进地方经济合作,建立多层次的合作组织等方面的措施,以此通过利益整合达到利益共赢,建立一个有效的利益激励、利益冲突协调与均衡的结构,协调地方经济的平衡发展来抑制地方保护主义,促进全国统一、繁荣的市场的形成。
The continued process of market reform has made China’s economic rapid development. Since 1980’s, the reform strategy that distributes power among local administrative governments, undoubtedly bring into full play the initiative of local governments in economic growth, the same while boosts the national economic growth for many years. However, as market-oriented reform continued to deepen, in China's economic development, economic disparity among regions is enlarged, has had diversion interest main body and differentiation in the market, the local government impossible independence outside of the benefit pattern. As a result of the local governments own benefit demand and the interest tendency, have caused many kinds of conflicts of interest, thus causes the most obvious result is the local protectionism. Local protectionism is one of the local protection measures in the process of reform, which chiefly concerns with local government’s advantage.
Therefore, from the perspective of the interest-driven ,this paper bringing“what factor and mechanism has hindered the interregional economic cooperation and coordination development, and will finally fall into the convict difficult position of the regional protectionism?”to conduct the research, so as to discover its motives and be resolved, it is a vital significance for promoting our country economical steady development. The purpose of the study in this article is to expatiate the development present situation of the local protectionism, the influence, the viewpoints of researchers, then analyzes the local protectionism from the benefit angle of view the origin, in the end , proposed that is coordinated by the benefit, the system reform and the promotion cooperation contain the local protectionism the countermeasure.
This article has mainly included the following several aspect contents:
Part one: Introduced that this article the selected topic bases on and the significance, summarized researches of the domestic and foreign scholars to the local protectionism. Through the system expounded that regional protectionism's development present situation, compares by some various disciplines to local protectionism research methods and perspective, proposed a a new study of local protectionism means - interest perspective.
Part two: By The public interest paradox proposed that under the Local authority behavior's self-interesting premise, then carries on the analysis to Local government's benefit pattern, benefit main body and the benefit demand multiplication. Finally, proposed the regional protectionism is the interest-driven behavior.
Part three: Detailed the benefit origin which produces to the local protectionism carries on the analysis. From the administrative decentralization system to local government's political promotion system, and the benefit non-balanced development among local government, which have urged the local protectionism appearance and the worse.
Part four: From the benefit origin angle proposed that the local protectionism question's solution lies in establishes an effective interest rules and the interests of standardized system , through promoting local economic cooperation to achieve benefit win-win. Such as perfect finance decentralization system, reforms magistrate's political promote system and so on interest regulation and partaking mechanism.
因此,本文带着“是什么因素、什么机制阻碍了地区间的经济合作协调发展,而取而代之的是最终会陷入‘囚徒困境’的地方保护主义?”的疑问,从利益驱动的视角对地方政府实施地方保护主义的行为进行研究,找出其动因并逐步加以解决,对促进我国经济健康平稳的发展具有重要的意义。本文的研究目的是通过系统阐明地方保护主义的发展现状、影响、理论界的各种研究现状,然后从利益的视角来解析地方保护主义的成因,最后提出以利益协调,制度改革和促进合作来遏制地方保护主义的对策。
本文主要包括了以下几个方面的内容:
第一,介绍本文的选题依据和研究意义,综述了国内外学者对地方保护主义问题的理论研究现状,通过系统阐明和分析研究地方保护主义的发展现状后,对照以有的各学科对地方保护主义的研究方法与角度,提出了一个新的研究地方保护主义的方法——利益视角。
第二,由公共利益悖论提出地方政府行为的自利性的前提下,接着对地方政府的利益格局进行分析,对地方保护主义的利益主体和利益需求进行分析,提出了利益主体的多重性以及利益需求的多元化,把地方政府的地方保护主义行为贯穿为利益驱动的行为。
第三,对我国地方保护主义利益成因进行系统分析:从导致地方利益凸显的行政性分权的制度原因开始,到后来的地方政府官员的政治晋升制度以及地方政府之间因为政策倾斜导致利益非均衡发展的历史原因。因为这三类原因相互作用,相互影响,共同促使了地方保护主义的出现及恶化,根本还是表现为利益冲突的行为过程,其中部分的引用博弈论方法分析各利益行为的形成原因和机制。
第四,提出对策:根据成因提出地方保护主义问题的解决在于建立一个有效的利益制度与规范体系,继续推进行政改革,完善财政分权制度,改革地方官员的政绩考核制度,同时促进地方经济合作,建立多层次的合作组织等方面的措施,以此通过利益整合达到利益共赢,建立一个有效的利益激励、利益冲突协调与均衡的结构,协调地方经济的平衡发展来抑制地方保护主义,促进全国统一、繁荣的市场的形成。
The continued process of market reform has made China’s economic rapid development. Since 1980’s, the reform strategy that distributes power among local administrative governments, undoubtedly bring into full play the initiative of local governments in economic growth, the same while boosts the national economic growth for many years. However, as market-oriented reform continued to deepen, in China's economic development, economic disparity among regions is enlarged, has had diversion interest main body and differentiation in the market, the local government impossible independence outside of the benefit pattern. As a result of the local governments own benefit demand and the interest tendency, have caused many kinds of conflicts of interest, thus causes the most obvious result is the local protectionism. Local protectionism is one of the local protection measures in the process of reform, which chiefly concerns with local government’s advantage.
