董事会治理风险预警研究
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摘要
国内外相继出现的一系列公司丑闻事件以及当前的全球性金融危机,与制度层面的风险控制缺失所致的公司治理风险有关。国内企业在由“行政型治理”向“经济型治理”转型过程中,公司治理机制存在着较为严重的“治理失灵”现象,内部人控制、金融风险、关联交易等治理风险时有引爆,对公司治理风险进行预警成为当前公司治理研究的热点和迫切需要。
中国市场改革开放30年来,企业改革由最初的公司治理结构建设转向完善公司治理机制,重点在于充分发挥董事会在公司治理中的核心作用。完善的董事会治理机制是企业规避治理风险、实现可持续发展的重要保证。国内外的一系列治理丑闻事件,使得董事会治理成为各界关注的焦点,以董事会为核心的公司治理内部控制系统的有效设置和实施对于防止和发现欺诈行为的重要性凸显。然而我国真正合格的董事会,屈指可数,上市公司董事会在应对公司治理风险能力上备受质疑。
通过分析近年来国内外有关董事会治理风险的研究,发现现有研究主要集中于董事会治理机制与公司治理风险表征之间的关系,董事会治理风险预警问题尚未引起足够的重视。基于委托代理关系,采用规范研究方法分析了公司治理风险的产生机理,在此基础上界定了公司治理风险的概念,即在内外部公司治理环境的影响下,由于治理机制及其运作的不合理,导致公司治理偏离利益相关者利益最大化的可能性。董事会作为现代公司治理的关键要素,直接影响公司治理风险。由于不存在最优的公司治理机制,从公司治理机制偏离利益最大化的严重性程度衡量公司治理风险更具操作性。
基于理论分析,选择2002-2007年上市公司数据进行了董事会治理风险预警的实证研究,利用信息含量丰富的Altman Z指数建立公司治理风险的代理变量,构建了董事会治理风险预警模型,使用2008年样本上市公司的数据对该模型进行的检验证实模型的预测效果较好,在此基础上利用该模型对我国2008年所有上市公司治理风险状况进行了预测,得到的主要结论包括：第一,我国上市公司董事会治理存在被动合规的现象,“自主性”治理缺失；第二,董事会治理机制中,董事激励(董事报酬、领取报酬董事比例、董事会持股比例)、董事会行为(薪酬与考核委员会及提名委员会设置、董事会会议次数)对公司治理风险有显著的影响；第三,包含了董事报酬、领取报酬董事比例、董事会持股比例、薪酬与考核委员会设置、提名委员会设置、董事会会议次数、资产收益率、总资产增长率、债务资产比率等在内的董事会治理风险预警模型能够较好地判断预测上市公司是否存在治理风险；第四,利用构建的董事会治理风险预警模型对我国沪深两市2008年上市公司的研究表明,我国上市公司普遍面临着较大的治理风险。完善董事会治理机制以规避治理风险成为上市公司的现实选择。
本文的创新之处在于：首先,从委托代理关系角度界定了治理风险的概念,阐明了治理风险的产生机理；其次,构建了董事会治理风险预警模型；再次,从治理风险的角度探讨董事会治理机制的有效性,为合理建设董事会提供了新的视角。但在数据可得的情况下,公司治理风险的衡量可以进一步采用多个指标构建综合性的公司治理风险指数进行董事会治理风险的预警。
A series of corporate scandals and the current global financial crisis which have happened at home and abroad are due to the corporate governance risk deriving from the missing risk control mechanism at system-level. During the process of transformation from administrative governance to economic governance in domestic enterprises, there exist a more serious problem of "governance failure" phenomenon as to corporate governance mechanism, governance risks like insider control, financial risk, related-party transaction erupt now and then, predicting governance risk has become a focus of current corporate governance research and urgent need for practice circle.
From China's market reform for opening till now has experienced about thirty years, enterprise reform has switched from initial construction of corporate governance structure to improve corporate governance mechanisms, and the critical point lies in displaying the central role of the board of directors in corporate governance fully. Sound board's governance mechanism is an important guarantee for avoiding governance risks and achieving sustainable development for domestic companies. A series of governance scandals at home and abroad make board governance become the focus of attention of all sectors, which highlights the importance of the effective development and implementation of internal control system in corporate governance for preventing and detecting fraud. However, there are few truly qualified boards of directors in domestic companies; the competence of board of directors on reacting to corporate governance risk is doubted and must be clarified.
We find that existing research has focused on the relationship between board governance mechanisms and characterization of corporate governance risk by analyzing related board governance risk researches at home and abroad, also the problem about predicting governance risk based on the board of directors has not yet attracted sufficient attention. This paper analyze the generation mechanism of corporate governance risk using normative research methods based on the principal-agent relationship, and we define the corporate governance risk, that is the probability of deviation between corporate governance and the maximization stakeholders'interests induced from unreasonable design and operation of governance mechanisms under the impact of the external and external corporate governance environment. As a critical factor, the board of directors affects governance risk directly. In the absence of optimal corporate governance mechanism, it is more operational to measure corporate governance risk from the perspective of the seriousness of deviation between the corporate governance mechanism and the interest maximization.
