中美两国证券监管制度比较研究
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摘要
现代金融体系随着证券市场在各国的迅速发展壮大，传统的金融架构正向现代的金融架构转换，即金融制度基础从以银行体系为主转向以证券市场为核心，证券市场的功能、作用正得到越来越多的关注。同时，证券市场本身又具有的高风险、高流动性特征以及跨境波动联动性，金融监管的重心因此也越来越向证券市场倾斜。我国证券市场经历了二十多年的发展，取得了巨大的成就，但也存在非常多的问题，由于“新兴加转轨”的市场特点，加上我国证券发展也是在摸索中前进，从发行到上市、从基金监管到期货监管，从制度创新到风险防控的兼顾与平衡等一系列的问题，还存在着一定的不足甚至是缺陷，需要不断学习、借鉴、完善、提高。
美国作为成熟资本市场的典型代表，在证券监管领域积累深厚的经验，虽然中美两国在法律制度、资本市场成熟程度等诸多方面有差异性，但从证券监管角度出发，监管的目的、监管的目标和主要监管手段有相同性、可比性、可借鉴性。在上述背景下，深入系统地探讨中国和美国之间证券监管制度的区别和联系，借鉴发达和成熟的金融市场的经验，对促进我国证券监管体系的改革和完善将具有极其现实的重大意义。为了能体现出中美监管制度的可比性，本文主要在分析中美两国证券监管差异性的基础上，筛选出可比性的内容，重点选取股票市场、基金市场和期货市场这三大代表性市场，作为证券监管实务论述的主要切入点。
此外，2008年席卷世界的金融危机暴露了金融体系的脆弱和金融监管的缺位，作为危机诞生地的美国政府对金融监管体系进行了认真总结和及时调整，包括证券监管政策在内的各项金融监管政策得到不断完善和修正。美国金融危机举世瞩目，美国对金融监管制度的完善更是得到全世界的高度关注。2008年下半年时任总统小布什发布了改革金融监管体系的计划、2009年6月新任总统奥巴马正式公布金融监管体系改革方案、2010年7月21日，奥巴马签署颁布了《金融监管改革法》，这一系列的改革，被世界金融界、学术界和监管机关认为是近八十年以来对美国金融业影响最广泛的金融监管制度改革。“它山之石，可以攻玉”，对其进行深层次的分析、研究，将对我国证券制度的完善提供非常有益的帮助，本文在这方面也予以了重点分析。
我国目前金融监管体系与美国现行分业监管体系比较类似，主要由人民银行、银监会、证监会和保监会（即俗称的“一行三会”）负责，在本轮全球金融危机中，我国金融监管体系充分发挥各自的监管职能，为我国金融体系的整体稳定发挥了重要作用。同时，我们也应看到，我国本轮金融未出现大的波动也与资本流动跨境管制、金融衍生品不多、政府刺激经济政策、政府信用无限背书、房地产资产价格近10年基本呈现单边上涨等有关。如果我们的市场成熟、开放到一定程度，我们是否能抵御这轮危机的冲击。此外，我国证券市场作为新兴加转轨的市场，本身存在监管不足、监管过度甚至监管失败的风险，需要不断学习借鉴相关成熟市场关于金融危机应对的经验和教训，不断提高监管水平。
在研究方法层面，本文主要采用了比较研究方法和规范研究的方法。进行理论研究的基本方法之一是采用比较的方法。同样，进行证券监管理论研究的常用方法也是采用比较分析方法。本文的比较对象，是两个有较大区别但存在密切相关的证券市场监管制度。比较的目的是研究和分析在各种背景共同性下生长的特殊形态和某种意义上的一般性，而不是把某两种制度模式或类型进行强加。其实，因文化选择的不同，人们在解决证券的上市监管与发行、信息公开制度等这些不同国家或地区面临的共同问题时，所持的立场、态度以及方法等都有所不同，我们应当重视在解决那些共同问题时不同制度下的不同处理方式，并关注不同制度类型相近似的地方。因此，认识金融监管的特征和揭示共同表象下不同意义的有效方法就是比较分析方法。
本文在理论研究方面，涉及了市场失灵经济理论、虚拟经济向实体经济的风险传导效应的经济学分析和交易费用经济学理论、委托代理经济学理论、公共选择理论、金融脆弱理论和有效资本市场理论，从国家干预角度，提出了证券监管目标的经济学意义。通过中美两国证券监管制度对比研究，本文提出成熟市场的经验一再证明，证券监管的目标应该比较明确：一是确保市场公平、有效和透明，二是保护投资者合法利益，三是依法查处违法违规行为，四是预防和化解系统性风险。我国证券监管不能再自身定位不清。
在股票市场监管方面，通过对比研究提出，中美两国股票市场的差异性是比较明显的，一是法律制度基础不同；二是上市公司结构不一样，美国上市公司股权相对分散，中国上市公司股权明显集中，持股30%以上的大股东比例远高于美国；三是资本市场发展程度不一样，美国市场比较成熟，市场化程度高，中国资本市场发展仅二十几年，市场化程度和制度完善性与美国差距较大，上市公司在中国明显是稀缺资源；四是两国投资者结构、投资者投资目的有一定差异。但是，中美两国股票市场是有可比性的，是有借鉴性的，主要体现在以下几方面：一是资本市场的功能定位是基本一致的，都是发挥配置资源功能；二是证券监管的主要方式和主要目标各国是有一定一致性的；三是全球化和全球资本流动，推动了各国资本市场制度规则的一致性、协调性；四是证券监管在成为上市公司等市场准入发挥的作用是一致的，仅是市场准入门槛高低和监管效果的期望值不一样。中美股票市场监管差别的核心，不仅仅是一个IPO核准制和注册制的区别，而是能否在认识自身市场发展特征基础上，坚持市场化机制导向、坚持提供和维护“三公”（公平、公正、公开）市场环境。但是，产生上述问题的原因是多方面的，包括一是市场诞生时间不长、市场发展较快，证券监管是舶来品，在实践中学习，在实践中领会，甚至很长时间不知道什么是监管、怎样监管；二是对自身定位不清，甚至国家更高层面对证券市场定位不清，曾经是为国企改制、国企改革、国有银行改制服务，又变更为定位于要特别保护中小投资者利益，一度力图提供公平、公正的市场环境，但又被我国现行法制、诚信环境所困扰，不得不削足适履；三是对外学习不精不透，最先是自己闭门造车琢磨监管，后来是学习西方，但对西方学习的不精不透，甚至出现过在没有完全了解人家系统制度的基础上拿人家的一个条款当所谓“国际惯例”在国内生搬硬套，造成水土不服，又继续否定、修改、完善；四是尽管提倡要结合中国国情因地制宜开展监管工作，但对现状、国情认知、分析不透，经常是无从下手；五是监管独立性和权威性不够，我国各部委行政权力很大，影响证券市场监管政策的“婆婆”很多，包括人民银行、财政部、发改委等，还有独具中国特色的国资委，上述机关的政策对证券市场的影响均很大，证监会同这些老部委、大部委比起来是小部委，在宏观经济管理层面发挥的作用很小；五是市场发展程度超前于监管，我国是一些问题没关注，一些问题又管制过度，监管政策或监管方向经常会出现迷惑、困惑、摇摆。因此，有必要正本清源，明确监管定位，完善相关监管措施。
在基金监管方面，通过对比分析总结出中美两国证券投资基金市场的差异性是比较明显的，既有法律制度基础不同，又有资本市场发展程度不一样，还有市场投资风格不一致导致的基金投资习惯的差异。但中美两国基金市场是有可比性的，是有借鉴性的，主要体现在以下几方面：一是基金投资目的的一致性；二是证券监管的主要方式和主要目标各国是有一定一致性的；三是基金投资方式、基金通过上市公司信息披露获取信息的渠道是有一致性的；四是基金公司内控、规范性要求是一致的。我国基金监管目前最核心的问题是要跳出所谓培育基金市场的怪论，监管就是监管，让监管回归本源，现在最大的问题是监管机构像行业的主管机构，监管部门去“越位”承担促进基金发展的职能，所以监管职责不清，对该处罚的未处罚或从轻处罚，对该监管的监管不到位，不该管的管制太多。在行业管制方面，基金监管一度是从基金经理任职资格到高管任职资格再到股东变更，从章程条款修改到基金产品的广告统统要求审批，监管变成行业高度管制，需要彻底的解放思想，需要彻底的接受市场化培训，虽然2012年修订的《证券投资者基金法》已经对此纠偏、修正，但证券监管工作人员脑海里的传统思路也应一并修正、完善。此外，要强化执法、处罚制度，对于我国基金市场经常暴露出来的基金公司“老鼠仓”、帮私募接盘等问题，必须严格执法，必须让执业人员敬畏法律。第三是要强化基金公司内控制度，市场发展快导致年轻的研究员没经历太多的历练就走上基金经理的工作岗位、基金经理有效驾驭能力差的情况屡屡暴露、基金投资散户化、公募基金内部管理水平老国企化、工作不尽责但高收入等问题应得到充分重视。
