国际政治中的权力周期问题研究
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摘要
权力周期理论,主要是来自查尔斯·朵兰的著作,该理论取决于某一主权国家在一个较为宽泛的国家体系里占总体权力的相对份额。通过横贯五个国家实力指标的非加权的方法,权力周期方法可以使分析者去评估每个国家在一个确定的体系或一系列国家中的相对等级位置,以及在相对权力上各国的崛起和衰败的频率并且可以预测在考察体系中的国家的可能性之未来。
然而,权力周期理论毕竟是它那个时代的产物。很显然,在后冷战和20世纪末期乃至21世纪它缺乏对国际关系解释的充分效用。查尔斯·朵兰的权力周期理论没有对技术和武器系统革新作出解释,也没有涵盖非国家行为体在相对权力统计中的意义;对于五个实力指标的统计也是五年一次,不象今天的国际体系观察者一样去均衡考虑更宽泛的权力因素:经济、军事、软权力。
该论文考虑到了这些问题,通过对权力周期理论行为者和权力进行分析以及对权力周期理论同其他国际关系理论的比较,提出了一个革新的权力周期模型,在一定程度上弥补了朵兰理论的不足之处。首先,实力指标得到修正。融合了技术变革因素,扩展了军事、经济以及相关替代物的国际权力之软因素。其次,涉及到了非国家国际行为体。最后,构建简化了的构造曲线方法,该方法用来简洁每个行为者的相对权力曲线。这一新方法和其他革新的权力因素方法对最终权力周期曲线的形状有一定影响。
The work of Charles F. Doran provided the idea of power cycle theory firstly. By weighting a sovereign state’s relative power within an international system, we can forecast the changing of international affairs. Using unweighted measures of national material capabilities across five indicators, the power cycle method allows the analyst to estimate the relative hierarchical position of each state in a defined system or set of states, the rapidity of each state’s rise and decline in relative power and to forecast the likely future for each state in the system under view.
Power cycle theory, however, is a product of its time and may have less utility in post-Cold War and post-twentieth century analysis of international relations. The power cycle theory of Charles F. Doran does not account for innovation in technology or weapons systems, nor does it include significant non-state actor when analyzing systems. The five indicators of material capability, measured only five years, are not equally weighted across the broader elements by which international analysts understand power today: military, economic, and soft power.
After analyzed the element- actors and power of power cycle theory, compared the difference with the other theories of international relations, this thesis presents a reformulated power cycle model which have modified the short of classical power cycle theory. Firstly, the indicator of material capabilities are modified, doing so, which can effect technology innovation, and explored a new atmosphere for military power and economic power. The most important is taking soft power into power cycle theory firstly. Secondly, Non-state international actors were discussed in power cycle theory. Finally, rethinking power cycle theory, we can get the simplified relative power curve. The shape of relative power curve has a little difference with Doran’s curve.
然而,权力周期理论毕竟是它那个时代的产物。很显然,在后冷战和20世纪末期乃至21世纪它缺乏对国际关系解释的充分效用。查尔斯·朵兰的权力周期理论没有对技术和武器系统革新作出解释,也没有涵盖非国家行为体在相对权力统计中的意义;对于五个实力指标的统计也是五年一次,不象今天的国际体系观察者一样去均衡考虑更宽泛的权力因素:经济、军事、软权力。
该论文考虑到了这些问题,通过对权力周期理论行为者和权力进行分析以及对权力周期理论同其他国际关系理论的比较,提出了一个革新的权力周期模型,在一定程度上弥补了朵兰理论的不足之处。首先,实力指标得到修正。融合了技术变革因素,扩展了军事、经济以及相关替代物的国际权力之软因素。其次,涉及到了非国家国际行为体。最后,构建简化了的构造曲线方法,该方法用来简洁每个行为者的相对权力曲线。这一新方法和其他革新的权力因素方法对最终权力周期曲线的形状有一定影响。
The work of Charles F. Doran provided the idea of power cycle theory firstly. By weighting a sovereign state’s relative power within an international system, we can forecast the changing of international affairs. Using unweighted measures of national material capabilities across five indicators, the power cycle method allows the analyst to estimate the relative hierarchical position of each state in a defined system or set of states, the rapidity of each state’s rise and decline in relative power and to forecast the likely future for each state in the system under view.
