防范政企合谋的实验研究和机制设计
|
摘要
我国正处于转型经济时期,官商勾结型利益集团的形成和发展成为中国市场经济发展的毒瘤。但是由于政企合谋的隐蔽性和复杂性,难以开展实证研究。本文采用实验经济学的研究方法,招募本科生作为被试者,以现金和课程分数作为激励,在实验中模拟政府官员与企业的行为,观察他们形成合谋的动态轨迹。本文在第一个实验中以官员薪水和监督概率作为核心变量,实验结果发现,监督才是有效防范政企合谋的元素;提高官员薪水反而引起企业更剧烈的寻租,并在互惠驱动下导致官员更多地与企业达成合谋。因此,防范机制的设计应当采取约束取向,而非激励取向。本文在第二个实验中,引入不对称处罚机制,基本思想是:在企业主动寻租的情况下,对行贿的处罚从重,而对受贿的处罚从轻;在官员主动设租的情况下,对官员索贿的处罚从重,而对企业接受了非法回报的处罚则从轻。实验结果发现,受贿豁免机制最有效,能够显著减少企业贿赂和官员腐败;被索贿豁免机制的效果有限,只能减少官员索贿数额,却不能减少合谋达成率;行贿豁免机制则有负效应,引起更高的贿赂与合谋率。结合两个实验研究的结论,本文提出,防范政企合谋的最优机制设计应当采取约束取向,对合谋行为产生威慑;同时采用不对称处罚机制,打破合谋同盟的互惠与信任。
The market system in China’s transitional economy is not mature. Collusion and illegal exchange between government officials and enterpriser harm market economy and social welfare. Although the negative effects are realized, empirical research is hindered by a notorious lack of data. Therefore, I use laboratory experiments to investigate the collusion behavior between officials and enterprisers. I recruit undergraduate students as subjects; and I use course score and cash as rewards. In the first experiment, I conduct four treatments by using official wage and detection probability as focus variables. The result shows that detection is the key element of preventing collusion. High detection significantly reduces bribery and corruption, while high wage drives more bribery and reciprocal exchange. In the second experiment, I carry out three treatments to test the design of asymmetric penalties and leniency. The result approves that bribe-takers should be less penalized for taking and more for extorting. Likewise, bribe-givers should be more penalized. Collusion can be prevented by offering leniency to officials who take bribe and to enterprisers who are extorted to bribe. Combining the results of two experiments, I suggest that the optimal prevention mechanism be constraint-orientation, not incentive-orientation, with high detection probability, and adopt asymmetric penalties to break down reciprocity and trust.
The market system in China’s transitional economy is not mature. Collusion and illegal exchange between government officials and enterpriser harm market economy and social welfare. Although the negative effects are realized, empirical research is hindered by a notorious lack of data. Therefore, I use laboratory experiments to investigate the collusion behavior between officials and enterprisers. I recruit undergraduate students as subjects; and I use course score and cash as rewards. In the first experiment, I conduct four treatments by using official wage and detection probability as focus variables. The result shows that detection is the key element of preventing collusion. High detection significantly reduces bribery and corruption, while high wage drives more bribery and reciprocal exchange. In the second experiment, I carry out three treatments to test the design of asymmetric penalties and leniency. The result approves that bribe-takers should be less penalized for taking and more for extorting. Likewise, bribe-givers should be more penalized. Collusion can be prevented by offering leniency to officials who take bribe and to enterprisers who are extorted to bribe. Combining the results of two experiments, I suggest that the optimal prevention mechanism be constraint-orientation, not incentive-orientation, with high detection probability, and adopt asymmetric penalties to break down reciprocity and trust.
引文
[1] Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner E. (2002). An experimental bribery game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18, 428-454.
[2] Abbink, K. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 887-906.
[3] Abbink, K., & Ellman, M. (2004). The donor problem. Working Paper, University of Nottingham and Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[4] Abbink, K. (2005). Fari Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption. Conference on Cognitive Economics, Sofia.
