独立董事监督力与盈余稳健性
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摘要
独立董事,作为解决公司委托代理问题和提升公司价值的内部治理机制,一直受到全球的广泛关注。2001年,我国在所有上市公司中正式全面实施独立董事制度。然而,迄今为止,对于独立董事职能的核心内容及其是否有效履行等重要问题,社会各界尚存在较大争论。独立董事主要具备两大职能:一是监督经理层和大股东;二是利用自身资源提升公司业绩。一方面,随着公司所有权与经营权的高度分离,经理层与股东之间产生了利益冲突和代理成本。由于具有信息优势并且具有有限的任期和责任,经理层往往产生机会主义的倾向,损害股东的权益。独立董事与其他董事相比更加独立、客观、中立,所以他们被授权以选择、监督、考核、奖惩公司的经理层。同时,在股权集中度高,特别是由第一大股东控制的上市公司中,公司的代理问题主要转变为控股大股东与中小股东的利益冲突,独立董事此时又肩负起监督大股东侵占行为,有效保护中小股东利益的重任。另一方面,由于独立董事往往由某一领域内的专家担任,因此他们一般拥有良好的教育背景、丰富的理论与实践经验、广泛而良好的外部关系网络,从而为当前公司提供许多有益的建意见建议和咨询,改善公司的经营管理,提升公司的业绩。
我国许多学者着眼于独立董事的专家角色和业绩提升职能,集中检验了独立董事能否提升公司的业绩,仅有少量的研究分析了独立董事的监督职能。然而,本文认为,无论从独立董事制度的起源,我国引入独立董事的目的,我国独立董事制度实际运行的现状,还是未来相当长一段时间的发展来看,监督职能都是独立董事最核心的职能。因此,本文聚焦于独立董事的监督职能,并且以其监督力作为衡量独立董事能否有效监督的尺度。
那又该如何衡量独立董事的监督力?现有文献均利用独立董事比例来反映监督力,其依据是独立董事更为客观和中立,因此比例越大,监督力就越大。本文认为,虽然独立董事的人数规模对其监督职能具有重要影响,但是并不能作为衡量监督力的唯一标准,至少还应考虑其他三个方面:首先,独立董事应具备一定的专业能力,否则无法对很多重大经济事项进行正确判定;其次,应具备积极监督的主观意愿,否则其履职效果将大打折扣;最后,还必须具备良好的履职环境。基于此,本文将独立董事监督力的衡量标准划分为四个维度,即规模维度、能力维度、意愿维度和环境维度,它们逐步回答了“是否具备足够的人数规模?是否具备监督必需的专业能力?是否从主观上愿意监督?监督是否得到外部环境的支持?”这样四个的问题,共同衡量了独立董事监督力。
作为会计的一项古老原则,盈余稳健性在国内外的存在性被大量经验证据所支持。在实务中,盈余稳健性被广泛界定为“会计人员在财务报告中确认‘好消息’比确认‘坏消息’更能得到保证”。这里的“消息”是指企业真实的经济收益,“好消息”就是真实经济收益为正的交易事项,而“坏消息”则是真实经济收益为负的交易事项。换言之,如果会计计量比较稳健的话,会计盈余能够立即对“坏消息”作出反应,而对于“好消息”,反应则不强烈。正是这种对损失和收益确认的非对称性,盈余稳健性具有减少法律诉讼成本、延迟税收支出、降低公司信息不对称程度等主要作用。本文重点阐述了第三个作用。在公司中,中小股东相对于大股东,股东相对于经理层,由于无法掌握公司具体的经营和财务状况,因此均处于信息弱势地位。他们往往借助财务报告的会计盈余信息来判断公司的盈利能力和投资价值。盈余稳健性严格的确认非对称性及时传递了经营预警信号,约束了大股东或经理层的会计信息美化行为,从而降低了信息不对称的程度。因此,在一个市场发展程度不高、公司治理尚不完善的资本市场中,盈余稳健性是高质量财务会计信息的重要特征。
然而,经理层与大股东都具有违背盈余稳健性的内在意愿。首先,由于经理层的薪酬与职位往往与其经营业绩直接挂钩,而经营业绩又主要由会计盈余来衡量,因此经理层具有延迟反映(甚至隐藏)损失、提前反映(甚至虚增)盈利的动机;其次,由于经理层的任期有限,因此其很可能投资短期内盈利但总体净现值为负的项目。当持股达到一定比例足以控制上市公司时,大股东也很可能违背盈余稳健性,这在我国体现得更为明显。为了获得控制权私人收益,大股东普遍具有股权再融资偏好,但是配股和增发均对公司盈余的状况有明确要求,于是大股东便只有通过正向的盈余管理获取股权再融资的资格。同时,当大股东对上市公司实施侵占、掏空等“隧道行为”时,为了避免监管部门和外部投资者发现,也适时提升盈余。另外,ST和PT制度的盈余刚性约束更使得大股东产生了保住“壳资源”的压力,因此会竭力通过避免反映坏消息、主动迅速反映好消息,甚至通过利益输送等方式,帮助公司改善报表盈余。因此,本文认为,独立董事监督力将对盈余稳健性产生重要影响:如果独立董事的监督力越强,越能够有效抑制经理层和大股东操纵会计数字、虚增会计盈余,从而使得会计政策体现出更强的盈余稳健性。