Power cycle theory, however, is a product of its time and may have less utility in post-Cold War and post-twentieth century analysis of international relations. The power cycle theory of Charles F. Doran does not account for innovation in technology or weapons systems, nor does it include significant non-state actor when analyzing systems. The five indicators of material capability, measured only five years, are not equally weighted across the broader elements by which international analysts understand power today: military, economic, and soft power.
After analyzed the element- actors and power of power cycle theory, compared the difference with the other theories of international relations, this thesis presents a reformulated power cycle model which have modified the short of classical power cycle theory. Firstly, the indicator of material capabilities are modified, doing so, which can effect technology innovation, and explored a new atmosphere for military power and economic power. The most important is taking soft power into power cycle theory firstly. Secondly, Non-state international actors were discussed in power cycle theory. Finally, rethinking power cycle theory, we can get the simplified relative power curve. The shape of relative power curve has a little difference with Doran’s curve.
引文
[1] Hans J. Morgenthau .1967 .Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace , 4th edition .New York :Alfred A .Knopf , p.25; John J. Mearsheimer .1990 .“Back to the Future : Instability in Europe after the Cold War ”International Security 15 (1):463-510,p.464
[2] Morgenthau. 1967. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th edition .New York: Alfred A .Knopf, p.149.
[3] Robert O. Keohane , Joseph S. Nye, Jr.2000.“ Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? ( And so What? ) ” Foreign Policy 118: 104-19, p. 115.
[4] Robert O. Keohane. 2002. “Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the United States.” Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 743-65.
[5] Joseph S. Nye, 1990. “The changing Nature of World Power.” Political Science Quarterly 105(2):177-92.
[6] Charles F. Doran , Wes Parsons. 1980. “War and the Cycle of Relative Power.” The American Political Science Review 74(4):947-965; Andrew T. Parasiliti. 2003. “The Causes and Timing of Iraq’s Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment.” International Political Science Review 24(1):151-165; Brock F. Tessman and Steve Chan .2004. “ Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-power Deterrence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2):131-153; Sushil Kumar.2003. “ Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics.” International Political Science Review 24(1):113-122
[7] Robert O. Keohane , Joseph S. Nye, 1977. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little Brown; Stoll and Ward 1989, p.3.
[8] Norman Z. Alcock , Alan G. Newcombe. 1970. “The Perception of National Power .” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14(3):335-43.
[9] George Modelski , William R. Thompson. 1988. Seapower in Global Politics 1494-1993. London: Macmillan press.
[10] Organski .1958. World Politics. New York: Knopf.
[11] Bruce M. Russett.1968. “Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 12(3):285-301.
[12] Clifford German. 1960. “A tentative evaluation of world power.” The journal of ConflictResolution 4(1): 138-44.
[13] CoW National Material Indicators Dataset V3.01.
[14] Doran , Parsons. 1980. “war and the cycle of relative power.” The American Political Science Review 74(4):947-965
[15] CoW National Material Indicators Dataset V3.01.
[16] 倪世雄:《当代西方国际关系理论》,复旦大学出版社,2001 年.P141.P.367.
[17]美 詹姆斯·多尔蒂,小罗伯特·普尔法茨格拉夫:《 争论中的国际关系理论》(第五版),阎学通等译,世界知识出版社,2003 年 .p326.
[18]美 罗伯特·基欧汉 ,约瑟夫·奈 :《权力与相互依赖》(第三版),门洪华译,北京大学出版社 ,2003 年.p 序言 18.
[19]肯尼思·华尔兹.国际政治理论[M].北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,1992.p168.
[20] Nicholas·J·Spykman ,American strategy and world politics(New York:Harcount Brace,1942).p21-22.
[21]中国政治学网,陈晓晨,国际政治长周期与体系进化——莫德尔斯基长周期理论再解读,http://www.cp.org.cn/show.asp? NewsID=333
[22]智识学术网,王福春、张学斌,第六章:英国近代外交思想,http://www.zisi.net/htm/wwzh/2005-04-06-15490.htm
[23]Andrew T. Parasiliti ,2003,The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment ,International Political Science Review, 24(1): 151-165.
[24] Sushil Kumar Jain ,2003,Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics ,international Political Science Review 24(1): 113-122.
[25]Walter Russell Mead.2004. “America’s Sticky Power.”Foreign Policy March\April 2004:47-53.
[26] Joseph Nye ,2004.Soft Power : The Means to Success in World’s Politics. New York: Public Affairs ,p.1.