[5] Abbink, K. & Hennig-Schmidt H. (2006). Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment. Experimental Economics, 9, 103-121.
[6] Abbink, K. (2006). Laboratory experiments on corruption. In: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed). The Handbook of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, US: Edward Elgar Publishers.
[7] Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review, 89, 982-994.
[8] Aidt, T. (2003). Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. The Economic Journal, 113, 632-652.
[9] Allen, F., Chakrabarti, R., De, S., Qian, J., & Qian, M. J. (2006). Finacing firms in India, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3975.
[10] Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. J. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 57-116.
[11] Anderson, L. R., & Stafford, S. L. (2003). An experimental analysis of rent seeking under varying competitive conditions. Public Choice, 115, 199-216.
[12] Antunes, A. R., & Cavalcanti, T. (2007). Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy. European Economic Review, 51, 203-224.
[13] Armantier, O. (2007): Corruption in the Lab and in the Field. Working Paper. University of Montreal.
[14] Azfar, Omar, & Nelson, W. (2007). Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption. Public Choice, 130, 471-493.
[15] Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee D. (2005). Decentralization, corruption and government accountability: An overview. In: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.). The Handbook of Corruption, , Cheltenham, UK, &Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishers.
[16] Barr, A., Lindelow, M., & Serneels, P. (2004). To serve the community or oneself: The public servant’s dilemma. Working Paper.
[17] Bartels, L., & Brady, H. (2003). Economic behavior in political context. American Economic Review, 93, 156-161.
[18] Becker, G., and G. Stigler (1974): Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 1-18.
[19] Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1415-1451.
[20] Besley, T., & McLaren, J. (1993). Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives. Economic Journal, 103, 119-141.
[21] Besley, T., & Smart, M. (2007). Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. Journal of Public Economics, 91, 755-773.
[22] Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142.
[23] Bischoff, I., & Hofmann, K. Edward Elgar Publishers (2002). Classroom game on the theory of rent seeking: Some practical experience. Southrn Economic Journal, 69, 195-199.
[24] Broadman, H. & Recanatini, F. (2001). Seeds of corruption: Do market institutions matter? MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, 11(4), 359-392.
[25] Buchner, S., Freytag, A., Gonzalez, L., & Guth, W. (2006). Bribery and public procurement: An experimental study. Working paper.
[26] Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experimental on strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[27] Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan L. (2005). Do attitudes towards corruption differ across cultures? Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Working Paper.
[28] Castro, M. F. (2006). To bribe or not bribe? An experimental analysis of corruption. Working Paper.
[29] Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political Economy, 56(2), 95-108.
[30] Clarke, G., & Xu, C. (2004). Privatization, competition, and corruption: How characteristics of bribetakers and payers affect bribes to utilities. Journal of Public Economics, 88,2067-2097.
[31] Cox, J. C., & Deck C. A. (2006). When are women more generous than men? Economic Inquiry, 44(4), 587-598.
[32] Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental Economics, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
[33] Del Monte, A. Papagni, E. (2001). Public expenditure, corruption and economic growth: The case of Italy. European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 1-16.
[34] Del Monte, A., & Papagni, E. (2007). The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel data analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2), 379-396.
[35] Del Monta, A., & Cantabene, C. (2007): Anticorruption Campaigns and the Determinants of Corruption in Europe. World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 3(2), 170-191.
[36] Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003). The role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of Buenos Aires. Journal of Law and Economics, 46, 269-292.
[37] Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 1-37.
[38] Dreher, A. 2007). Greasing the wheels of entrepreneurship? Impact of regulations and corruption on firm. KOF Working Paper No. 166.
[39] Dusek, L., Ortmann, A., & Lizal, L. (2005). Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments: A primer. Prague Economic Papers 14(2).
