基于经理管理防御的企业过度投资行为研究
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摘要
投资决策作为公司成长的主要动因和未来现金流量增长的重要基础,影响着公司的经营风险、盈利水平以及资本市场对其经营业绩和发展前景的评价,因此一直受到财务学家、经济学家和实业界的普遍关注。而决策过程的复杂性及影响因素的多重性,使得大量企业面临过度投资问题,严重损害企业价值,阻碍企业的发展。一般而言投资决策的形成与投资决策者的动机有密切联系,甚至是决定因素。而在我国所有权缺位的情况下,经理层拥有企业的各种决策权,因此本文从经理管理防御角度,采用理论和实证相结合的方法,试图找出我国公司过度投资行为背后的原因,为防范和减少这种非效率投资行为提供理论依据,并提出相应对策和建议。
本文在系统回顾经理管理防御与企业过度投资理论基础上,分析经理管理防御形成的原因以及其对企业过度投资的影响,并由此提出本文的研究假说：具有管理防御动机的经理人,在制定投资项目时会更多选择过度投资进行防御,以稳定其职位。随后通过建模分析以及实验研究方法对此研究假说进行验证,研究结果表明：(1)由于两权分离且我国企业所有权缺位的原因,使得经理人掌握着企业的经营决策权,成为投资决策的控制者,因此经理人在内部、外部威胁和压力下,会选择有利于维护自身职位并使得自身效用最大化的行为；(2)建模分析表明,由于信息不对称性以及防御的存在,那么拥有控制决策权的经理人会从自身效益最大化角度考虑各种投资决策,从而产生过度投资现象,且实验研究对此进行了很好的验证；(3)设置合理的惩罚机制和激励机制可以使经理人从风险收益角度权衡得失,从而在一定程度上降低经理管理防御；(4)经理管理防御测度在一定程度上可以利用经理人能力和转换成本代替,克服了管理防御测度困难的问题。
因此,为了降低经理人管理防御水平,提高企业经营效率,增加企业价值,企业可以从以下几个方面着手：完善企业的投资决策治理机制；对经理人实施激励和监督并重；完善经理人选拨机制。
Investment decision, the main cause for corporation development, the crucial base for future cash-flow increase, influences the managerial risk, profit level, capital market's evaluation of company's management achievements and development prospect, so it gets the attention from financial expert, economist and entrepreneur. Owing to the complexity of decision-making process and the multiplicity of influencing factors, over-investment is generated, badly damaging company's value and hinders company's development. Generally, there is a close relation between the formulation of investment decision and the decision maker, with the latter as the determinant of the former sometimes.And as of the absence of the ownership in our enterprises,the manager hold the power of the business. Therefore, from the angle of managerial entrenchment and by means of combining theory and empirical study, this dissertation attempts to find out the motive of the Chinese companies'over-investment, provide theoretical basis for preventing and decreasing ineffectiveinvestment and advance corresponding suggestions and strategies.
On the base of recalling the managerial entrenchment and the corporate over-investment theory, we analyze the formation of managerial entrenchment and its impact on the effects of over-investment, and put foword the hypothsis:that is the managers who have the managerial entrenchment, will more choice for over-investment in the formulation of investment projects, in order to stabiliza their jobs. The next we adopt the modeling analysis and academic experiment to verify the hypothesis of this study. The result of this research shows that:(1)Because of the separation of powers and the absence of the ownership in our enterprises, managers hold the power of the business decision-making and act as an control of the investment decision-making, the managers in the internal and external threats and pressures, will choose the behavior to safeguard their jobs and to make their own utility maximization; (2)Modeling analysis shows that, as a result of information asymmetry, as well as the existence of entrenchment, the managers who have the power of the decision-making will make decisions to maximiza their own benefits, thereby creating the phenomenon of over-investment, and academic experiment have had s very good tests to this; (3) To some extent, setting reasonable punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism can reduce the managerial entrenchment, because they will more trade-off gains and losses from the perspective of risk-benefit; (4) To some extent, managerial entrenchment can use the manager's ability and relocation cost to instead, in order to overcome the difficult of the measure of managerial entrenchment.
