逃税避税及影响因素的经济分析
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摘要
逃税和避税是纳税人减轻税收负担通常所采取的两种方式 近年来 逃税问题
在我国愈演愈烈 避税现象也在中国逐步兴起并且快速发展 逃税和避税已经成为
社会各界普遍关注的热点 为便于税务当局对逃税 避税方式进行合理的治理和引
导 本论文对逃税和避税的影响因素及其对经济产生的影响从理论到实践进行了系
统的分析 这对于揭示逃税避税的内在规律 加强反避税杜绝偷逃税 促进税收政
策的宏观决策部门科学决策并推进我国税收法制化建设具有非常重要的理论和现实
意义
对逃税问题及其影响因素进行一般理论分析的基本框架是由 Allingham, M.G.和
Sandmo, A 于 1972 年最先提出的预期效用最大化模型 简称 A S 模型 确立的
本论文首先详细介绍了 A S 模型的构造 该模型的比较静态分析和模型结论 并对
A S 模型和国外其他经典逃税模型的研究方法和研究结论进行了评述
在借鉴这些国外关于逃税问题经典模型的基础上 本论文以中国逃税避税问题
作为研究对象 结合中国实践 从经济学和心理学的角度建立了关于逃税和避税的
比较静态模型 并通过比较静态分析方法推导了逃税和避税的各种影响因素及其影
响方向 得出研究结果 查获概率和罚款比例的提高以及纳税人道德修养和素质的
提高都将抑制纳税人逃税活动鼓励避税行为 而税率的提高将刺激纳税人的逃税活
动同时抑制避税行为 逃税和避税行为具有对立性 为了使建立的比较静态模型具
有较强的适应性 本论文还对模型参数的特征和在各种不同情况下可能出现的假设
条件进行扩展说明 即避税行为具有自我保障功能 如果查处概率是收入隐瞒额和
税收努力支出的函数 原有的比较静态模型得出的结论不改变
为了验证理论研究的结论与现实经济现象的吻合程度 用实践的数据检验理论
分析的结论和主张 论文设计了一项对逃税避税现象及其影响因素的问卷调查 计
算逃税避税及其影响因素的相关性系数 其意图在于用实证的资料从纳税人的角度
揭示逃税避税与各影响因素之间的关系 并对论文理论研究结论进行检验 实证研
究得出如下结论 纳税人自身的知识素质决定其纳税意识的高低 从而影响纳税人
的逃税避税行为 加强国民税收教育 提高纳税人知识素质 是倡导合法避税并抑
制非法逃税的有力手段 税收制度对纳税人逃税避税行为产生重要影响 较高的税
率会降低纳税申报的比例 激励逃税行为 而提高税务稽查查处率和逃税行为处罚
率均可以有效抑制逃税行为 纳税人税收筹划 避税 支出大小直接影响规避税负
I
的效果 筹划支出的比例越高 税务当局为纳税人核定的收入占实际收入的比例越
低 纳税人税负规避的效果就越好 故纳税人应该充分重视避税行为 以上结论说
明通过问卷调查的实证分析结果支持论文中的理论研究结果
为了将研究结果与中国的具体实践相结合 论文结合典型案例对中国的逃税和
避税现象均进行了现实性分析 讨论了中国逃税问题的规模和原因以及避税现象的
制度空间和发展层次 在对中国逃税的现实性分析中 论文通过一个逃税的博弈模
型 从另一个角度再一次分析了中国逃税的影响因素 该博弈模型除了比较静态模
型中涉及的因素外 还增加了税务稽查成本因素 其揭示的各种因素与逃税的关系
基本上与比较静态模型结论一致 通过这个逃税的博弈模型 结合中国经济实践中
的数据 论文计算了处于纳什均衡状态下我国 2001 年 2002 年均衡稽查概率均应该
大于 100
而这两年均衡逃税额应该分别为 1625.92 亿元和 1710.05 亿元 但由于
我国纳税人和税务机关的博弈状况没有达到纳什均衡状态 非均衡状况下的实际逃
税额应该远远大于论文计算出的均衡逃税水平 估计每年应该在 2000 亿元以上 通
过对中国逃税 避税的现实状况分析 论文比较了这两种现象的异同点以及对经济
的不同影响效应 最后 结合论文的理论分析 实证分析以及现实性分析结果 论
文有针对性地提出了较全面的正确处理我国逃税避税问题的基本思路
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are two kinds of measures that are usually taken by
taxpayers to reduce their tax burden. Recently, the problem of tax evasion has become
more and more serious, tax avoidance has sprung up, tax evasion and tax avoidance has
become the focus of the whole society. In order to help the revenue authority to deal
properly with the problem of tax evasion and tax avoidance, this dissertation has analyzed
the affecting factors of tax evasion and tax avoidance, and has analyzed their effects on
economy systematically from the point of view of theory and practice, which is very
important theoretically and practically to disclose the inner laws of tax evasion and tax
avoidance, reinforce anti-tax avoidance and pretect tax evasion, and to help the
macro-policy authorities of tax make decisions scientifically and advance the course of
lawful revenue.
The basic frame theoretically analysis of tax evasion and its effects was established by
