排污权拍卖的机制研究
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摘要
国内外对排污权交易制度的研究主要集中在几个问题:排污权分配方式问题、排污权的存储和借用问题、区域间排污权分配和交易问题、排污权交易市场中的市场势力问题等等。其中,对于利用排污权交易治理污染最大的争议莫过于排污权的初始分配问题。因为它不仅对企业本身的财政负担有重要影响,而且牵扯到社会上某些集团的利益得失。
关于初始排污权的分配问题,美国国会在《清洁空气法》中提出了三类分配方式:即拍卖、免费分配和标价出售。采用拍卖方式进行排污权的分配从公平性、有效性、收益等各方面都较后两种分配方式优异。因此,本文在分析了排污权拍卖特点的基础上,指出排污权的拍卖属于同质多物品拍卖,建立了基于预算与佣金约束的排污权私人价值模型和关联价值模型下的一阶密封投标拍卖和二阶密封投标拍卖模型,给出了拍卖模型的贝叶斯-纳什均衡报价策略,并对投标人、政府、拍卖行三方的收益分配进行了研究。最后,针对我国目前排污权拍卖存在的问题,本文提出了应结合国外先进经验和本国国情,采用循序渐进的方法开展排污权的拍卖。
在章节安排上,本文第一章为绪论,主要阐述本研究的背景和总体的研究目的,确定研究内容和研究方法。第二章研究了排污权拍卖的基本理论,给出单个排污权拍卖的基础模型。第三章研究了排污权私人价值拍卖机制,讨论了厂商的投标策略和政府、拍卖行、厂商三者的收益分配。第四章研究了排污权关联价值拍卖机制,讨论了厂商的投标策略和政府、拍卖行、厂商三者的收益分配。第五章讨论了我国进行排污权拍卖的对策问题。第六章对全文进行总结,提出进一步研究方向。
The research work on Tradable Emission Permits (TEPs) focus on several issues: the allocation of initial Emission Permits (EPs), the saving and borrowing problem of EPs, EPs in ambient market, EPs in the presence of market power and so on. The most disputed issue is the allocation of EPs, because it not only may effluence enterprise’s fiscal burden, but also results in gains and losses of some interest groups.
According to the allocation of initial Emission Permits, American capital hill had proposed three type of allocation in. They are auction, pricing and free allocating. This paper surmises the characteristic of EPs action and analyzes the bench model. Then, based on the homogeneous multi-unit characteristic of emission permits, first-price sealed-bid auction model and second-price sealed-bid auction model are established. Under the condition of introducing the budget-constraint and the commission of action house, applying the individual private value model and affiliated value model, the bidders’Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid strategy is given out, and the revenue of government, auction house and the enterprises are discussed.
Finally, it discusses the existing problem of allocation of initial emission permits in China and proposes some suggestion to our government.
Chapter one discusses the research background and research method. Chapter two analyzes the bench-model of Emission Permits auction and gives the model of single Emission Permits auction. In chapter three, applying the individual private value model, first-price sealed-bid auction model and second-price sealed-bid auction model are established. In chapter four, applying the affiliated value model, first-price sealed-bid auction model and second-price sealed-bid auction model are established. Chapter five discusses the existing problem of allocation of initial emission permits in China and proposes some suggestion to our government. At the end, the research work is summarized and a perspective on the future research work is made.