考虑到《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(以下简称“《指导意见》”)的发布以及股权分置改革等制度背景,本文选择2001年12月31日以前在沪深两地上市的1382家A股公司为基础样本,以2002-2004年作为研究观测窗口,考察了在中国不完善的资本市场条件下,独立董事对大股东和经理层的监督能否有效增强会计盈余稳健性,进而提高会计信息质量,保护广大投资者的利益。本文以Basu(1997)的经典模型为基础,通过理论分析并且首次综合运用因子分析法(Component Analysis)、通径分析法(Path Analysis)、Backwards多元回归法等统计学、计量经济学方法,对基础模型进行了修改,同时构建出独特的指标体系。
通过实证检验,本文的主要有以下6点发现:1.独立董事在上市公司中的规模并不大,但显现出递增趋势。2.上市公司并没有真正重视独立董事的会计专业能力,且显现出政策迎合行为。3.年度津贴是独立董事报酬的主要方式,但确认标准很不统一,激励效果并不明显。4.独立董事兼任情况并不普遍。5.独立董事监督力对盈余稳健性的综合影响系数在三年间分别为0.018、0.048和0.060,体现出递增的趋势。6.三年间,独立董事的比例对盈余稳健性的影响系数分别为:0.0156、0.0432和0.0564;其会计专业能力的影响系数分别为0.0161、0.0415和0.0527;其激励薪酬的影响系数分别为:0.00758、0.00706、0.0228;其兼职数量的影响系数分别为0.00592、0.0215和0.0299;第一大股东持股比例的影响系数分别为0.0114、0.0367和0.0458;董事长与总经理是否二职合一的影响系数分别为:0.0167、0.0434和0.0562。总结上述发现,本文得到两个基本结论:
第一,独立董事监督力对盈余稳健性具有显著的正向影响,并且这种影响随着资本市场的发展和公司治理的改善不断增强。
第二,独立董事的履职环境对盈余稳健性的影响最大,其次是人数规模和会计专业能力,而其薪酬和声誉的影响则相对最小。
基于上述研究发现,本文最后对独立董事的履职环境、专业能力和激励约束机制等几个重要问题进行了探讨,并提出了相应的建议。
本文的创新之处在于:第一,首次系统研究了独立董事对盈余稳健性的影响。国内外学者虽然开始关注公司治理对盈余稳健性的影响,却并未就独立董事的作用进行深入的研究,往往仅以独立董事比例这一指标“一笔带过”。然而,独立董事的监督力大小仅由人数比例来代表并不全面。本文聚焦于独立董事监督力,不仅从理论上梳理了其与盈余稳健性的关系,并且利用具有递进逻辑关系的规模、能力、意愿、环境四维度指标来综合度量监督力大小,从而更客观地反映了独立董事监督力与盈余稳健性的关系。第二,充分考虑了我国资本市场的制度背景。国内相关研究未考虑我国上市公司股权分置的特殊情况,将非流通股与流通股“一视同仁”。但是,非流通股的价值要远低于流通股的价值,如果不对其加以修正,将导致不准确的研究结论。本文对非流通股的价格和市值等重要变量进行了调整,同时也考虑了我国上市公司股权集中度高等因素。第三,本文运用了不同的模型检验方法。与现有研究不同,本文并未直接对模型进行OLS回归,而是进一步运用因子分析法和通径分析法、Backwards多元回归法等统计学、计量经济学方法进行分析,既避免了因模型交互项太多带来的多重共线性问题,又深入反映了独立董事监督力与稳健性两者关系的内在特征,为监管部门、上市公司完善独立董事制度提供了重要的参考价值。
As an internal governance mechanism, independent directors are regarded as an important role for solving agent problem and promoting firm value. China implemented this mechanism on all listed firms in 2001. However, there are issues on the functions of independent directors from then on.