[40] Dyer, D., Kagel, J., & Levin, D. (1989). A comparison of na?ve and experienced bidders in common value auctions: a laboratory analysis. Economic Journal, 99, 108-115.
[41] Faccio, M. (2006). Politically-connected firms. American Economic Review, 96, 369-386.
[42] Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437-459.
[43] Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65, 833-860.
[44] Fehr, E., & Fishbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87.
[45] Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001). Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 351-377.
[46] Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics, 83, 325-345.
[47] Frank, B., & Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43,101-113.
[48] Friedman, D., & Sunder, S. (1994). Experimental methods: A primer for economics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
[49] Gerring, J., & Thacker, S. (2005). Do neoliberal policies deter political corruption? International Organization, 59, 233-254.
[50] Garoupa, N., & Klerman, D. (2004). Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics, 24, 219-225.
[51] Goel, R. K. (2008). Regulatory bottlenecks, transaction costs and corruption: A cross-country investigation. BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 10/2008.
[52] Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (1999). Classroom games: Rent-seeking and the inefficiency of non-market allocation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13, 217-226.
[53] Gonzalez, L., Guth, W., & Levati, V. (2004). Speeding up bureaucrats by greasing them: An experimental study. Working Paper, MPI Jena.
[54] Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (1998). Does corruption affect inequality and poverty? IMF Working Paper WP/98/76.
[55] Harbaugh, B.T., Mayr, U., & Burghart, D. (2007). Neural responses to taxation and voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science, 316, 1622-1625.
[56] Huang, Y., & Chen, H. Y. (2008). Experimental study on mechanisms for individual cooperation. In: Zhu,X. N., & Zhao, S. R. (Eds.). Proceedings of 2008 International Conference on Public Administration (4th), 1, 34-41, Chengdu: UESTC Press.
[57] Hunt, J. (2005). Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? In: Rose-Ackerman, S., (Ed.). The Handbook of Corruption, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishers.
[58] Hunt, J., & Laszlo, S. (2005). Bribery: who pays, who refuse, what are the payoffs? NBER Working Papers 11635.
[59] Hwang, J. (2002). A Note on the relationship between corruption and government revenue. Journal of Economic Development, 27, 161-178.
[60] Irlenbush, B. (2004). Relying on a man’s word? An experiment on non-binding contracts. InternationalReview of Law and Economics, 24, 299-332.
[61] Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71.
[62] Jaquemet, N. (2005). Corruption as betrayal: Experimental evidence on corruption under delegation. Working Paper.
[63] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
[64] Kaufman, D., & Wei, J. (1999). Does“grease money”speed up the wheels of commerce? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7093, Cambridge MA.
[65] Konrad, K. I., & Skaperdas, S. (1998), Extortion. Economica, 65: pp. 461-477.
[66] Krueger, A. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64: pp. 291-303.
[67] Lambsdorff, J. G., & Cornelius, P. (2000). Corruption, foreign investment and growth. In: Schwab, K., Cook, L., Cornelius, P., Sachs, J. D., Sievers, S., & Warner, A. (Eds.). The Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, joint publication of the World Economic Forum and the Institute for International Development, Harvard University. Oxford University Press, 70-78.
[68] Lambstorff, J. G., & Nell, M. (2005). Let them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influence. Discussion paper of the Economic Faculty of Passau University, No.41-05, December 2005.
[69] Lambstorff, J. G., & Nell, M. (2007). Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency. Discussion paper of Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, No.59.
[70] Laffont, J. J., & Meleu, M. (1997) Reciprocal supervision, collusion and organizational design. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(4), 519-540.
[71] Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (1998). Collusion and delegation. Rand Journal of Economics, 29(2), 280-305.
[72] Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (1999). Separation of regulators against collusive behavior, Rand Journal of Economics, 30(2), 232-262.
[73] Li, H., Meng, L., & Zhang, J. (2006). Why do entrepreneurs enter politics? Evidence from China. Economic Inquiry, 44, 559-578.