关于初始排污权的分配问题,美国国会在《清洁空气法》中提出了三类分配方式:即拍卖、免费分配和标价出售。采用拍卖方式进行排污权的分配从公平性、有效性、收益等各方面都较后两种分配方式优异。因此,本文在分析了排污权拍卖特点的基础上,指出排污权的拍卖属于同质多物品拍卖,建立了基于预算与佣金约束的排污权私人价值模型和关联价值模型下的一阶密封投标拍卖和二阶密封投标拍卖模型,给出了拍卖模型的贝叶斯-纳什均衡报价策略,并对投标人、政府、拍卖行三方的收益分配进行了研究。最后,针对我国目前排污权拍卖存在的问题,本文提出了应结合国外先进经验和本国国情,采用循序渐进的方法开展排污权的拍卖。
在章节安排上,本文第一章为绪论,主要阐述本研究的背景和总体的研究目的,确定研究内容和研究方法。第二章研究了排污权拍卖的基本理论,给出单个排污权拍卖的基础模型。第三章研究了排污权私人价值拍卖机制,讨论了厂商的投标策略和政府、拍卖行、厂商三者的收益分配。第四章研究了排污权关联价值拍卖机制,讨论了厂商的投标策略和政府、拍卖行、厂商三者的收益分配。第五章讨论了我国进行排污权拍卖的对策问题。第六章对全文进行总结,提出进一步研究方向。
The research work on Tradable Emission Permits (TEPs) focus on several issues: the allocation of initial Emission Permits (EPs), the saving and borrowing problem of EPs, EPs in ambient market, EPs in the presence of market power and so on. The most disputed issue is the allocation of EPs, because it not only may effluence enterprise’s fiscal burden, but also results in gains and losses of some interest groups.
According to the allocation of initial Emission Permits, American capital hill had proposed three type of allocation in
Finally, it discusses the existing problem of allocation of initial emission permits in China and proposes some suggestion to our government.
Chapter one discusses the research background and research method. Chapter two analyzes the bench-model of Emission Permits auction and gives the model of single Emission Permits auction. In chapter three, applying the individual private value model, first-price sealed-bid auction model and second-price sealed-bid auction model are established. In chapter four, applying the affiliated value model, first-price sealed-bid auction model and second-price sealed-bid auction model are established. Chapter five discusses the existing problem of allocation of initial emission permits in China and proposes some suggestion to our government. At the end, the research work is summarized and a perspective on the future research work is made.
引文
[1] Montgomery, W. D. Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs [J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1972,5 (3),395-418.
[2] Palmisano J. Air permits Trading Paradigms for Greenhouse Gases: Why Allowances won’t work and credits will. Discussion Draft [M]. Enron Europe Lid, London, 1996,32-33.
[3] R. W. Hahn. Trade-offs in Designing Markets with Multiple Objectives [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Resource Economics 1986, 3,1-26.
[4] Kjell J. Sunnevag. Auction design for the allocation of emission permits [J]. Working Paper in Economics, 2001, (11),7-8.
[5] 李寿德,仇胜萍.排污权交易思想及其初始分配与定价问题探析[J].科学学与科学技术管理, 2002, (1),69- 71.
[6] Boemare C, Quirion P. Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: Lessons from economic literature and international experiences [J]. Ecological Economics, 2002, (43),213-230.
[7] Kvemdokk. Tradable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem [R]. CSERGE GEC Working Paper, 1992.
[8] Cramton P, Kerr S. Tradable carbon permit auctions--How and why to auction not grandfather [J]. Energy Policy, 2002, (30),333-345.
[9] 王先甲,肖 文.排污权初始权分配的两种方法及其效率比较[J].自然科学进展,2004,(1),81-87.
[10] Burtraw D, Palmer K, Bharvirkar R. The effect of allowance allocation on the cost of carbon emission trading [R]. RFF Discussion Paper, 2001,01-30.
[11] Ballard, C.L, Shoven. General equilibrium computations of the marginal welfare costs of taxes in the United States [J]. American Economic Review, 1985, (75),128-138.
[12] Friedman L. A Competitive Bidding Strategy [J]. Operations Research, 1956, (4),104-112.
[13] Vichrey W. Counter Speculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders [J]. Journal of Finance, 1961, (16),8-37.
[14] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店,2004,57.
[15] Milgrom PR, Weber. RJ.A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [J].Econometrica, 1982, (50),102-105.
[16] Back, K, and J.F. Zender. Auctions of Divisible Gods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment [J]. Review of Financial Studies 1993, (4),733-764.
[17] Ausubel, L.m, Cramton, P. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multiple-unit auctions[R]. Working Paper. 1996.
[18] Barry, J.N, Bulow. Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment [J]. Review of Financial Studies 1993, (4),733-764.