From above theoretical analysis, we adopt a sample data from the year 2002 to 2007 of listed companies to do a empirical research on predicting governance risk based on the board of directors, and construct a model for predicting using a proxy variable to measure governance risk which is derived from Altman Z, after this, we use the data of year 2008 to test the effect of the model which indicate the model is reasonable. Then we use this model to predict the governance risk of all the listed companies of China in year 2008, the results are:first, there exists a phenomenon of passive compliance for the board of directors of listed companies in China, governance which derives from the motivation of their actual need is in short, so there exists a phenomenon of ceiling effect; second, for the mechanisms of the board of directors, director incentives, like directors remuneration, the proportion of receiving remuneration for directors, board ownership percentage, and behaviors, like the setting of Remuneration and Evaluation Committee and the Nomination Committee, board meetings frequency, all these affect governance risk significantly; third, the predicting model which include directors remuneration, the proportion of receiving remuneration for directors, board ownership percentage, the setting of Remuneration and Evaluation Committee, the setting of Nominating Committee, the number of board meetings, return on assets, total assets growth rate, debt-asset ratio can make a better judge on whether there has been a governance risk for listed companies; fourth, studying on the data of the year 2008 from China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange has shown that China's listed companies are generally facing greater governance risk. Improving the mechanisms of the b of directors in order to avoid governance risk is a realistic choice.
The innovations maybe:first, we define the governance risk based on the perspective of principal-agent relationship, and clarify the generation mechanism of governance risk; second, construct a predicting model to predict the governance risk based on the board of directors; moreover, we test the effectiveness of the board governance mechanisms from the view of governance risk and provide a new perspective for rational construction of the board of directors. However, in the case of data are available, more indicators can be further used to build a comprehensive risk index to measure the governance risk and do researches on predicting the governance risk based on the board of directors.
中国市场改革开放30年来,企业改革由最初的公司治理结构建设转向完善公司治理机制,重点在于充分发挥董事会在公司治理中的核心作用。完善的董事会治理机制是企业规避治理风险、实现可持续发展的重要保证。国内外的一系列治理丑闻事件,使得董事会治理成为各界关注的焦点,以董事会为核心的公司治理内部控制系统的有效设置和实施对于防止和发现欺诈行为的重要性凸显。然而我国真正合格的董事会,屈指可数,上市公司董事会在应对公司治理风险能力上备受质疑。
通过分析近年来国内外有关董事会治理风险的研究,发现现有研究主要集中于董事会治理机制与公司治理风险表征之间的关系,董事会治理风险预警问题尚未引起足够的重视。基于委托代理关系,采用规范研究方法分析了公司治理风险的产生机理,在此基础上界定了公司治理风险的概念,即在内外部公司治理环境的影响下,由于治理机制及其运作的不合理,导致公司治理偏离利益相关者利益最大化的可能性。董事会作为现代公司治理的关键要素,直接影响公司治理风险。由于不存在最优的公司治理机制,从公司治理机制偏离利益最大化的严重性程度衡量公司治理风险更具操作性。
基于理论分析,选择2002-2007年上市公司数据进行了董事会治理风险预警的实证研究,利用信息含量丰富的Altman Z指数建立公司治理风险的代理变量,构建了董事会治理风险预警模型,使用2008年样本上市公司的数据对该模型进行的检验证实模型的预测效果较好,在此基础上利用该模型对我国2008年所有上市公司治理风险状况进行了预测,得到的主要结论包括：第一,我国上市公司董事会治理存在被动合规的现象,“自主性”治理缺失；第二,董事会治理机制中,董事激励(董事报酬、领取报酬董事比例、董事会持股比例)、董事会行为(薪酬与考核委员会及提名委员会设置、董事会会议次数)对公司治理风险有显著的影响；第三,包含了董事报酬、领取报酬董事比例、董事会持股比例、薪酬与考核委员会设置、提名委员会设置、董事会会议次数、资产收益率、总资产增长率、债务资产比率等在内的董事会治理风险预警模型能够较好地判断预测上市公司是否存在治理风险；第四,利用构建的董事会治理风险预警模型对我国沪深两市2008年上市公司的研究表明,我国上市公司普遍面临着较大的治理风险。完善董事会治理机制以规避治理风险成为上市公司的现实选择。
本文的创新之处在于：首先,从委托代理关系角度界定了治理风险的概念,阐明了治理风险的产生机理；其次,构建了董事会治理风险预警模型；再次,从治理风险的角度探讨董事会治理机制的有效性,为合理建设董事会提供了新的视角。但在数据可得的情况下,公司治理风险的衡量可以进一步采用多个指标构建综合性的公司治理风险指数进行董事会治理风险的预警。
A series of corporate scandals and the current global financial crisis which have happened at home and abroad are due to the corporate governance risk deriving from the missing risk control mechanism at system-level. During the process of transformation from administrative governance to economic governance in domestic enterprises, there exist a more serious problem of "governance failure" phenomenon as to corporate governance mechanism, governance risks like insider control, financial risk, related-party transaction erupt now and then, predicting governance risk has become a focus of current corporate governance research and urgent need for practice circle.
