H公司股权激励方案设计
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摘要
股权激励制度作为现代公司的一种重要激励机制,在西方发达国家已经得到了广泛的运用,近年来我国上市公司也开始引入了股权激励制度。研究股权激励制度,对于建立高层经理人员的激励约束机制,完善上市公司经营者报酬制度,激发经理人员的工作积极性和主动性,提高上市公司的经营业绩和促进其持续发展具有重要的现实意义。
在简要讨论股权激励理论,总结国内外股权激励的发展历程及特点的基础上,本文结合我国107家A股上市公司数据,对已提出或已实施的股权激励模式及股权激励现状进行了详细的统计和分析。根据最近3年H公司的财务状况,以企业的净资产收益率及净利润增长率分析为基础,提出了H公司的股权激励方案。通过制定详细的业绩考核指标及五年内逐步认购的方式,使得激励对象的目标长期化。本方案旨在解决H公司所面临的长远稳定发展的动力问题,使得股东与员工的长期利益趋于一致,公司治理更优化,业绩更上一层楼。
与国内上市公司已经推出的股权激励方案相比,本方案具有覆盖面广、单个高级管理人员所获得的期权数量不多的特点。这既反映激光行业高素质人力密集的特征,也体现公司决策者一贯坚持的均衡发展的原则。公司的骨干员工通过资本的方式分享经营成果,承担经营风险。本文的工作主要在于在激励指标的设定上,摒弃了企业规模指标,转而使用加权平均净资产收益率与净利润增长率相结合的办法,在收益得到保证的前提下,并以此规划企业的利润分配,使得增量资产在股东和激励对象之间得到合理分配,妥善解决了公司股东与经营层、员工之间的利益共享问题。
As an important incentive mechanism of modern corporate, stock incentives have been widely used in the western developed countries, and also began to be introduced to listed companies in China in recent years. It is of important practical significance to the research on stock incentive system, in terms of establishing incentive and restraint mechanisms of top management, improving executive compensation of listed companies, stimulating their enthusiasm and initiative of working, increasing the operating performance of listed companies, and promoting their sustainable development.
After simply discussing the theory of stock incentives and summarizing the course of and characteristics of domestic and international development , we in detail analyze the patterns and present situation of stock incentive programs which have been proposed or already implemented using a sample of 107 A-share listed companies . According to H Corporation’recent 3-years financial reports and the analysis of H Corporation’ROE and net profit growth rate, we propose a stock incentive scheme for H Corporation. Through formulating detailed performance indicators and a five-year subscribe year by year, the plans make incentive targets have a long-term goal. The scheme is designed to keep H Corporation’s dynamic energy in the course of the long-term stable development and to make stockholders keep long-term interests with employees in line, to optimize corporate governance of the company and to drive the corporate to get better business performance.
Compared with the stock incentives schemes that domestic listed companies have proposed, our scheme has many advantages, such as the wide coverage, the distribution of a small share of options for each single top management. It not only reflects the characteristics of intensive high-tech labors in the laser industry, but also displays the principle of balanced development that decision-makers have consistently adhered to. Under the mode of capital, the company's core employees share labor fruits and burden the operational risks. Our work mainly focus on setting new incentive indicators, abandoning the firm size as indicator, and turning to combine weighted average earnings of net assets with net profit growth rate. Under the promise of guaranteeing earnings, the scheme designs the distribution of enterprises profits to rationally allocate incremental assets between shareholders and incentive objects, solves the problem of how to share profits between shareholders, management and employee.
