大小非解禁下的中小股东权益的法律保护
|
摘要
中小股东权益保护问题一直是各国所关注的研究课题。在不同法系、不同司法制度下,各国各公司中小股东权益实际受损害程度也不尽相同,而在我国特殊环境和制度下,中小股东权益受损害程度更为严重。尽管现在已经施行了股权分置改革制度,非流通股股东与流通股股东在“同股同权”的基本原则下,法定权利趋向一致,但是大股东与中小股东权益的冲突并没有消除,大股东与其他相关利益主体对中小股东权益的损害仍然存在,并呈现出新的特点。因此,如何在股改实施阶段,在大小非解禁下对中小股东权益进行保护成为新形势下的旧问题。
在本文,笔者以两个案例做引,提出大小非解禁下中小股东权益的保护问题不容忽视,通过对中小股东权益受侵害的必然性理论分析,指出股权结构、公司治理结构、法律环境和股东理性冷漠是影响中小股东权益的四大因素。在对大小非解禁下的中小股东权益问题研究之前,笔者先分析了股权分置条件下的中小股东权益受侵害状况和原因,经对比发现,在大小非解禁下,我国的资本市场、股权结构都发生了深刻的变化,由此引起的中小股东权益受侵害状况呈现出多样性和隐蔽性的特点。因此,原有的对中小股东权益保护制度凸显不足,针对于此,笔者提出要以法律为主导,通过法律制度推进其他制度的辅助,建立一个全面的保护体系,概括地说就是一个明晰(表决权信托制度)、两个建立(投资者保护机构和证券投资者保险制度)、三个细化(表决权代理、相关诉讼机制、权益保护的执行)和四个改善(累积投票制度、独立董事制度、股份回购制度和股东派生诉讼制度)。最后,笔者提出“天下之法,不难于立法,而难于法之必行”,因此对于中小股东权益的保护不仅仅在于法律的完善和法律的主导,更在于将法律保护落于实处,切实为中小股东权益做出保障。
相对于国内其他学者对中小股东权益保护的研究,笔者选取了新的形势,新的视角,通过对股权结构和公司治理结构角度研究中小股东权益受损的必然性在于权益的冲突,通过大小非解禁前后股东权益受侵害的形式对比,发现大小非解禁下中小股东权益受损具有多样性和隐蔽性特点,并对现阶段中小股东权益保护现状做出了评述,提出自己的观点:合理的公司治理结构与完善的法律体系过于理想化,制度的完善需要一步一步进行,当务之急就在于在资本市场要将法律的地位提升,建立以法律为主导的保护体系,通过法律的实施切实保护中小股东权益。
The minority shareholders’rights and interests protection question has been the research subject which various countries pay attention. Under the different legal system, in various countries' various companies the minority shareholders’rights and interests actual are also different in the extent of damage, but under our country special environment and the system, the minority shareholders’rights and interests has been more serious in the extent of damage. Although we had already implemented The split share structure reform now, and under“the same stock and the same power”basic principle, non-circulation stock shareholders and circulation stock shareholders’legal right trend to consistent, but this has not eliminate with the major stockholders and the minority shareholders rights' and interests' conflict. The major stockholders with other related benefit main body are still harm to the minority shareholders’rights and interests, and present the new characteristic. So, how to protect the minority shareholders rights and interests in share reform implementation stage is an old problem in new situation.
In this article, the author use two cases to propose that after the split share structure reform the minority shareholders’rights and interest’s protection question is still hard to neglect. Through theoretical analysis which the minority shareholders’rights and interests’violation is inevitable, the author pointed out that the stockholder's rights structure, the company management structure, the legal environment and the shareholders’rationality indifferent are the main factors which influence the minority shareholders’rights and interests. Before research the minority shareholders’rights and interests question, the author analyzed under the stockholder's rights mounted cylinder condition, the main condition and the reason that minority shareholder rights and interests to violate. After contrast research, under the split share structure reform, our country's capital market, the stockholder's rights structure has had the deep transformation, from this caused the minority shareholders’rights and interests are violated ,and the condition to present the multiplicity and the covert characteristic. Therefore, to the original minority shareholders’rights and interests protection system seems insufficient. In view of this, the author proposed that we must take the law as the leadership, advances other system's auxiliary through the legal regime, establishes a comprehensive protection system, said broadly is one defined (the right to vote trust system), two establishments (investor protection agency and negotiable securities investor insurance system), three refinements (proxy voting, related lawsuit mechanism, rights and interests protection execution) and four improvements (cumulative voting system, independent director system, stock buy-back system and shareholder derives lawsuit system). Finally, the author proposed that“law of the world, not difficulty with legislates, but difficulty with method must the line”, therefore to protect minority shareholders’rights and interests not only lies in legal regarding and the legal leadership, but also lies in the legal protection falls in the tangible, makes the safeguard earnestly for the minority shareholder rights and interests.