在期货监管方面，我国的期货监管是与美国有较大不一样的，首先是期货监管的监管机构不一样,其次是我们没有期货监管法律层面的制度规定，但是由于商品期货价格跨境联动式高度一致的，甚至远高于股票市场和基金市场，我们形成了比较成熟的商品期货监管制度，但同时，我们要充分认识衍生品期货、类期货产品的重要性和复杂性，抓紧推动《期货监管法》的制订发布，积极稳妥发展金融衍生产品。
美国金融危机由于其体制的原因，风险爆发有一定时间积累性和必然性，但是并不是不可避免的。在深入剖析美国金融危机诞生原因和证券监管制度完善的背景、举措后，本文从宏观和微观两个角度提出了对我国证券监管制度完善的建议。此外，对我国证券市场的风险评判，本文提出：单独看股票、基金和期货市场，目前来看中国资本市场单独、直接发生金融危机的概率不大，况且我们有明显更严格、更高的上市核准制度，上市市场准入门槛较高，造假上市公司虽不能完全杜绝，但比例很低，业绩造假公司风险暴露引发系统风险的概率很低。但同时要对相关风险进行系统、有预见的分析，应对危机需要未雨绸缪，危机也不是百分之百预测出来，更不能因为感觉没有危机或预测没有危机就不去考虑危机的应对。因此,本文最后提出,证券监管工作是一个越来越复杂、一个永无止境、一个越来越有挑战的工作，需要持之以恒的在实践中不断学习、吸收、总结、纠正、完善、提高。
With the rapid development of the security markets in many countries, the traditionalfinancial structure has been transferring to a modern one, as the basis of financial system ischanging from bank system to the securities market, which caused more and more attention toits function and effect. As the security market has the characters of high-risk, high-liquidityand interaction between markets, financial regulation has put more emphasis on it. Havingbeen developed for more than20years, our security market have made great achievements,but also has a lot of questions. Since our capital market is in the special period of emergingand transition, as well as fumbling in practice, there are some questions, and even defects inthe fields of Public Offering and listing, fund and futures management, in the balancingbetween institutional innovation and risk managements, which needs further studying,enhancing and improving.
As the typical respective of mature capital market, American has profound experience inthe security regulation experience. Though there are some differences in the legal system andthe maturity of capital market between US and China, from the perspective of securitysupervision, there are some similarity and comparability in the purpose of target and themethods of the regulation. Under this background, studing the difference and similaritybetween US and China security regulation system is extremely important to improve andenhance the reformation of our security regulation system. Based on the comparative study ofUS and China security regulation system, this paper selects the security market, fund marketand future market respectively, as the breakthrough point of the statement of securityregulation practice.
The global financial crisis in2008revealed the fragility of the global financial system.Being the source of the crisis, US government has made careful self-examination, timelyadjustment and relative financial regulation polices including security regulation. Theseimprovements as well as the US financial crisis have caused high attention to the whole world.In the latter half of2008, President Bush announced the blueprint of financial regulatorysystem reformation, In June2009, the reformation proposal was officially put forward by theObama government. On July21st of2010, the financial regulatory reform bill went intoforce after being signed by President Obama. This Act is now deemed by the financialcircles, academic circles and regulatory authorities as the most influential and comprehensiveact in the near80years. Therefore, to in-depth study and research it,will be beneficial for theimprovement of our financial regulatory system，so this paper also put an emphasis on it.