在简要讨论股权激励理论,总结国内外股权激励的发展历程及特点的基础上,本文结合我国107家A股上市公司数据,对已提出或已实施的股权激励模式及股权激励现状进行了详细的统计和分析。根据最近3年H公司的财务状况,以企业的净资产收益率及净利润增长率分析为基础,提出了H公司的股权激励方案。通过制定详细的业绩考核指标及五年内逐步认购的方式,使得激励对象的目标长期化。本方案旨在解决H公司所面临的长远稳定发展的动力问题,使得股东与员工的长期利益趋于一致,公司治理更优化,业绩更上一层楼。
与国内上市公司已经推出的股权激励方案相比,本方案具有覆盖面广、单个高级管理人员所获得的期权数量不多的特点。这既反映激光行业高素质人力密集的特征,也体现公司决策者一贯坚持的均衡发展的原则。公司的骨干员工通过资本的方式分享经营成果,承担经营风险。本文的工作主要在于在激励指标的设定上,摒弃了企业规模指标,转而使用加权平均净资产收益率与净利润增长率相结合的办法,在收益得到保证的前提下,并以此规划企业的利润分配,使得增量资产在股东和激励对象之间得到合理分配,妥善解决了公司股东与经营层、员工之间的利益共享问题。
As an important incentive mechanism of modern corporate, stock incentives have been widely used in the western developed countries, and also began to be introduced to listed companies in China in recent years. It is of important practical significance to the research on stock incentive system, in terms of establishing incentive and restraint mechanisms of top management, improving executive compensation of listed companies, stimulating their enthusiasm and initiative of working, increasing the operating performance of listed companies, and promoting their sustainable development.
After simply discussing the theory of stock incentives and summarizing the course of and characteristics of domestic and international development , we in detail analyze the patterns and present situation of stock incentive programs which have been proposed or already implemented using a sample of 107 A-share listed companies . According to H Corporation’recent 3-years financial reports and the analysis of H Corporation’ROE and net profit growth rate, we propose a stock incentive scheme for H Corporation. Through formulating detailed performance indicators and a five-year subscribe year by year, the plans make incentive targets have a long-term goal. The scheme is designed to keep H Corporation’s dynamic energy in the course of the long-term stable development and to make stockholders keep long-term interests with employees in line, to optimize corporate governance of the company and to drive the corporate to get better business performance.
Compared with the stock incentives schemes that domestic listed companies have proposed, our scheme has many advantages, such as the wide coverage, the distribution of a small share of options for each single top management. It not only reflects the characteristics of intensive high-tech labors in the laser industry, but also displays the principle of balanced development that decision-makers have consistently adhered to. Under the mode of capital, the company's core employees share labor fruits and burden the operational risks. Our work mainly focus on setting new incentive indicators, abandoning the firm size as indicator, and turning to combine weighted average earnings of net assets with net profit growth rate. Under the promise of guaranteeing earnings, the scheme designs the distribution of enterprises profits to rationally allocate incremental assets between shareholders and incentive objects, solves the problem of how to share profits between shareholders, management and employee.
引文
[1]张帆.股权激励的激励机制及其绩效解说: [博士学位论文].上海:复旦大学, 2003
[2]吴敬琏.股票期权激励与公司治理.经济管理文摘, 2002. 5
[3]吴艳霞,赵庆远.电子信息产业发展趋势及我国发展状况分析.情报杂志, 2005, 12: 127-131
[4]海因茨,韦里克、哈罗德,孔茨.管理学.第十一版.北京:经济科学出版社
[5] Hall, Brian J. Equity-Pay Design for Executives. Harvard Business School, Working paper, 2002
[6] Jorge Gabriel Aseff, Manuel Santos. Stock Options and Managerial optimal Contracts. Economic Theory, 2005(26): 813-837
[7] Hall B. J., Kevin J. Murphy. The Trouble with Stock Options. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, 17(3): 49-70