Allingham .M.G and Sandmo in 1972. which named maximum predicted utility model. The
dissertation firstly introduced detaily the structure, the comparative static analysis and the conclusion of
the A-S model. And it also gave some coments on A-S model and research methods and results of
foreign typical tax evasion models.
Based on these typical foreign tax evasion models, this dissertation has mainly
studied the problem of tax evasion and tax avoidance. Based on using the classical models
abroad of tax evasion and considering the practice of China, this dissertation has built a
comparative static model from the view of economics and psychics. Through comparative
static analysis, the affecting factors and directions of tax evasion and tax avoidance has
been deducted, and a conclusion has been made: if the probability of being ferreted out
and punished increases, and the taxpayers’ moral culture and diathesis are enhanced, then
tax evasion will be restrained and the tax avoidance will be encouraged; the increase of tax
rate will stimulate the tax evasion and restrain the tax avoidance of taxpayers; the
activities of tax evasion and tax avoidance are something of opposing. In order to make
the model even more adaptable, this dissertation gives some enlarged explanation of the
characteristics of model parameters under different conditions: that is the action of tax
evasion has the function of self-insurance; if the probability of being detected is the
function of the hidden income and the tax effect, the conclusion of original comparative
static model remains the same.
To check the degree of coincidence between the theoretical study and realistic
economic phenomena, and to check the theoretical analysis conclusion and dissertation
using empirical data, questionnaires have been made to investigate the tax evasion and tax
avoidance phenomena and their affecting factors, and also calculate the relative
coefficients of tax evasion and tax avoidance and their affecting factors. The intension is
to indicate the said relationship (tax evasion and tax avoidance and affecting factors)from
III
the view of taxpayers. And check the dissertation theoretical conclusion, the empirical
study supports the conclusion:tax-paid intention was decided by taxpayer’s diathesis, then
affect the taxpayer’s diathesis is the good way of legal tax evasion and tax avoidance and
restrain illegal taxpayer’s behavior of tax evasion, the larger percentage of taxed revenue
will decrease the percent of tax paid and stimulate the behavior of tax evasion, higher
probability of being detected and punishment will restrain the tax evasion ;the tax effort
will directly affect the effect of the tax avoidance, the higher the cost, the lower the