Independent directors have two main functions. First, they supervise managers and large shareholders. As the separation of ownership and control, there was conflict of interest and agency cost between managers and shareholders. Because of information asymmetry and the limited tenure, managers may damage the interests of shareholders. Compared with other directors, independent directors are more independent and objective. So, they are appointed to supervise managers. Meanwhile, they also supervise large shareholders when companies are mainly controlled by large shareholders. Second, independent directors can promote firm value. They can propose instructive suggestions and help firms’operation, for they are well educated and have abroad social relationships.
Chinese scholars mostly studied whether independent directors can promote firms value, based the second function. However, no matter we look at the origin of independent directors backwards and expect its orientation forwards, supervision is the most important function. So, we focus on independent directors’supervision function in this paper.
Then, how to measure independents’supervision? All of the literatures use the ratio of independent directors to measure their supervision. However, we don’t think it is the only index. There are at least other three aspects to be considered. First, independent directors must be competent in accounting, or they can not make right decisions. Second, they must be willing to supervise. Third, there must be a good environment for supervising. So, we measure the supervision of independent directors with four dimensions, which are scale-dimension, competency-dimension, will- dimension and environment-dimension.
As an old principle in accounting, earning conservatism is proved to be existed by many empirical studies. Earning conservatism is interpreted as representing“the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses”. In other words, earning conservatism is the asymmetrical verification requirements for gains and losses. This interpretation allows for degrees of conservatism: the greater the difference in degree of verification required for gains versus losses, the greater the conservatism. Asymmetric verifiability speeds up the recognition of losses and provides the shareholders/outside directors with a signal to investigate the reasons for those losses. So, earning conservatism is an important character of the high-quality accounting information.
Nevertheless, managers and large shareholders have incentives to violate the earning conservatism. Because of information asymmetry, managers have incentives to hide losses to avoid being fired before their tenure is over. Admitting losses and/or that they took negative net present value projects can lead shareholders to push for the manager’s dismissal. In order to get the control rights, large shareholders prefer to SEO. Then, they manipulate the earnings to satisfy the strict requirements of SEO.
So, independent directors may affect earning conservatism by supervising managers and large shareholders. If the independent directors supervise more effectively, the conservatism is greater.
Using a sample of 1382 Chinese listed firms for the period 2002-2004, we empirically test the impact of supervision of independent directors on earnings conservatism. Based on the Basu’s model, we construct a new testing model and a new index system by pioneering the use of Component Analysis, Path Analysis and Backwards Regression.
We find that the supervision of independent directors had very significant positive effects on earnings conservatism, and the effects had been growing as the development of capital market and corporate governance. We further find that the environment-dimension had the most important effect on earnings conservatism, which show that independent directors were not supported enough by corporations for working. The effects of scale-dimension and competency-dimension were secondary and will-dimension had relative small influence on earnings conservatism, which reflected that independent directors did not have enough incentive to supervise. Based our study, inspiring independent directors effectively and improving independent directors’accounting competency is the key to supervisor better.
The study has three contributions. First, we systemically study the independent directors’effects on earning conservatism in the first time. Second, we consider the particular system environment of china’s capital market. Third, we use an extremely new research method.
