物流企业动态联盟的构建及收益分配契约设计研究
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摘要
随着物流需求的专业化、敏捷化和多样化发展,第三方物流市场竞争更加激烈,加之国外物流企业纷纷进入中国,我国第三方物流企业面临着严峻的形势。物流动态联盟为我国第三方物流企业的发展指出了方向,通过组建动态联盟可以提高企业的竞争力,实现资源的有效整合和信息的高度共享,为经济和社会带来效益。本文在前人的研究基础上,对动态联盟的构建和联盟收益分配问题进行了深入的研究。
本文引入了动态联盟这一新的战略管理理论,在分析了定义和特征的基础上,剖析了动态联盟形成动机、内部激励设计、及联盟稳定性,为下文的研究做好了铺垫。
然后,文中提出了物流动态联盟产生的背景,产生的必然性及现状,并且详细阐述了物流动态联盟的三种合作形式,即纵向合作、横向合作和网络化合作；三种支撑体系,即战略支撑体系、技术支撑体系和契约支撑体系；及联盟的三种模式,即资源整合、服务整合与组织整合。
继而,针对与联盟有着很大影响的信任机制进行了详细论述,包括信任的影响因素,我国物流动态联盟信任存在的问题等。影响联盟的另一主要因素是合作伙伴的选择,本文从原则、实力评价和合作可能性博弈分析三个方面来介绍了合作伙伴的选择。在此基础上给出了建立动态联盟的详细步骤。
随后,针对收益分配这一重要问题进行了理论铺垫。简要分析了收益分配的五要素和六项原则,之后运用模糊综合评价法对收益分配的有效性进行了评价。
最后,分析了主要的三种收益分配基本理论,在比较其优缺点的基础上给出了本文的收益分配模型,即基于时间价值、贡献和风险态度的收益分配模型,通过对模型的分析,得出如下结论：随着联盟持续时间的增长,成员努力程度增加；随着联盟成员个数的增加,成员努力程度降低。在本节之后通过数值分析证明了该方法的科学性与可操作性。
Along with the logistics demand of specialization, diversification and agility, the competition in logistics becomes more and more intense, moreover, foreign logistics enterprises enter into our country gradually, the third-party logistics enterprises in China are facing a serious situation. Logistics dynamic coalition points the third part logistics in the right developing direction. It can raise the competition ability of enterprises; realize the effective integration of resources and the high pooling of information eventually increase the social and economic interests. Based on previous research, the establishment of the logistics dynamic coalition and its profit allocation are investigated deeply here.
In this paper, the dynamic coalition and its characters were introduced in as a new management concept, and then the author dissected the incentive, motivation and its stability. This laid a foundation for the later researches.
Whereafter, the background and necessity for the establishment of logistics dynamic coalition were pointed out, following the present developing situation. It showed three collaboration formats, as followed, portrait, lateral and networking. It also showed three support systems, strategy support, and tech support and contract support. Besides, three coalition patterns were analyzed in detail, which were resource integration, service integration and organization integration.
In succession, trust mechanism was studied which was related to the alliance deeply, including its effect factors. In china, there are many problems blocking the logistics to generate trust, it gave the solutions in the following. The choice of cooperators is another important factor in alliance. This part was introduced in three portion, the principal for choosing, the estimating of their strength. Then, the process to establish the alliance was set forth in detail.
Afterward, in order to get the model of profit allocation the writer analyzed theory related with the allocation, that is to say, the element and the principal of allocation. By way of understanding the impact in the allocation system, it showed the appraisal system and then used the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation to estimate its impact.
At last, the new model was found after analyzing three more popular models and their advantage and disadvantage that is the model based on contribution, risk and the value of time. It extracted their advantage and avoided their disadvantage. The following conclusions were got through this model. First, the longer the alliance maintai(?) the harder its participators work; second, the less the enterprises take part in, the harder they work. In the last part of this paper, it proved the feasibility of the model through numerical analysis.
