建设项目利益相关者治理的经济学分析
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摘要
建筑业是我国国民经济支柱产业,建设项目是建筑业的主要产品,建设项目管理水平的高低,直接影响着整个建筑业的投入产出效率。本文对建设项目利益相关者治理的研究,旨在从组织和制度层面深入探讨和完善我国建设项目管理理论,促进建筑业的可持续发展。
首先,运用交易成本经济学理论定性及定量研究建设项目治理结构模式的演变,并指出现代建设项目日趋大型化、集成化与信息化,建设项目的规模和技术难度增大,交易的不确定性增强,推行建设项目利益相关者治理结构模式可以促进信息交流,提高决策的正确性,并可降低治理成本,因而成为一种有效率的制度安排。
其次,界定建设项目利益相关者,并选择关系程度、影响力以及紧急性等三个维度将其分类为核心利益相关者、蛰伏利益相关者以及边缘利益相关者。在辨析建设项目利益相关者的利益需求和行为特征的基础上,合理构建了建设项目利益相关者治理结构模型。同时,通过简化委托代理链的方式对建设项目利益相关者治理结构进行合理的优化。
最后,从制度层面完善建设项目利益相关者治理机制。通过对以承包商为代表的人力资本所有者与以项目业主为代表的非人力资本所有者的产权重复博弈演变分析建立合理的产权配置制度;构建完善的建设项目利益相关者激励机制,从而有效防止“代理人”问题的发生,最大效益地实现建设项目治理目标;建设项目利益相关者在项目执行过程中很容易出现矛盾和争端,构建合理的冲突处理机制以提高治理效率。
The construction industry is a pillar industry in national economy of our country, the construction project is the main product of construction industry, and the management level of construction project will influence the input and output efficiency of the whole construction directly. This paper researches on the stakeholder governance of construction project; and aims at discussing and perfecting the management theory of construction project of our country from organization and system aspect thoroughly, and in order to promote the sustainable development of the construction.
First of all, this paper researches on the development of construction project governance structure mode which determines the nature and quantitatively by the economics theory of transaction cost, and point out that pursuing the stakeholder governance of construction project can promote information interchanging, improve the exactness of decision , and reduce the cost of management, therefore It becomes a kind of efficient system arrangement, because the modern construction project is more and more maximization, integration and information, the scale of the construction project and the difficulty of the technological degree increases, and the uncertainty of the trade is strengthened.
Secondly, this paper defines the construction project stakeholder, and Categories the construction project stakeholders into the core stakeholders, the potential core stakeholders and the edge stakeholders by choosing the relations degree, the influence as well as the emergency as three Dimensions. On the basis of differentiating and analyzing the requirement and behavior characteristic of the stakeholder governance of construction project, this paper establishes the structure models of stakeholder governance of construction project rationally, and optimizes it by simplifying the principal-agent chain.
Finally, this paper improves the construction project stakeholder governance mechanisms from a system perspective. This paper set up the reasonable allocation of the property rights system by analyzing the property rights repeat game evolution between the owner of Human Capital represented by the contractor and the owner of non-human capital owners project represented by the project owners, and set up the perfect incentive mechanism of the construction project stakeholders so as to prevent the "agent" problem happened effectively and to achieve the construction project governance goals biggest-effectively. At the same time, the stakeholder governance of construction project easily get contradiction and dispute in the course of carrying out in project, so structure the rational conflict disposal mechanism to improve the efficiency of governance.
首先,运用交易成本经济学理论定性及定量研究建设项目治理结构模式的演变,并指出现代建设项目日趋大型化、集成化与信息化,建设项目的规模和技术难度增大,交易的不确定性增强,推行建设项目利益相关者治理结构模式可以促进信息交流,提高决策的正确性,并可降低治理成本,因而成为一种有效率的制度安排。
其次,界定建设项目利益相关者,并选择关系程度、影响力以及紧急性等三个维度将其分类为核心利益相关者、蛰伏利益相关者以及边缘利益相关者。在辨析建设项目利益相关者的利益需求和行为特征的基础上,合理构建了建设项目利益相关者治理结构模型。同时,通过简化委托代理链的方式对建设项目利益相关者治理结构进行合理的优化。
最后,从制度层面完善建设项目利益相关者治理机制。通过对以承包商为代表的人力资本所有者与以项目业主为代表的非人力资本所有者的产权重复博弈演变分析建立合理的产权配置制度;构建完善的建设项目利益相关者激励机制,从而有效防止“代理人”问题的发生,最大效益地实现建设项目治理目标;建设项目利益相关者在项目执行过程中很容易出现矛盾和争端,构建合理的冲突处理机制以提高治理效率。
The construction industry is a pillar industry in national economy of our country, the construction project is the main product of construction industry, and the management level of construction project will influence the input and output efficiency of the whole construction directly. This paper researches on the stakeholder governance of construction project; and aims at discussing and perfecting the management theory of construction project of our country from organization and system aspect thoroughly, and in order to promote the sustainable development of the construction.