From China's market reform for opening till now has experienced about thirty years, enterprise reform has switched from initial construction of corporate governance structure to improve corporate governance mechanisms, and the critical point lies in displaying the central role of the board of directors in corporate governance fully. Sound board's governance mechanism is an important guarantee for avoiding governance risks and achieving sustainable development for domestic companies. A series of governance scandals at home and abroad make board governance become the focus of attention of all sectors, which highlights the importance of the effective development and implementation of internal control system in corporate governance for preventing and detecting fraud. However, there are few truly qualified boards of directors in domestic companies; the competence of board of directors on reacting to corporate governance risk is doubted and must be clarified.
We find that existing research has focused on the relationship between board governance mechanisms and characterization of corporate governance risk by analyzing related board governance risk researches at home and abroad, also the problem about predicting governance risk based on the board of directors has not yet attracted sufficient attention. This paper analyze the generation mechanism of corporate governance risk using normative research methods based on the principal-agent relationship, and we define the corporate governance risk, that is the probability of deviation between corporate governance and the maximization stakeholders'interests induced from unreasonable design and operation of governance mechanisms under the impact of the external and external corporate governance environment. As a critical factor, the board of directors affects governance risk directly. In the absence of optimal corporate governance mechanism, it is more operational to measure corporate governance risk from the perspective of the seriousness of deviation between the corporate governance mechanism and the interest maximization.
From above theoretical analysis, we adopt a sample data from the year 2002 to 2007 of listed companies to do a empirical research on predicting governance risk based on the board of directors, and construct a model for predicting using a proxy variable to measure governance risk which is derived from Altman Z, after this, we use the data of year 2008 to test the effect of the model which indicate the model is reasonable. Then we use this model to predict the governance risk of all the listed companies of China in year 2008, the results are:first, there exists a phenomenon of passive compliance for the board of directors of listed companies in China, governance which derives from the motivation of their actual need is in short, so there exists a phenomenon of ceiling effect; second, for the mechanisms of the board of directors, director incentives, like directors remuneration, the proportion of receiving remuneration for directors, board ownership percentage, and behaviors, like the setting of Remuneration and Evaluation Committee and the Nomination Committee, board meetings frequency, all these affect governance risk significantly; third, the predicting model which include directors remuneration, the proportion of receiving remuneration for directors, board ownership percentage, the setting of Remuneration and Evaluation Committee, the setting of Nominating Committee, the number of board meetings, return on assets, total assets growth rate, debt-asset ratio can make a better judge on whether there has been a governance risk for listed companies; fourth, studying on the data of the year 2008 from China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange has shown that China's listed companies are generally facing greater governance risk. Improving the mechanisms of the b of directors in order to avoid governance risk is a realistic choice.
The innovations maybe:first, we define the governance risk based on the perspective of principal-agent relationship, and clarify the generation mechanism of governance risk; second, construct a predicting model to predict the governance risk based on the board of directors; moreover, we test the effectiveness of the board governance mechanisms from the view of governance risk and provide a new perspective for rational construction of the board of directors. However, in the case of data are available, more indicators can be further used to build a comprehensive risk index to measure the governance risk and do researches on predicting the governance risk based on the board of directors.
引文
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④王鹏,张俊瑞.董事会独立性与会计稳健性关系研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2009,31(5)：109-117.
⑤ Santhosh Abraham, Paul Cox.Analysing the Determinants of Narrative Risk Information in UK FTSE 100 Annual Reports[J].The British Accounting Review,2007, (3):227-248.
⑥ Kenneth E. Scott.The Role of Corporate Governance in Coping with Risks and Unknowns[R]. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No.356,2008.
⑦叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,2007,(4)：101-111.
①黄志忠.大股东性质、持股比例与独立董事治理效率[A].第四届公司治理国际学术会议论文集[C],2007.
② Stephen P. Ferris, Xuemin (Sterling) Yan.Do Independent Directors and Chairmen Matter? The Role of Boards of Directors in Mutual Fund Governance[J] Journal of Corporate Finance,2007, (2/3):392-420.
① Massson, R.T..Executive Motivations, Earning and Consequent Equity Performance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1971, (79):1278-1292.
②杨清香,张翼,张亮.董事会特征与盈余管理的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2008,(11)：133-140.
③ Donaldson, L., Davis, J..Boards and Company Performance:Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom[J]. Corporate Governance International Review,1994, (2):151-160.