[19] Klemperer, P. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature [J]. Journal of Economic Surveys 1999, (2),227-286.
[20] Cason T N. Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1993, (2),177-195.
[21] Cason T N. An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction [J]. American Economic Review, 1995, (4).
[22] Cason T N, Plott C R. EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory evaluation [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1996, (2),905-922.
[23] Svendsena G T, Christensen J L. The US SO auction: analysis and generalization [J]. Energy Economics, 1999, (21),133-160.
[24] Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ascending price Vickrey auctions [J]. Games and Economic Behavior. 2004, (5),216.
[25] Wilson, R. Activity rules for the power exchange[R]. Report to the California Trust for Power Industry Restructuring, 1997.
[26] Sunnevg K J. Auction design for the allocation of emission permits[R]. Working Paper,2001
[27] Ausubel, L.M. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects[R]. Working Paper, University of Maryland, 1998
[28] McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. Selling Spectrum Rights [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, (8),145-62.
[29] McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. Analyzing the Airwaves Auctions [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996, (10),159-75.
[30] Green, R. J. and Newbery, D. M. Competition in British Electricity Spot Market [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1992, (100),929-53.
[31] Klemperer, P. D. and Meyer, M. A. Supply Function and Equilibriums in Oligopoly under Uncertainty [J]. Econometrica, 1989, (57),43-77.
[32] 蔡志明.拍卖理论与实验研究[J].经济科学,1999 , (2).
[33] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal auctions with risk adverse buyers [J]. Econometrica, 1984,(52) ,1473-1518.
[34] Milgrom P R, Weber R J. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [J]. Econometrica, 1982, (50),1089-1122.
[35] Maskin E S, Riley J G Asymmetric auctions [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, (67),413-438.
[36] Robinson M S. Collusion and the choice of auction[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985, (16),141-145.
[37] Lucking-Reiley D. Vickrey auctions in practice: from nineteenth century philately to twenty first century E commerce [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000, (14),183-192.
[38] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal multiunit auctions. in the economics of missing markets, information, and games[M]. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1989.
[39] Bower J, Bunn D. Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market [J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2001, (25),561-592.
[40] Ashenfelter O. How auctions work for wine and art [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1989, (3),23-36.
[41] McAfee R P, McMillan J. Auctions and Bidding[J]. Journal of Economic literature, 1987, (25),699-738.
[42] Milgrom, P. and R. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding[J]. Econometrica, 1982, (50),1089-1122.
[43] Myerson, R, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, (6),58-73.
[44] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal Auctions with Risk Adverse Buyers [J]. Econometrica, 1984, (6),1473-1578.
[45] Bulow J I, Klemperer P D. Auctions vs. Negotiations [J]. American Economic Review, 1996, (1),180-194.
[46] Hahn, R. and R. Noll. Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions [J], Yale Journal on Regulation, 1983, (1),63-91.
[47] Fischer C, Pizer W A. Instrument choice for environmental protection whentechnological innovation is endogenous [J], Resources for the Future Discussion paper, 1999, (99) ,99-104.
[48] Ledyard,J. O. and K.Szakaly-Moore. Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1994, (25),3-4.
[49] 王 彦,毕志伟,李楚霖.佣金收取对拍卖结果的影响,[J],管理科学学报,2008(8).
[50] 吴亚琼. 总量控制下排污权交易制度若干机制的研究[D]. 博士论文, 2004.
[51] 赵海霞. 不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择[J]. 绿色经济,2005(2),5.
[52] 张颖,王勇.我国排污权初始分配的研究[J].绿色经济,2005(2).
[53] 李巍, 毛渭锋, 丁中华.大同市二氧化硫初始排污权分配研究[J].环境科学与技术2005, (4) .
[54] 李寿德, 黄桐城.基于经济最优性与公平性的初始排污权免费分配模型[J].系统工程理论方法应用。2004,(6),3-5.
[55] 肖江文, 罗云峰, 赵勇等. 排污申报机制设计的博弈分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2002, (11),87-91.