Similar to the US separate business management, the financial regulatory system ofChina basically consists of the people's bank, China Banking Regulatory Commission(CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and China Insurance RegulatoryCommission (CIRC). In this round of financial crisis, by going effectively about theirrespective terms of references, the regulatory institutions played an important role to maintainthe stability of the financial system.
However, we should clearly note that the effectiveness of our financial regulators andthe stability of our financial market are closely related to the control of capital account,limited kinds of financial derivatives, the massive economic stimulus plan, the stronggovernmental support, and the unilateral rise in the price of real property assets. Think of ifwe have had a mature and open market, if we can resist from the crisis. Furthermore, as amarket in the period of emerging and transition, there exists the risk of Inadequate and overregulation, even regulatory failure, so it is necessary to keep on studying from the maturemarkets on the experience and lessons of how to deal with the financial crisis, so as toimprove the level of regulation.
From the perspective of methodology, this paper mainly uses comparative study andnormative research. Comparative study is one of the basic methods of theoretical study, aswell as a normal method in the study of security regulatory theories. The compare objects ofthis paper, are two securities regulatory system which has big difference but relates closely.The purpose of comparison is to study the special and similar form under variousbackgrounds, but not to impose the two systems together. In fact, because of the difference ofculture, people from different countries and districts usually hold different views and usedifferent methods to solve even the same problem in public offering and listing regulation,information disclosure regulations. We should put emphasis on these differences, as well asthe similarities under different type of regulation system. Comparative study is the effectivemethod to learn the characters of financial regulation and to reveal the difference under thesame appearance.
For the theoretical study, the paper involves the economic theory of market failure,analysis of risk conduction effect of the virtual economy to the real economy and transactioncost theory, the principal-agent theory, public choice theory, financial fragility theory andeffective capital market theory. From the view of government intervention, this paper putforwards the economic value of securities regulatory aim. Based on the comparative study ofUS and China securities regulatory system, the paper made the point that, the regulationobjectives should be clear and definite to protect the benefits of investors, to ensure themarket fair, efficient and transparent, to investigate and punish illegal acts, and to prevent andresolve of systemic risk. Our securities regulators can not posit themselves unclearly anyfurther.
In the stock market supervision, the comparative study shows that the differencesbetween US and China stock markets are relatively obvious; firstly, the basis of legal systemis different. Secondly, the structures of listed companies is different, the Us listing companies'ownership is relatively decentralized, while in china is obviously centralized, the ratio of themain shareholders who owns more than30%stock of a company is much higher in Chinathan in US. Thirdly, the development extent of capital market is different, the US market ismore mature and highly market-based, while china capital market has been only developedfor2o years and has a big gap in the degree of market and perfecting of the system, since thatthe listed companies is a rare source in china. Fourthly, the structure and the aim of theinvestors are different in two countries. But on the other hand, there still some similarities inthe two markets, mainly in the following aspects: firstly, the function orientation of the capitalmarket is basically the same, which is to play the functions of resource allocation. Secondly,the main mode and the main goal of the securities supervision is consist. Thirdly, theglobalization and global capital flow have promoted the consistency and coordination of thecapital market system rules. Finally, the securities regulation has played the same role inmarket access of listing companies, only the market access threshold level and the regulatoryeffect of expectation values are not the same。The main gap between US and China securitiesregulation, is not only IPO approval or registration system, but also whether can adhere onmarket-oriented mechanism, can provide and maintain fair, justice, open market environment,based on the understanding of their own market characteristics. There are several factors thatcause the gap, firstly, since it is only a short period after the market set up, which developsvery fast, there is a period that we don't even know what is the supervision, how to regulate,securities regulation is an exotic, which should keep learning in practice, grasping inpractice.Secondly, orientation of the stock market's role is unclear, even the nationalgovernment made it unclear, it has been served for the restructuring of state-owned enterprises,the reform of state-owned enterprises, the state-owned bank reform, then changed itsorientation into protection to minor shareholders' interest, it has been working to provide afair market environment, but at the same time
troubled by China's current legal system, credit environment, which leads to cut its feetto fit the shoes. Thirdly, we have not studied profoundly. In the early times, we did theresearch by ourself.; later we began to learn from the west, but not precisely and thoroughly. Ithas even happened that we have copied from one of the rules as International practice to usein the homeland without understanding their whole regulation system, as result, it causeAnticipated, and has to be denied, modified, perfected, Fourthly, though it is encouraged thatregulation should be adapted to the China conditions, but it is not clear that what theconditions, so it is hard to find the right point. Fifthly, regulatory independence and authorityis not strong enough. The Administrative power of the ministries of China is strong, there are several ministries that has hands on the stock market supervision, including the people'sBank of China, the Ministry of finance, the national development and Reform Commission, aswell as State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which is uniqueChinese characteristics. These ministries have great influential on stock market. On the otherside,CSRC is relatively young, and have limited effect on macro economics management.Finally, market develops faster than regulation, sometimes over-regulate, sometimes there isvacancy. Thesepolices and target are changed constantly. It is necessary to make clear theposition, the target and enhance the regulation tools.
In the fund market supervision, the comparative study shows that the difference betweenUS and China fund markets is relatively obvious, the basis of legal system, the level of capitalmarket developments, and the market investment style caused by the inconsistency of fundinvestment habits are all different. habitat caused by the difference is different. But on theother hand, there still some similarities in the two markets, mainly in the following aspects:firstly, the consistency of the fund investment objective, secondly, the main mode and mainobjectives of the securities supervision. Thirdly, the way of fund investment and they use thelisting Corporation information disclosure as information channel. Fourthly, the fundcompany internal control, regulatory requirements are the same.The core problem of fundregulation is to pass away the weird theory of cultivation of fund market, to return to theoriginal target of supervision. The problem is regulatory commission is just like theIndustrial authorities, off side take the responsibility to improve the development of fund, butvacancy in where he should do. In the aspect of industry administration, it has been charge ofthe approval of fund manager qualification, SM qualification, shareholder change,modifyarticles and even the advertisement. of fund. The fund market is regulated strictly, whichshould be change totally. Though in2012, Securities investors fund law has modified aboutthis, but the regulators mind should change accordingly. On the other hand, the commissionsshould increasei the law enforcement, to vow to crack down on "rat trading " and help thePrivate equity fund by fund management companies. Finally, the internal control of fundcompanies should be strengthened. The rapid development of market results in that manyyoung researchers take the responsibility as the fund manager without enough experience andability. The problem of the under-quantified of fund manager, thatindividual investors becomethe main investors of the funds, the poor level of public fund managers, high salary withouttaking responsibility, should be paid full attention.