④朱宇.经理、内部董事与公司财务风险外部化——基于管家理论的视角[J].贵州财经学院学报,2006,(4)：38-42.
① Eugene Kang, Asghar Zardkooh.Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance[J].Corporate Governance: An International Review,2005,13 (6):785-799.
① Charles P. Cullinan, Hui Du, Gail B. Wright. Is There an Association between Director Option Compensation and the Likelihood of Misstatement?[J].Advances in Accounting,2008, (1):16-23.
① Rudiger Fahlebrach, Ren6 M.Stulz.Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value[J]Journal of Financial Economics,2009, (92):342-361.
② Aiyesha Dey.Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2008, (5): 1143-1180.
③ Scott B. Jackson, Thomas J. Lopez, Austin L. Reitenga.Accounting Fundamentals and CEO Bonus Compensation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2008, (5):374-393.
④ Mine Ertugrul, Shantaram Hegde. Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2008, (5):512-531.
①张晓岚,吴东霖,张超.董事会治理特征：上市公司信息披露违规的经验证据[J].当代经济科学,2009,31(4)：99-107.
②刘亭立,王化成.基于会计稳健性的董事会治理结构与盈余质量研究[J].科学决策,2009,(8)：32-39.
③洪剑峭,方军雄.审计委员会制度与盈余质量的改善[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(4)：107-112.
①高雷,宋顺林.董事会、监事会与代理成本——基于上市公司2002-2005年面板数据的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2007,(10)：18-24.
②如Beasley (1996)、Cohen et al. (2004)、 Uzun et al. (2004)、Chen et al. (2006)、蔡志岳和吴世农(2007)、Larelle Chapple et al. (2008)等。
③如Pfeffer (1972)、 Changanti et al. (1985)、 Lipton& Lorsch (1992)、 Mark&Yuanto (2002)、 Coles et al. (2004)、 Kusnadi&Mak(2005)、 de Anderes et al. (2005)、 Yangmin Kim (2005)、 Bennedsen et al. (2007)、 Shijun Cheng (2008)、 Coles et al. (2008)等。
①丁友刚,胡兴国.内部控制、风险控制与风险管理——基于组织目标的概念解说与思想演进[J].会计研究,2007,(12)： 51-54.
① Crichton-Miller, Worman.Seeking A Structured Approach to Assessing Corporate Governance Risk in Emerging Markets[R].Winning essay in an Essay Competition in honor of Jacques de Larosiere, The Institute of International Finance，1999.
②刘红霞,韩嫄.董事会对经理层治理风险预警模型构建研究[J].现代财经,2005,25(12)：42-46.
③刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经,2007,(6)：115-120.
④李维安,谢永珍.上市公司治理风险预警指标体系的理论分析与实际验证[A].第四届南开大学公司治理国际研讨会论文集[C],2007.
⑤李亚.民营上市公司治理风险研究——以产权和人才为视角[J].生产力研究,2008,(15)：44-48.
①张兰霞,王俊,张燕,吴小康.基于BP网络的人力资源管理风险预警模型[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6)：78-85.
②高小玲(2006)对道德风险的相关研究进行了详细的评述,参见高小玲.企业道德风险及基于中国企业额实证研究[D].复旦大学博士学位论文,2006.
① Eliezer M. Fich, Steve L. Slezak.Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2008,30 (2):225-251.
①李维安.经济复苏之际看公司治理[J].资本市场,2010,(1)：114-119.
①张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理[M].经济科学出版社,2005.
② David H. Scott. Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-owned Financial Institutions[R].The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4321,2007.
① Altman, E..Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy[J].Journal of Finance,1968,23 (4):589-609.
② Altman, E..Predicting Financial Distress of Companies:Revising the Z-Score and ZETA(?) Models[R]. http:// pages. stern. nyu.edu/--ealtman/Zscores.pdf,2000.
①吴超鹏,吴世农.基于价值创造和公司治理的财务状态分析与预测模型研究[J].经济研究,2005,(11)：99.
②吴沧澜,邵少敏,林伟.独立董事和投资者利益保护的实证研究——以浙江省上市公司为例[R].浙江大学Working Paper,2004.
②李维安和孙文(2007)认为董事会治理对公司绩效改善的影响主要来源于董事会组织结构建设和董事薪酬激励的作用。
[1]Claessens, Djankov, Lang.Who Controls East Asian Corporations[R].World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No.2054,1999.
[2]Riccardo Tiscini, Francesca di Donato.The Relation between Accounting Frauds and Corporate Governance Systems:An Analysis of Recent Scandals [R].http: //ssrn. com/abstract=1086624,2007.
[3]http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/20090411/532510.shtml.
[4]Larelle Chapple, Colin Ferguson, Diana Kang.Corporate Governance and Misappropriation[R].http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1011936,2008.
[5]雷家骗,杨建昆.股票期权制度缺陷与市场监管失效下的安然事件及次贷危机[J].国有企业管理,2009, (1)
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[9]Shleifer Andrei, Vishny Robert W..A Survey of Corporate Governance [J].Journal of Finance,1997, (52):737-783.