First of all, this paper researches on the development of construction project governance structure mode which determines the nature and quantitatively by the economics theory of transaction cost, and point out that pursuing the stakeholder governance of construction project can promote information interchanging, improve the exactness of decision , and reduce the cost of management, therefore It becomes a kind of efficient system arrangement, because the modern construction project is more and more maximization, integration and information, the scale of the construction project and the difficulty of the technological degree increases, and the uncertainty of the trade is strengthened.
Secondly, this paper defines the construction project stakeholder, and Categories the construction project stakeholders into the core stakeholders, the potential core stakeholders and the edge stakeholders by choosing the relations degree, the influence as well as the emergency as three Dimensions. On the basis of differentiating and analyzing the requirement and behavior characteristic of the stakeholder governance of construction project, this paper establishes the structure models of stakeholder governance of construction project rationally, and optimizes it by simplifying the principal-agent chain.
Finally, this paper improves the construction project stakeholder governance mechanisms from a system perspective. This paper set up the reasonable allocation of the property rights system by analyzing the property rights repeat game evolution between the owner of Human Capital represented by the contractor and the owner of non-human capital owners project represented by the project owners, and set up the perfect incentive mechanism of the construction project stakeholders so as to prevent the "agent" problem happened effectively and to achieve the construction project governance goals biggest-effectively. At the same time, the stakeholder governance of construction project easily get contradiction and dispute in the course of carrying out in project, so structure the rational conflict disposal mechanism to improve the efficiency of governance.
引文
[1]谢钰敏,魏晓平.项目利益相关者管理研究[J].科技管理研究,2006(1):168-171
[2]严玲,尹贻林.公共项目治理[M].天津大学出版社,2006
[3]TURNER.J.R,MULLER.R.On the nature of the project as a temporary organization[J].International Journal of Project Management,2001,(21):1-8
[4]JONAS SODERLUND.Building theories of projects management:past research question for future[J].International Journal of Project Management,2004,(22):183-191
[5]TURNER.J.R Communication and co-operation on projects between the project owner as principal and the project management as agent[J].European Management Journal,2004,(5)
[6]TURNER.J.R,KEEGAN.A.E.Mechanism of governance in the project-based organization:a transaction cost perspective[J].European Management Journal,2001,19(3):254-267
[7]http://www.apm.org.uk/resources/sigs/governance.htm
[8]TURNER.J.R,ANNE KEEGAN.The versatile project-based organization:governance and operational control[J].European Management Journal,1999,(3):296-309
[9]TURNER.J.R,SIMISTER.S.J.Project contract management and a theory of organization[J].International of Project Management,2001,(19)
[10]Winch.G.M.Institutional reform in British construction:partnering and private finance[J].International Journal of Building Research and Information,2000,28(2):141-155
[11]Winch.G.M.Governing the project process:a conceptual framework[J],Construction Management and Economics,2001,(19):799-808
[12]KEITH.LAMBERT.Project governance[J].World Project Management Week,2003
[13]江伟.工程项目管理中信息不对称的对策研究[D].华北电力大学,2003,(12)
[14]罗建华.我国国家投资建设项目业主代理模式及规范管理研究.湖南省自然科学基金项目(01JJY2121)