本文引入了动态联盟这一新的战略管理理论,在分析了定义和特征的基础上,剖析了动态联盟形成动机、内部激励设计、及联盟稳定性,为下文的研究做好了铺垫。
然后,文中提出了物流动态联盟产生的背景,产生的必然性及现状,并且详细阐述了物流动态联盟的三种合作形式,即纵向合作、横向合作和网络化合作；三种支撑体系,即战略支撑体系、技术支撑体系和契约支撑体系；及联盟的三种模式,即资源整合、服务整合与组织整合。
继而,针对与联盟有着很大影响的信任机制进行了详细论述,包括信任的影响因素,我国物流动态联盟信任存在的问题等。影响联盟的另一主要因素是合作伙伴的选择,本文从原则、实力评价和合作可能性博弈分析三个方面来介绍了合作伙伴的选择。在此基础上给出了建立动态联盟的详细步骤。
随后,针对收益分配这一重要问题进行了理论铺垫。简要分析了收益分配的五要素和六项原则,之后运用模糊综合评价法对收益分配的有效性进行了评价。
最后,分析了主要的三种收益分配基本理论,在比较其优缺点的基础上给出了本文的收益分配模型,即基于时间价值、贡献和风险态度的收益分配模型,通过对模型的分析,得出如下结论：随着联盟持续时间的增长,成员努力程度增加；随着联盟成员个数的增加,成员努力程度降低。在本节之后通过数值分析证明了该方法的科学性与可操作性。
Along with the logistics demand of specialization, diversification and agility, the competition in logistics becomes more and more intense, moreover, foreign logistics enterprises enter into our country gradually, the third-party logistics enterprises in China are facing a serious situation. Logistics dynamic coalition points the third part logistics in the right developing direction. It can raise the competition ability of enterprises; realize the effective integration of resources and the high pooling of information eventually increase the social and economic interests. Based on previous research, the establishment of the logistics dynamic coalition and its profit allocation are investigated deeply here.
In this paper, the dynamic coalition and its characters were introduced in as a new management concept, and then the author dissected the incentive, motivation and its stability. This laid a foundation for the later researches.
Whereafter, the background and necessity for the establishment of logistics dynamic coalition were pointed out, following the present developing situation. It showed three collaboration formats, as followed, portrait, lateral and networking. It also showed three support systems, strategy support, and tech support and contract support. Besides, three coalition patterns were analyzed in detail, which were resource integration, service integration and organization integration.
In succession, trust mechanism was studied which was related to the alliance deeply, including its effect factors. In china, there are many problems blocking the logistics to generate trust, it gave the solutions in the following. The choice of cooperators is another important factor in alliance. This part was introduced in three portion, the principal for choosing, the estimating of their strength. Then, the process to establish the alliance was set forth in detail.
Afterward, in order to get the model of profit allocation the writer analyzed theory related with the allocation, that is to say, the element and the principal of allocation. By way of understanding the impact in the allocation system, it showed the appraisal system and then used the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation to estimate its impact.
At last, the new model was found after analyzing three more popular models and their advantage and disadvantage that is the model based on contribution, risk and the value of time. It extracted their advantage and avoided their disadvantage. The following conclusions were got through this model. First, the longer the alliance maintai(?) the harder its participators work; second, the less the enterprises take part in, the harder they work. In the last part of this paper, it proved the feasibility of the model through numerical analysis.
引文
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[22]Bardi E J. Tracey M. transportation outsourcing:A survey of US practices[J]. International Journal of Physical and Logistics Management,1991(21):15-21
[23]Murphy Paul R,Richard F Poist. Third Party Logistics:some user versus provider perspective [J]. Journal of Business Logistics,2000,21(1):121-133
[24]Cooke JA. How to build a solid third-party relationship[J]. Logistics Management,1996(8):9-41
[25]Wei Shi Lim. A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2000(125):519-525
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[29]马士华、王鹏,基于Shapley值法的供应链合作伙伴间收益分配机制,工业工程与管理,2006(4)：43-45
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[32]李亚东、李从东,动态联盟收益分配中的风险机制研究,中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2006,01：52-55
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