[56] 杨玉峰, 傅国伟.非对称信息条件下排污申报登记制度的策略[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2001,(6),124-128 .
[57] 向勇,金春姬.排污权分配对污染治理技术创新的影响分析[J]. 中国海洋大学学报,2005,(3).
[58] 徐自力.排污权定价策略分析[J].武汉理工大学学报信息与管理工程版, 2003, (5),4-5.
[59] 李寿德,仇胜萍.排污权交易思想及其初始分配与定价问题探析[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理,2002, (1),126-128.
[60] 肖江文,罗云峰,赵勇等.初始排污权拍卖的博弈分析[J]. 华中科技大学学报, 2001,(9),69-71.
[61] 鲁炜,崔丽琴.可交易排污权初始分配模式分析[J]. 中国环境管理,2003,(5),37-39.
[62] Parry I.W., Williams, R.C. When can Carbon abatement policies increase welfare? The fundamental role of distorted factor markets [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1998, (1),8-9.
[63] CasonTN, Gangadharan L. A Laboratory Study of Auctions for Reducing Non-point Source Pollution[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2003, (3),52-84.
[64] Hagem C. The Merits of Non-tradable Quotas as a Domestic Policy Instrument toPrevent Firm Closure [J]. Resource and Energy Economics, 2003, (4),446-471.
[65] Edwards T H, Hutton J P. Allocation of carbon permits within a country: a general equilibrium analysis of the United Kingdom [J]. Energy Economics, 2001, (23),373-386.
[66] Holmes K J, Friedman R M. Design alternatives for a domestic carbon trading scheme in the United States [J]. Global Environmental Change, 2000, (10),371-386.
[2] Palmisano J. Air permits Trading Paradigms for Greenhouse Gases: Why Allowances won’t work and credits will. Discussion Draft [M]. Enron Europe Lid, London, 1996,32-33.
[3] R. W. Hahn. Trade-offs in Designing Markets with Multiple Objectives [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Resource Economics 1986, 3,1-26.
[4] Kjell J. Sunnevag. Auction design for the allocation of emission permits [J]. Working Paper in Economics, 2001, (11),7-8.
[5] 李寿德,仇胜萍.排污权交易思想及其初始分配与定价问题探析[J].科学学与科学技术管理, 2002, (1),69- 71.
[6] Boemare C, Quirion P. Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: Lessons from economic literature and international experiences [J]. Ecological Economics, 2002, (43),213-230.
[7] Kvemdokk. Tradable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem [R]. CSERGE GEC Working Paper, 1992.
[8] Cramton P, Kerr S. Tradable carbon permit auctions--How and why to auction not grandfather [J]. Energy Policy, 2002, (30),333-345.
[9] 王先甲,肖 文.排污权初始权分配的两种方法及其效率比较[J].自然科学进展,2004,(1),81-87.
[10] Burtraw D, Palmer K, Bharvirkar R. The effect of allowance allocation on the cost of carbon emission trading [R]. RFF Discussion Paper, 2001,01-30.
[11] Ballard, C.L, Shoven. General equilibrium computations of the marginal welfare costs of taxes in the United States [J]. American Economic Review, 1985, (75),128-138.
[12] Friedman L. A Competitive Bidding Strategy [J]. Operations Research, 1956, (4),104-112.
[13] Vichrey W. Counter Speculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders [J]. Journal of Finance, 1961, (16),8-37.
[14] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店,2004,57.
[15] Milgrom PR, Weber. RJ.A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [J].Econometrica, 1982, (50),102-105.
[16] Back, K, and J.F. Zender. Auctions of Divisible Gods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment [J]. Review of Financial Studies 1993, (4),733-764.
[17] Ausubel, L.m, Cramton, P. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multiple-unit auctions[R]. Working Paper. 1996.
[18] Barry, J.N, Bulow. Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment [J]. Review of Financial Studies 1993, (4),733-764.
[19] Klemperer, P. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature [J]. Journal of Economic Surveys 1999, (2),227-286.