[27] John. Mearsheimer.1988. “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance.” International Security 12(4):174-85.
[28] Robert O. Keohane. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly 32(4):379-96,p.380.
[29] Michael Howard. 1964. “Military Power and International Order .” International Affairs 40(3):397-408,p.401.
[30] Aaron Friedberg.1987. “The Assessment of Military Power: A Review Essay.” InternationalSecurity 12(3):190-202.
[31] 李合俊, 经济全球化的利益分析和对策,学习与探索 2004 ,152(3).
[32] Niall Ferguson. 2003. “power ” Foreign Policy January: 18-24,pp.19-20.
[33]资料来源:世界银行网站 http://www.worldbank.org,《世界发展报告 2000/2001 年》,2000 年9 月。
[34] Joseph Nye, , Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power ,New York: Basic Books, 1990.
[35] Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics ,New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
[36] 约瑟夫·奈,美国注定能领导世界吗 [M]. 何小东等译,北京:军事译文出版社,1992.
[37]Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American ForeignPolicy,”Political Science Quarterly, No.2,2004, pp.256,266.
[38] 约瑟夫·奈.软力量世界政坛成功之道[M].吴晓辉,钱程译.北京:东方出版社,2005.
[39]〔美〕约瑟夫·奈“软权力”再思索 蔡玮摘自美《外交政策》2006 年 2 月号.
[40] 张小明.约瑟夫·奈的“软权力”思想分析[J].美国研究,2005(1):20-36.
[41] 社会人文资讯网 http://www.xissue.com/165/35/34318.html
[42]杨国顺,威斯特伐利亚体系和维也纳体系的形成和特征———兼谈欧洲统一性内涵的近代化,辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,33(1).
[43]《欧盟的历史、地位、最近两次扩大》,2007-01-03 http://www.chinamission.be/chn/rsom/omjk/t286600.htm
[44]中国新闻网 ,《欧盟最高军事官员:10 年内欧洲不再依赖美国保护》,2004-01-19 http://www.jxgdw.com/news/gjxw/2004-01-19/1074484205.html
[45] 联合国统计数据库 http://www.un.org/unsd/
[46] 杨伟国,欧盟在世界经济中的地位,新视野 2003(3),P73.
[47] The Wall Street Journal. 2002. “Europe beats America.” 2002-7-23.
[48] Joseph Nye, 2004c. “Europe’s Soft Power.” The Globalist May 3rd 2004.
[49] Yale H. Ferguson , Richard W. Mansbach. 1999. “Global Politics at the turn of the Millennium: Changing Bases of ‘us ’and ‘them’.” International Studies Review 1(2):77-107,p.80.
[50] Department of State. 2003b. Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999-2000. May 17th 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2003/17447.htm
[2] Morgenthau. 1967. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th edition .New York: Alfred A .Knopf, p.149.
[3] Robert O. Keohane , Joseph S. Nye, Jr.2000.“ Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? ( And so What? ) ” Foreign Policy 118: 104-19, p. 115.
[4] Robert O. Keohane. 2002. “Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the United States.” Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 743-65.
[5] Joseph S. Nye, 1990. “The changing Nature of World Power.” Political Science Quarterly 105(2):177-92.
[6] Charles F. Doran , Wes Parsons. 1980. “War and the Cycle of Relative Power.” The American Political Science Review 74(4):947-965; Andrew T. Parasiliti. 2003. “The Causes and Timing of Iraq’s Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment.” International Political Science Review 24(1):151-165; Brock F. Tessman and Steve Chan .2004. “ Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-power Deterrence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2):131-153; Sushil Kumar.2003. “ Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics.” International Political Science Review 24(1):113-122
[7] Robert O. Keohane , Joseph S. Nye, 1977. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little Brown; Stoll and Ward 1989, p.3.
[8] Norman Z. Alcock , Alan G. Newcombe. 1970. “The Perception of National Power .” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 14(3):335-43.
[9] George Modelski , William R. Thompson. 1988. Seapower in Global Politics 1494-1993. London: Macmillan press.
[10] Organski .1958. World Politics. New York: Knopf.
[11] Bruce M. Russett.1968. “Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 12(3):285-301.
[12] Clifford German. 1960. “A tentative evaluation of world power.” The journal of ConflictResolution 4(1): 138-44.
[13] CoW National Material Indicators Dataset V3.01.
