社会资本视角下团体贷款运作机制研究
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摘要
团体贷款作为一种独特的小额信贷模式,在还款率方面取得了巨大成功,从而引起了世界各国的注意。现今,无论是发展中国家,还是发达国家都竞相引入这一贷款方式,以解决国内低收入群体的信贷难题。然而,在移植学习团体贷款时,并非每个国家都能获得成功,甚至有些国家和地区的团体贷款最终走向了失败。那么,其原因何在呢?本文认为这主要是因为有些国家的小额信贷机构在开展团体贷款的过程中,未能抓住影响其还款率的核心要素——社会资本。因此,有必要对社会资本是如何影响团体贷款还款率进行系统深入的研究,以给我国成功推广团体贷款提供指导。
由此,本文从社会资本角度入手,在分析社会资本影响团体贷款还款率作用机理的基础上,构建了引入社会资本的团体贷款博弈模型,丰富了现有关于团体贷款的研究。首先本文分析了社会资本对团体贷款还款率的影响机理,发现社会资本可以通过信息共享机制、横向监督机制及社会奖惩机制促进团体贷款还款率的提高;随后本文构建了两个博弈模型——小额信贷机构与小组间的博弈、小组借款者之间的还款博弈,并将来自小组外部的社会惩罚、社会奖励及违约者的再偿还约束引入模型,进一步说明了社会资本影响团体贷款还款率的内在作用机理,同时还用实际中的案例加以验证;最后本文得出结论,认为社会资本能够通过社会惩罚(包括小组内部的及来自小组外部的)、社会奖励及违约者的再偿还约束来激励借款者还款,从而提高团体贷款的还款率。
鉴于社会资本在提高团体贷款还款率中的积极意义,本文认为我国在移植学习团体贷款时,要对社会资本给予足够的重视,尽可能创造一切条件使其在提高团体贷款还款率中的作用得以充分发挥,从而保证移植学习的成功,进而达到改善低收入群体信贷难题的终极目标。
Group lending is a unique micro-credit model. It has aroused the attention of the world because of its higher repayment rate. Recently almost all of the countries in the world are rushing to introduce the loan model in order to solve the credit problems of domestic low-income groups. However, not every country was able to be successful during the transplantation of group lending. Even in some countries and regions the group lending had ultimately failed. Well what's the reason on earth? This paper argued that it was mainly because the MIFs in these countries couldn't capture the social capital in the process of developing group lending, which is the key factor in the group lending. So it is essential to study how the social capital affects the repayment rate in the group lending. This will give some guidance for the extension of the group lending in our country.
Thus, from the perspective of social capital, this article analyzed the impact mechanism of social capital on the repayment rate of group lending. And then we built the game models of group lending with the introduction of social capital. The study enriched the existing research on group lending. Firstly, this paper analyzed the social capital's influence mechanism on the group lending's repayment rate. We found that the social capital could improve the repayment rate of group lending through information-sharing mechanism, horizontal-monitoring mechanism and social incentives and sanctions mechanism. Then we constructed two game models which were the model between MFI and lending group and the repayment game model between Borrows in the Group Lending. In the models we introduced the external social penalty out of the group, social incentives and the defaulter's re-pay restraint. The models further illustrated the intrinsic mechanism of social capital's impact on the groups lending's repayment rate. In addition we also used actual cases to verify the conclusions of the models. Finally, the paper concluded that the social capital could through social sanctions (including group internal and from outside groups), social incentives and the defaulter's re-pay restraint to encourage borrowers to repay the group loan, thereby enhancing group lending's repayment rate.
In view of the fact that the positive significance of social capital in improving the group lending's repayment rate, this paper pointed out that we must pay enough attention to the social capital when our country transplant and learn the group lending. We should create all conditions to make the social capital fully play its positive role in improving the group lending's repayment rate as far as possible. So as to ensure the success of transplantation and learn, and then realizing the ultimate goal of improving the low-income groups' credit difficult problems.