[74] Lizal, L., & Ortmann, A. (2003). Designing and Testing Incentive-Compatible and Effective Anticorrupt Measures. Working Paper.
[75] Long, D. M. & Rao, S. (1995). The Wealth Effects of Unethical Business Behavior. Journal ofEconomics and Finance, 19(2), 65-73.
[76] Lui, F. T. (1986). A dynamic model of corruption deterrence. Journal of Public Economics, 31, 215-236.
[77] Manion, M. (1996). Corruption by design: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12, 167-195.
[78] Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 680-712.
[79] McChesney, F. S. (1987). Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation. Journal of Legal Studies, 1, 101-118.
[80] McMillan, J. (1997). Markets in transition. 11, 210-239. In: Kreps, D. M., & Wallis, K. F. (Ed.). Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[81] McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002). The central role of entrepreneurs in transition economies. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 153-170.
[82] Meidinger, C., Robin, S., & Ruffieux, B. (1998). A repeated investment game. Working Paper.
[83] Méon, P. G., & Sekkat, K. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? Public Choice, 122, 69-97.
[84] Mocan, N. (2008). What determines corruption? International evidence from microdata. Economic Inquiry, online: Jan 16th, 2008.
[85] Morgan, T. (1964).The theory of error in centrally-directed economic systems, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78(3), 395-419.
[86] Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211-240.
[87] Persson, T., Tabellini, G., & Trebbi, F. (2003). Electoral rules and corruption. Journal of the Economic Association, 1, 958-989.
[88] Posner, R. (1975). The social cost of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 83: pp. 807-826.
[89] Potters, J., Rockenbach, B., Sadrieh, A., & van Damme E. (2004). Collusion under yardstick competition: An experiment study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(7), 1017-1038.
[90] Rivas, M. F. (2006). An experiment on corruption and gender. Working Paper.
[91] Roumanias C. (2007). Is collusion of corrupt agents welfare increasing? Economic Letters, 94(3), 421-425.
[92] Rubinstein, A. (2001). A theorist’s view of experiments. European Economic Review, 45, 615-628.
[93] Schulze, G. G., & Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of Governance, 4, 143-160.
[94] Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 70, 111-137.
[95] Smith, V. L. (1994). Economics in the laboratory. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), 113-131.
[96] Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G., & Williams, A. (1988). Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica, 56, 1119-1151.
[97] Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2, 3-21.
[98] Strow, B. K., & Strow, C. W. (2006). A rent-seeking experiment for the classroom. Journal of Economic Education, 37, 323-330.
[99] Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19-42.
[100] Tirole, J., (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2(2), 181-214.
[101] Tollison, R. D. (1982) Rent seeking: A survey, Kyklos, 35(4), 575-602.
[102] Tollison, R. D. (1991). Regulation and interest groups, In: High, J. (Ed.). Regulation: Economic Theory and History, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 59-76.
[103] Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232.
[104] Treisman, D. (2000). The cause of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76, 307-331.
[105] Van Rijckeghem, G, & Weder, B. (1997). Corruption and the rate of tempation: Do low wages in the civil service cause corruption? IMF Working Paper WP/97/73.
[106] Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. M., & Harrington, J. E. (2005). Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
[107] Weimann, J., Yang, C. L., & Vogt, C. (2000). An experiment on sequential rent-seeking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 41, 405-426.
[108]丹尼尔·F·史普博,管制与市场,余晖等译,上海:上海三联出版社和上海人民出版社,1999,p.45.