percentage between the tax-paid revenue and actual revenue, the better the result of the tax
evasion and tax avoidance. As a result, the taxpayer should pay more attention to tax
avoidance. The conclusion made is consistent with the prior conclusion ma
在我国愈演愈烈 避税现象也在中国逐步兴起并且快速发展 逃税和避税已经成为
社会各界普遍关注的热点 为便于税务当局对逃税 避税方式进行合理的治理和引
导 本论文对逃税和避税的影响因素及其对经济产生的影响从理论到实践进行了系
统的分析 这对于揭示逃税避税的内在规律 加强反避税杜绝偷逃税 促进税收政
策的宏观决策部门科学决策并推进我国税收法制化建设具有非常重要的理论和现实
意义
对逃税问题及其影响因素进行一般理论分析的基本框架是由 Allingham, M.G.和
Sandmo, A 于 1972 年最先提出的预期效用最大化模型 简称 A S 模型 确立的
本论文首先详细介绍了 A S 模型的构造 该模型的比较静态分析和模型结论 并对
A S 模型和国外其他经典逃税模型的研究方法和研究结论进行了评述
在借鉴这些国外关于逃税问题经典模型的基础上 本论文以中国逃税避税问题
作为研究对象 结合中国实践 从经济学和心理学的角度建立了关于逃税和避税的
比较静态模型 并通过比较静态分析方法推导了逃税和避税的各种影响因素及其影
响方向 得出研究结果 查获概率和罚款比例的提高以及纳税人道德修养和素质的
提高都将抑制纳税人逃税活动鼓励避税行为 而税率的提高将刺激纳税人的逃税活
动同时抑制避税行为 逃税和避税行为具有对立性 为了使建立的比较静态模型具
有较强的适应性 本论文还对模型参数的特征和在各种不同情况下可能出现的假设
条件进行扩展说明 即避税行为具有自我保障功能 如果查处概率是收入隐瞒额和
税收努力支出的函数 原有的比较静态模型得出的结论不改变
为了验证理论研究的结论与现实经济现象的吻合程度 用实践的数据检验理论
分析的结论和主张 论文设计了一项对逃税避税现象及其影响因素的问卷调查 计
算逃税避税及其影响因素的相关性系数 其意图在于用实证的资料从纳税人的角度
揭示逃税避税与各影响因素之间的关系 并对论文理论研究结论进行检验 实证研
究得出如下结论 纳税人自身的知识素质决定其纳税意识的高低 从而影响纳税人
的逃税避税行为 加强国民税收教育 提高纳税人知识素质 是倡导合法避税并抑
制非法逃税的有力手段 税收制度对纳税人逃税避税行为产生重要影响 较高的税
率会降低纳税申报的比例 激励逃税行为 而提高税务稽查查处率和逃税行为处罚
率均可以有效抑制逃税行为 纳税人税收筹划 避税 支出大小直接影响规避税负
I
的效果 筹划支出的比例越高 税务当局为纳税人核定的收入占实际收入的比例越
低 纳税人税负规避的效果就越好 故纳税人应该充分重视避税行为 以上结论说
明通过问卷调查的实证分析结果支持论文中的理论研究结果
为了将研究结果与中国的具体实践相结合 论文结合典型案例对中国的逃税和
避税现象均进行了现实性分析 讨论了中国逃税问题的规模和原因以及避税现象的
制度空间和发展层次 在对中国逃税的现实性分析中 论文通过一个逃税的博弈模
型 从另一个角度再一次分析了中国逃税的影响因素 该博弈模型除了比较静态模
型中涉及的因素外 还增加了税务稽查成本因素 其揭示的各种因素与逃税的关系
基本上与比较静态模型结论一致 通过这个逃税的博弈模型 结合中国经济实践中
的数据 论文计算了处于纳什均衡状态下我国 2001 年 2002 年均衡稽查概率均应该
大于 100
而这两年均衡逃税额应该分别为 1625.92 亿元和 1710.05 亿元 但由于
我国纳税人和税务机关的博弈状况没有达到纳什均衡状态 非均衡状况下的实际逃
税额应该远远大于论文计算出的均衡逃税水平 估计每年应该在 2000 亿元以上 通
过对中国逃税 避税的现实状况分析 论文比较了这两种现象的异同点以及对经济
的不同影响效应 最后 结合论文的理论分析 实证分析以及现实性分析结果 论
文有针对性地提出了较全面的正确处理我国逃税避税问题的基本思路
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are two kinds of measures that are usually taken by
taxpayers to reduce their tax burden. Recently, the problem of tax evasion has become
more and more serious, tax avoidance has sprung up, tax evasion and tax avoidance has
become the focus of the whole society. In order to help the revenue authority to deal
properly with the problem of tax evasion and tax avoidance, this dissertation has analyzed
the affecting factors of tax evasion and tax avoidance, and has analyzed their effects on
economy systematically from the point of view of theory and practice, which is very
important theoretically and practically to disclose the inner laws of tax evasion and tax
avoidance, reinforce anti-tax avoidance and pretect tax evasion, and to help the
macro-policy authorities of tax make decisions scientifically and advance the course of
lawful revenue.