我国许多学者着眼于独立董事的专家角色和业绩提升职能,集中检验了独立董事能否提升公司的业绩,仅有少量的研究分析了独立董事的监督职能。然而,本文认为,无论从独立董事制度的起源,我国引入独立董事的目的,我国独立董事制度实际运行的现状,还是未来相当长一段时间的发展来看,监督职能都是独立董事最核心的职能。因此,本文聚焦于独立董事的监督职能,并且以其监督力作为衡量独立董事能否有效监督的尺度。
那又该如何衡量独立董事的监督力?现有文献均利用独立董事比例来反映监督力,其依据是独立董事更为客观和中立,因此比例越大,监督力就越大。本文认为,虽然独立董事的人数规模对其监督职能具有重要影响,但是并不能作为衡量监督力的唯一标准,至少还应考虑其他三个方面:首先,独立董事应具备一定的专业能力,否则无法对很多重大经济事项进行正确判定;其次,应具备积极监督的主观意愿,否则其履职效果将大打折扣;最后,还必须具备良好的履职环境。基于此,本文将独立董事监督力的衡量标准划分为四个维度,即规模维度、能力维度、意愿维度和环境维度,它们逐步回答了“是否具备足够的人数规模?是否具备监督必需的专业能力?是否从主观上愿意监督?监督是否得到外部环境的支持?”这样四个的问题,共同衡量了独立董事监督力。
作为会计的一项古老原则,盈余稳健性在国内外的存在性被大量经验证据所支持。在实务中,盈余稳健性被广泛界定为“会计人员在财务报告中确认‘好消息’比确认‘坏消息’更能得到保证”。这里的“消息”是指企业真实的经济收益,“好消息”就是真实经济收益为正的交易事项,而“坏消息”则是真实经济收益为负的交易事项。换言之,如果会计计量比较稳健的话,会计盈余能够立即对“坏消息”作出反应,而对于“好消息”,反应则不强烈。正是这种对损失和收益确认的非对称性,盈余稳健性具有减少法律诉讼成本、延迟税收支出、降低公司信息不对称程度等主要作用。本文重点阐述了第三个作用。在公司中,中小股东相对于大股东,股东相对于经理层,由于无法掌握公司具体的经营和财务状况,因此均处于信息弱势地位。他们往往借助财务报告的会计盈余信息来判断公司的盈利能力和投资价值。盈余稳健性严格的确认非对称性及时传递了经营预警信号,约束了大股东或经理层的会计信息美化行为,从而降低了信息不对称的程度。因此,在一个市场发展程度不高、公司治理尚不完善的资本市场中,盈余稳健性是高质量财务会计信息的重要特征。
然而,经理层与大股东都具有违背盈余稳健性的内在意愿。首先,由于经理层的薪酬与职位往往与其经营业绩直接挂钩,而经营业绩又主要由会计盈余来衡量,因此经理层具有延迟反映(甚至隐藏)损失、提前反映(甚至虚增)盈利的动机;其次,由于经理层的任期有限,因此其很可能投资短期内盈利但总体净现值为负的项目。当持股达到一定比例足以控制上市公司时,大股东也很可能违背盈余稳健性,这在我国体现得更为明显。为了获得控制权私人收益,大股东普遍具有股权再融资偏好,但是配股和增发均对公司盈余的状况有明确要求,于是大股东便只有通过正向的盈余管理获取股权再融资的资格。同时,当大股东对上市公司实施侵占、掏空等“隧道行为”时,为了避免监管部门和外部投资者发现,也适时提升盈余。另外,ST和PT制度的盈余刚性约束更使得大股东产生了保住“壳资源”的压力,因此会竭力通过避免反映坏消息、主动迅速反映好消息,甚至通过利益输送等方式,帮助公司改善报表盈余。因此,本文认为,独立董事监督力将对盈余稳健性产生重要影响:如果独立董事的监督力越强,越能够有效抑制经理层和大股东操纵会计数字、虚增会计盈余,从而使得会计政策体现出更强的盈余稳健性。
考虑到《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》(以下简称“《指导意见》”)的发布以及股权分置改革等制度背景,本文选择2001年12月31日以前在沪深两地上市的1382家A股公司为基础样本,以2002-2004年作为研究观测窗口,考察了在中国不完善的资本市场条件下,独立董事对大股东和经理层的监督能否有效增强会计盈余稳健性,进而提高会计信息质量,保护广大投资者的利益。本文以Basu(1997)的经典模型为基础,通过理论分析并且首次综合运用因子分析法(Component Analysis)、通径分析法(Path Analysis)、Backwards多元回归法等统计学、计量经济学方法,对基础模型进行了修改,同时构建出独特的指标体系。
通过实证检验,本文的主要有以下6点发现:1.独立董事在上市公司中的规模并不大,但显现出递增趋势。2.上市公司并没有真正重视独立董事的会计专业能力,且显现出政策迎合行为。3.年度津贴是独立董事报酬的主要方式,但确认标准很不统一,激励效果并不明显。4.独立董事兼任情况并不普遍。5.独立董事监督力对盈余稳健性的综合影响系数在三年间分别为0.018、0.048和0.060,体现出递增的趋势。6.三年间,独立董事的比例对盈余稳健性的影响系数分别为:0.0156、0.0432和0.0564;其会计专业能力的影响系数分别为0.0161、0.0415和0.0527;其激励薪酬的影响系数分别为:0.00758、0.00706、0.0228;其兼职数量的影响系数分别为0.00592、0.0215和0.0299;第一大股东持股比例的影响系数分别为0.0114、0.0367和0.0458;董事长与总经理是否二职合一的影响系数分别为:0.0167、0.0434和0.0562。总结上述发现,本文得到两个基本结论:
第一,独立董事监督力对盈余稳健性具有显著的正向影响,并且这种影响随着资本市场的发展和公司治理的改善不断增强。
第二,独立董事的履职环境对盈余稳健性的影响最大,其次是人数规模和会计专业能力,而其薪酬和声誉的影响则相对最小。
基于上述研究发现,本文最后对独立董事的履职环境、专业能力和激励约束机制等几个重要问题进行了探讨,并提出了相应的建议。
本文的创新之处在于:第一,首次系统研究了独立董事对盈余稳健性的影响。国内外学者虽然开始关注公司治理对盈余稳健性的影响,却并未就独立董事的作用进行深入的研究,往往仅以独立董事比例这一指标“一笔带过”。然而,独立董事的监督力大小仅由人数比例来代表并不全面。本文聚焦于独立董事监督力,不仅从理论上梳理了其与盈余稳健性的关系,并且利用具有递进逻辑关系的规模、能力、意愿、环境四维度指标来综合度量监督力大小,从而更客观地反映了独立董事监督力与盈余稳健性的关系。第二,充分考虑了我国资本市场的制度背景。国内相关研究未考虑我国上市公司股权分置的特殊情况,将非流通股与流通股“一视同仁”。但是,非流通股的价值要远低于流通股的价值,如果不对其加以修正,将导致不准确的研究结论。本文对非流通股的价格和市值等重要变量进行了调整,同时也考虑了我国上市公司股权集中度高等因素。第三,本文运用了不同的模型检验方法。与现有研究不同,本文并未直接对模型进行OLS回归,而是进一步运用因子分析法和通径分析法、Backwards多元回归法等统计学、计量经济学方法进行分析,既避免了因模型交互项太多带来的多重共线性问题,又深入反映了独立董事监督力与稳健性两者关系的内在特征,为监管部门、上市公司完善独立董事制度提供了重要的参考价值。