[14] Doran , Parsons. 1980. “war and the cycle of relative power.” The American Political Science Review 74(4):947-965
[15] CoW National Material Indicators Dataset V3.01.
[16] 倪世雄:《当代西方国际关系理论》,复旦大学出版社,2001 年.P141.P.367.
[17]美 詹姆斯·多尔蒂,小罗伯特·普尔法茨格拉夫:《 争论中的国际关系理论》(第五版),阎学通等译,世界知识出版社,2003 年 .p326.
[18]美 罗伯特·基欧汉 ,约瑟夫·奈 :《权力与相互依赖》(第三版),门洪华译,北京大学出版社 ,2003 年.p 序言 18.
[19]肯尼思·华尔兹.国际政治理论[M].北京:中国人民公安大学出版社,1992.p168.
[20] Nicholas·J·Spykman ,American strategy and world politics(New York:Harcount Brace,1942).p21-22.
[21]中国政治学网,陈晓晨,国际政治长周期与体系进化——莫德尔斯基长周期理论再解读,http://www.cp.org.cn/show.asp? NewsID=333
[22]智识学术网,王福春、张学斌,第六章:英国近代外交思想,http://www.zisi.net/htm/wwzh/2005-04-06-15490.htm
[23]Andrew T. Parasiliti ,2003,The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment ,International Political Science Review, 24(1): 151-165.
[24] Sushil Kumar Jain ,2003,Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics ,international Political Science Review 24(1): 113-122.
[25]Walter Russell Mead.2004. “America’s Sticky Power.”Foreign Policy March\April 2004:47-53.
[26] Joseph Nye ,2004.Soft Power : The Means to Success in World’s Politics. New York: Public Affairs ,p.1.
[27] John. Mearsheimer.1988. “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance.” International Security 12(4):174-85.
[28] Robert O. Keohane. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly 32(4):379-96,p.380.
[29] Michael Howard. 1964. “Military Power and International Order .” International Affairs 40(3):397-408,p.401.
[30] Aaron Friedberg.1987. “The Assessment of Military Power: A Review Essay.” InternationalSecurity 12(3):190-202.
[31] 李合俊, 经济全球化的利益分析和对策,学习与探索 2004 ,152(3).
[32] Niall Ferguson. 2003. “power ” Foreign Policy January: 18-24,pp.19-20.
[33]资料来源:世界银行网站 http://www.worldbank.org,《世界发展报告 2000/2001 年》,2000 年9 月。
[34] Joseph Nye, , Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power ,New York: Basic Books, 1990.
[35] Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics ,New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
[36] 约瑟夫·奈,美国注定能领导世界吗 [M]. 何小东等译,北京:军事译文出版社,1992.
[37]Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American ForeignPolicy,”Political Science Quarterly, No.2,2004, pp.256,266.
[38] 约瑟夫·奈.软力量世界政坛成功之道[M].吴晓辉,钱程译.北京:东方出版社,2005.
[39]〔美〕约瑟夫·奈“软权力”再思索 蔡玮摘自美《外交政策》2006 年 2 月号.
[40] 张小明.约瑟夫·奈的“软权力”思想分析[J].美国研究,2005(1):20-36.
[41] 社会人文资讯网 http://www.xissue.com/165/35/34318.html
[42]杨国顺,威斯特伐利亚体系和维也纳体系的形成和特征———兼谈欧洲统一性内涵的近代化,辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,33(1).
[43]《欧盟的历史、地位、最近两次扩大》,2007-01-03 http://www.chinamission.be/chn/rsom/omjk/t286600.htm
[44]中国新闻网 ,《欧盟最高军事官员:10 年内欧洲不再依赖美国保护》,2004-01-19 http://www.jxgdw.com/news/gjxw/2004-01-19/1074484205.html
[45] 联合国统计数据库 http://www.un.org/unsd/
[46] 杨伟国,欧盟在世界经济中的地位,新视野 2003(3),P73.
[47] The Wall Street Journal. 2002. “Europe beats America.” 2002-7-23.
[48] Joseph Nye, 2004c. “Europe’s Soft Power.” The Globalist May 3rd 2004.
[49] Yale H. Ferguson , Richard W. Mansbach. 1999. “Global Politics at the turn of the Millennium: Changing Bases of ‘us ’and ‘them’.” International Studies Review 1(2):77-107,p.80.
[50] Department of State. 2003b. Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999-2000. May 17th 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/2003/17447.htm