The basic frame theoretically analysis of tax evasion and its effects was established by
Allingham .M.G and Sandmo in 1972. which named maximum predicted utility model. The
dissertation firstly introduced detaily the structure, the comparative static analysis and the conclusion of
the A-S model. And it also gave some coments on A-S model and research methods and results of
foreign typical tax evasion models.
Based on these typical foreign tax evasion models, this dissertation has mainly
studied the problem of tax evasion and tax avoidance. Based on using the classical models
abroad of tax evasion and considering the practice of China, this dissertation has built a
comparative static model from the view of economics and psychics. Through comparative
static analysis, the affecting factors and directions of tax evasion and tax avoidance has
been deducted, and a conclusion has been made: if the probability of being ferreted out
and punished increases, and the taxpayers’ moral culture and diathesis are enhanced, then
tax evasion will be restrained and the tax avoidance will be encouraged; the increase of tax
rate will stimulate the tax evasion and restrain the tax avoidance of taxpayers; the
activities of tax evasion and tax avoidance are something of opposing. In order to make
the model even more adaptable, this dissertation gives some enlarged explanation of the
characteristics of model parameters under different conditions: that is the action of tax
evasion has the function of self-insurance; if the probability of being detected is the
function of the hidden income and the tax effect, the conclusion of original comparative
static model remains the same.
To check the degree of coincidence between the theoretical study and realistic
economic phenomena, and to check the theoretical analysis conclusion and dissertation
using empirical data, questionnaires have been made to investigate the tax evasion and tax
avoidance phenomena and their affecting factors, and also calculate the relative
coefficients of tax evasion and tax avoidance and their affecting factors. The intension is
to indicate the said relationship (tax evasion and tax avoidance and affecting factors)from
III
the view of taxpayers. And check the dissertation theoretical conclusion, the empirical
study supports the conclusion:tax-paid intention was decided by taxpayer’s diathesis, then
affect the taxpayer’s diathesis is the good way of legal tax evasion and tax avoidance and
restrain illegal taxpayer’s behavior of tax evasion, the larger percentage of taxed revenue
will decrease the percent of tax paid and stimulate the behavior of tax evasion, higher
probability of being detected and punishment will restrain the tax evasion ;the tax effort
will directly affect the effect of the tax avoidance, the higher the cost, the lower the
percentage between the tax-paid revenue and actual revenue, the better the result of the tax
evasion and tax avoidance. As a result, the taxpayer should pay more attention to tax
avoidance. The conclusion made is consistent with the prior conclusion ma
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[48] Rainald Borck,Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion, DIW Berlin Discussion
Paper,No.329,February 2003.
[49] Roger H. Gordon Soren Bo Nielsen Tax evasion in an open economy Value-added
vs. income taxation Journal of Public Economics 1997,(66) 173–197.