In the future market supervision, there are relatively big difference between US and ourcountry, first, the institution in charge of regulation is different, Second, we have no rules atthe legal level of future regulate, but due to high consistence of commodity futures prices ofcross-border interlocking, which is even higher that the stock market and fund market, thecommodity future supervision system is relatively mature. However, we should recognize the importance and complexity of the future derivatives, promote the Futures supervision law toissue quickly, so as to develop the financial derivative products actively and safely.
Due to the system problems, the financial crisis of US has been accumulated for somecertain time and the outbreak of it is sooner or later, but it is not Inevitable. Based on in-depthstudy of the causes of American financial crisis and the background of enhancement of thesecurities regulation system, the paper makes the suggestion of how to improve ours from themacro and micro prospects. Moreover, the paper suggests that, the risk of a financial crisisthat happens originally and singly in our country is low in our capital market, due to thestrictly requirement to be listed and the
listing approval system. Though we cannot prevent fraud definitely but the ratio is low,so that the probability of systemic risk caused by a exposure of fraud is very low.However, we should analyze the risks systematically and predictability. First, whether theindividual problem of an industrial can cause the group problem. For example, in2012, listedcompanies in the photovoltaic industry loss collectively, a company of the Small andmedium-sized plate went to liquidity risk and could not pay the interests of bond of a billion.If there were several such companies in the industrial, the confidence of investors woulddiminish in investing in some industrial or some kind of investment products(such asbond).Second, the impact on the stock index of major bad news by the big marketcapitalization company and heavyweights. For instance, in2012, the plasticizer problem ofKweichow Moutai, which is listed in Shanghai Stock Market, and the media false reportsabout Kangmei pharmaceutical, have caused the stock price go down in the same day and thefollowing several days, and also blow hardly to the whole industry, even though the problemshave been clarified lately. Think of that if the reports were true and concentrated in theindustry leading companies, whether it would produce a chain reaction.Third,if the short salesand stock index futures short mechanism may cause superposition.
Margin financing and stock index futures is a new thing in China's capital market, whichhas only existed for3years. There is a process for the investors and speculators to know it,and after that, if they become familiar about them, short sales and stock index futuresspeculation act together with the bad news released by the listed companies, may cause thestock index goes down deeply or not. Finally, since the bond market is not uniform, thebond rating agencies are not professional and the information disclosure platform are notunified, we may think of whether there will be a risk in some bond market of major industries.As mentioned above, the Photovoltaic listed company has3billions of bank debt, a billion oflisted company debt, and rating agency rated it AA when it issued bonds. Because of risk ofsuperposition,it would be extremely horrible if the company had applied for the issuance ofcorporate bonds at the national development and Reform Commission, the medium-termnotes at the people's Bank at the same time,So the unified platform of bond market information disclosure, the listing Corporation governance and the bond rating regulationare very important, since these are all factors that may cause system risk. We should be readyto face the crisis before it really happens,since crisis is not one hundred percent predictions.As a conclusion, the paper argues that securities regulation will become more and morecomplex, more challenging, we have to keeping learning, absorbing, summarizing,correcting, and improving in practice.
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美国作为成熟资本市场的典型代表，在证券监管领域积累深厚的经验，虽然中美两国在法律制度、资本市场成熟程度等诸多方面有差异性，但从证券监管角度出发，监管的目的、监管的目标和主要监管手段有相同性、可比性、可借鉴性。在上述背景下，深入系统地探讨中国和美国之间证券监管制度的区别和联系，借鉴发达和成熟的金融市场的经验，对促进我国证券监管体系的改革和完善将具有极其现实的重大意义。为了能体现出中美监管制度的可比性，本文主要在分析中美两国证券监管差异性的基础上，筛选出可比性的内容，重点选取股票市场、基金市场和期货市场这三大代表性市场，作为证券监管实务论述的主要切入点。