[8]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究, 1996, 6
[9]张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理.北京:经济科学出版社, 2005
[10]周鹏生.谈马斯洛“需要层次论”.哈尔滨学院学报, 2002, 6
[11]于晶晶. Herzberg激励——保健因素理论的发展.心理学科, 2002(5): 633-634
[12] Williamson O. E. The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial objectives in a theory of the firm. NJ, Englewood Cliffs, Pretice-Hall, 2004
[13]美国经理阶层的激励机制, http: //tyfx. diy. myrice. com/ , 2006
[14]袁桦,董登新.美国雇员持股计划的发展历程与现状分析.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2005(3)
[15] Johnson S., Y. Tian. The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 57: 3-34
[16] Baumol W. J. Business behavior, Value and growth. New York: Macmillan, 1959
[17] Global Equity Stake Study. Pearl Meyer& Partners, 2007
[18] Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options. Yale ICF Working, 2002: 2-7
[19]刘园,李志群.股票期权制度分析.北京:外经济贸易大学出版, 2002. 8: 5
[20]朗朗.股权激励走近上市公司.上海:上海证券报, 2005. 8
[21]李光林,周来振.国有企业产权的改造与激励:探索国有企业如何建立现代产业激励机制的模式.海口:南海出版公司, 2004
[22]韦敏.我国上市公司股权激励方案研究: [硕士学位论文].武汉:中国地质大学, 2008
[23]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会.关于印发《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》的通知.国资发分配[2006]175号
[24] Hemalin B. E., M. S. Weilsbach. The effets of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management, 1991(20): 101-112
[25] Jensen Michael C., Kevin J. Murphy. CEOs Incentives-It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How. Harvard Business Review, May-Lune, 1990: 138-153
[26] Jensen Michael C., Kevin J. Murphy. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy, XCVIII, 1990: 225-264
[27]赵慧卷.高新技术企业知识型员工虚拟股票期权激励模式研究: [硕士学位论文].长沙:中南大学, 2007
[28]王海鸥.国有上市公司实施股权激励存在的问题及对策.经营管理, 2007(9): 66-67
[29] H公司. H上市公司2008年公告. H上市公司2008年年度报告, 2008
[30] Merck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, et al. Management Ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988(20): 293-315
[31] Wreck, Karen H. Equity ownership Concentration and Firm Value Evidence from Private Equity Financing. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989(23): 3-28
[32] Thomas, K. J. Martin. The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans. Wake Forest Law Review, 2000
[33]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——一项来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究, 2003, 5: 74-82
[34]邓娜.我国上市公司中经营者股权激励现状及效率的实证研究: [硕士学位论文].杭州:浙江大学, 2004. 12
[35]张剑文.公司治理与股权激励.广州:广东经济出版社, 2001
[36]郑君君.关于委托代理理论的股权激励模型的研究.管理科学学报, 2005(2): 28-32
[37]李春琦,石磊.国外企业激励理论述评.经济学动态, 2001(6): 61-66
[38]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效.经济研究, 2000(3)
[39]白仲光,张维,陶桦.公司管理成股权类激励方案的成本研究.天津大学学报(自然科学版), 2002(5)
[40]崔如波.企业家人力资本产权特征与经营者股票期权激励.经济与管理研究, 2002(4)
[41]朱宝宪,王怡凯. 1998年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析.经济研究, 2003(2)
[42]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析.经济研究, 2003, 2: 64-74
[43]魏明海,陈建武.战略性激励及其约束机制的效应.管理学报, 2004, 3: 273-277
[44]陶长琪.高新技术企业的委托代理关系研究.江西财经大学学报, 2005, 37(1): 13-18
[45]张培荣.现代企业制度下的最优股权激励契约设计: [博士学位论文].上海:华东师范大学, 2003
[46]张煌.我国上市公司股权激励问题研究.现代管理科学, 2005(10): 41-43
[47]郑长德.论经理人股票期权激励的有效性.中国管理科学, 2001(5)
[48]郑君君.关于委托代理理论的股权激励模型的研究.管理科学学报, 2005(2): 28-32
[49]张彩玉.对我国三大股权激励模式的成本分析.软科学, 2004
[50]张彩玉.现代企业制度下的股权激励契约研究: [博士学位论文].成都:西南交通大学, 2006. 11
[2]吴敬琏.股票期权激励与公司治理.经济管理文摘, 2002. 5
[3]吴艳霞,赵庆远.电子信息产业发展趋势及我国发展状况分析.情报杂志, 2005, 12: 127-131
[4]海因茨,韦里克、哈罗德,孔茨.管理学.第十一版.北京:经济科学出版社
[5] Hall, Brian J. Equity-Pay Design for Executives. Harvard Business School, Working paper, 2002