[10]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R..Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000, (58):3-27.
[11]Gavin Anderson, Matt Orsagh.The Corporate Governance Risk [J].Electric Perspectives,2004, (1)
[12]李维安.“问题高管”凸现公司治理风险[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(1)：主编寄语.
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[15]何波忠.现代公司制企业的治理风险分析[J].企业家天地,2005,(7)：10-11.
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[18]Vincent Soltes, Vladimir Penjak.A Structured Approach to Risk Assessment Using FUZZY Logic[R].School of Economics of the Technical University of Kosice, BIATEC, rocnik,2001.
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[22]Rodolfo Apreda.Factoring Governance Risk into Investors' Expected Rates of Return by Means of a Weighted-average Governance Index[R].Working Paper Series,2007.
[23]孙奕驰.上市公司治理风险评价模型构建[J].财会通讯,2009, (7)：44-45.
[24]李维安,谢永珍.上市公司治理风险预警指标体系的理论分析与实际验证[A].第四届南开大学公司治理国际研讨会论文集[C],2007.
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[28]张翼,马光.法律、公司治理与公司丑闻[J].管理世界,2005,(10)：113-122.
[29]Hatice Uzun, Samuel H. Szewczyk,Raj Varma.Board Composition and Corporate Fraud[J].Financial Analysts Journal,2004, (3):33-43.
[30]Panagiotis E. Dimitropoulosb, Dimitrios Asterioua. The Effect of Board Composition on the Informativeness and Quality of Annual Earnings:Empirical Evidence from Greece[J]. Research in International Business and Finance, In Press,2009.
[31]于富生,张敏,姜付秀,任梦杰.公司治理影响公司财务风险吗?[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：52-59.
[32]杨清香,俞麟,陈娜.董事会特征与财务舞弊——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2009,(7)：64-70.
[33]刘明辉,韩小芳.“谴责”能否促进财务舞弊的公司改善公司治理?[J].财经问题研究,2009, (2)：100-107.
[34]陈关亭.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊因素的实证分析[J].审计研究,2007,(9)：91-96.
[35]Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F., Young, S..Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?[J].Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2005, (32):1311-1346.
[36]Bikki Jaggi, Sidney Leung, Ferdinand Gul. Family Control, Board Independence and Earnings Management:Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009, (4):281-300.
[37]Michael Firth, Peter M.Y. Fung, Oliver M. Rui. Ownership, Two-tier Board Structure, and the Informativeness of Earnings-Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2007, (4):463-496.
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[39]王平心,吴清华,殷俊明.独立董事制度之弱化治理效应：一种理论假说及其证据[J].西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2006,26(])：37-42.
[40]陈胜蓝,魏明海.董事会独立性、盈余稳健性与投资者保护[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2007,47(2)：96-102.
[41]王鹏,张俊瑞.董事会独立性与会计稳健性关系研究[J].山西财经大学学报, 2009,31 (5):109-117.
[42]Santhosh Abraham, Paul Cox. Analysing the Determinants of Narrative Risk Information in UK FTSE 100 Annual Reports[J].The British Accounting Review, 2007, (3):227-248.
[43]Kenneth E. Scott.The Role of Corporate Governance in Coping with Risks and Unknowns[R].John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No.356,2008.
[44]叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,2007, (4)：101-111.
[45]黄志忠.大股东性质、持股比例与独立董事治理效率[A].第四届公司治理国际学术会议论文集[C],2007.
[46]Stephen P. Ferris, Xuemin (Sterling) Yan. Do Independent Directors and Chairmen Matter? The Role of Boards of Directors in Mutual Fund Governance[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2007, (2/3):392-420.
[47]Massson, R.T..Executive Motivations, Earning and Consequent Equity Performance [J].Journal of Political Economy,1971, (79):1278-1292.
[48]杨清香,张翼,张亮.董事会特征与盈余管理的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2008, (11)：133-140.
[49]Donaldson, L., Davis, J..Boards and Company Performance:Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom[J]. Corporate Governance International Review,1994, (2):151-160.
[50]朱宇.经理、内部董事与公司财务风险外部化——基于管家理论的视角[J].贵州财经学院学报,2006, (4)：38-42.
[51]Eugene Kang, Asghar Zardkooh.Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance [J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2005,13 (6): 785-799.
[52]Charles P. Cullinan, Hui Du, Gail B. Wright. Is There an Association between Director Option Compensation and the Likelihood of Misstatement?[J]. Advances in Accounting,2008, (1):16-23.
[53]Rudiger Fahlebrach, Rene M.Stulz.Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2009, (92):342-361.
[54]Aiyesha Dey.Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2008, (5):1143-1180.
[55]Scott B. Jackson, Thomas J. Lopez, Austin L. Reitenga.Accounting Fundamentals and CEO Bonus Compensation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2008, (5):374-393.