此外，2008年席卷世界的金融危机暴露了金融体系的脆弱和金融监管的缺位，作为危机诞生地的美国政府对金融监管体系进行了认真总结和及时调整，包括证券监管政策在内的各项金融监管政策得到不断完善和修正。美国金融危机举世瞩目，美国对金融监管制度的完善更是得到全世界的高度关注。2008年下半年时任总统小布什发布了改革金融监管体系的计划、2009年6月新任总统奥巴马正式公布金融监管体系改革方案、2010年7月21日，奥巴马签署颁布了《金融监管改革法》，这一系列的改革，被世界金融界、学术界和监管机关认为是近八十年以来对美国金融业影响最广泛的金融监管制度改革。“它山之石，可以攻玉”，对其进行深层次的分析、研究，将对我国证券制度的完善提供非常有益的帮助，本文在这方面也予以了重点分析。
我国目前金融监管体系与美国现行分业监管体系比较类似，主要由人民银行、银监会、证监会和保监会（即俗称的“一行三会”）负责，在本轮全球金融危机中，我国金融监管体系充分发挥各自的监管职能，为我国金融体系的整体稳定发挥了重要作用。同时，我们也应看到，我国本轮金融未出现大的波动也与资本流动跨境管制、金融衍生品不多、政府刺激经济政策、政府信用无限背书、房地产资产价格近10年基本呈现单边上涨等有关。如果我们的市场成熟、开放到一定程度，我们是否能抵御这轮危机的冲击。此外，我国证券市场作为新兴加转轨的市场，本身存在监管不足、监管过度甚至监管失败的风险，需要不断学习借鉴相关成熟市场关于金融危机应对的经验和教训，不断提高监管水平。
在研究方法层面，本文主要采用了比较研究方法和规范研究的方法。进行理论研究的基本方法之一是采用比较的方法。同样，进行证券监管理论研究的常用方法也是采用比较分析方法。本文的比较对象，是两个有较大区别但存在密切相关的证券市场监管制度。比较的目的是研究和分析在各种背景共同性下生长的特殊形态和某种意义上的一般性，而不是把某两种制度模式或类型进行强加。其实，因文化选择的不同，人们在解决证券的上市监管与发行、信息公开制度等这些不同国家或地区面临的共同问题时，所持的立场、态度以及方法等都有所不同，我们应当重视在解决那些共同问题时不同制度下的不同处理方式，并关注不同制度类型相近似的地方。因此，认识金融监管的特征和揭示共同表象下不同意义的有效方法就是比较分析方法。
本文在理论研究方面，涉及了市场失灵经济理论、虚拟经济向实体经济的风险传导效应的经济学分析和交易费用经济学理论、委托代理经济学理论、公共选择理论、金融脆弱理论和有效资本市场理论，从国家干预角度，提出了证券监管目标的经济学意义。通过中美两国证券监管制度对比研究，本文提出成熟市场的经验一再证明，证券监管的目标应该比较明确：一是确保市场公平、有效和透明，二是保护投资者合法利益，三是依法查处违法违规行为，四是预防和化解系统性风险。我国证券监管不能再自身定位不清。
在股票市场监管方面，通过对比研究提出，中美两国股票市场的差异性是比较明显的，一是法律制度基础不同；二是上市公司结构不一样，美国上市公司股权相对分散，中国上市公司股权明显集中，持股30%以上的大股东比例远高于美国；三是资本市场发展程度不一样，美国市场比较成熟，市场化程度高，中国资本市场发展仅二十几年，市场化程度和制度完善性与美国差距较大，上市公司在中国明显是稀缺资源；四是两国投资者结构、投资者投资目的有一定差异。但是，中美两国股票市场是有可比性的，是有借鉴性的，主要体现在以下几方面：一是资本市场的功能定位是基本一致的，都是发挥配置资源功能；二是证券监管的主要方式和主要目标各国是有一定一致性的；三是全球化和全球资本流动，推动了各国资本市场制度规则的一致性、协调性；四是证券监管在成为上市公司等市场准入发挥的作用是一致的，仅是市场准入门槛高低和监管效果的期望值不一样。中美股票市场监管差别的核心，不仅仅是一个IPO核准制和注册制的区别，而是能否在认识自身市场发展特征基础上，坚持市场化机制导向、坚持提供和维护“三公”（公平、公正、公开）市场环境。但是，产生上述问题的原因是多方面的，包括一是市场诞生时间不长、市场发展较快，证券监管是舶来品，在实践中学习，在实践中领会，甚至很长时间不知道什么是监管、怎样监管；二是对自身定位不清，甚至国家更高层面对证券市场定位不清，曾经是为国企改制、国企改革、国有银行改制服务，又变更为定位于要特别保护中小投资者利益，一度力图提供公平、公正的市场环境，但又被我国现行法制、诚信环境所困扰，不得不削足适履；三是对外学习不精不透，最先是自己闭门造车琢磨监管，后来是学习西方，但对西方学习的不精不透，甚至出现过在没有完全了解人家系统制度的基础上拿人家的一个条款当所谓“国际惯例”在国内生搬硬套，造成水土不服，又继续否定、修改、完善；四是尽管提倡要结合中国国情因地制宜开展监管工作，但对现状、国情认知、分析不透，经常是无从下手；五是监管独立性和权威性不够，我国各部委行政权力很大，影响证券市场监管政策的“婆婆”很多，包括人民银行、财政部、发改委等，还有独具中国特色的国资委，上述机关的政策对证券市场的影响均很大，证监会同这些老部委、大部委比起来是小部委，在宏观经济管理层面发挥的作用很小；五是市场发展程度超前于监管，我国是一些问题没关注，一些问题又管制过度，监管政策或监管方向经常会出现迷惑、困惑、摇摆。因此，有必要正本清源，明确监管定位，完善相关监管措施。
在基金监管方面，通过对比分析总结出中美两国证券投资基金市场的差异性是比较明显的，既有法律制度基础不同，又有资本市场发展程度不一样，还有市场投资风格不一致导致的基金投资习惯的差异。但中美两国基金市场是有可比性的，是有借鉴性的，主要体现在以下几方面：一是基金投资目的的一致性；二是证券监管的主要方式和主要目标各国是有一定一致性的；三是基金投资方式、基金通过上市公司信息披露获取信息的渠道是有一致性的；四是基金公司内控、规范性要求是一致的。我国基金监管目前最核心的问题是要跳出所谓培育基金市场的怪论，监管就是监管，让监管回归本源，现在最大的问题是监管机构像行业的主管机构，监管部门去“越位”承担促进基金发展的职能，所以监管职责不清，对该处罚的未处罚或从轻处罚，对该监管的监管不到位，不该管的管制太多。在行业管制方面，基金监管一度是从基金经理任职资格到高管任职资格再到股东变更，从章程条款修改到基金产品的广告统统要求审批，监管变成行业高度管制，需要彻底的解放思想，需要彻底的接受市场化培训，虽然2012年修订的《证券投资者基金法》已经对此纠偏、修正，但证券监管工作人员脑海里的传统思路也应一并修正、完善。此外，要强化执法、处罚制度，对于我国基金市场经常暴露出来的基金公司“老鼠仓”、帮私募接盘等问题，必须严格执法，必须让执业人员敬畏法律。第三是要强化基金公司内控制度，市场发展快导致年轻的研究员没经历太多的历练就走上基金经理的工作岗位、基金经理有效驾驭能力差的情况屡屡暴露、基金投资散户化、公募基金内部管理水平老国企化、工作不尽责但高收入等问题应得到充分重视。
在期货监管方面，我国的期货监管是与美国有较大不一样的，首先是期货监管的监管机构不一样,其次是我们没有期货监管法律层面的制度规定，但是由于商品期货价格跨境联动式高度一致的，甚至远高于股票市场和基金市场，我们形成了比较成熟的商品期货监管制度，但同时，我们要充分认识衍生品期货、类期货产品的重要性和复杂性，抓紧推动《期货监管法》的制订发布，积极稳妥发展金融衍生产品。
美国金融危机由于其体制的原因，风险爆发有一定时间积累性和必然性，但是并不是不可避免的。在深入剖析美国金融危机诞生原因和证券监管制度完善的背景、举措后，本文从宏观和微观两个角度提出了对我国证券监管制度完善的建议。此外，对我国证券市场的风险评判，本文提出：单独看股票、基金和期货市场，目前来看中国资本市场单独、直接发生金融危机的概率不大，况且我们有明显更严格、更高的上市核准制度，上市市场准入门槛较高，造假上市公司虽不能完全杜绝，但比例很低，业绩造假公司风险暴露引发系统风险的概率很低。但同时要对相关风险进行系统、有预见的分析，应对危机需要未雨绸缪，危机也不是百分之百预测出来，更不能因为感觉没有危机或预测没有危机就不去考虑危机的应对。因此,本文最后提出,证券监管工作是一个越来越复杂、一个永无止境、一个越来越有挑战的工作，需要持之以恒的在实践中不断学习、吸收、总结、纠正、完善、提高。
With the rapid development of the security markets in many countries, the traditionalfinancial structure has been transferring to a modern one, as the basis of financial system ischanging from bank system to the securities market, which caused more and more attention toits function and effect. As the security market has the characters of high-risk, high-liquidityand interaction between markets, financial regulation has put more emphasis on it. Havingbeen developed for more than20years, our security market have made great achievements,but also has a lot of questions. Since our capital market is in the special period of emergingand transition, as well as fumbling in practice, there are some questions, and even defects inthe fields of Public Offering and listing, fund and futures management, in the balancingbetween institutional innovation and risk managements, which needs further studying,enhancing and improving.