As an internal governance mechanism, independent directors are regarded as an important role for solving agent problem and promoting firm value. China implemented this mechanism on all listed firms in 2001. However, there are issues on the functions of independent directors from then on.
Independent directors have two main functions. First, they supervise managers and large shareholders. As the separation of ownership and control, there was conflict of interest and agency cost between managers and shareholders. Because of information asymmetry and the limited tenure, managers may damage the interests of shareholders. Compared with other directors, independent directors are more independent and objective. So, they are appointed to supervise managers. Meanwhile, they also supervise large shareholders when companies are mainly controlled by large shareholders. Second, independent directors can promote firm value. They can propose instructive suggestions and help firms’operation, for they are well educated and have abroad social relationships.
Chinese scholars mostly studied whether independent directors can promote firms value, based the second function. However, no matter we look at the origin of independent directors backwards and expect its orientation forwards, supervision is the most important function. So, we focus on independent directors’supervision function in this paper.
Then, how to measure independents’supervision? All of the literatures use the ratio of independent directors to measure their supervision. However, we don’t think it is the only index. There are at least other three aspects to be considered. First, independent directors must be competent in accounting, or they can not make right decisions. Second, they must be willing to supervise. Third, there must be a good environment for supervising. So, we measure the supervision of independent directors with four dimensions, which are scale-dimension, competency-dimension, will- dimension and environment-dimension.
As an old principle in accounting, earning conservatism is proved to be existed by many empirical studies. Earning conservatism is interpreted as representing“the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses”. In other words, earning conservatism is the asymmetrical verification requirements for gains and losses. This interpretation allows for degrees of conservatism: the greater the difference in degree of verification required for gains versus losses, the greater the conservatism. Asymmetric verifiability speeds up the recognition of losses and provides the shareholders/outside directors with a signal to investigate the reasons for those losses. So, earning conservatism is an important character of the high-quality accounting information.