[109]过勇,经济转轨滋生腐败机会的微观机制研究——从594个腐败要案中得出的结论,经济社会体制比较,2006年第6期,p.53-59
[110]胡鞍钢,中国90年代后半期腐败造成的经济损失,国际经济评论,2001年第5-6期,p.12-21
[111]胡鞍钢,过勇,转型期防治腐败的综合战略与制度设计,管理世界,2001年第6期
[112]胡鞍钢,过勇,公务员腐败成本-收益的经济学分析,经济社会体制比较,2002年第4期。
[113]黄燕,陈欢勇,德治、法治与和谐社会相关性研究——来自行为经济实验的数据证明,太平洋学报,2008年第4期,p.55-63
[114]黄燕,王艳涛,我国税法在执行过程中为何出现扭曲——来自博弈论的证据,税务与经济,2008年第5期。
[115]黄燕,杨振斌,孟繁邨,谨防地方政府由经营城市转向经营管制,中国行政管理,2007年第2期,p.64-67
[116]李秀峰,民间组织与反腐败——理论背景和国际经验分析,中国行政管理,2008年第1期,p.98-101
[117]茅铭晨,政府管制理论研究综述,管理世界,2007年第2期,p. 137-150
[118]聂辉华,李金波,政企合谋与经济发展,经济学(季刊),2006年第6卷第1期,p.75-90
[119]田瑛,廖肇辉,合谋激励与国有银行改革,南开经济研究,2006年第2期,p. 105-121
[120]王斌,蔡宏波,电信市场演化与政府管制,南开经济研究,2007年第2期,p. 56-71
[121]汪伟,史晋川,金融壁垒与民营企业的成长,管理世界,2005年第4期,p. 132-140
[122]谢平,陆磊,利益共同体的胁迫与共谋行为:论金融监管腐败的一般特征与部门特征,金融研究,2003年第7期,p.1-15
[123]余晖,受管制市场里的政企同盟,中国工业经济,2000年第1期,p. 63-67.
[124]约翰纳·伯爵·兰斯多夫,腐败与改革的制度经济学:理论、证据与政策,清华大学公共管理学院廉政与治理研究中心译,北京:中国方正出版社,2007,p.7-8.
[125]植草益,微观管制经济学,朱绍文等译,北京:中国发展出版社,1992,p.1-2.
[2] Abbink, K. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 887-906.
[3] Abbink, K., & Ellman, M. (2004). The donor problem. Working Paper, University of Nottingham and Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[4] Abbink, K. (2005). Fari Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption. Conference on Cognitive Economics, Sofia.
[5] Abbink, K. & Hennig-Schmidt H. (2006). Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment. Experimental Economics, 9, 103-121.
[6] Abbink, K. (2006). Laboratory experiments on corruption. In: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed). The Handbook of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, US: Edward Elgar Publishers.
[7] Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review, 89, 982-994.
[8] Aidt, T. (2003). Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. The Economic Journal, 113, 632-652.
[9] Allen, F., Chakrabarti, R., De, S., Qian, J., & Qian, M. J. (2006). Finacing firms in India, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3975.
[10] Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. J. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 57-116.
[11] Anderson, L. R., & Stafford, S. L. (2003). An experimental analysis of rent seeking under varying competitive conditions. Public Choice, 115, 199-216.
[12] Antunes, A. R., & Cavalcanti, T. (2007). Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy. European Economic Review, 51, 203-224.
[13] Armantier, O. (2007): Corruption in the Lab and in the Field. Working Paper. University of Montreal.
[14] Azfar, Omar, & Nelson, W. (2007). Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption. Public Choice, 130, 471-493.
[15] Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee D. (2005). Decentralization, corruption and government accountability: An overview. In: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.). The Handbook of Corruption, , Cheltenham, UK, &Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishers.
[16] Barr, A., Lindelow, M., & Serneels, P. (2004). To serve the community or oneself: The public servant’s dilemma. Working Paper.
[17] Bartels, L., & Brady, H. (2003). Economic behavior in political context. American Economic Review, 93, 156-161.
[18] Becker, G., and G. Stigler (1974): Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies, 3, 1-18.
[19] Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1415-1451.
[20] Besley, T., & McLaren, J. (1993). Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives. Economic Journal, 103, 119-141.
[21] Besley, T., & Smart, M. (2007). Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. Journal of Public Economics, 91, 755-773.