[15]杨飞雪、汪海舰、尹贻林.项目治理结构初探[J].中国软科学,2004,(3)
[16]严玲,尹贻林,范道津.公共项目治理理论概念模型的建立[J].中国软科学,2004,(6):130-136
[17]严玲,赵黎明.论项目治理理论体系的构建[J].上海经济研究,2005,(11):104-110
[18]Ronald H.Coase.The Nature of the Firm[J].Economical.N.S 1937
[19]Oliver E.Williamson.Comparative Ecomomic Organization:The Analysis of Dsicurete Structural Alternatives[J].Administrative Science Puarterly,1991b
[20]张五常.企业的合约性质[M].商务印书馆,2000
[21]丁力.交易成本研究综述[J].财经界,2006,9:119-120
[22]路易斯.普特曼等.企业的经济性质[M].上海财经大学出版社,2000
[23]Mitchell.A & Wood.D,Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the principle of who and what really counts[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):853-886
[24]杨瑞龙,周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].经济科学出版社,2000,(8)
[25]Frederick,W C.Business and society,corporate strategy,public policy,ethics[J].McGraw-Hill Book Co.,1988
[26]寇小首.企业营销中的伦理问题研究[M].天津:天津人民出版社,2001
[27]Clarkson,M.A risk-based model of stakeholder theory.Proceedings of the Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory[J].Center for Corporate Social Performance and Ethics.University of Toronto,Toronto,Canada.1994
[28]Wheeler&Maria.1998.Including the stakeholders:the business case[J].Long Range Planning,31,(2):201-210
[29]威勒,张丽华译.利益相关者公司:利益相关者价值最大化之蓝图[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2002
[30]Mitchell.A & Wood.D,Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the principle of who and what really counts[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):853-886
[31]何维达.企业委托代理制的比较分析[M].北京:中国财政经济出版 社,1999:200-240
[32]郭志欣,汪海舰.建设项目治理理论探讨[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(6):44-46
[33]贺卫,伍山林.制度经济学[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2003:12-15
[34]杨瑞龙,周业安.交易费用与企业所有权分配合约的选择[J].经济研究,1998,(9):27-36
[35]吴家骏.公司治理结构研究中三种值得注意的倾向[J].当代财经,2003,(1):81
[36]杨经福.投资项目利益相关者分析[D].河海大学,2002,(3)
[37]郑仕华.石林风景区利益相关者及其协调机制研究[D].云南师范大学,2006,5
[38]王玉林.工程项目治理研究[D].河南:郑州大学,2005
[39]王华,尹贻林.基于委托—代理的工程项目治理结构及其优化[J].中国软科学,2004,(1)
[40]张新华,任玉龙.委托代理树——一种产业组织优化方法[J].软科学,2003,17(4):7-10
[41]王卓甫,简迎辉.工程项目管理——模式及其创新[M].中国水利水电出版社,2006
[42]王艳娜.工程项目Partnering模式的理论与应用研究[D].重庆大学,2006
[43]张维迎.企业的企业家—契约理论[M].上海人民出版社,2003
[44]周其仁.控制权汇报和企业家控制的企业[J].经济研究,1997,(5)
[45]李新春.企业家过程与国有企业的准企业家模型[J].经济研究,2006,(6)
[46]王宣喻,翟少发,李怀祖.私营企业内部治理结构的演变及其实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2004(1):70-77
[47]Aghion,Tirole.Formal and authority in organizations[J].Journal of Politial Economy,1997,(105):1-29
[48]姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,2003,(5):83-90
[49]罗能生,洪联英.人力资本产权优化与公司动态治理[J].财经理论与实践,2004,(5)
[50]张立君.企业利益相关者共同治理机制设计[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2002,(3):38-41
[51]周鹏,张宏志.利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构[J].经济研 究,2002(6):55-62
[52]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996
[53]王晓州.建设项目委托代理关系的经济学分析及激励与约束机制设计[J].中国软科学,2004,(6)
[54]郑志刚.声誉制度理论及其实践评述[J].经济学动态,2002,(5)
[55]许天戟,宋京豫.建筑伙伴的机理与实施的研究[J].基建优化,2002(2):12-17
[2]严玲,尹贻林.公共项目治理[M].天津大学出版社,2006
[3]TURNER.J.R,MULLER.R.On the nature of the project as a temporary organization[J].International Journal of Project Management,2001,(21):1-8
[4]JONAS SODERLUND.Building theories of projects management:past research question for future[J].International Journal of Project Management,2004,(22):183-191
[5]TURNER.J.R Communication and co-operation on projects between the project owner as principal and the project management as agent[J].European Management Journal,2004,(5)
[6]TURNER.J.R,KEEGAN.A.E.Mechanism of governance in the project-based organization:a transaction cost perspective[J].European Management Journal,2001,19(3):254-267
[7]http://www.apm.org.uk/resources/sigs/governance.htm