[56]Mine Ertugrul, Shantaram Hegde. Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2008, (5):512-531.
[57]张晓岚,吴东霖,张超.董事会治理特征：上市公司信息披露违规的经验证据[J].当代经济科学,2009,31(4)：99-107.
[58]刘亭立,王化成.基于会计稳健性的董事会治理结构与盈余质量研究[J].科学决策,2009, (8)：32-39.
[59]洪剑峭,方军雄.审计委员会制度与盈余质量的改善[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(4)： 107-112.
[60]高雷,宋顺林.董事会、监事会与代理成本——基于上市公司2002-2005年面板数据的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2007, (10)：18-24.
[61]丁友刚,胡兴国.内部控制、风险控制与风险管理——基于组织目标的概念解说与思想演进[J].会计研究,2007, (12)：51-54.
[62]Crichton-Miller, Worman.Seeking A Structured Approach to Assessing Corporate Governance Risk in Emerging Markets[R].Winning essay in an Essay Competition in honor of Jacques de Larosiere, The Institute of International Finance,1999.
[63]刘红霞,韩嫄.董事会对经理层治理风险预警模型构建研究[J].现代财经,2005,25(12)：42-46.
[64]刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经,2007,(6)：115-120.
[65]李亚.民营上市公司治理风险研究——以产权和人才为视角[J].生产力研究,2008, (15)：44-48.
[66]张兰霞,王俊,张燕,吴小康.基于BP网络的人力资源管理风险预警模型[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6)：78-85.
[67]高小玲.企业道德风险及基于中国企业额实证研究[D].复旦大学博士学位论 文,2006.
[68]斯达特勒,卡斯特里罗.信息经济学引论：激励与合约[M].上海财经大学出版社,2004.
[69]Eliezer M. Fich, Steve L. Slezak.Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from Bankruptcy?An Empirical Analysis[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2008,30 (2):225-251.
[70]李维安.经济复苏之际看公司治理[J].资本市场,2010, (1)：114-119.
[71]张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理[M].经济科学出版社,2005.
[72]David H. Scott. Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-owned Financial Institutions[R]. The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4321, 2007.
[73]Altman, E..Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy [J]. Journal of Finance,1968,23 (4):589-609.
[74]Altman, E..Predicting Financial Distress of Companies:Revising the Z-Score and ZETA(?) Models[R]. http://pages.stern. nyu.edu/-ealtman/Zscores.pdf,2000.
[75]吴超鹏,吴世农.基于价值创造和公司治理的财务状态分析与预测模型研究[J].经济研究,2005,(11)：99.
[76]吴沧澜,邵少敏,林伟.独立董事和投资者利益保护的实证研究——以浙江省
上市公司为例[R].浙江大学Working Paper,2004.
② Riccardo Tiscini, Francesca di Donato.The Relation between Accounting Frauds and Corporate Governance Systems:An Analysis of Recent Scandals[R].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086624,2007.
③ http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/20090411/532510.shtml.
④ Larelle Chapple, Colin Ferguson, Diana Kang.Corporate Governance and Misappropriation[R].http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1011936,2008.
⑤雷家骕和杨建昆(2009)认为股票期权制度的内在缺陷导致了早先的安然事件和今日的次贷危机。参阅：雷家骕,杨建昆.股票期权制度缺陷与市场监管失效下的安然事件及次贷危机[J].国有企业管理,2009,(1).
①弗兰克.H.奈特.安佳译.风险、不确定性与利润[M].商务印书馆,2006.
① Shleifer Andrei, Vishny Robert W..A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997, (52): 737-783.
② La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R..Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000, (58):3-27.
③ Gavin Anderson, Matt Orsagh.The Corporate Governance Risk[J].Electric Perspectives,2004, (1).
④李维安.“问题高管”凸现公司治理风险[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(1)：主编寄语.
⑤胡强.我国券商治理风险及对策[R].证券市场导报,2006,(1)：58-62.
⑥孙奕驰,王静.上市公司委托代理风险度量模型的构建[J].财会月刊,2007,(11)：16-17.
①何波忠.现代公司制企业的治理风险分析[J].企业家天地,2005,(7)：10-11.
②于福凤.影响公司治理风险因素的结构方程模型分析[D].沈阳工业大学硕士学位论文,2007.
③Brunswick UBS Warburg.Russia Equity Research[R].http://www.corp-gov.org/projects/rating/BUBSW-Eng. pdf.,2002.
① Vincent Soltes, Vladimir Penjak.A Structured Approach to Risk Assessment Using FUZZY Logic[R].School of Economics of the Technical University of Kosice, BIATEC, rocnik,2001.
② Jean C. Bedard, Johnstone.Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance, and Audits' Planning and Pricing Decisions[J].The Accounting Review,2004, (79):277-304.
③ Olesya V. Grishchenko, Lubomir P., Litov, Jianping Mei.Private Information Trading and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets[R]. www.pages.stern.nyu.edu/ogrishch/research/CorpGov.pdf,2003.