Nevertheless, managers and large shareholders have incentives to violate the earning conservatism. Because of information asymmetry, managers have incentives to hide losses to avoid being fired before their tenure is over. Admitting losses and/or that they took negative net present value projects can lead shareholders to push for the manager’s dismissal. In order to get the control rights, large shareholders prefer to SEO. Then, they manipulate the earnings to satisfy the strict requirements of SEO.
So, independent directors may affect earning conservatism by supervising managers and large shareholders. If the independent directors supervise more effectively, the conservatism is greater.
Using a sample of 1382 Chinese listed firms for the period 2002-2004, we empirically test the impact of supervision of independent directors on earnings conservatism. Based on the Basu’s model, we construct a new testing model and a new index system by pioneering the use of Component Analysis, Path Analysis and Backwards Regression.
We find that the supervision of independent directors had very significant positive effects on earnings conservatism, and the effects had been growing as the development of capital market and corporate governance. We further find that the environment-dimension had the most important effect on earnings conservatism, which show that independent directors were not supported enough by corporations for working. The effects of scale-dimension and competency-dimension were secondary and will-dimension had relative small influence on earnings conservatism, which reflected that independent directors did not have enough incentive to supervise. Based our study, inspiring independent directors effectively and improving independent directors’accounting competency is the key to supervisor better.
The study has three contributions. First, we systemically study the independent directors’effects on earning conservatism in the first time. Second, we consider the particular system environment of china’s capital market. Third, we use an extremely new research method.
引文
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3.丛春霞,2004:《我国上市公司董事会设置与公司经营业绩的实证研究》,《管理世界》第11期。
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5.李常青、赖建清,2004:《董事会特征影响公司绩效吗》,《金融研究》第5期。
6.李远鹏、李若山,2005:《是会计盈余稳健性,还是利润操纵?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》第3期。
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2.陈旭东、黄登仕,2006:《会计盈余水平与会计稳健性——基于分量回归的探索分析》,《管理科学》第4期。
3.丛春霞,2004:《我国上市公司董事会设置与公司经营业绩的实证研究》,《管理世界》第11期。
4.李彬、童颖,2004:《我的“独董”生涯》,《上海证券报》5月27日。
5.李常青、赖建清,2004:《董事会特征影响公司绩效吗》,《金融研究》第5期。
6.李远鹏、李若山,2005:《是会计盈余稳健性,还是利润操纵?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据》,《中国会计与财务研究》第3期。
7.刘舒文、张寿阳,2006:《上市公司盈余稳健和资产负债表稳健的相关性》,《系统工程》第10期。
8.孙铮、刘凤委、汪辉,2005:《债务、公司治理与会计稳健性》,《中国会计与财务研究》第3期。
9.童颖,2004:《中国独董生存现状》,《上海证券报》5月27日。
10.王兵,2007:《独立董事监督了吗?——基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角》,《金融研究》第1期。
11.王跃堂、赵子夜、魏晓雁,2006:《董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效》,《经济研究》第5期。
12.魏刚、肖泽忠、NickTravlos、邹宏,2007:《独立董事背景与公司绩效》,《经济研究》第3期。
13.杨丹、魏蕴新、叶建明,2007:《股权分置对股票市场实证研究的影响及模型修正―兼论股票全流通改革的公平对价》,西南财经大学工作论文。
14.杨华军,2007:《会计稳健性述评》,《会计研究》第1期。
15.叶康涛、陆正飞、张志华,2007:《独立董事能否抑制大股东掏空》,《经济研究》第4期。
16.于东智、王化成,2003:《独立董事与公司治理:理论、经验与实践》,《会计研究》第8期。
17.支晓强、童盼,2005:《盈余管理、控制权转移与独立董事变更——兼论独立董事治理作用的发挥》,《管理世界》第11期。
18.Ahmed, A.S., B.K., Billings, R.M., Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris, 2002,“The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs”, The Accounting Review 77,867-890.
19.Ahmed,A.S., and S. Duellman, 2007,“Accounting conservatism and board of directors’characteristics: An empirical analysis”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 43,411-437.
20.Ball, R., S.P. Kothari and A. Robin,2000,“The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1),1-51.
21.Ball, R., A. Robin, and J. Wu, 2003,“Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four East Asia countries”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(3), 235-270.
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