[50] Sanjay Gupta,Lillian F.Mills,Corporate multistate tax
planning:benefits of multiple jurisdictions,Journal of Accounting and
Economics,2002,(33)
[51] Scott J Boylan,Geoffrey B.Sprinkle,Experimental evidence on the relation between
tax rates and compliance:The effect of earned vs.endowed income,The Journal of
the American Taxation Association,2001,(23):75-90
[52] Slemrod J.,A General Model of the Behavioral Responses to Taxation,
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[55] Stiglitz, J., The general theory of tax avoidance. National Tax Journal,1985,(38)
325–337.
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121
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Fund,1993,(40):807-827
[58] Thomas R. Pope Richard W. Schwartz Tax planning strategies for physicians The
American Journal of Surgery 2002,(184) 19–25.
[59] Triest R.,The Effect of Income Taxation on Labor Supply when Deductions are
Endogenous,Review of Economics and Statistics,1992,(74):91-99.
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for managers, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,1998,(7):
251-272.
[61] William T. Chittenden Scott E. Hein Tax Rate Changes and the Long-Run
Equilibrium Relationship Between Taxable and Tax-Exempt Interest Rates Journal
of Economics and Business 1999,(51) 327-346.
[62] Wojciech Kopczuk Redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous
Journal of Public Economics 2001,(81) 51–71.
[63] Yitzhaki,S.,A note on income tax evasion:A theoretical analysis, Journal of Public
Economics 1974,(3) 201-202.
[64] [美]平狄克 鲁宾费尔德 微观经济学 中国人民大学出版社 2000.09
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[66] [英]安东尼·B·阿特金森 [美]约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨 公共经济学 上海三联书
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[72] 樊丽明,税收调控研究,经济科学出版社,2000.05
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[75] 樊虹国 满莉 新避税与反避税实务 北京 中国审计出版社 1999.05
[76] 钱晟,税收负担的经济分析,北京 中国人民大学出版社 2000.04
[77] 钱晟,税收管理实务操作与案例分析,北京 中国人民大学出版社 1998.11
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[78] 冯耕中,税收理论与实务,西安 西安交通大学出版社 1999.04
[79] 王曙光,税法,大连 东北财经大学出版社 2001.08
[80] 方红星 陆建桥,税务会计,大连 东北财经大学出版社 2000.09
[81] 张中秀 现代企业的合理避税筹划 北京 中华工商联合出版社 2000.01
[82] 张中秀 企业节税规划策略与案例 北京 企业管理出版社 1996.03
[83] 黄凤羽 论我国税收筹划市场的规范与发展 河南税务 2002.06
[84] 李嘉明,企业税务筹划的数理分析,重庆大学学报(自然科学版) 2001 年第 9 期
[85] 李嘉明,企业税务筹划的效应分析,重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2001 年第 2 期
[86] 李辉 朱洪泽,税收筹划与避税对宏观经济的影响,税务与经济,2000 年第 1 期
[87] 邓永勤 税收筹划效果受多种因素制约 中国税务报 2002.11.26