[22] Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142.
[23] Bischoff, I., & Hofmann, K. Edward Elgar Publishers (2002). Classroom game on the theory of rent seeking: Some practical experience. Southrn Economic Journal, 69, 195-199.
[24] Broadman, H. & Recanatini, F. (2001). Seeds of corruption: Do market institutions matter? MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, 11(4), 359-392.
[25] Buchner, S., Freytag, A., Gonzalez, L., & Guth, W. (2006). Bribery and public procurement: An experimental study. Working paper.
[26] Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experimental on strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[27] Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan L. (2005). Do attitudes towards corruption differ across cultures? Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Working Paper.
[28] Castro, M. F. (2006). To bribe or not bribe? An experimental analysis of corruption. Working Paper.
[29] Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political Economy, 56(2), 95-108.
[30] Clarke, G., & Xu, C. (2004). Privatization, competition, and corruption: How characteristics of bribetakers and payers affect bribes to utilities. Journal of Public Economics, 88,2067-2097.
[31] Cox, J. C., & Deck C. A. (2006). When are women more generous than men? Economic Inquiry, 44(4), 587-598.
[32] Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental Economics, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
[33] Del Monte, A. Papagni, E. (2001). Public expenditure, corruption and economic growth: The case of Italy. European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 1-16.
[34] Del Monte, A., & Papagni, E. (2007). The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel data analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2), 379-396.
[35] Del Monta, A., & Cantabene, C. (2007): Anticorruption Campaigns and the Determinants of Corruption in Europe. World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 3(2), 170-191.
[36] Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003). The role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of Buenos Aires. Journal of Law and Economics, 46, 269-292.
[37] Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 1-37.
[38] Dreher, A. 2007). Greasing the wheels of entrepreneurship? Impact of regulations and corruption on firm. KOF Working Paper No. 166.
[39] Dusek, L., Ortmann, A., & Lizal, L. (2005). Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments: A primer. Prague Economic Papers 14(2).
[40] Dyer, D., Kagel, J., & Levin, D. (1989). A comparison of na?ve and experienced bidders in common value auctions: a laboratory analysis. Economic Journal, 99, 108-115.
[41] Faccio, M. (2006). Politically-connected firms. American Economic Review, 96, 369-386.
[42] Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437-459.
[43] Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65, 833-860.
[44] Fehr, E., & Fishbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87.
[45] Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001). Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 351-377.
[46] Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics, 83, 325-345.
[47] Frank, B., & Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43,101-113.
[48] Friedman, D., & Sunder, S. (1994). Experimental methods: A primer for economics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
[49] Gerring, J., & Thacker, S. (2005). Do neoliberal policies deter political corruption? International Organization, 59, 233-254.
[50] Garoupa, N., & Klerman, D. (2004). Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics, 24, 219-225.
[51] Goel, R. K. (2008). Regulatory bottlenecks, transaction costs and corruption: A cross-country investigation. BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 10/2008.
[52] Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (1999). Classroom games: Rent-seeking and the inefficiency of non-market allocation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13, 217-226.
[53] Gonzalez, L., Guth, W., & Levati, V. (2004). Speeding up bureaucrats by greasing them: An experimental study. Working Paper, MPI Jena.
[54] Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (1998). Does corruption affect inequality and poverty? IMF Working Paper WP/98/76.
[55] Harbaugh, B.T., Mayr, U., & Burghart, D. (2007). Neural responses to taxation and voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science, 316, 1622-1625.
[56] Huang, Y., & Chen, H. Y. (2008). Experimental study on mechanisms for individual cooperation. In: Zhu,X. N., & Zhao, S. R. (Eds.). Proceedings of 2008 International Conference on Public Administration (4th), 1, 34-41, Chengdu: UESTC Press.
[57] Hunt, J. (2005). Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? In: Rose-Ackerman, S., (Ed.). The Handbook of Corruption, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishers.