[6] Jorge Gabriel Aseff, Manuel Santos. Stock Options and Managerial optimal Contracts. Economic Theory, 2005(26): 813-837
[7] Hall B. J., Kevin J. Murphy. The Trouble with Stock Options. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, 17(3): 49-70
[8]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约.经济研究, 1996, 6
[9]张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理.北京:经济科学出版社, 2005
[10]周鹏生.谈马斯洛“需要层次论”.哈尔滨学院学报, 2002, 6
[11]于晶晶. Herzberg激励——保健因素理论的发展.心理学科, 2002(5): 633-634
[12] Williamson O. E. The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial objectives in a theory of the firm. NJ, Englewood Cliffs, Pretice-Hall, 2004
[13]美国经理阶层的激励机制, http: //tyfx. diy. myrice. com/ , 2006
[14]袁桦,董登新.美国雇员持股计划的发展历程与现状分析.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2005(3)
[15] Johnson S., Y. Tian. The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 57: 3-34
[16] Baumol W. J. Business behavior, Value and growth. New York: Macmillan, 1959
[17] Global Equity Stake Study. Pearl Meyer& Partners, 2007
[18] Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options. Yale ICF Working, 2002: 2-7
[19]刘园,李志群.股票期权制度分析.北京:外经济贸易大学出版, 2002. 8: 5
[20]朗朗.股权激励走近上市公司.上海:上海证券报, 2005. 8
[21]李光林,周来振.国有企业产权的改造与激励:探索国有企业如何建立现代产业激励机制的模式.海口:南海出版公司, 2004
[22]韦敏.我国上市公司股权激励方案研究: [硕士学位论文].武汉:中国地质大学, 2008
[23]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会.关于印发《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》的通知.国资发分配[2006]175号
[24] Hemalin B. E., M. S. Weilsbach. The effets of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management, 1991(20): 101-112
[25] Jensen Michael C., Kevin J. Murphy. CEOs Incentives-It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How. Harvard Business Review, May-Lune, 1990: 138-153
[26] Jensen Michael C., Kevin J. Murphy. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy, XCVIII, 1990: 225-264
[27]赵慧卷.高新技术企业知识型员工虚拟股票期权激励模式研究: [硕士学位论文].长沙:中南大学, 2007
[28]王海鸥.国有上市公司实施股权激励存在的问题及对策.经营管理, 2007(9): 66-67
[29] H公司. H上市公司2008年公告. H上市公司2008年年度报告, 2008
[30] Merck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, et al. Management Ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988(20): 293-315
[31] Wreck, Karen H. Equity ownership Concentration and Firm Value Evidence from Private Equity Financing. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989(23): 3-28
[32] Thomas, K. J. Martin. The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans. Wake Forest Law Review, 2000
[33]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究——一项来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究, 2003, 5: 74-82
[34]邓娜.我国上市公司中经营者股权激励现状及效率的实证研究: [硕士学位论文].杭州:浙江大学, 2004. 12
[35]张剑文.公司治理与股权激励.广州:广东经济出版社, 2001
[36]郑君君.关于委托代理理论的股权激励模型的研究.管理科学学报, 2005(2): 28-32
[37]李春琦,石磊.国外企业激励理论述评.经济学动态, 2001(6): 61-66
[38]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效.经济研究, 2000(3)
[39]白仲光,张维,陶桦.公司管理成股权类激励方案的成本研究.天津大学学报(自然科学版), 2002(5)
[40]崔如波.企业家人力资本产权特征与经营者股票期权激励.经济与管理研究, 2002(4)
[41]朱宝宪,王怡凯. 1998年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析.经济研究, 2003(2)
[42]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析.经济研究, 2003, 2: 64-74
[43]魏明海,陈建武.战略性激励及其约束机制的效应.管理学报, 2004, 3: 273-277
[44]陶长琪.高新技术企业的委托代理关系研究.江西财经大学学报, 2005, 37(1): 13-18
[45]张培荣.现代企业制度下的最优股权激励契约设计: [博士学位论文].上海:华东师范大学, 2003
[46]张煌.我国上市公司股权激励问题研究.现代管理科学, 2005(10): 41-43
[47]郑长德.论经理人股票期权激励的有效性.中国管理科学, 2001(5)
[48]郑君君.关于委托代理理论的股权激励模型的研究.管理科学学报, 2005(2): 28-32
[49]张彩玉.对我国三大股权激励模式的成本分析.软科学, 2004
[50]张彩玉.现代企业制度下的股权激励契约研究: [博士学位论文].成都:西南交通大学, 2006. 11