④ Germ'an Creamer, Yoav Freund.Predicting Performance and Quantifying Corporate Governance Risk for LATIN American ADRS and Banks[A].Proceedings of the Second IASTED Conference,2004.
⑤ Rodolfo Apreda.Factoring Governance Risk into Investors' Expected Rates of Return by Means of a Weighted-average Governance Index[R]. Working Paper Series,2007.
①孙奕驰.上市公司治理风险评价模型构建[J1.财会通讯,2009,(7)：44-45.
②李维安,谢永珍.上市公司治理风险预警指标体系的理论分析与实际验证[A].第四届南开大学公司治理国际研讨会论文集[C],2007.
① Shams Pathan.Strong Boards, CEO Power and Bank Risk-taking[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2009, (33): 1340-1350.
② Shijun Cheng.Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, (87):157-176.
③崔伟,陆正飞.董事会规模、独立性与会计信息透明度——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(2)：22-27.
④如Pfeffer(1972)从资源依赖的角度证实了董事会规模越大越有利的观点；Provan (1980)认为董事会规模大有助于形成一个强有力的董事会,而强有力的董事会有助于公司获得资本：Kiel & Nicholson (2003)对澳大利亚348家大型公众公司的研究发现董事会规模与公司价值正相关；Yangmin Kim (2005)在对韩国199家大型公众公司董事会特征与公司价值研究后发现董事会成员的社会资本与公司绩效显著正相关,而通常规模较大的董事会其社会资本比较丰裕；Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta (2005)的研究认为,董事会规模较小的公司容易招致股东诉讼,规模较大的董事会有助于监督管理层。
⑤张翼,马光.法律、公司治理与公司丑闻[J].管理世界,2005,(10)：113-122.
①如Lipton & Lorsch (1992)认为即使董事会的监控能力会随着董事会规模的增大而增加,但是由此带来的成本也将超过其收益；Alexander et al. (1993)认为,CEO可以通过一些策略在与规模较大的董事会成员的交往中获取权力优势,比如结盟、提供有选择性的信息渠道、分化和“征服”等。Bennedsen et al. (2007)对7000家公司的研究发现,在数量较少的董事会规模为6人或者稍多的中小公司中存在董事会规模的负面效应。Shijun Cheng (2008)利用1252家公司样本的研究发现,董事会规模与Tobin'Q值、股票收益波动、ROA等均表现出负相关关系,类似结论的研究还包括Mark & Yuanto (2002)、Loderer & Peyer (2002)、 Coles et al. (2004)、Kusnadi&Mak (2005)、de Anderes et al. (2005)等。
② Hatice Uzun, Samuel H. Szewczyk. Raj Varma.Board Composition and Corporate Fraud[J].Financial Analysts Journal,2004, (3):33-43.
③ Panagiotis E. Dimitropoulosb, Dimitrios Asterioua,The Effect of Board Composition on the Informativeness and Quality of Annual Earnings:Empirical Evidence from Greece[J]. Research in International Business and Finance, In Press,2009.
④于富生,张敏,姜付秀,任梦杰.公司治理影响公司财务风险吗?[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：52-59.
⑤杨清香,俞麟,陈娜.董事会特征与财务舞弊——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2009,(7)：64-70.
⑥刘明辉,韩小芳.“谴责”能否促进财务舞弊的公司改善公司治理?[J].财经问题研究,2009,(2)：100-107.
①陈关亭.我国上市公司财务报告舞弊因素的实证分析[J].审计研究,2007,(9)：91-96.
② Peasnell, K. V. Pope, P.F., Young, S..Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?[J].Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2005, (32):1311-1346.
③ Bikki Jaggi, Sidney Leung, Ferdinand Gul.Family Control, Board Independence and Earnings Management: Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2009, (4):281-300.
④ Michael Firth, Peter M.Y. Fung, Oliver M. Rui. Ownership, Two-tier Board Structure, and the Informativeness of Earnings-Evidence from China[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2007, (4):463-496.
① Anwer S. Ahmed, Scott Duellman.Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007, (2/3):411-437.
②王平心,吴清华,殷俊明.独立董事制度之弱化治理效应：一种理论假说及其证据[J].西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2006,26(1)：37-42.
③陈胜蓝,魏明海.董事会独立性、盈余稳健性与投资者保护[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2007,47(2)：96-102.
④王鹏,张俊瑞.董事会独立性与会计稳健性关系研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2009,31(5)：109-117.
⑤ Santhosh Abraham, Paul Cox.Analysing the Determinants of Narrative Risk Information in UK FTSE 100 Annual Reports[J].The British Accounting Review,2007, (3):227-248.
⑥ Kenneth E. Scott.The Role of Corporate Governance in Coping with Risks and Unknowns[R]. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, Working Paper No.356,2008.
⑦叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,2007,(4)：101-111.