由此,本文从社会资本角度入手,在分析社会资本影响团体贷款还款率作用机理的基础上,构建了引入社会资本的团体贷款博弈模型,丰富了现有关于团体贷款的研究。首先本文分析了社会资本对团体贷款还款率的影响机理,发现社会资本可以通过信息共享机制、横向监督机制及社会奖惩机制促进团体贷款还款率的提高;随后本文构建了两个博弈模型——小额信贷机构与小组间的博弈、小组借款者之间的还款博弈,并将来自小组外部的社会惩罚、社会奖励及违约者的再偿还约束引入模型,进一步说明了社会资本影响团体贷款还款率的内在作用机理,同时还用实际中的案例加以验证;最后本文得出结论,认为社会资本能够通过社会惩罚(包括小组内部的及来自小组外部的)、社会奖励及违约者的再偿还约束来激励借款者还款,从而提高团体贷款的还款率。
鉴于社会资本在提高团体贷款还款率中的积极意义,本文认为我国在移植学习团体贷款时,要对社会资本给予足够的重视,尽可能创造一切条件使其在提高团体贷款还款率中的作用得以充分发挥,从而保证移植学习的成功,进而达到改善低收入群体信贷难题的终极目标。
Group lending is a unique micro-credit model. It has aroused the attention of the world because of its higher repayment rate. Recently almost all of the countries in the world are rushing to introduce the loan model in order to solve the credit problems of domestic low-income groups. However, not every country was able to be successful during the transplantation of group lending. Even in some countries and regions the group lending had ultimately failed. Well what's the reason on earth? This paper argued that it was mainly because the MIFs in these countries couldn't capture the social capital in the process of developing group lending, which is the key factor in the group lending. So it is essential to study how the social capital affects the repayment rate in the group lending. This will give some guidance for the extension of the group lending in our country.
Thus, from the perspective of social capital, this article analyzed the impact mechanism of social capital on the repayment rate of group lending. And then we built the game models of group lending with the introduction of social capital. The study enriched the existing research on group lending. Firstly, this paper analyzed the social capital's influence mechanism on the group lending's repayment rate. We found that the social capital could improve the repayment rate of group lending through information-sharing mechanism, horizontal-monitoring mechanism and social incentives and sanctions mechanism. Then we constructed two game models which were the model between MFI and lending group and the repayment game model between Borrows in the Group Lending. In the models we introduced the external social penalty out of the group, social incentives and the defaulter's re-pay restraint. The models further illustrated the intrinsic mechanism of social capital's impact on the groups lending's repayment rate. In addition we also used actual cases to verify the conclusions of the models. Finally, the paper concluded that the social capital could through social sanctions (including group internal and from outside groups), social incentives and the defaulter's re-pay restraint to encourage borrowers to repay the group loan, thereby enhancing group lending's repayment rate.
In view of the fact that the positive significance of social capital in improving the group lending's repayment rate, this paper pointed out that we must pay enough attention to the social capital when our country transplant and learn the group lending. We should create all conditions to make the social capital fully play its positive role in improving the group lending's repayment rate as far as possible. So as to ensure the success of transplantation and learn, and then realizing the ultimate goal of improving the low-income groups' credit difficult problems.
引文
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[36]Saharia Kanak,Yoshiaki Iiguni.Microfiance Programs and Social Capital Formation:The Present Scenario in a Rural Village of Bangladesh.The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance.2007,1(2):97-104.
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[39]张勉,魏钧,杨百寅.社会资本的来源:工作咨询网络中心性的前因变量.管理世界.2009,(3):119-127.
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[2]赵岩青,何广文.农户联保贷款有效性问题研究.金融研究.2007,(7):61-77.
[3]涂裕春.世界欠发达地区小额信贷实践分析.现代财经(天津财经大学学报).2007,27(9):10-13.
[4]王曙光.草根金融.北京:中国发展出版社,2008.
[5]Varian H.Monitoring agents with other agents.Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.1990,146(1):153-174.
[6]Wenner M.Group credit:a means to improve information transfer and loan repayment performance.Journal of Development Studies.1995,32(2):263-81.
[7]Ghatak M.Group lending,local information,and peer selection.Journal of Development Economics.1999,60(1):27-50.
[8]van Tassel E.Group lending under asymmetric information.Journal of Development Economics.1999,60(1):3-25.
[9]Ghatak M,Guinnane T W.The economics of lending with joint liability:Theory and practice.Journal of Development Economics.1999,60(1):195-228.
[10]Ghatak M.Screening by the Company You Keep:Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect.Economic Journal.2000,110(465):601 - 631.
[11]Xinhua G.A Search Approach to Group-based lending with Joint Liability under Asymmetric Information.Working Paper.Ontario:University of Toronto.2001.
[12]Sadoulet L.Equilibrium Risk-Matching in Group Lending.ECARES:University of Brussels.1999.