Was different from other domestic scholars to the minority shareholders’rights and interests protection research, the author has selected the new situation, the new angle of view, from the stockholder's rights structure and in the company management structure angle research that the inevitability which the minority shareholders’rights and interests suffered injury lies in the conflict of the rights and interests, through contrast the shareholders’rights and interests which had been violated before and after The split share structure reform ,I discovered that under this special time the minority shareholders’rights and interests to suffer injury has the multiplicity and the covert characteristic, and the made the narration to the present stage with minority shareholders’rights and interests protection present situation, then the author proposed her own viewpoint: The reasonable company management structure and the consummation legal framework are too idealizes, system's consummation needs to carry on gradually, the urgent matter lies in the capital market must built the legal status promotion, establishes take the law as the leading protection system, through in legal implementation to practically protect minority shareholders’rights and interests.
在本文,笔者以两个案例做引,提出大小非解禁下中小股东权益的保护问题不容忽视,通过对中小股东权益受侵害的必然性理论分析,指出股权结构、公司治理结构、法律环境和股东理性冷漠是影响中小股东权益的四大因素。在对大小非解禁下的中小股东权益问题研究之前,笔者先分析了股权分置条件下的中小股东权益受侵害状况和原因,经对比发现,在大小非解禁下,我国的资本市场、股权结构都发生了深刻的变化,由此引起的中小股东权益受侵害状况呈现出多样性和隐蔽性的特点。因此,原有的对中小股东权益保护制度凸显不足,针对于此,笔者提出要以法律为主导,通过法律制度推进其他制度的辅助,建立一个全面的保护体系,概括地说就是一个明晰(表决权信托制度)、两个建立(投资者保护机构和证券投资者保险制度)、三个细化(表决权代理、相关诉讼机制、权益保护的执行)和四个改善(累积投票制度、独立董事制度、股份回购制度和股东派生诉讼制度)。最后,笔者提出“天下之法,不难于立法,而难于法之必行”,因此对于中小股东权益的保护不仅仅在于法律的完善和法律的主导,更在于将法律保护落于实处,切实为中小股东权益做出保障。
相对于国内其他学者对中小股东权益保护的研究,笔者选取了新的形势,新的视角,通过对股权结构和公司治理结构角度研究中小股东权益受损的必然性在于权益的冲突,通过大小非解禁前后股东权益受侵害的形式对比,发现大小非解禁下中小股东权益受损具有多样性和隐蔽性特点,并对现阶段中小股东权益保护现状做出了评述,提出自己的观点:合理的公司治理结构与完善的法律体系过于理想化,制度的完善需要一步一步进行,当务之急就在于在资本市场要将法律的地位提升,建立以法律为主导的保护体系,通过法律的实施切实保护中小股东权益。
The minority shareholders’rights and interests protection question has been the research subject which various countries pay attention. Under the different legal system, in various countries' various companies the minority shareholders’rights and interests actual are also different in the extent of damage, but under our country special environment and the system, the minority shareholders’rights and interests has been more serious in the extent of damage. Although we had already implemented The split share structure reform now, and under“the same stock and the same power”basic principle, non-circulation stock shareholders and circulation stock shareholders’legal right trend to consistent, but this has not eliminate with the major stockholders and the minority shareholders rights' and interests' conflict. The major stockholders with other related benefit main body are still harm to the minority shareholders’rights and interests, and present the new characteristic. So, how to protect the minority shareholders rights and interests in share reform implementation stage is an old problem in new situation.