As the typical respective of mature capital market, American has profound experience inthe security regulation experience. Though there are some differences in the legal system andthe maturity of capital market between US and China, from the perspective of securitysupervision, there are some similarity and comparability in the purpose of target and themethods of the regulation. Under this background, studing the difference and similaritybetween US and China security regulation system is extremely important to improve andenhance the reformation of our security regulation system. Based on the comparative study ofUS and China security regulation system, this paper selects the security market, fund marketand future market respectively, as the breakthrough point of the statement of securityregulation practice.
The global financial crisis in2008revealed the fragility of the global financial system.Being the source of the crisis, US government has made careful self-examination, timelyadjustment and relative financial regulation polices including security regulation. Theseimprovements as well as the US financial crisis have caused high attention to the whole world.In the latter half of2008, President Bush announced the blueprint of financial regulatorysystem reformation, In June2009, the reformation proposal was officially put forward by theObama government. On July21st of2010, the financial regulatory reform bill went intoforce after being signed by President Obama. This Act is now deemed by the financialcircles, academic circles and regulatory authorities as the most influential and comprehensiveact in the near80years. Therefore, to in-depth study and research it,will be beneficial for theimprovement of our financial regulatory system，so this paper also put an emphasis on it.
Similar to the US separate business management, the financial regulatory system ofChina basically consists of the people's bank, China Banking Regulatory Commission(CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and China Insurance RegulatoryCommission (CIRC). In this round of financial crisis, by going effectively about theirrespective terms of references, the regulatory institutions played an important role to maintainthe stability of the financial system.
However, we should clearly note that the effectiveness of our financial regulators andthe stability of our financial market are closely related to the control of capital account,limited kinds of financial derivatives, the massive economic stimulus plan, the stronggovernmental support, and the unilateral rise in the price of real property assets. Think of ifwe have had a mature and open market, if we can resist from the crisis. Furthermore, as amarket in the period of emerging and transition, there exists the risk of Inadequate and overregulation, even regulatory failure, so it is necessary to keep on studying from the maturemarkets on the experience and lessons of how to deal with the financial crisis, so as toimprove the level of regulation.
From the perspective of methodology, this paper mainly uses comparative study andnormative research. Comparative study is one of the basic methods of theoretical study, aswell as a normal method in the study of security regulatory theories. The compare objects ofthis paper, are two securities regulatory system which has big difference but relates closely.The purpose of comparison is to study the special and similar form under variousbackgrounds, but not to impose the two systems together. In fact, because of the difference ofculture, people from different countries and districts usually hold different views and usedifferent methods to solve even the same problem in public offering and listing regulation,information disclosure regulations. We should put emphasis on these differences, as well asthe similarities under different type of regulation system. Comparative study is the effectivemethod to learn the characters of financial regulation and to reveal the difference under thesame appearance.
For the theoretical study, the paper involves the economic theory of market failure,analysis of risk conduction effect of the virtual economy to the real economy and transactioncost theory, the principal-agent theory, public choice theory, financial fragility theory andeffective capital market theory. From the view of government intervention, this paper putforwards the economic value of securities regulatory aim. Based on the comparative study ofUS and China securities regulatory system, the paper made the point that, the regulationobjectives should be clear and definite to protect the benefits of investors, to ensure themarket fair, efficient and transparent, to investigate and punish illegal acts, and to prevent andresolve of systemic risk. Our securities regulators can not posit themselves unclearly anyfurther.