①黄志忠.大股东性质、持股比例与独立董事治理效率[A].第四届公司治理国际学术会议论文集[C],2007.
② Stephen P. Ferris, Xuemin (Sterling) Yan.Do Independent Directors and Chairmen Matter? The Role of Boards of Directors in Mutual Fund Governance[J] Journal of Corporate Finance,2007, (2/3):392-420.
① Massson, R.T..Executive Motivations, Earning and Consequent Equity Performance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1971, (79):1278-1292.
②杨清香,张翼,张亮.董事会特征与盈余管理的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2008,(11)：133-140.
③ Donaldson, L., Davis, J..Boards and Company Performance:Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom[J]. Corporate Governance International Review,1994, (2):151-160.
④朱宇.经理、内部董事与公司财务风险外部化——基于管家理论的视角[J].贵州财经学院学报,2006,(4)：38-42.
① Eugene Kang, Asghar Zardkooh.Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance[J].Corporate Governance: An International Review,2005,13 (6):785-799.
① Charles P. Cullinan, Hui Du, Gail B. Wright. Is There an Association between Director Option Compensation and the Likelihood of Misstatement?[J].Advances in Accounting,2008, (1):16-23.
① Rudiger Fahlebrach, Ren6 M.Stulz.Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value[J]Journal of Financial Economics,2009, (92):342-361.
② Aiyesha Dey.Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2008, (5): 1143-1180.
③ Scott B. Jackson, Thomas J. Lopez, Austin L. Reitenga.Accounting Fundamentals and CEO Bonus Compensation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2008, (5):374-393.
④ Mine Ertugrul, Shantaram Hegde. Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2008, (5):512-531.
①张晓岚,吴东霖,张超.董事会治理特征：上市公司信息披露违规的经验证据[J].当代经济科学,2009,31(4)：99-107.
②刘亭立,王化成.基于会计稳健性的董事会治理结构与盈余质量研究[J].科学决策,2009,(8)：32-39.
③洪剑峭,方军雄.审计委员会制度与盈余质量的改善[J].南开管理评论,2009,12(4)：107-112.
①高雷,宋顺林.董事会、监事会与代理成本——基于上市公司2002-2005年面板数据的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2007,(10)：18-24.
②如Beasley (1996)、Cohen et al. (2004)、 Uzun et al. (2004)、Chen et al. (2006)、蔡志岳和吴世农(2007)、Larelle Chapple et al. (2008)等。
③如Pfeffer (1972)、 Changanti et al. (1985)、 Lipton& Lorsch (1992)、 Mark&Yuanto (2002)、 Coles et al. (2004)、 Kusnadi&Mak(2005)、 de Anderes et al. (2005)、 Yangmin Kim (2005)、 Bennedsen et al. (2007)、 Shijun Cheng (2008)、 Coles et al. (2008)等。
①丁友刚,胡兴国.内部控制、风险控制与风险管理——基于组织目标的概念解说与思想演进[J].会计研究,2007,(12)： 51-54.
① Crichton-Miller, Worman.Seeking A Structured Approach to Assessing Corporate Governance Risk in Emerging Markets[R].Winning essay in an Essay Competition in honor of Jacques de Larosiere, The Institute of International Finance，1999.
②刘红霞,韩嫄.董事会对经理层治理风险预警模型构建研究[J].现代财经,2005,25(12)：42-46.
③刘红霞,韩嫄.中国上市公司董事会治理风险研究[J].当代财经,2007,(6)：115-120.
④李维安,谢永珍.上市公司治理风险预警指标体系的理论分析与实际验证[A].第四届南开大学公司治理国际研讨会论文集[C],2007.
⑤李亚.民营上市公司治理风险研究——以产权和人才为视角[J].生产力研究,2008,(15)：44-48.
①张兰霞,王俊,张燕,吴小康.基于BP网络的人力资源管理风险预警模型[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6)：78-85.
②高小玲(2006)对道德风险的相关研究进行了详细的评述,参见高小玲.企业道德风险及基于中国企业额实证研究[D].复旦大学博士学位论文,2006.
① Eliezer M. Fich, Steve L. Slezak.Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2008,30 (2):225-251.
①李维安.经济复苏之际看公司治理[J].资本市场,2010,(1)：114-119.
①张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理[M].经济科学出版社,2005.
② David H. Scott. Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-owned Financial Institutions[R].The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4321,2007.
① Altman, E..Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy[J].Journal of Finance,1968,23 (4):589-609.
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①吴超鹏,吴世农.基于价值创造和公司治理的财务状态分析与预测模型研究[J].经济研究,2005,(11)：99.
②吴沧澜,邵少敏,林伟.独立董事和投资者利益保护的实证研究——以浙江省上市公司为例[R].浙江大学Working Paper,2004.
②李维安和孙文(2007)认为董事会治理对公司绩效改善的影响主要来源于董事会组织结构建设和董事薪酬激励的作用。
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