[13]Armendariz de Aghion B,Gollier C.Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model.The Economic Journal.2000,100(465):632-643.
[14]Sadoulet L,Carpenter S.Endogenous Matching and Risk Heterogeneity:Evidence on Micro-credit Group Formation in Guatemala.ECARES:University of Brussels.2001.
[15]Mehrteab H T.Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Group-Based Lending:Evidence from Eritrea.Netherlands:University of Groningen.2005.
[16]Guttman J M.Assortative matching,adverse selection and group lending.Journal of Development Economics.2008,87(1):51-56.
[17]章元.团体贷款中不同贷款条件甄别机制的可行性研究.上海:复旦大学社会主义市场经济研究中心.2004.
[18]Stiglitz J E.Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets.The World Bank Economic Review.1990,4(3):351-366.
[19]Varian H R.Monitoring agents with other agents.Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.1990,146(1):153-174.
[20]Rashid M,Townsend R.Targeting credit and insurance:efficiency,mechanism design and program evaluation.World Bank.America:University of Chicago.1992.
[21]Basley T,Coate S.Group lending,repayment incentives and social collateral.Journal of Development Economics.1995,46(1):1-18.
[22]Conning J.Group Lending,Moral Hazard,and the Creation of Social Collateral.Working Paper.Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector.University of Maryland at College Park.1996.
[23]Diagneetal A,Simtowe F,Chimombo W,Mataya C.Design and Sustainability Issues of Rural Credit and Savings Programs for the Poor in Malawi.An Action-Oriented Research Project.IFPRI.2000.
[24]Baron J N,Kathy Paulson Gjerde.Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship.Journal of Labor Economics.1997,15(2):234-254.
[25]Simtowe F,Zeller M.Determinants of Moral Hazard in Microfinance:Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Program in Malawi.Germany:University of Hohenheim.2006.
[26]Beatrix Pall,Thomas Wiseman.Group lending with endogenous social collateral.UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN.2002.
[27]Impavido Gregorio.Credit Rationing,Group Lending and Optimal Group Size.Annals of Public &Cooperative Economics.1998,69(2):243-260.
[28]Maurice Kugler,Rossella Oppes.Collateral and Risk Sharing in Group Lending:Evidence from an Urban Microcredit Program.Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics,NO.0504.2005.
[29]Thierry Van Bastelaer,Howard Leathers.Trust in Lending Social Capital and Joint Liability Seed Loans in Southern Zambia.World Development.2006,34(10):1788-1807.
[30]章元.对团体贷款高还款率的解释:一个社会担保模型.世界经济文汇.2005,(2):67-72.
[31]Dean S.Karlan.The Impact of Social Capital on Poor Borrowers and Savers.America:M.I.T.Department of Economics.2001.
[32]Dean S.Karlan.Social Capital and Group Banking.BREAD Working Paper,No.062.2004.
[33]Marguerite Robinson.The Microfinance Revolution:Sustainable Finance for the Poor.World Bank.2001.
[34]Anderson C L,Laura Locker.Microcredit,Social Capital and Common Pool Resources.World Development.2002,30(1):95-105.
[35]Asif Dowla.In credit we trust:Building social capital by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.The Journal of Socio-Economics.2006,35(1):102-122.
[36]Saharia Kanak,Yoshiaki Iiguni.Microfiance Programs and Social Capital Formation:The Present Scenario in a Rural Village of Bangladesh.The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance.2007,1(2):97-104.
[37]陈军,曹远征.农村金融深化与发展评析.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[38]皮埃尔·布尔迪厄.文化资本与社会炼金术.上海:上海人民出版社,1997.
[39]张勉,魏钧,杨百寅.社会资本的来源:工作咨询网络中心性的前因变量.管理世界.2009,(3):119-127.
[40]James S.Colemna.Foundations of Social Theory.Cambridge Mass.America:Harvard University Press,1990.
[41]Krishna A.Creating and Harnessing Social Capital.In:Social Capital _ A Multifaceted Perspective.Washington DC:The World Bank,2000:88-109.
[42]Lin N.Social Capital:A Theory of Social structure and Action.England:Cambridge University Press,2001.
[43]Robert D.Pumam,R.Leonardi,Raffaella Nanetti.Making Democracy Work:Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.America:Princeton University Press,1993.
[44]Nahapiet J,Ghoshal S.Social Capital,Intellectual Capital and the Organizational Advantage.Academy of Management Journal.1998,23(2):242-266.
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