[8]TURNER.J.R,ANNE KEEGAN.The versatile project-based organization:governance and operational control[J].European Management Journal,1999,(3):296-309
[9]TURNER.J.R,SIMISTER.S.J.Project contract management and a theory of organization[J].International of Project Management,2001,(19)
[10]Winch.G.M.Institutional reform in British construction:partnering and private finance[J].International Journal of Building Research and Information,2000,28(2):141-155
[11]Winch.G.M.Governing the project process:a conceptual framework[J],Construction Management and Economics,2001,(19):799-808
[12]KEITH.LAMBERT.Project governance[J].World Project Management Week,2003
[13]江伟.工程项目管理中信息不对称的对策研究[D].华北电力大学,2003,(12)
[14]罗建华.我国国家投资建设项目业主代理模式及规范管理研究.湖南省自然科学基金项目(01JJY2121)
[15]杨飞雪、汪海舰、尹贻林.项目治理结构初探[J].中国软科学,2004,(3)
[16]严玲,尹贻林,范道津.公共项目治理理论概念模型的建立[J].中国软科学,2004,(6):130-136
[17]严玲,赵黎明.论项目治理理论体系的构建[J].上海经济研究,2005,(11):104-110
[18]Ronald H.Coase.The Nature of the Firm[J].Economical.N.S 1937
[19]Oliver E.Williamson.Comparative Ecomomic Organization:The Analysis of Dsicurete Structural Alternatives[J].Administrative Science Puarterly,1991b
[20]张五常.企业的合约性质[M].商务印书馆,2000
[21]丁力.交易成本研究综述[J].财经界,2006,9:119-120
[22]路易斯.普特曼等.企业的经济性质[M].上海财经大学出版社,2000
[23]Mitchell.A & Wood.D,Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the principle of who and what really counts[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):853-886
[24]杨瑞龙,周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].经济科学出版社,2000,(8)
[25]Frederick,W C.Business and society,corporate strategy,public policy,ethics[J].McGraw-Hill Book Co.,1988
[26]寇小首.企业营销中的伦理问题研究[M].天津:天津人民出版社,2001
[27]Clarkson,M.A risk-based model of stakeholder theory.Proceedings of the Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory[J].Center for Corporate Social Performance and Ethics.University of Toronto,Toronto,Canada.1994
[28]Wheeler&Maria.1998.Including the stakeholders:the business case[J].Long Range Planning,31,(2):201-210
[29]威勒,张丽华译.利益相关者公司:利益相关者价值最大化之蓝图[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2002
[30]Mitchell.A & Wood.D,Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the principle of who and what really counts[J].Academy of Management Review,1997,22(4):853-886
[31]何维达.企业委托代理制的比较分析[M].北京:中国财政经济出版 社,1999:200-240
[32]郭志欣,汪海舰.建设项目治理理论探讨[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(6):44-46
[33]贺卫,伍山林.制度经济学[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2003:12-15
[34]杨瑞龙,周业安.交易费用与企业所有权分配合约的选择[J].经济研究,1998,(9):27-36
[35]吴家骏.公司治理结构研究中三种值得注意的倾向[J].当代财经,2003,(1):81
[36]杨经福.投资项目利益相关者分析[D].河海大学,2002,(3)
[37]郑仕华.石林风景区利益相关者及其协调机制研究[D].云南师范大学,2006,5
[38]王玉林.工程项目治理研究[D].河南:郑州大学,2005
[39]王华,尹贻林.基于委托—代理的工程项目治理结构及其优化[J].中国软科学,2004,(1)
[40]张新华,任玉龙.委托代理树——一种产业组织优化方法[J].软科学,2003,17(4):7-10
[41]王卓甫,简迎辉.工程项目管理——模式及其创新[M].中国水利水电出版社,2006
[42]王艳娜.工程项目Partnering模式的理论与应用研究[D].重庆大学,2006
[43]张维迎.企业的企业家—契约理论[M].上海人民出版社,2003
[44]周其仁.控制权汇报和企业家控制的企业[J].经济研究,1997,(5)
[45]李新春.企业家过程与国有企业的准企业家模型[J].经济研究,2006,(6)
[46]王宣喻,翟少发,李怀祖.私营企业内部治理结构的演变及其实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2004(1):70-77
[47]Aghion,Tirole.Formal and authority in organizations[J].Journal of Politial Economy,1997,(105):1-29
[48]姚伟,黄卓,郭磊.公司治理理论前沿综述[J].经济研究,2003,(5):83-90
[49]罗能生,洪联英.人力资本产权优化与公司动态治理[J].财经理论与实践,2004,(5)
[50]张立君.企业利益相关者共同治理机制设计[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2002,(3):38-41
[51]周鹏,张宏志.利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构[J].经济研 究,2002(6):55-62
[52]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996
[53]王晓州.建设项目委托代理关系的经济学分析及激励与约束机制设计[J].中国软科学,2004,(6)
[54]郑志刚.声誉制度理论及其实践评述[J].经济学动态,2002,(5)
[55]许天戟,宋京豫.建筑伙伴的机理与实施的研究[J].基建优化,2002(2):12-17