So, in order to reduce the level of managerial entrenchment, improve business efficiency, increase corporate value, companies can proceed from the following aspects:to improve the investment decision-making mechanisms of governance gradually; to incentive and supervise the managers; to improve the manager's selection mechanism.
本文在系统回顾经理管理防御与企业过度投资理论基础上,分析经理管理防御形成的原因以及其对企业过度投资的影响,并由此提出本文的研究假说：具有管理防御动机的经理人,在制定投资项目时会更多选择过度投资进行防御,以稳定其职位。随后通过建模分析以及实验研究方法对此研究假说进行验证,研究结果表明：(1)由于两权分离且我国企业所有权缺位的原因,使得经理人掌握着企业的经营决策权,成为投资决策的控制者,因此经理人在内部、外部威胁和压力下,会选择有利于维护自身职位并使得自身效用最大化的行为；(2)建模分析表明,由于信息不对称性以及防御的存在,那么拥有控制决策权的经理人会从自身效益最大化角度考虑各种投资决策,从而产生过度投资现象,且实验研究对此进行了很好的验证；(3)设置合理的惩罚机制和激励机制可以使经理人从风险收益角度权衡得失,从而在一定程度上降低经理管理防御；(4)经理管理防御测度在一定程度上可以利用经理人能力和转换成本代替,克服了管理防御测度困难的问题。
因此,为了降低经理人管理防御水平,提高企业经营效率,增加企业价值,企业可以从以下几个方面着手：完善企业的投资决策治理机制；对经理人实施激励和监督并重；完善经理人选拨机制。
Investment decision, the main cause for corporation development, the crucial base for future cash-flow increase, influences the managerial risk, profit level, capital market's evaluation of company's management achievements and development prospect, so it gets the attention from financial expert, economist and entrepreneur. Owing to the complexity of decision-making process and the multiplicity of influencing factors, over-investment is generated, badly damaging company's value and hinders company's development. Generally, there is a close relation between the formulation of investment decision and the decision maker, with the latter as the determinant of the former sometimes.And as of the absence of the ownership in our enterprises,the manager hold the power of the business. Therefore, from the angle of managerial entrenchment and by means of combining theory and empirical study, this dissertation attempts to find out the motive of the Chinese companies'over-investment, provide theoretical basis for preventing and decreasing ineffectiveinvestment and advance corresponding suggestions and strategies.
On the base of recalling the managerial entrenchment and the corporate over-investment theory, we analyze the formation of managerial entrenchment and its impact on the effects of over-investment, and put foword the hypothsis:that is the managers who have the managerial entrenchment, will more choice for over-investment in the formulation of investment projects, in order to stabiliza their jobs. The next we adopt the modeling analysis and academic experiment to verify the hypothesis of this study. The result of this research shows that:(1)Because of the separation of powers and the absence of the ownership in our enterprises, managers hold the power of the business decision-making and act as an control of the investment decision-making, the managers in the internal and external threats and pressures, will choose the behavior to safeguard their jobs and to make their own utility maximization; (2)Modeling analysis shows that, as a result of information asymmetry, as well as the existence of entrenchment, the managers who have the power of the decision-making will make decisions to maximiza their own benefits, thereby creating the phenomenon of over-investment, and academic experiment have had s very good tests to this; (3) To some extent, setting reasonable punishment mechanism and incentive mechanism can reduce the managerial entrenchment, because they will more trade-off gains and losses from the perspective of risk-benefit; (4) To some extent, managerial entrenchment can use the manager's ability and relocation cost to instead, in order to overcome the difficult of the measure of managerial entrenchment.
So, in order to reduce the level of managerial entrenchment, improve business efficiency, increase corporate value, companies can proceed from the following aspects:to improve the investment decision-making mechanisms of governance gradually; to incentive and supervise the managers; to improve the manager's selection mechanism.
引文
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