[88] 晁毓欣,崔金平 纳税人与征税人的博弈 — — 逃税行为的经济学分析 财经问题
研究 2001 年第 10 期
[89] 安体富 当前中国应采取适当减税政策 财政与税务(中国人民大学复印报刊资
料),2002 年第 1 期
[90] 李文 逃税的经济分析 涉外税务 2002 年第 12 期
[91] 李文宏 逃税行为的经济与社会原因分析 锦州师范学院学报 2002 年第 6 期
[92] 李选举,税收稽查选案模型研究,财政研究,1998 年 08 期
[93] 李选举,税收诚实申报判别模型,税务研究,1998 年 12 期
[94] 李选举,Tobit 模型与税收稽查,统计研究,2000 年 01 期
[95] 王韬 顾承胜 论企业的税务策略 财会通讯 1999 年第 5 期
[96] 管强 从经济学假设前提看税收筹划 中国税务报 2002.10.15
[97] 郭烈民 提高我国税收征管效率的思考 税务研究 1999 年第 6 期
[98] 韩亭 “恩威集团”税案及启示 中国税务 1999 年第 1 期
[99] 中国税务报 2000 2003 年各期
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[51] Scott J Boylan,Geoffrey B.Sprinkle,Experimental evidence on the relation between
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[52] Slemrod J.,A General Model of the Behavioral Responses to Taxation,
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Fund,1993,(40):807-827
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[64] [美]平狄克 鲁宾费尔德 微观经济学 中国人民大学出版社 2000.09
[65] [美]N· 格里高利· 曼昆 宏观经济学 中国人民大学出版社 2000.12
[66] [英]安东尼·B·阿特金森 [美]约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨 公共经济学 上海三联书
店 上海人民出版社 1994.09
[67] [美]哈尔· 瓦里安,微观经济学(高级教程),北京:经济科学出版社,1997.04
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[69] 郭庆旺 苑新丽 夏文丽 当代西方税收学 大连 东北财大出版社 1994.12
[70] 刘心一 税式支出分析 北京 中国财政经济出版社
[71] 梁朋 税收流失经济分析 北京 中国人民大学出版社 2000.11
[72] 樊丽明,税收调控研究,经济科学出版社,2000.05
[73] 贾绍华 中国税收流失问题研究 北京 中国财政经济出版社 2002.06
[74] 梁云风 税务筹划实务 纳税人节税指南 北京 经济科学出版社 2001.03
[75] 樊虹国 满莉 新避税与反避税实务 北京 中国审计出版社 1999.05
[76] 钱晟,税收负担的经济分析,北京 中国人民大学出版社 2000.04
[77] 钱晟,税收管理实务操作与案例分析,北京 中国人民大学出版社 1998.11
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[78] 冯耕中,税收理论与实务,西安 西安交通大学出版社 1999.04
[79] 王曙光,税法,大连 东北财经大学出版社 2001.08
[80] 方红星 陆建桥,税务会计,大连 东北财经大学出版社 2000.09
[81] 张中秀 现代企业的合理避税筹划 北京 中华工商联合出版社 2000.01
[82] 张中秀 企业节税规划策略与案例 北京 企业管理出版社 1996.03
[83] 黄凤羽 论我国税收筹划市场的规范与发展 河南税务 2002.06
[84] 李嘉明,企业税务筹划的数理分析,重庆大学学报(自然科学版) 2001 年第 9 期
[85] 李嘉明,企业税务筹划的效应分析,重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2001 年第 2 期
[86] 李辉 朱洪泽,税收筹划与避税对宏观经济的影响,税务与经济,2000 年第 1 期
[87] 邓永勤 税收筹划效果受多种因素制约 中国税务报 2002.11.26
[88] 晁毓欣,崔金平 纳税人与征税人的博弈 — — 逃税行为的经济学分析 财经问题
研究 2001 年第 10 期
[89] 安体富 当前中国应采取适当减税政策 财政与税务(中国人民大学复印报刊资
料),2002 年第 1 期
[90] 李文 逃税的经济分析 涉外税务 2002 年第 12 期
[91] 李文宏 逃税行为的经济与社会原因分析 锦州师范学院学报 2002 年第 6 期
[92] 李选举,税收稽查选案模型研究,财政研究,1998 年 08 期
[93] 李选举,税收诚实申报判别模型,税务研究,1998 年 12 期
[94] 李选举,Tobit 模型与税收稽查,统计研究,2000 年 01 期
[95] 王韬 顾承胜 论企业的税务策略 财会通讯 1999 年第 5 期
[96] 管强 从经济学假设前提看税收筹划 中国税务报 2002.10.15
[97] 郭烈民 提高我国税收征管效率的思考 税务研究 1999 年第 6 期
[98] 韩亭 “恩威集团”税案及启示 中国税务 1999 年第 1 期
[99] 中国税务报 2000 2003 年各期