Therefore, from the perspective of the interest-driven ,this paper bringing“what factor and mechanism has hindered the interregional economic cooperation and coordination development, and will finally fall into the convict difficult position of the regional protectionism?”to conduct the research, so as to discover its motives and be resolved, it is a vital significance for promoting our country economical steady development. The purpose of the study in this article is to expatiate the development present situation of the local protectionism, the influence, the viewpoints of researchers, then analyzes the local protectionism from the benefit angle of view the origin, in the end , proposed that is coordinated by the benefit, the system reform and the promotion cooperation contain the local protectionism the countermeasure.
This article has mainly included the following several aspect contents:
Part one: Introduced that this article the selected topic bases on and the significance, summarized researches of the domestic and foreign scholars to the local protectionism. Through the system expounded that regional protectionism's development present situation, compares by some various disciplines to local protectionism research methods and perspective, proposed a a new study of local protectionism means - interest perspective.
Part two: By The public interest paradox proposed that under the Local authority behavior's self-interesting premise, then carries on the analysis to Local government's benefit pattern, benefit main body and the benefit demand multiplication. Finally, proposed the regional protectionism is the interest-driven behavior.
Part three: Detailed the benefit origin which produces to the local protectionism carries on the analysis. From the administrative decentralization system to local government's political promotion system, and the benefit non-balanced development among local government, which have urged the local protectionism appearance and the worse.
Part four: From the benefit origin angle proposed that the local protectionism question's solution lies in establishes an effective interest rules and the interests of standardized system , through promoting local economic cooperation to achieve benefit win-win. Such as perfect finance decentralization system, reforms magistrate's political promote system and so on interest regulation and partaking mechanism.
引文
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[2]盛洪.为什么人们会选择对自己不利的制度安排.载《社会主义经济中的公共选择问题》,上海:人民出版社,1994,1-11
[3] Bruce Gilley. Breaking barriers. Far Eastern Economic Review, Jul 12,2001
[4] Alwyn Young. The razors edge: Distortions and incremental reform in the Peoples Republic of China. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.115, November2000
[5] Lee, Pak K. Local Economic Protectionism in China’s Economic Reform. Development Policy Review, Sep 16, 1998
[6]徐家良.地方保护主义:地方与中央的博弈关系.中共云南省委党校学报,2002(3):84
[7]臧跃菇.关于打破地方市场分割问题的研究.改革,2000(6):5-16
[8]韩朝华.明晰产权与规范政府.经济研究,2003(2) :24-26
[9]周黎安.晋升博弈中的政府官员的激励与合作.经济研究,2004(6):34
[10]谢庆奎,毛寿龙.中国地方政府体制概论,中国政府功能的经济分析,北京:中国广播电视出版社,1998
[11]辛向阳.中国诸候:中央与地方关系之结,北京:中国社会出版社,1995
[12] Trish Saywell. China’s city limits. Far Eastern Economic Review,Oct 14 ,1999
[13]张可云.区域大战与区域经济关系,北京:民主与建设出版社,2001
[14]陈东琪,银温泉,藏跃茹.打破地方市场分割,北京:中国计划出版社,2002.11
[15]郑毓盛、李崇高:中国地方分割的效率损失.中国社会科学,2003(1) :66-68
[16]冯兴元,刘会荪.论我国地方市场分割与地方保护.国家行政学院学报,2002(4):30
[17]阳国亮,何元庆.地方保护主义的成因及其博弈分析.经济学动态,2002(8):45
[18]吴敬链主编.比较(第六辑),北京:中信出版社,2003
[19] Myrdal·G·Economic theory and under-developregions. London:Duckworth, 1957,23-24
[20]马克思,恩格斯.马克思恩格斯全集第24卷,北京:人民出版社,1972,558
[21]吴易风.经济增长理论的历史辨析.学术月刊,2003(2):43-45
[22]马克思.资本论第一卷,北京:人民出版社,1975,389-392
[23]管跃庆.地方利益论,上海:复旦大学出版社,2006(12),65-67
[24]樊纲.渐进改革的政治经济分析,上海:远东出版社,1996,76
[25]陈红太.当代中国政府体系与政治研究法,北京:经济日报出版社,2002,224-225
[26]马克思,恩格斯.马克思恩格斯选集第三卷,北京:人民出版社,1995,275-276
[27] (美)萨缪尔森,诺德豪斯:经济学,北京:中国发展出版社,1992,318
[28]尹呐.地方保护主义的成因与对策.重庆教育学院学报,Sep2007,Vol.20,No.5:50
[29]曾鸿斌.地方保护的经济分析.华中科技大学,2004.4.
[30]尹呐,祝小宁.地方政府竞争的异质化—非理性竞争行为分析.电子科技大学学报,Dec2007,VOL.9,NO.6:44
[31]毛寿龙.中国政府功能的经济分析,北京:中国广播电视出版社,1996,170
[32](美)林德布洛姆:市场体制的秘密,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000,65
[33]转胡鞍钢.中国:挑战腐败,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000,149-161
[34]周克瑜.走向市场经济—中国行政区与经济区的关系及其整合,上海:复旦大学出版社,1999,101—102
[35]李军杰,钟君.中国地方政府经济行为分析—基于公共选择视角.新华文摘,2004(16):28-32
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