In this article, the author use two cases to propose that after the split share structure reform the minority shareholders’rights and interest’s protection question is still hard to neglect. Through theoretical analysis which the minority shareholders’rights and interests’violation is inevitable, the author pointed out that the stockholder's rights structure, the company management structure, the legal environment and the shareholders’rationality indifferent are the main factors which influence the minority shareholders’rights and interests. Before research the minority shareholders’rights and interests question, the author analyzed under the stockholder's rights mounted cylinder condition, the main condition and the reason that minority shareholder rights and interests to violate. After contrast research, under the split share structure reform, our country's capital market, the stockholder's rights structure has had the deep transformation, from this caused the minority shareholders’rights and interests are violated ,and the condition to present the multiplicity and the covert characteristic. Therefore, to the original minority shareholders’rights and interests protection system seems insufficient. In view of this, the author proposed that we must take the law as the leadership, advances other system's auxiliary through the legal regime, establishes a comprehensive protection system, said broadly is one defined (the right to vote trust system), two establishments (investor protection agency and negotiable securities investor insurance system), three refinements (proxy voting, related lawsuit mechanism, rights and interests protection execution) and four improvements (cumulative voting system, independent director system, stock buy-back system and shareholder derives lawsuit system). Finally, the author proposed that“law of the world, not difficulty with legislates, but difficulty with method must the line”, therefore to protect minority shareholders’rights and interests not only lies in legal regarding and the legal leadership, but also lies in the legal protection falls in the tangible, makes the safeguard earnestly for the minority shareholder rights and interests.
Was different from other domestic scholars to the minority shareholders’rights and interests protection research, the author has selected the new situation, the new angle of view, from the stockholder's rights structure and in the company management structure angle research that the inevitability which the minority shareholders’rights and interests suffered injury lies in the conflict of the rights and interests, through contrast the shareholders’rights and interests which had been violated before and after The split share structure reform ,I discovered that under this special time the minority shareholders’rights and interests to suffer injury has the multiplicity and the covert characteristic, and the made the narration to the present stage with minority shareholders’rights and interests protection present situation, then the author proposed her own viewpoint: The reasonable company management structure and the consummation legal framework are too idealizes, system's consummation needs to carry on gradually, the urgent matter lies in the capital market must built the legal status promotion, establishes take the law as the leading protection system, through in legal implementation to practically protect minority shareholders’rights and interests.
引文
[1]刘俊海.股份有限公司股东权的保护.(修订版).北京:法律出版社,2004
[2]王保树.商事法论集.(第8卷)北京:法律出版社,2005
[3]胡果威.美国公司法.北京:法律出版社,1999
[4]卞耀武.当代外国公司法.北京:法律出版社,1995
[5]段亚林.论大股东股权滥用及实例.北京:经济管理出版社,2001
[6]【加】布莱恩.R.柴芬斯.公司法:理论、结构和运作.林华伟等译.北京法律出版社,2001
[7]倪建林.公司治理结构:法律与实践.北京:法律出版社,2001
[8]王斌.股权结构论.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001
[9]吴晓求.中国资本市场:股权分裂与流动性变革.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005
[10]熊海滨.股东行为与股东产权——公司治理中的股东与股权.北京:中国城市出版社,2002
[11]万国华.证券法前沿问题研究.天津:天津人民出版社,2002
[12]何美欢.公众公司及其股权证券.北京:北京大学出版社,1999
[13]张民安.公司法上的利益平衡.北京:北京大学出版社,2003
[14]梅慎实.公司法人治理结构规范运作论.北京:中国法制出版社,2001
[15]曹兴权.公司法的现代化.北京:法律出版社,2007
[16]曹富国.少数股东保护与公司治理.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2006