In the stock market supervision, the comparative study shows that the differencesbetween US and China stock markets are relatively obvious; firstly, the basis of legal systemis different. Secondly, the structures of listed companies is different, the Us listing companies'ownership is relatively decentralized, while in china is obviously centralized, the ratio of themain shareholders who owns more than30%stock of a company is much higher in Chinathan in US. Thirdly, the development extent of capital market is different, the US market ismore mature and highly market-based, while china capital market has been only developedfor2o years and has a big gap in the degree of market and perfecting of the system, since thatthe listed companies is a rare source in china. Fourthly, the structure and the aim of theinvestors are different in two countries. But on the other hand, there still some similarities inthe two markets, mainly in the following aspects: firstly, the function orientation of the capitalmarket is basically the same, which is to play the functions of resource allocation. Secondly,the main mode and the main goal of the securities supervision is consist. Thirdly, theglobalization and global capital flow have promoted the consistency and coordination of thecapital market system rules. Finally, the securities regulation has played the same role inmarket access of listing companies, only the market access threshold level and the regulatoryeffect of expectation values are not the same。The main gap between US and China securitiesregulation, is not only IPO approval or registration system, but also whether can adhere onmarket-oriented mechanism, can provide and maintain fair, justice, open market environment,based on the understanding of their own market characteristics. There are several factors thatcause the gap, firstly, since it is only a short period after the market set up, which developsvery fast, there is a period that we don't even know what is the supervision, how to regulate,securities regulation is an exotic, which should keep learning in practice, grasping inpractice.Secondly, orientation of the stock market's role is unclear, even the nationalgovernment made it unclear, it has been served for the restructuring of state-owned enterprises,the reform of state-owned enterprises, the state-owned bank reform, then changed itsorientation into protection to minor shareholders' interest, it has been working to provide afair market environment, but at the same time
troubled by China's current legal system, credit environment, which leads to cut its feetto fit the shoes. Thirdly, we have not studied profoundly. In the early times, we did theresearch by ourself.; later we began to learn from the west, but not precisely and thoroughly. Ithas even happened that we have copied from one of the rules as International practice to usein the homeland without understanding their whole regulation system, as result, it causeAnticipated, and has to be denied, modified, perfected, Fourthly, though it is encouraged thatregulation should be adapted to the China conditions, but it is not clear that what theconditions, so it is hard to find the right point. Fifthly, regulatory independence and authorityis not strong enough. The Administrative power of the ministries of China is strong, there are several ministries that has hands on the stock market supervision, including the people'sBank of China, the Ministry of finance, the national development and Reform Commission, aswell as State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which is uniqueChinese characteristics. These ministries have great influential on stock market. On the otherside,CSRC is relatively young, and have limited effect on macro economics management.Finally, market develops faster than regulation, sometimes over-regulate, sometimes there isvacancy. Thesepolices and target are changed constantly. It is necessary to make clear theposition, the target and enhance the regulation tools.
In the fund market supervision, the comparative study shows that the difference betweenUS and China fund markets is relatively obvious, the basis of legal system, the level of capitalmarket developments, and the market investment style caused by the inconsistency of fundinvestment habits are all different. habitat caused by the difference is different. But on theother hand, there still some similarities in the two markets, mainly in the following aspects:firstly, the consistency of the fund investment objective, secondly, the main mode and mainobjectives of the securities supervision. Thirdly, the way of fund investment and they use thelisting Corporation information disclosure as information channel. Fourthly, the fundcompany internal control, regulatory requirements are the same.The core problem of fundregulation is to pass away the weird theory of cultivation of fund market, to return to theoriginal target of supervision. The problem is regulatory commission is just like theIndustrial authorities, off side take the responsibility to improve the development of fund, butvacancy in where he should do. In the aspect of industry administration, it has been charge ofthe approval of fund manager qualification, SM qualification, shareholder change,modifyarticles and even the advertisement. of fund. The fund market is regulated strictly, whichshould be change totally. Though in2012, Securities investors fund law has modified aboutthis, but the regulators mind should change accordingly. On the other hand, the commissionsshould increasei the law enforcement, to vow to crack down on "rat trading " and help thePrivate equity fund by fund management companies. Finally, the internal control of fundcompanies should be strengthened. The rapid development of market results in that manyyoung researchers take the responsibility as the fund manager without enough experience andability. The problem of the under-quantified of fund manager, thatindividual investors becomethe main investors of the funds, the poor level of public fund managers, high salary withouttaking responsibility, should be paid full attention.
In the future market supervision, there are relatively big difference between US and ourcountry, first, the institution in charge of regulation is different, Second, we have no rules atthe legal level of future regulate, but due to high consistence of commodity futures prices ofcross-border interlocking, which is even higher that the stock market and fund market, thecommodity future supervision system is relatively mature. However, we should recognize the importance and complexity of the future derivatives, promote the Futures supervision law toissue quickly, so as to develop the financial derivative products actively and safely.
Due to the system problems, the financial crisis of US has been accumulated for somecertain time and the outbreak of it is sooner or later, but it is not Inevitable. Based on in-depthstudy of the causes of American financial crisis and the background of enhancement of thesecurities regulation system, the paper makes the suggestion of how to improve ours from themacro and micro prospects. Moreover, the paper suggests that, the risk of a financial crisisthat happens originally and singly in our country is low in our capital market, due to thestrictly requirement to be listed and the
listing approval system. Though we cannot prevent fraud definitely but the ratio is low,so that the probability of systemic risk caused by a exposure of fraud is very low.However, we should analyze the risks systematically and predictability. First, whether theindividual problem of an industrial can cause the group problem. For example, in2012, listedcompanies in the photovoltaic industry loss collectively, a company of the Small andmedium-sized plate went to liquidity risk and could not pay the interests of bond of a billion.If there were several such companies in the industrial, the confidence of investors woulddiminish in investing in some industrial or some kind of investment products(such asbond).Second, the impact on the stock index of major bad news by the big marketcapitalization company and heavyweights. For instance, in2012, the plasticizer problem ofKweichow Moutai, which is listed in Shanghai Stock Market, and the media false reportsabout Kangmei pharmaceutical, have caused the stock price go down in the same day and thefollowing several days, and also blow hardly to the whole industry, even though the problemshave been clarified lately. Think of that if the reports were true and concentrated in theindustry leading companies, whether it would produce a chain reaction.Third,if the short salesand stock index futures short mechanism may cause superposition.
Margin financing and stock index futures is a new thing in China's capital market, whichhas only existed for3years. There is a process for the investors and speculators to know it,and after that, if they become familiar about them, short sales and stock index futuresspeculation act together with the bad news released by the listed companies, may cause thestock index goes down deeply or not. Finally, since the bond market is not uniform, thebond rating agencies are not professional and the information disclosure platform are notunified, we may think of whether there will be a risk in some bond market of major industries.As mentioned above, the Photovoltaic listed company has3billions of bank debt, a billion oflisted company debt, and rating agency rated it AA when it issued bonds. Because of risk ofsuperposition,it would be extremely horrible if the company had applied for the issuance ofcorporate bonds at the national development and Reform Commission, the medium-termnotes at the people's Bank at the same time,So the unified platform of bond market information disclosure, the listing Corporation governance and the bond rating regulationare very important, since these are all factors that may cause system risk. We should be readyto face the crisis before it really happens,since crisis is not one hundred percent predictions.As a conclusion, the paper argues that securities regulation will become more and morecomplex, more challenging, we have to keeping learning, absorbing, summarizing,correcting, and improving in practice.