[58] Hunt, J., & Laszlo, S. (2005). Bribery: who pays, who refuse, what are the payoffs? NBER Working Papers 11635.
[59] Hwang, J. (2002). A Note on the relationship between corruption and government revenue. Journal of Economic Development, 27, 161-178.
[60] Irlenbush, B. (2004). Relying on a man’s word? An experiment on non-binding contracts. InternationalReview of Law and Economics, 24, 299-332.
[61] Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71.
[62] Jaquemet, N. (2005). Corruption as betrayal: Experimental evidence on corruption under delegation. Working Paper.
[63] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
[64] Kaufman, D., & Wei, J. (1999). Does“grease money”speed up the wheels of commerce? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7093, Cambridge MA.
[65] Konrad, K. I., & Skaperdas, S. (1998), Extortion. Economica, 65: pp. 461-477.
[66] Krueger, A. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64: pp. 291-303.
[67] Lambsdorff, J. G., & Cornelius, P. (2000). Corruption, foreign investment and growth. In: Schwab, K., Cook, L., Cornelius, P., Sachs, J. D., Sievers, S., & Warner, A. (Eds.). The Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, joint publication of the World Economic Forum and the Institute for International Development, Harvard University. Oxford University Press, 70-78.
[68] Lambstorff, J. G., & Nell, M. (2005). Let them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influence. Discussion paper of the Economic Faculty of Passau University, No.41-05, December 2005.
[69] Lambstorff, J. G., & Nell, M. (2007). Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency. Discussion paper of Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, No.59.
[70] Laffont, J. J., & Meleu, M. (1997) Reciprocal supervision, collusion and organizational design. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(4), 519-540.
[71] Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (1998). Collusion and delegation. Rand Journal of Economics, 29(2), 280-305.
[72] Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (1999). Separation of regulators against collusive behavior, Rand Journal of Economics, 30(2), 232-262.
[73] Li, H., Meng, L., & Zhang, J. (2006). Why do entrepreneurs enter politics? Evidence from China. Economic Inquiry, 44, 559-578.
[74] Lizal, L., & Ortmann, A. (2003). Designing and Testing Incentive-Compatible and Effective Anticorrupt Measures. Working Paper.
[75] Long, D. M. & Rao, S. (1995). The Wealth Effects of Unethical Business Behavior. Journal ofEconomics and Finance, 19(2), 65-73.
[76] Lui, F. T. (1986). A dynamic model of corruption deterrence. Journal of Public Economics, 31, 215-236.
[77] Manion, M. (1996). Corruption by design: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12, 167-195.
[78] Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 680-712.
[79] McChesney, F. S. (1987). Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation. Journal of Legal Studies, 1, 101-118.
[80] McMillan, J. (1997). Markets in transition. 11, 210-239. In: Kreps, D. M., & Wallis, K. F. (Ed.). Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[81] McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002). The central role of entrepreneurs in transition economies. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 153-170.
[82] Meidinger, C., Robin, S., & Ruffieux, B. (1998). A repeated investment game. Working Paper.
[83] Méon, P. G., & Sekkat, K. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? Public Choice, 122, 69-97.
[84] Mocan, N. (2008). What determines corruption? International evidence from microdata. Economic Inquiry, online: Jan 16th, 2008.
[85] Morgan, T. (1964).The theory of error in centrally-directed economic systems, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78(3), 395-419.
[86] Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211-240.
[87] Persson, T., Tabellini, G., & Trebbi, F. (2003). Electoral rules and corruption. Journal of the Economic Association, 1, 958-989.
[88] Posner, R. (1975). The social cost of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 83: pp. 807-826.
[89] Potters, J., Rockenbach, B., Sadrieh, A., & van Damme E. (2004). Collusion under yardstick competition: An experiment study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(7), 1017-1038.
[90] Rivas, M. F. (2006). An experiment on corruption and gender. Working Paper.
[91] Roumanias C. (2007). Is collusion of corrupt agents welfare increasing? Economic Letters, 94(3), 421-425.