[17]王斌.股权结构论.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001
[18]【美】罗伯特.W.汉密尔顿.公司法.北京:法律出版社,1999
[19]殷召良.公司控制权法律问题研究.北京:法律出版社,2001
[20]郑若山.公司制的异化.北京:北京大学出版社,2003
[21]梁上上.论股东表决权.北京:法律出版社,2006
[22]【美】弗兰克?伊斯特布鲁克,丹尼尔?费希尔.公司法的经济结构.张建伟,罗培新译,北京:北京大学出版社.,2005
[23]罗培新.公司法的合同解释.北京:北京大学出版社, 2004
[24]杨松、王婧、王立彦.股东之间利益冲突研究——根源、作用和治理.北京:北京大学出版社.,2007
[25]刘彦平.中小股权保护的制度基础.北京:人民出版社, 2006
[26]何如.股权分置改革操作实务与后股权分置时代.北京:华夏出版社, 2006
[27]施天涛.公司法论.(第二版),北京:法律出版社,2006
[28]孙光焰.公司治理模式趋同化研究.北京:中国社会科学出版社. 2007
[29]王保树主编.实践中的公司法.北京:社会科学文献出版社.,2008
[30]谈萧.上市公司治理与监管专题研究.北京:法律出版社,2006
[31]【美】杰弗里·N·戈登,【美】马克·J·罗主编,赵玲,刘凯译.公司治理:趋同与存续.北京:北京大学出版社,2006
[32]谢伏瞻.优化股权结构,规范上市公司治理.中国证券报. 2001(6)
[33]王保树.股份公司组织结构的法的实态考察和立法课题.法学研究. 1998(2)
[34]王保树.现代股份有限公司发展中的几个趋势性问题.中国法学. 1992(6)
[35]杨辉.资本多数决与少数股股东之保护.人大复印资料经济法、劳动法. 1998(4)
[36]李华振.大股东侵占和“以股抵债”——从法学视角分析中国股市治理.经济导刊2005(1-2)
[37]吴晓求.股权分置改革的历史、现状和未来.深圳特区科技. 2005(12)
[38]姬长进.股改法律问题漫谈.股市动态分析. 2005
[39]蒋学跃、向静.股改后上市公司股东权利保护制度创新初探——以司法救济为线索.证券市场导报. 2008(3)
[40]曹兴权.股权分置改革:公司法拷问.商业研究. 2006(14)
[41]赖建平.思考与建议:流通股东补偿权的法理依据与标准.中国证券导报. 2005(7)
[42]谈萧.股权分置改革中若干法律问题探析.证券市场导报. 2005(12)
[43]李腊生.论股权分置改革后的投资者利益保护.商业经济与管理. 2007(3)
[44]戴爽.非流通股解禁及减持情况分析.证券导刊. 2008(1)
[45]朱武祥.一股独大与股权多元化.上市公司. 2001(10)
[46]吴敬琏.控股股东行为与公司治理. www.cnstock.com 2001(6)
[47]甘培忠、孟刚.论股权分置改革方案中的投票表决制度——兼谈保护流通股小股东权益的制度构建.北大分类信息网
[48]Berle, A .and G. Means ,The Modern Corporate and Private Property , New York: Macmillan, 1932.
[49]La Porta , R. ,Lopez-de-Silance, A .Shelfer, and R. W. Vishny, 2002,“Investor protection and corporate valuation,”Journal of Finance 3.
[50]Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, The American Law Institute.
[51]Tian, L., 2002, Government shareholding and value China’s modern firms,”Working paper, London Business School
[52]Holderness, C. G., and D. P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
[53]Ho, Simon S. M., Corporate Governance in China: An Integrated Framework for Research and Some Implications, Working paper, 2003, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
[54]Holderness, C. G., and D. P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics,1988
[55] Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economics 94,1986
[56] Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, 69 Harv. Rev.140 (Jan.-Feb.1994).
[57]Robert Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Cooperate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174 (2001)
[58]Burkart M, Panunzi F, Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection, 15 Journal of Financial Intermediation.
[59]Faccio M, Lang LHP, The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations, 65 Journal of Financial Economics.
[60] Leech,D,Leahy J.,1991,Ownership Structure,Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies.The Economic Journal,Vol.101
[61]Demsetz.H.and K.Lehn,The structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences,93Journal of Political Economics,1985.
[62]Tom Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant,Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe,CEP Discussion Paper No.0631,April 2004.
[63]Alma Pekmezovic, Determinants of Corporate Ownership: The Question of Legal Original (part 1), [2007] 3 International Company and Commercial Law Review
①案例源于皮海洲.全流通上演叶公好龙一幕.http://blog.sina.com.cn/phz168 ,访问日期2008年6月20日
①何如.股权分置改革操作实务与后股权分置时代.华夏出版社,2006
①蔡奕.股权分置改革承诺的法律界定与履行监管. http://finance1.jrj.con.cn/news/2007-01-30/00000/963187-004.html,访问日期2007年1月30日
①谈萧.股权分置改革中若干法律问题探析.证券市场导报.2005(12)
①金鑫.上市公司股权结构与公司治理.中国金融出版社,2005
①A dolf. Berle. And Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan, 1932
①Adolf. Berle. And Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan, 1932。笔者通过Berle &Means的分析总结,概述了这五种控制权形态。
①See R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Sheifer,“Corporate Ownership Around the World”[1999] 54 Journal of Finance p 491
②[台湾]陈丽娟.从德国“公司治理规约”看该国公司治理之改革.东海大学法学研究.2007(26).51,另参见Franks﹠ Mayer,“Ownership and Control of German Corporations,”14 Rev. Fin. Stud. 943 (2001))
③Gadhoum, L. H. P. Lang and L. Young,“Who controls us?”(Working paper, 2005) .P7.available at http:// papers. ssrn. com.