.
引文
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②《公司法》，2006年1月正式实施。
③中国证券业协会成立于1991年8月28日，属于自律组织。
①《现代经济学与中国经济改革》(Modern Economics and China’s Reform)，中国人民大学出版社，北京，2003年。
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②《关于修改<证券发行与承销管理办法>的决定》证监会令[2012]第78号
①《关于进一步深化新股发行体制改革的指导意见》（证监会公告[2012]10号）
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①《股票发行与交易管理暂行条例》（国务院令[1993]第112号）
②《上市公司收购管理办法》（简称《收购办法》），根据2008年8月27日中国证券监督管理委员会《关于修改<上市公司收购管理办法>第六十三条的决定》修订。
③《上市公司股东持股变动信息披露管理办法》证监会令[2002]第11号2002年12月1日起施行。
①全国人民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会：《中华人民共和国法律释义丛书——〈中华人民共和国证券法（修订）释义（2005年版）〉》，法律出版社2005，第125页。
②周正庆、李飞、桂敏杰主编《新证券法条文解析》，人民法院出版社，2006，第210页。
③全国人大证券法修改起草工作小组编：《中华人民共和国证券法释义》，中国金融出版社，2006，第125页。
①见中国证券监督管理委员会上市公司监管部编《上市公司高级管理人员培训教材》，中国金融出版社，2007年，第137页
①[日]河本一郎、大武泰南著：《证券交易法概论》（第四版），侯水平译，法律出版社2001年版，第88页
①周正庆、李飞、桂敏杰主编《新证券法条文解析》，人民法院出版社，2006，第220页。
①见《关于修改上市公司重大资产重组与配套融资相关规定的决定》（证监会令第73号）第一条。
①See House of Commons Hansard XXV(1844)277, Bishop Carleton Hunt, Development of the Business Corporation inEngland1800-1867,Harvard University Press in Cambridge, Mass,1936,p.95,footnote12.转自何美欢：《公众公司及其股权证券》，北京大学出版社1999年版，第85页。
②参见廖凡：“钢丝上的平衡——美国证券信息披露体系的演变”，《法学》2003年第4期。
①《上市公司信息披露管理办法》（2007年1月30日证监会令[2007]第40号）
①《证券投资基金》，中国证券业协会编，中国财政经济出版社，2012年版，第9-10页
①《证券投资基金管理暂行办法》（1997年11月5日国务院批准，1997年11月14日国务院证券委员会发布）
①《期货投资者保障基金管理暂行办法》（证监会令[2007]第38号），2007年8月1日起施行。
①姜洋主编.国际期货监管经验与借鉴[G].2011年
①姜洋主编.国际期货监管经验与借鉴[G].2011年
②姜洋主编.国际期货监管经验与借鉴[G].2011年
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①《证券法》，2006年1月正式实施。
②《公司法》，2006年1月正式实施。
③中国证券业协会成立于1991年8月28日，属于自律组织。
①《现代经济学与中国经济改革》(Modern Economics and China’s Reform)，中国人民大学出版社，北京，2003年。
①《关于深化新股发行体制改革的指导意见》，证监会公告[2010]26号
②《关于修改<证券发行与承销管理办法>的决定》证监会令[2012]第78号
①《关于进一步深化新股发行体制改革的指导意见》（证监会公告[2012]10号）
②马骁.《上市公司并购重组监管制度解析》.法律出版社.2009:P33
①《股票发行与交易管理暂行条例》（国务院令[1993]第112号）
②《上市公司收购管理办法》（简称《收购办法》），根据2008年8月27日中国证券监督管理委员会《关于修改<上市公司收购管理办法>第六十三条的决定》修订。
③《上市公司股东持股变动信息披露管理办法》证监会令[2002]第11号2002年12月1日起施行。
①全国人民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会：《中华人民共和国法律释义丛书——〈中华人民共和国证券法（修订）释义（2005年版）〉》，法律出版社2005，第125页。
②周正庆、李飞、桂敏杰主编《新证券法条文解析》，人民法院出版社，2006，第210页。
③全国人大证券法修改起草工作小组编：《中华人民共和国证券法释义》，中国金融出版社，2006，第125页。
①见中国证券监督管理委员会上市公司监管部编《上市公司高级管理人员培训教材》，中国金融出版社，2007年，第137页
①[日]河本一郎、大武泰南著：《证券交易法概论》（第四版），侯水平译，法律出版社2001年版，第88页
①周正庆、李飞、桂敏杰主编《新证券法条文解析》，人民法院出版社，2006，第220页。
①见《关于修改上市公司重大资产重组与配套融资相关规定的决定》（证监会令第73号）第一条。
①See House of Commons Hansard XXV(1844)277, Bishop Carleton Hunt, Development of the Business Corporation inEngland1800-1867,Harvard University Press in Cambridge, Mass,1936,p.95,footnote12.转自何美欢：《公众公司及其股权证券》，北京大学出版社1999年版，第85页。
②参见廖凡：“钢丝上的平衡——美国证券信息披露体系的演变”，《法学》2003年第4期。
①《上市公司信息披露管理办法》（2007年1月30日证监会令[2007]第40号）
①《证券投资基金》，中国证券业协会编，中国财政经济出版社，2012年版，第9-10页
①《证券投资基金管理暂行办法》（1997年11月5日国务院批准，1997年11月14日国务院证券委员会发布）
①《期货投资者保障基金管理暂行办法》（证监会令[2007]第38号），2007年8月1日起施行。
①姜洋主编.国际期货监管经验与借鉴[G].2011年
①姜洋主编.国际期货监管经验与借鉴[G].2011年
②姜洋主编.国际期货监管经验与借鉴[G].2011年
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