[92] Rubinstein, A. (2001). A theorist’s view of experiments. European Economic Review, 45, 615-628.
[93] Schulze, G. G., & Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of Governance, 4, 143-160.
[94] Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 70, 111-137.
[95] Smith, V. L. (1994). Economics in the laboratory. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), 113-131.
[96] Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G., & Williams, A. (1988). Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica, 56, 1119-1151.
[97] Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2, 3-21.
[98] Strow, B. K., & Strow, C. W. (2006). A rent-seeking experiment for the classroom. Journal of Economic Education, 37, 323-330.
[99] Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19-42.
[100] Tirole, J., (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2(2), 181-214.
[101] Tollison, R. D. (1982) Rent seeking: A survey, Kyklos, 35(4), 575-602.
[102] Tollison, R. D. (1991). Regulation and interest groups, In: High, J. (Ed.). Regulation: Economic Theory and History, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 59-76.
[103] Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232.
[104] Treisman, D. (2000). The cause of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76, 307-331.
[105] Van Rijckeghem, G, & Weder, B. (1997). Corruption and the rate of tempation: Do low wages in the civil service cause corruption? IMF Working Paper WP/97/73.
[106] Viscusi, W. K., Vernon, J. M., & Harrington, J. E. (2005). Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
[107] Weimann, J., Yang, C. L., & Vogt, C. (2000). An experiment on sequential rent-seeking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 41, 405-426.
[108]丹尼尔·F·史普博,管制与市场,余晖等译,上海:上海三联出版社和上海人民出版社,1999,p.45.
[109]过勇,经济转轨滋生腐败机会的微观机制研究——从594个腐败要案中得出的结论,经济社会体制比较,2006年第6期,p.53-59
[110]胡鞍钢,中国90年代后半期腐败造成的经济损失,国际经济评论,2001年第5-6期,p.12-21
[111]胡鞍钢,过勇,转型期防治腐败的综合战略与制度设计,管理世界,2001年第6期
[112]胡鞍钢,过勇,公务员腐败成本-收益的经济学分析,经济社会体制比较,2002年第4期。
[113]黄燕,陈欢勇,德治、法治与和谐社会相关性研究——来自行为经济实验的数据证明,太平洋学报,2008年第4期,p.55-63
[114]黄燕,王艳涛,我国税法在执行过程中为何出现扭曲——来自博弈论的证据,税务与经济,2008年第5期。
[115]黄燕,杨振斌,孟繁邨,谨防地方政府由经营城市转向经营管制,中国行政管理,2007年第2期,p.64-67
[116]李秀峰,民间组织与反腐败——理论背景和国际经验分析,中国行政管理,2008年第1期,p.98-101
[117]茅铭晨,政府管制理论研究综述,管理世界,2007年第2期,p. 137-150
[118]聂辉华,李金波,政企合谋与经济发展,经济学(季刊),2006年第6卷第1期,p.75-90
[119]田瑛,廖肇辉,合谋激励与国有银行改革,南开经济研究,2006年第2期,p. 105-121
[120]王斌,蔡宏波,电信市场演化与政府管制,南开经济研究,2007年第2期,p. 56-71
[121]汪伟,史晋川,金融壁垒与民营企业的成长,管理世界,2005年第4期,p. 132-140
[122]谢平,陆磊,利益共同体的胁迫与共谋行为:论金融监管腐败的一般特征与部门特征,金融研究,2003年第7期,p.1-15
[123]余晖,受管制市场里的政企同盟,中国工业经济,2000年第1期,p. 63-67.
[124]约翰纳·伯爵·兰斯多夫,腐败与改革的制度经济学:理论、证据与政策,清华大学公共管理学院廉政与治理研究中心译,北京:中国方正出版社,2007,p.7-8.
[125]植草益,微观管制经济学,朱绍文等译,北京:中国发展出版社,1992,p.1-2.