④Alma Pekmezovic, Determinants of Corporate Ownership: The Question of Legal Original (part 1), [2007] 3 International Company and Commercial Law Review, p101
⑤马克·J·罗.现代政治与所有权分离.公司治理:趋同与存续. [美]杰弗里·N·戈登,马克·J·罗编,北京大学出版社,2006.271
①刘家胜.我国公司治理结构与中小股东权益保护.商场现代化,2007(9)
②这也是莫兰德(Moerland)1995年从资本流动机制和国内银行体系的作用方面提出的公司治理类型。转引自孙光焰.公司治理模式趋同化研究.中国社会科学出版社,2007
①LaPorta、Rafael、Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes、Andrei Shleifer , and Robert W Vishny,“Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy , 106 , 1988 ,1113—1155
①LaPorta、Rafael、Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes、Andrei Shleifer , and Robert W Vishny,“Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy , 106 , 1988
②罗伯特·C·克拉克.公司法则.胡平、林长远、徐庆恒、陈亮翻译.工商出版社,1999
①施天涛.我国公司法上关联交易的皈依及其法律规制. http://china.findlaw.cn/gongsifa/gongsidongtai/5402-3.html,访问日期2008年05月23日
①资料转引自杨松、王婧、王立彦.股东之间利益冲突研究——根源、作用和治理.北京大学出版社,2007
①赵旭东.公司法修改中的中小股东保护,www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1063/3104148.html,访问日期2005年1月7日
①罗培新.证监会的边界. http://www.chinabaike.com/work/lunwen/jj/stock/1140034.html ,访问日期2005年5月12日
①张歆.机构投资者“绝对控股”流通股.http://cs.xinhuanet.com/tzjj/03/200905/t20090507_1887337.htm,访问日期:2009年5月7日
①数据来源:图4源于中国证监会官方统计数据,图5源于上市公司资讯网统计数据,转引自张高胜、初珊娜.股权分置改革后上市公司股权结构的变化及其对公司治理机制的影响.现代经济,2007(8)
①谢少萍.深交所:机构投资者持股比例上升.http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/zldx/20090518/02296236961.shtml.访问日期2009年5月18日
①杨晶.全流通时代中小股东权益法律保护的战略研究.http://www.civillaw.com.cn/Article/default.asp?id=42575.访问日期2009年1月8日
①施天涛.公司法论(第二版).法律出版社,2006
①李郁.新公司法:中小股东权益保护的条文尚待细化. http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2007-03/11/content_555858.htm,访问日期:2007年11月30日
②施天涛.公司法论(第二版).法律出版社,2006
①陈芳.对我国累计投票制度的反思——兼评公司法第106条之规定.西华大学学报,2007(8)
①【美】弗兰克·伊斯特布鲁克、丹尼尔·费希尔,张建伟、罗培新译.公司法的经济结构,82.北京大学出版社,2005
[2]王保树.商事法论集.(第8卷)北京:法律出版社,2005
[3]胡果威.美国公司法.北京:法律出版社,1999
[4]卞耀武.当代外国公司法.北京:法律出版社,1995
[5]段亚林.论大股东股权滥用及实例.北京:经济管理出版社,2001
[6]【加】布莱恩.R.柴芬斯.公司法:理论、结构和运作.林华伟等译.北京法律出版社,2001
[7]倪建林.公司治理结构:法律与实践.北京:法律出版社,2001
[8]王斌.股权结构论.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001
[9]吴晓求.中国资本市场:股权分裂与流动性变革.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005
[10]熊海滨.股东行为与股东产权——公司治理中的股东与股权.北京:中国城市出版社,2002
[11]万国华.证券法前沿问题研究.天津:天津人民出版社,2002
[12]何美欢.公众公司及其股权证券.北京:北京大学出版社,1999
[13]张民安.公司法上的利益平衡.北京:北京大学出版社,2003
[14]梅慎实.公司法人治理结构规范运作论.北京:中国法制出版社,2001
[15]曹兴权.公司法的现代化.北京:法律出版社,2007
[16]曹富国.少数股东保护与公司治理.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2006
[17]王斌.股权结构论.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001
[18]【美】罗伯特.W.汉密尔顿.公司法.北京:法律出版社,1999
[19]殷召良.公司控制权法律问题研究.北京:法律出版社,2001
[20]郑若山.公司制的异化.北京:北京大学出版社,2003
[21]梁上上.论股东表决权.北京:法律出版社,2006
[22]【美】弗兰克?伊斯特布鲁克,丹尼尔?费希尔.公司法的经济结构.张建伟,罗培新译,北京:北京大学出版社.,2005