[20] Cason T N. Seller Incentive Properties of EPA's Emission Trading Auction [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1993, (2),177-195.
[21] Cason T N. An Experimental Investigation of the Seller Incentives in the EPA's Emission Trading Auction [J]. American Economic Review, 1995, (4).
[22] Cason T N, Plott C R. EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory evaluation [J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1996, (2),905-922.
[23] Svendsena G T, Christensen J L. The US SO auction: analysis and generalization [J]. Energy Economics, 1999, (21),133-160.
[24] Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ascending price Vickrey auctions [J]. Games and Economic Behavior. 2004, (5),216.
[25] Wilson, R. Activity rules for the power exchange[R]. Report to the California Trust for Power Industry Restructuring, 1997.
[26] Sunnevg K J. Auction design for the allocation of emission permits[R]. Working Paper,2001
[27] Ausubel, L.M. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects[R]. Working Paper, University of Maryland, 1998
[28] McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. Selling Spectrum Rights [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, (8),145-62.
[29] McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. Analyzing the Airwaves Auctions [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996, (10),159-75.
[30] Green, R. J. and Newbery, D. M. Competition in British Electricity Spot Market [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1992, (100),929-53.
[31] Klemperer, P. D. and Meyer, M. A. Supply Function and Equilibriums in Oligopoly under Uncertainty [J]. Econometrica, 1989, (57),43-77.
[32] 蔡志明.拍卖理论与实验研究[J].经济科学,1999 , (2).
[33] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal auctions with risk adverse buyers [J]. Econometrica, 1984,(52) ,1473-1518.
[34] Milgrom P R, Weber R J. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [J]. Econometrica, 1982, (50),1089-1122.
[35] Maskin E S, Riley J G Asymmetric auctions [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, (67),413-438.
[36] Robinson M S. Collusion and the choice of auction[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985, (16),141-145.
[37] Lucking-Reiley D. Vickrey auctions in practice: from nineteenth century philately to twenty first century E commerce [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000, (14),183-192.
[38] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal multiunit auctions. in the economics of missing markets, information, and games[M]. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1989.
[39] Bower J, Bunn D. Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market [J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2001, (25),561-592.
[40] Ashenfelter O. How auctions work for wine and art [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1989, (3),23-36.
[41] McAfee R P, McMillan J. Auctions and Bidding[J]. Journal of Economic literature, 1987, (25),699-738.
[42] Milgrom, P. and R. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding[J]. Econometrica, 1982, (50),1089-1122.
[43] Myerson, R, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, (6),58-73.
[44] Maskin E S, Riley J G. Optimal Auctions with Risk Adverse Buyers [J]. Econometrica, 1984, (6),1473-1578.
[45] Bulow J I, Klemperer P D. Auctions vs. Negotiations [J]. American Economic Review, 1996, (1),180-194.
[46] Hahn, R. and R. Noll. Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions [J], Yale Journal on Regulation, 1983, (1),63-91.
[47] Fischer C, Pizer W A. Instrument choice for environmental protection whentechnological innovation is endogenous [J], Resources for the Future Discussion paper, 1999, (99) ,99-104.
[48] Ledyard,J. O. and K.Szakaly-Moore. Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1994, (25),3-4.
[49] 王 彦,毕志伟,李楚霖.佣金收取对拍卖结果的影响,[J],管理科学学报,2008(8).
[50] 吴亚琼. 总量控制下排污权交易制度若干机制的研究[D]. 博士论文, 2004.
[51] 赵海霞. 不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择[J]. 绿色经济,2005(2),5.
[52] 张颖,王勇.我国排污权初始分配的研究[J].绿色经济,2005(2).
[53] 李巍, 毛渭锋, 丁中华.大同市二氧化硫初始排污权分配研究[J].环境科学与技术2005, (4) .
[54] 李寿德, 黄桐城.基于经济最优性与公平性的初始排污权免费分配模型[J].系统工程理论方法应用。2004,(6),3-5.
[55] 肖江文, 罗云峰, 赵勇等. 排污申报机制设计的博弈分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2002, (11),87-91.
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