[23]罗培新.公司法的合同解释.北京:北京大学出版社, 2004
[24]杨松、王婧、王立彦.股东之间利益冲突研究——根源、作用和治理.北京:北京大学出版社.,2007
[25]刘彦平.中小股权保护的制度基础.北京:人民出版社, 2006
[26]何如.股权分置改革操作实务与后股权分置时代.北京:华夏出版社, 2006
[27]施天涛.公司法论.(第二版),北京:法律出版社,2006
[28]孙光焰.公司治理模式趋同化研究.北京:中国社会科学出版社. 2007
[29]王保树主编.实践中的公司法.北京:社会科学文献出版社.,2008
[30]谈萧.上市公司治理与监管专题研究.北京:法律出版社,2006
[31]【美】杰弗里·N·戈登,【美】马克·J·罗主编,赵玲,刘凯译.公司治理:趋同与存续.北京:北京大学出版社,2006
[32]谢伏瞻.优化股权结构,规范上市公司治理.中国证券报. 2001(6)
[33]王保树.股份公司组织结构的法的实态考察和立法课题.法学研究. 1998(2)
[34]王保树.现代股份有限公司发展中的几个趋势性问题.中国法学. 1992(6)
[35]杨辉.资本多数决与少数股股东之保护.人大复印资料经济法、劳动法. 1998(4)
[36]李华振.大股东侵占和“以股抵债”——从法学视角分析中国股市治理.经济导刊2005(1-2)
[37]吴晓求.股权分置改革的历史、现状和未来.深圳特区科技. 2005(12)
[38]姬长进.股改法律问题漫谈.股市动态分析. 2005
[39]蒋学跃、向静.股改后上市公司股东权利保护制度创新初探——以司法救济为线索.证券市场导报. 2008(3)
[40]曹兴权.股权分置改革:公司法拷问.商业研究. 2006(14)
[41]赖建平.思考与建议:流通股东补偿权的法理依据与标准.中国证券导报. 2005(7)
[42]谈萧.股权分置改革中若干法律问题探析.证券市场导报. 2005(12)
[43]李腊生.论股权分置改革后的投资者利益保护.商业经济与管理. 2007(3)
[44]戴爽.非流通股解禁及减持情况分析.证券导刊. 2008(1)
[45]朱武祥.一股独大与股权多元化.上市公司. 2001(10)
[46]吴敬琏.控股股东行为与公司治理. www.cnstock.com 2001(6)
[47]甘培忠、孟刚.论股权分置改革方案中的投票表决制度——兼谈保护流通股小股东权益的制度构建.北大分类信息网
[48]Berle, A .and G. Means ,The Modern Corporate and Private Property , New York: Macmillan, 1932.
[49]La Porta , R. ,Lopez-de-Silance, A .Shelfer, and R. W. Vishny, 2002,“Investor protection and corporate valuation,”Journal of Finance 3.
[50]Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, The American Law Institute.
[51]Tian, L., 2002, Government shareholding and value China’s modern firms,”Working paper, London Business School
[52]Holderness, C. G., and D. P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
[53]Ho, Simon S. M., Corporate Governance in China: An Integrated Framework for Research and Some Implications, Working paper, 2003, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
[54]Holderness, C. G., and D. P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics,1988
[55] Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economics 94,1986
[56] Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, 69 Harv. Rev.140 (Jan.-Feb.1994).
[57]Robert Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Cooperate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174 (2001)
[58]Burkart M, Panunzi F, Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection, 15 Journal of Financial Intermediation.
[59]Faccio M, Lang LHP, The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations, 65 Journal of Financial Economics.
[60] Leech,D,Leahy J.,1991,Ownership Structure,Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies.The Economic Journal,Vol.101
[61]Demsetz.H.and K.Lehn,The structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences,93Journal of Political Economics,1985.
[62]Tom Kirchmaier & Jeremy Grant,Corporate Ownership Structure and Performance in Europe,CEP Discussion Paper No.0631,April 2004.
[63]Alma Pekmezovic, Determinants of Corporate Ownership: The Question of Legal Original (part 1), [2007] 3 International Company and Commercial Law Review
①案例源于皮海洲.全流通上演叶公好龙一幕.http://blog.sina.com.cn/phz168 ,访问日期2008年6月20日
①何如.股权分置改革操作实务与后股权分置时代.华夏出版社,2006
①蔡奕.股权分置改革承诺的法律界定与履行监管. http://finance1.jrj.con.cn/news/2007-01-30/00000/963187-004.html,访问日期2007年1月30日
①谈萧.股权分置改革中若干法律问题探析.证券市场导报.2005(12)
①金鑫.上市公司股权结构与公司治理.中国金融出版社,2005
①A dolf. Berle. And Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan, 1932
①Adolf. Berle. And Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan, 1932。笔者通过Berle &Means的分析总结,概述了这五种控制权形态。
①See R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Sheifer,“Corporate Ownership Around the World”[1999] 54 Journal of Finance p 491
②[台湾]陈丽娟.从德国“公司治理规约”看该国公司治理之改革.东海大学法学研究.2007(26).51,另参见Franks﹠ Mayer,“Ownership and Control of German Corporations,”14 Rev. Fin. Stud. 943 (2001))
③Gadhoum, L. H. P. Lang and L. Young,“Who controls us?”(Working paper, 2005) .P7.available at http:// papers. ssrn. com.
④Alma Pekmezovic, Determinants of Corporate Ownership: The Question of Legal Original (part 1), [2007] 3 International Company and Commercial Law Review, p101
⑤马克·J·罗.现代政治与所有权分离.公司治理:趋同与存续. [美]杰弗里·N·戈登,马克·J·罗编,北京大学出版社,2006.271
①刘家胜.我国公司治理结构与中小股东权益保护.商场现代化,2007(9)
②这也是莫兰德(Moerland)1995年从资本流动机制和国内银行体系的作用方面提出的公司治理类型。转引自孙光焰.公司治理模式趋同化研究.中国社会科学出版社,2007
①LaPorta、Rafael、Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes、Andrei Shleifer , and Robert W Vishny,“Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy , 106 , 1988 ,1113—1155
①LaPorta、Rafael、Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes、Andrei Shleifer , and Robert W Vishny,“Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy , 106 , 1988
②罗伯特·C·克拉克.公司法则.胡平、林长远、徐庆恒、陈亮翻译.工商出版社,1999
①施天涛.我国公司法上关联交易的皈依及其法律规制. http://china.findlaw.cn/gongsifa/gongsidongtai/5402-3.html,访问日期2008年05月23日
①资料转引自杨松、王婧、王立彦.股东之间利益冲突研究——根源、作用和治理.北京大学出版社,2007
①赵旭东.公司法修改中的中小股东保护,www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1063/3104148.html,访问日期2005年1月7日
①罗培新.证监会的边界. http://www.chinabaike.com/work/lunwen/jj/stock/1140034.html ,访问日期2005年5月12日
①张歆.机构投资者“绝对控股”流通股.http://cs.xinhuanet.com/tzjj/03/200905/t20090507_1887337.htm,访问日期:2009年5月7日
①数据来源:图4源于中国证监会官方统计数据,图5源于上市公司资讯网统计数据,转引自张高胜、初珊娜.股权分置改革后上市公司股权结构的变化及其对公司治理机制的影响.现代经济,2007(8)
①谢少萍.深交所:机构投资者持股比例上升.http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/zldx/20090518/02296236961.shtml.访问日期2009年5月18日
①杨晶.全流通时代中小股东权益法律保护的战略研究.http://www.civillaw.com.cn/Article/default.asp?id=42575.访问日期2009年1月8日
①施天涛.公司法论(第二版).法律出版社,2006
①李郁.新公司法:中小股东权益保护的条文尚待细化. http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2007-03/11/content_555858.htm,访问日期:2007年11月30日
②施天涛.公司法论(第二版).法律出版社,2006
①陈芳.对我国累计投票制度的反思——兼评公司法第106条之规定.西华大学学报,2007(8)
①【美】弗兰克·伊斯特布鲁克、丹尼尔·费希尔,张建伟、罗培新译.公司法的经济结构,82.北京大学出版社,2005